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ABSTRACT
The Potosi Mita under Hapsburg Administration.
The Seventeenth Century.
(May, 1981)
Jeffrey Austin Cole, B.A., The University of Connecticut
M.A. , The University of Connecticut
Ph.D., The University of Massachusetts
Directed by: Professor Robert A. Potash
The mita was a draft Indian labor system that Viceroy
Francisco de Toledo developed in 157 3 for the silver
industry at Potosi (in colonial Upper Peru; current-day
Bolivia) . For a brief period the mita served, in
combination with the introduction of amalgamation
technology, stockpiles of previously unrefinable ore and
a large capital investment by the mine and mill owners
( azogueros ) to cause a boom in production.
By 1600, however, the stockpiles of ore had been
exhausted and the boom had given way to decreasing levels
of silver production at Potosi. The Indians who were
serving in the mita (mitayos ) had become more important to
the industry, because they were now the principal means of
obtaining ore, but their condition had deteriorated. As
X
their own profits fell, the Indians began to flee from
Potosi and from the provinces that were subject to the
mita. Their migration^ which was caused by tribute
requirements and other labor obligations as well, disrupted
the social, economic and political order that the Spanish
were trying to impose upon the Indians. Their method of
resisting the invaders was passive, but the Indians were
neither conquered nor submissive victims of the mita.
The group that was caught between the continuing demand
for mitayos at Potosl and the decreasing number of Indians
in the provinces was the caciques (Indian nobles) . They
were the key to the entire system, because they delivered
the Indians to the mines and the mills. At first the
caciques were able to meet their quotas by abridging the
legal restrictions on the recruitment of the mitayos . But
in the early seventeenth century they found themselves
fined for the growing number of Indians that they were
unable to deliver, and a new form of mita service was
founded: service in silver, ostensibly to hire substitutes.
By 1630, between one-third and one-half of the total
delivery of mitayos to Potest was made in money. The
azogueros used some of the silver they received from the
caciques for operating funds, rather than to hire laborers.
The mita therefore became a capital subsidy as well as
forced labor system.
The Hapsburg government of colonial Peru opposed the
xi
new form of mita service because it was an unauthorized
arrangement between the azogueros and the caciques to which
it was not a party. The crown's ability to counter the de
facto mita was restricted, however, by its isolation in
Spain, by the time that was consumed by trans-Atlantic
correspondence and by its own bureaucracy. The viceroys
who were stationed in Lima were plagued by similar problems,
and they depended upon the President of the Audiencia de
Charcas and the Corregidor de Potosi to administer the mita
on a daily basis. A constant interplay of personal and
professional jealousies among these officials, the
viceroy's reluctance to innovate and the contradictory
orders that were issued from Lima and Madrid complicated
the government's efforts to reform the mita to the point
of near-total ineffectiveness.
In 1670, the Viceroy Conde de Lemos determined that the
system could not be purged of the azogueros * misuse of mita
service in silver and the other abuses that stemmed from
it, and he proposed that the system be abolished. The
crown was reluctant to accept the loss of revenue that such
an act would have entailed, and instead it ordered a total
reformation of the mita . That program was executed during
the 16 80s, under the Viceroy Duque de la Palata. It too
failed, because it was based on an untenable premise: that
the Toledan mita could be re-established despite 110 years
of economic, political and demographic change in Peru.
xii
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
The mita was a draft labor system developed by Viceroy
Francisco de Toledo in 1573 to meet the labor requirements
of the silver mining center at Potosi. Indians from the
far reaches of Upper Peru were compelled to travel to
Potosi and serve a year working in the mines and refining
mills there. The system continued, with various
modifications, until it was abolished by the Cortes de
CSdiz in 1812. This study concerns the mita during the
seventeenth century, when Potosl was a jewel in the
Hapsburg crown."'"
Toledo designed the mita to meet the specific needs
and goals of his viceroyalty, including the consolidation
of royal dominion in a rebellious realm and the protection
of the crown's economic interests. Over the next century
and a quarter the Peruvian economy diversified, the
realities of silver production altered, and the demographic
landscape changed. In concert with those developments the
mita evolved, most often through local, extralegal,
adaptations. The mita of 1680 bore little resemblance to
that of 1580. The story of its metamorphosis, and of the
1
2Hapsburg government's efforts to administer the system,
shed an interesting light on the history of seventeenth
century Peru.
Historiography
Bitter debate swirled about the mita during most of its
239-year history. The system was identified by its enemies
as a form of servitude worse than slavery, and was accused
of depopulating the provinces subject to it. The mita 's
supporters denied that it was responsible for the
demographic decline in Upper Peru and defended draft labor
on the premise that the Spanish Empire depended upon PotosI
silver for its survival.
Despite its importance to the Black Legend-White Legend
controversy, the mita has not received the careful
2historical analysis it requires. Too often modern essays
have merely parroted the contemporary debates waged during
the colonial period. Only a few objective articles have
been written on the mita, and although some larger studies
have considered the system, no monograph has yet been
produced on the subject.
Modern study of the mita began with Jorge Basadre's
19 37 article, "El Rggimen de la Mita." Basadre scanned
the history of the system from 1573 to 1812 in forty short
pages. The PotosI mita, moreover, was only one of many he
discussed, for mitas were also established for other
enterprises that required large contingents of Indian
labor. While it was a pioneering study, therefore,
Basadre's article could offer only a glimpse of the
institution at Potosi."^
Basadre made a number of very important points. He
argued, for example, that the mita was merely one of many
factors that contributed to the depopulation of Upper Peru
during the colonial period. He also demonstrated that
Toledo did not create the mita, but institutionalized
labor practices which were extant upon his arrival in Peru.
Finally, Basadre showed a keen appreciation for the
difference between law and reality in his discussion of the
services the Indians performed for encomenderos
. But when
he described the PotosI mita, Basadre's argument became
rigid and considerably weaker. Evidence from the sixteenth,
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries was interspersed,
implying that the mita ' s form was static. Basadre relied
almost exclusively upon the Recopilaci6n de las leyes of
168 0 and viceregal memoirs for his information on the
mita. The use of those official sources resulted in a
4
sketch that was more of a blueprint than a portrait.
Many of the shortcomings of Basadre's "Regimen" were
overcome by Alberto Crespo Rodas in his 1955 article, "La
'Mita' de Potosi." Crespo was the first to limit his study
to the mita at Potosi, and he further confined his scope to
the institution during the seventeenth century. Using
manuscript documentation from the Archive General de Indias
(AGI) in Sevilla, Crespo began to add flesh to the "bare
bones" description that Basadre had presented some eighteen
years earlier.^
Crespo concluded that Basadre had been correct in
asserting that the population decline in Upper Peru was not
caused by mitayo death in the mines at Potosl. Instead, he
argued that the mita contributed to the social and economic
disruption of the region. Aware that this view might be
construed by some as an apology for the system, Crespo was
quick to point to the abuses—corporal and financial
—
endemic to the mita
. He argued, however, that the Indians
did not tolerate mistreatment and non-payment of their
wages, but fled from the mita, leaving their caciques to
bear the brunt of abuse. Crespo therefore introduced the
concept that the Indians were active opponents of the mita,
rather than passive victims of it.
Crespo has said that his research base was minimal;
that he used only enough documentation to suggest the form
of the seventeenth century mita . Nevertheless, his
investigation of the de facto mita, including the means
used by the Indians to protect themselves from abuses, was
an important contribution.
The Proceedings of the Sixth International Congress on
Mining (Le6n, 1970) included many valuable short studies on
the mita, or subjects closely related to it. Of particular
interest are Alberto Crespo's article on the recruitment
of mitayos
;
Juan Pgrez de Tudela y Bueso's essay on the
moral issues raised by the mita; and Ram6n Ezquerra
Abadla's survey of the problems that plagued the system
during the eighteenth century.^
Crespo's study reinforced the concepts that he had set
forth in his 1955 article. His comments on the provinces
from which the mitayos came, however, added a little more
detail to that earlier description. Crespo noted that the
provinces included in the seventeenth century mita were all
altiplano regions, sharing Potosl's high altitude and cold
climate. He argued that their selection by Viceroy Toledo
had been based on a contemporary understanding that changes
in altitude had very negative effects on the Indians'
9health. This would suggest that Toledo designed the mita
with an eye toward minimizing its impact on the Indian
population.
Juan P§rez de Tudela differed sharply with that
conclusion. He accused the Spanish crown of premeditated
cruelty in subjecting the Indians to mita service at
Potosl. Focusing on the sixteenth century, P^rez argued
that the demographic disaster in the Caribbean should have
been sufficient to convince the crown that mining was
deadly for the Indians . Forced Indian labor was permitted
in Peru, he said, because the crown pushed aside questions
of conscience in favor of riches. Hapsburg kings merely
pretended innocence by emitting lofty proclamations for the
conservation of the Indians, and later decrying any failure
to comply with their "wishes." Meanwhile, P§rez argued,
they assured non-compliance with their proclamations by
forfeiting real decision-making to local government
officials; they knew that their representatives in Peru
would yield to the pressures exerted upon them by the
mining interests there.
Pgrez de Tudela's article is an example of the recent
studies that have failed to escape the polemics of the
colonial debate over the mita. He is heir to a long line
of quasi-historians who have argued that there was a
conspiracy between the crown and its colonists to profit
from the extermination of the Indians. The conspiracy
approach is unrealistic, for reasons that will become
apparent below, and has been attacked with equal hyperbole
by David Pereyra and others ; Such studies are not the
products of objective investigations, and should not be
the bases of future scholarship. They do, however, suggest
topics worthy of greater attention: a) the relative power
of the crown and colonists to affect local practice; b) the
gap between legal ideals and reality, and the reasons for
it; and c) the relationship between government officials in
Spain and those in America.
Ram6n Ezquerra Abadla touched upon these topics in his
survey of the problems that were characteristic of the
eighteenth century mita. In a prefatory discussion of the
1600s, he described the mid-century battle between Hapsburg
officials and the azogueros (mine and mill owners) at PotosI
over abuses that had appeared in the mita—mistreatment of
^^^^Y^s and indios de faltriguera (money that the Indians
sent to PotosI to hire substitutes in their place, but used
by the azogueros for their own purposes)
. Ezquerra blamed
the deterioration of the mita on the effects of time and
the continual exploitation of the cerro. The azogueros
, he
said, had mistreated mitayos and engaged in fraud in a vain
attempt to protect their profits. The Indians, in turn, had
responded to the increased pressure on them by running
12
away
.
According to Ezquerra, a conflict over the mita was
also waged within the ranks of Hapsburg government. Most
officials believed that production at PotosI had fallen,
and abuses had appeared, because of mismanagement; that the
mita and production could both be restored to earlier levels
if government administration of the system were improved.
By the mid-seventeenth century, however, other officials
had come to argue that the mita was fatally flawed, or
obsolete, and should be abolished. The most serious effort
to extinguish the mita, led by the Viceroy Conde de Lemos
in 1670, was defeated by the crown's reluctance to live
without PotosI silver, and its belief that the system could
be revitalized. An attempt to regenerate the mita followed.
8under the direction of the Viceroy Duque de la Palata. it
too was unsuccessful, overcome by the opposition of
economic interests that were hurt by Palata 's reforms and
the lack of a consensus within the government . '"^ Clearly,
there was no colonist-government conspiracy to kill off the
Indians
.
While there has been no monograph on the mita
, it has
been treated within larger studies. One of the earliest
was Gwendolin Ballantine Cobb's dissertation, "Potosi and
Huancavelica. Economic Bases of Peru, 1545-1640"
(University of California, Berkeley, 1947) . Cobb briefly
considered the mita systems at both mining centers within
the larger context of silver and mercury production.
Because she conducted her research during World War II,
Cobb had to rely entirely upon secondary literature and
published primary sources. As a summary of that material
her dissertation is useful, but it is uncomfortably vague
at many junctures and includes some basic mistakes. For
example, Cobb said that "because of the weight of
unaccustomed heavy mine work the native population
14declined." This is undoubtedly true, but the degree to
which it is correct, and other factors that contributed to
depopulation, should have been noted. She also said that
the 1578 repartimiento de la mita for Potosi was Toledo's
first, when it was actually his third. "''^ These weaknesses
are understandable given the early date of the dissertation
and the circumstances under which it was written, it is
unfortunate that they were not corrected before the work
was published in Bolivia in 1977. '^
One of the better, longer, works on the question of
Indian labor at Potosl is Garrick Wilson Holmes' M.A.
thesis, "The Indian Miner in Colonial Potosl. Sketch for
a Study of Urbanization in the Andes" (Columbia University,
1959)
.
As an anthropologist. Holmes was concerned with the
reasons why a mining proletariat did not develop at Potosl,
and why Indians there did not work any harder than their
immediate survival required. He explored both mita and
"^inqa (volunteer) labor in his search for the reason why
the latter did not supplant the former. Holmes' focus was
on urbanization and acculturation as phenomena, but he
conceded that both processes would eventually have to be
studied within a chronological framework: ".
. . the
paradoxes of the process of Indian acculturation in Potosi
can be resolved only by relating that process to the
17general historical evolution of this remarkable city."
Holmes' thesis, like Cobb's dissertation, was based on
secondary and published primary sources. It was written,
however, with unusual imagination and insight. One is
especially struck by his consideration of the Indian as an
active element; building upon the lead of Alberto Crespo,
Holmes argued that the Indians were knowledgeable of the
value of silver, adult and quick to exploit economic
opportunities or evade oppressive obligations. His fresh
approach extended to the issue of population decline as
well. Holmes asked why the provinces failed to meet their
mita quotas, not whether the mita had caused their
depopulation. New questions always spark new answers, and
his investigation resulted in a long list of reasons; the
mita was only a minor factor among many. He postulated,
furthermore, that the lines of causality between the
failure to comply with mita quotas and depopulation ran in
both directions at the same time."*"^
Regrettably, Holmes did not pursue the questions he
raised in his thesis in a doctoral dissertation. His
little-known and under-utilized study was, nevertheless,
an important contribution to our understanding of Indian
labor at Potosi. It is now the historian's responsibility
to investigate the themes and subjects the anthropologist
has identified for him.
There has been no monograph on the mita largely because
of the amount of source material available on the subject.
One of the authors who might have been expected to write
such a work is Alberto Crespo. In his 1970 article,
however, he said that the volume of documentation was
simply too vast for him to consider a full-fledged assault
on the mita. Crespo lamented that he would have to content
19himself with accomplishing a little at a time.
Another historian from whom a monograph has been
11
expected is Marie Helmer. Over the years Helmer has
published a number of documents and brief articles about
PotosI, and she planned to write a comprehensive work on
the mita. Her outline proposed a thorough investigation
of the system for the entire colonial period. The promised
study has not appeared; the enormity of the task has
probably prevented its completion
.
Silvio Zavala has spent a lifetime compiling notes and
collecting documents on Indian labor in colonial Peru, and
he has published many books and articles on various aspects
of the Spanish-Indian relationship. During the last three
years his research notes on forced labor in Peru have
appeared in a three volume work entitled El servicio
personal de los indios en el Peru
, with one tome for each
of the sixteenth, seventeenth and eighteenth centuries
.
Zavala has drawn together many useful sources from Spain,
Peru and elsewhere in an exhaustive collection of
" extractos . " The volumes do not represent the long-awaited
monograph, however, but rather a chronological presentation
of notes, with commentary and synthesis kept to a minimum.
The result is a hybrid—something between a primary and a
secondary source—which is 'an extremely valuable research
22tool
.
The seventeenth century volume holds some traps for the
unsuspecting investigator. Zavala has employed a few
anonymous, undated, memoriales and relaciones in his section
on the 1601 and 1609 c§dulas that forbade Indian personal
service. The originals of some of those documents are in
the Archivo General de Indias, dated and signed fifty years
after the two cgdulas were issued. Scholars who use the
Zavala volumes must, therefore, take care to check the
ultimate source of the information they employ, especially
when the document in question has been dated by context.
The need for a monograph on the mita
, and for more
study of all aspects of Potosl's history, was clear in
D. A. Brading and Harry E. Cross' 1972 article, "Colonial
Silver Mining: Mexico and Peru."^^ Brading and Cross
applied Mexican-derived concepts to the Peruvian case to
demonstrate our relative ignorance of the latter example,
and issued a clarion call for more research in the Andean
area
.
Brading and Cross were puzzled why repartimiento labor
mining was replaced by volunteer labor in Mexico after the
middle of the seventeenth century, but continued at Potosi.
They hypothesized that the reason probably lay with the
differences in geography, geology and the nature of the
Indians who lived in the two realms. The authors also
noted that volunteer Indian labor did gravitate to Potosi
in the period before Toledo, and identified the mita as a
state subsidy that permitted silver production in Peru to
25
soar beyond that in Mexico. Like Holmes, however, they
could not understand why a class of Indian miners failed to
13
develop at Potosi.^^
In the ten years since the Brading and Cross article,
Potosi and the mita have attracted the attention of a small
group of investigators. Many of the themes suggested by
that essay, and earlier studies, have received in-depth
analysis, as scholars have begun to exploit the wealth of
documentation that is available. Research has been greatly
facilitated by the appearance of bibliographic and archival
aids by Gunnar Mendoza L., Lewis Hanke and Celso Rodriguez,
Rene Arze Aguirre, Mario Chac6n Torres, Josi Vazquez
Machicado and others
. These guides have been complemented
by recent editions of contemporary works by Bartolom^
ArzSns de Orsua y Vela, Luis Capoche, Juan de Solorzano
27Pereira and Vicente Canete y Domlnguez.
In their approach to the manuscript documentation,
investigators have chosen either to write limited studies
based on a small part of the source material, or broad
essays based on a sampling of sources. An example of the
first kind of study is the tesis de licenciatura by Teresa
Canedo-Arguelles Fabrega, "Efectos de Potosi en la
estructura de una provincia mitaya: Pacajes a mediados
del siglo XVII" (Universidad de Sevilla, 1976) . Using
manuscripts from the Escribania section of the Archive
General de Indias, Canedo-Arguelles delved directly into
the question of the mita ' s impact on the obligated provinces.
Like Crespo, she concluded that Indian flight, not death in
14
the mines, was the principal effect of the Potosi mita on
Pacajes. Indian flight, in turn, caused economic and social
disruption, and led to fundamental changes in the political
institutions of the province.
Of special interest is Canedo-Arguelles ' description of
the caciques ' role in the mita . The azogueros held them
responsible for delivering mitayos to Potosi, both in
person and in silver. The latter form of service, she
said, grew out of the fines levied by the azogueros when
caciques proved unable to meet their quotas in persons.
Mita service in silver was caused, in part, by the
depopulation of the province, for which the mita was
29partially responsible. In the case of Pacajes, therefore,
Holmes' suggestion that falling compliance with mita quotas
and depopulation were linked by causal ties in both
directions seems to have been true.
Canedo-Arguelles offered her thesis as one case study
from which questions and themes could be drawn for future
investigations. She noted that more such limited studies
would be necessary to construct a mosaic portrait of the
mita as a whole.
An example of the second kind of study is NicolSs
Sanchez-Albornoz ' 1978 volume, Indies ^ tributes en el Alto
3
1
Peru. The Potosi mita was discussed only briefly, but
the author made a valuable contribution by incorporating
source material from pleitos , informaciones and testimonies
in which Indians were witnesses. However altered by
translators and the form of questioning, these sources are
the closest we will come to the Indians' own story of life
under the mita and similar labor requirements
. One of
the most important sources was included by SSnchez-Albornoz
as an appendix: the questioning of capitanes enteradores
de la mita in 1690 by the Conde de Canillas, Corregidor de
Potosi.^^
SSnchez-Albornoz approached the issue of depopulation
in Upper Peru from a quantitative angle. He compared the
results of the 1573 and 1683 general censi conducted by
Francisco de Toledo and the Duque de la Palata,
respectively. Ten provinces were included in both counts,
and SSnchez-Albornoz
' comparison of the two censi suggested
a net population loss within them of 40 per cent, which he
considered modest. He said his findings lent credence to
Noble David Cook's conclusion that the southeastern section
of modern Peru, which included some of the more populous
niita provinces, suffered less population loss during the
colonial period than the remainder of the realm. "^^ S^nchez-
Albornoz' quantitative investigation shared the problems
inherent in numerical studies. Most importantly, he could
not adequately compensate for Indian migration within or
without the ten provinces. Fortunately, he understood the
limitations of his comparison, and cautioned the reader that
35his findings were highly tentative.
The studies described here have all touched upon the
PotosI mita or some aspect of it. Most have been concerned
with the demographic ramifications of the system. They
have also suggested a number of themes worthy of future
attention. For one, it seems evident that the mita did not
perform as it was designed, but changed with time,
interacting with developments at PotosI and in the
provinces. Second, there was no conspiracy between the
Hapsburg government and the colonists to exterminate the
Indians. On the contrary, the colonists and the
government competed with one another, and within their
ranks, for control of Indian labor. The Indians, moreover,
were as active as any group in protecting their interests.
With the number of interested groups involved in the
mita, the importance of considering the system both at
PotosI and in the provinces, and the amount of documentation
available on the subject, it is clear that no one study
could adequately address all of the issues involved for
the entire colonial period. Indeed, the most valuable
studies to date have been those that have limited their
scope and their conclusions to the materials upon which
they were based.
Fortunately, a number of investigations are either
currently in progress or have recently been completed.
Peter Bakewell is engaged in an overview of Potosi from
1545 to 1650, and will discuss the mita in an extensive
17
chapter on Indian labor. Brian M. Evans is applying his
skills as a demographer to an investigation of the general
census of 1683, and the concomitant issues of depopulation
and Indian migration. Enrique Tandeter has just completed
a dissertation on the late-eighteenth century mita, from an
economic perspective.^^ Catherine J. Julien is involved
with the "Re-use of Inca Recruitment Practices in the
Potosi Mita."^^ Finally, Ann Zulawski has begun work on a
dissertation that will consider competition for Indian
labor between PotosI and other sections of the Peruvian
economy during the seventeenth century. These studies,
by scholars from various fields, employing their respective
skills, give promise that a mosaic history of the Potosl
mita will soon be available.
Goals
, Sources and Methods
Where does this dissertation fit into the mosaic? I
hope that it will serve as the framework upon which the
pieces for the seventeenth century will be hung, or at
least as a guide to how they should be arranged. At the
same time, because this study covers a large segment of the
colonial period—it includes a background chapter on the
sixteenth century as well—it represents the first monograph
on the Potosl mita.
My research began with two very general goals: a) to
determine what the mita was really like; and b) to discover
18
the role of the Hapsburg government in its history. The
seventeenth century was chosen for a pair of reasons. The
first was the quantity and quality of available source
material. Eight legajos of expedientes on the mita, from
the period 1633-1700, were available on microfilm in the
University of Massachusetts, Amherst, Library (AGI, Charcas
266-273) Other major collections, principally the
records of the Audiencia de Charcas and the Cabildo de
PotosI, were accessible in the Archive Nacional de Bolivia
(ANB) and the Biblioteca Nacional de Bolivia (BNB) in
o 42Sucre. Manuscript materials were also consulted in the
Archive Hist6rico de PotosI (AHP) ; the Archive General de
la Nacian, Buenos Aires (AGN) ; the Archive General de la
Nacion, Lima (AGNP) ; and the Biblioteca Nacional del Peru,
43Lima (BNP)
.
Not only was there a sufficient amount of
documentation, it was diverse enough to permit a
multi-dimensional investigation. The microfilm was
particularly strong with regard to official correspondence,
and it revealed the processes by which government policy was
determined. The Archive Nacional de Bolivia held similar
material for the period 1600-1633, and the Archive General
de la Naci6n, Buenos Aires for the mid-1640s. The South
American archives also contained the pleitos
, testimonies
and infermaciones that provided insights into the mita as it
actually functioned, not as it was intended to function.
Silvio Zavala's volumes were another important source of
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information, for he summarized documents from the
Biblioteca Nacional in Madrid that I would not otherwise
have had available.
The second reason this dissertation is limited to
the seventeenth century is my desire to present the
multi-dimensional view of the mita that the documentation
permits. To attempt such a study for the entire colonial
period was unrealistic, given the amount of material, so
the period for which the sources were strongest was
selected. The time frame—a century—is still large
enough to allow the formulation of general conclusions
about the PotosI mita.
I have employed qualitative methodology almost
exclusively. Quantitative history serves best to test
the traditional view of a subject, and to raise new
questions. In this instance there was no traditional view
to modify, for the qualitative history had yet to be
written. Moreover, it became clear very early in my
research that the quantitative data produced during the
seventeenth century were highly biased. The groups and the
officials who produced the statistical material manipulated
it to enhance their own positions. The biases of those
who produced the figures had to be determined before the
data could be used. The quantitative evidence is abundant,
and available, and when it is used carefully it will add to
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our knowledge of the mita. But the qualitative history
had to come first, and although it may be out of fashion,
it was the goal of the present dissertation.
As the preceding discussion suggests, I hold no
illusions that this study will be the final word on the
PotosI mita. I intend to continue working on the subject,
including use of the quantitative data. I expect, however,
that this thesis will prove useful to other investigators
who are interested in a particular period in PotosI 's
history, or some aspect of the mita
. I have, therefore,
taken great pains to document my sources. Whenever
possible, I have included a summary of the manuscript
materials in the notes (see Table 1 for a list of the
abbreviations employed in them)
. The summaries are based,
in the case of the ANB and BNB,' on the MC catalogue
(described in Table 1) ; those for the AGNP, AHP and BNP
are from the card catalogues in those institutions; and
those for the AGI and AGN are taken directly from the
documents themselves (usually a secretary's abstract, on
the envelope). It is my hope that these citations will
aid other researchers in locating primary source materials
for their own investigations.
The notes are an important part of this study, but they
are also very long and detailed. I have chosen, therefore,
to include them at the end of each chapter. The casual
reader will not be distracted from the narrative, but the
more interested, or doubting, reader will still have them
21
close at hand.
The chapters that follow are divided by chronological
period, so that the metamorphosis of the mita may be
followed, as well as the Hapburg government's response to
its changing form. A summary is provided at the end of
each chapter. Chapter VIII ("Conclusions") will offer
general comments on the mita as a whole, and discuss the
implications of this dissertation for the history of
PotosI and of the Hapsburg dynasty's efforts to administer
its American colonies.
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AGI
AGN
AGNP
ANB
BNB
TABLE 1
ABBREVIATIONS EMPLOYED IN THE CHAPTER NOTES
Archive General de Indias, Sevilla, Spain.
Archive General de la Naci6n, Buenos Aires,Argentina. '
Archive General de la NaciSn, Lima, Peru.
C Cuaderno.
AHP Archive Hist6rice de Petes!
, Petesi, Belivia
.
CR Cajas Reales.
Archive Nacienal de Belivia, Sucre, Belivia.
ACh.LA Audiencia de Charcas
. Libres de acuerdos
C Audiencia de Charcas. Cerrespondencia
.
CRC Audiencia de Charcas. C^dulas reales.
Cepiader
.
EC Audiencia de Charcas. Expedientes.
M Minas
.
RC Audiencia de Charcas. Reales c§dulas.
Biblieteca Nacienal de Belivia, Sucre, Belivia.
CPLA Celeccienes particulares de manuscrites
,
Riick, Cabilde de Potesi. Libres de
acuerdes
.
Celeccienes particulares de manuscrites,
Riick, Manuscrites de Pedre Vicente
Canete
.
MSS
BNP Biblieteca Nacienal del Peru, Lima, Peru
MC Mendoza L. , Gunnar. "Gula de documentes en el
Archive Nacienal de Belivia y la Biblieteca
Nacienal de Belivia para el estudie de la
mineria en Belivia durante el coleniaje, anos
1549-1825." Unpublished typescript. Sucre, 1962
MOM Mendeza L., Gunnar. "Gula de decumentes en el
Archive Nacienal de Belivia y la Biblieteca
Nacienal de Bolivia para el estudie de la mane
de ebra minera durante el coleniaje, anos
1549-1825." Unpublished typescript. Sucre, 1962
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CHAPTER II
BACKGROUND: THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY
Before embarking on a discussion of the mita in the
seventeenth century, it is important to understand why the
system was established, what function it was designed to
perform, and how it actually worked during the sixteenth
century. The original mita is more than a point of
departure; it also serves as a backdrop against which the
changes of the subsequent one hundred years may be kept
in perspective.
When Francisco de Toledo founded the Potosl mita in
1573, it reflected the realities of the time. For a brief
period the system served, together with a new technology,
a massive capital investment and an abundance of high grade
ore, to cause a production boom at Potosl. Thereafter the
realities of silver mining changed for the worse, and the
nature of the mita began to change. By the turn of the
seventeenth century it was already very different from the
system that Toledo had established twenty-seven years
earlier
.
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Origins
When silver mining began at Potosl in 1545, the Spanish
experience in America was already fifty years old. in the
Caribbean, Mexico, and then Peru, conquest had quickly
given way to a struggle between the crown and colonists for
control of Indian labor. The Indies had proven more easily
conquered than colonized; royal sovereignty was more easily
claimed than exercised
.
Spanish kings and their officials had rewarded the
victorious conguistadores with grants in encomienda
. The
encomenderos received royal tribute in exchange for their
military, religious and jurisdictional supervision of the
natives. In the Caribbean they had forced the Indians to
work in their mining ventures. The crown responded in 1512
with the Laws of Burgos, restricting such activities, but
the royal prohibitions had little effect. Excessive work
combined with epidemic disease and other factors to
2decimate the native population.
With the conquest of Mexico, and later Peru, the Spanish
crown was provided with another chance at colonization.
Chastened by the Caribbean fiasco, and determined not to
repeat it, Charles I issued a royal cedula in 1526 that
prohibited forced Indian labor in mining, "because our
principal intention has always been, and continues to be,
that the Indians be spared such work so that they might be
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conserved
... and converted to our Catholic faith.
Royal protection of the Indians was based on more than
humanitarian concern for their survival and their souls.
Legal restrictions on the encomenderos ' use of the Indians
were also meant to protect the crown's economic and
political interests. Indian labor was the key to economic
gain in the colonies, and the encomenderos were busily
establishing themselves as feudal lords, with the Indians
as their serfs."* when Charles I identified the Indians as
his free christian vassals he hoped to discredit and
frustrate the encomenderos ' efforts to monopolize access
to their labor.
^
The crown was isolated temporally as well as
geographically by the Atlantic Ocean. It lacked both
armed force and the ability to respond to events quickly.
The use of legal sanctions was one of the few means at its
disposal in the battle with the encomenderos
. Another
method it employed was the encouragement of divisions
between soldados and encomenderos
, and between secular and
ecclesiastical interests. Intra-colonist conflict meant
recourse to the king's courts, and a role for royal
officials
.
Thus, despite their ineffectiveness, c^dulas concerning
Indian labor continued to appear. In 1536 Charles I
reiterated his earlier stand on the treatment of the Indians
in his orders for the Adelantado of Peru, Francisco
Pizarro.^ Pizarro had warned, a year before, that the
encomenderos would not give up the services performed for
them by the Indians, and bluntly suggested that royal
efforts to enforce earlier edicts would lead to armed
resistance.^ The King was not disuaded. His Queen
encouraged the Bishop of Cuzco to champion the Indians'
cause, and when Crist6bal Vaca de Castro was sent to
govern Peru in 154 0, Charles I ordered him to ensure that
the Indians did not work in the mines against their will.
A year later Vaca de Castro received yet another
directive confirming the contents of the 1526 cedula
, and
urging him to enforce that order.
^
Royal orders against forced Indian labor in the mines
did not mean that the crown wanted mining to stop. It was
very much interested in the continuation of mining
operations, for it received a percentage of production in
the quinto real (royal fifth) Thus, Vaca de Castro was
also instructed:
In those towns that are under our control, where
there are gold or silver mines, you are to determine,
with the governor and other government officials, how
best to exploit them, in a manner that will enrich
the royal treasury without burdening the natives.
This should be accomplished with all appropriate
diligence, as it is a matter of great concern to the
royal cause.
H
Charles I had a penchant for lofty goals and universal
dicta, but his directives were more than idealistic dreams.
12They were also part of his government mechanism. Because
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he was so far from Mexico and Peru, Charles could not hope
to rule them as he did Castilla.^^ Leaving the day-to-day
decisions to his representatives in America-and providing
them with the requisite authority-was necessary in a
pragmatic sense. Because he was removed from a direct
administrative role, the King had to make his orders more
forceful, even exaggerated, so they would have an impact
even after they were modified by local government officials.
In many cases, therefore, the original cgdulas took on the
outward appearance of inconsistency; orders for the
protection of the Indians were issued concurrently with
orders for increased mining output. '"'^
Juggling these diverse orders was the responsibility of
government officials in America. Their task was to
determine the true intentions of their king, and act
accordingly. For Vaca de Castro and his successors in
Peru, it was clear that protection of the Indians was
secondary to increased mineral production. The problem
was how to work the mines without forced Indian labor,
either by some means of persuasion short of force, or
through the use of imported Black slaves. "'"^ Vaca de Castro
interpreted his orders to mean that encomienda Indians
could voluntarily work in the mines of encomenderos other
than their own, as long as they were well-treated and
received food and shelter.
The New Laws of 1542 were another attempt by the crown
ions
c
s
to limit the exploitation of the Indians by Spanish
colonists. Indian personal service-tribute obligat
met in labor—for encomenderos was banned outright. The
encomenderos had come to enjoy the services of Indians in
their homes, while traveling and in any number of economi
enterprises. The language contained in the New Laws wa
bold and straightforward, a sign that the crown was
worried about the advances made by the encomenderos and
aware that its previous directives had been ineffective.
As with other legislation, the enforcement of the New Laws
was left to government officials stationed in Lima.^"^
By the time the New Laws arrived in Peru, Potosi had
been discovered, in 1544. The new mining center presented
a unique set of circumstances which required administration
tailored to its realities; lessons learned elsewhere would
have little meaning there. Potosi differed from other
mining zones primarily in geography and climate. Situated
4,000 meters above sea level on the Andean altiplano
, the
cerro was 1,000 kilometers from any large pre-hispanic
population center, and more than twice that far from Lima.
The countryside was barren, with little vegetation for
twenty-five kilometers in any direction."''^ Water was
scarce nine months of the year and torrential rains plagued
the remaining three. Extreme weather—cold, heat, wind and
19thunderstorms—was commonplace. Indeed, the environment
was so inhospitable that had it not been for the discovery
of silver, PotosI would have remained a desert. ^0
Geographical and meterological extremes were overcome
because the cerro held the largest, purest, silver lode in
history. 21 The Spaniards' craving for the metal was so
keen that they were drawn to Potosi like bees to honey. ^2
Indians arrived in even larger numbers; they were no less
appreciative of the value of silver. A year after its
discovery, a boomtown at the base of PotosI held 170
Spaniards and 3,000 Indians. Two years later, when the
villa of PotosI was officially founded, it residents
numbered 14,000 (the population of a European city of the
day)
For its sustenance, Potosi depended upon outlying valley
regions, such as Chuquisaca. Goods brought in from 100 or
150 kilometers away commanded astronomical prices, but the
profits of the early years made them nonetheless affordable.
As the villa 's population grew toward 100,000 souls,
transport and agriculture developed into lucrative support
24industries
.
During the early years at Potosi, the Indians
dominated every phase of silver production, as they did at
25Porco. Spanish efforts at smelting failed; their
European methods were frustrated by the altitude.
Conversely, Indian technicians using the pre-hispanic
guayra (wind oven) skillfully coaxed molten silver from
26the rich tacana ore. At one point there were as many as
36
2715,000 guayras in operation/^ Indian labor was provided,
in part, by yanaconas—Indian artisans who had been
displaced by the conquest and were free to come to PotosI.^S
Hatunrunas
-rural Indians who provided personal service in
lieu of tribute—worked in the mines as well.^^ other
Indians were sent by their caciques or encomenderos to earn
enough silver to pay their village's tribute quota. This
practice was eventually halted when the Indians failed to
return home after their period of service was completed.
Indian laborers at PotosI usually worked for Spanish
mine-owners in exchange for a percentage of the silver they
produced. The Spaniards' contribution to production was
therefore limited to their legal ownership of the mines,
and their determination to profit by them.^"^ Legal title
was no small factor, however, for in practice only the
Spaniards were able to fend off legal challenges and protect
their claims against interlopers in the courts.
The inhabitants of Potosl would come to be known not
only for their number, but for their bellicosity. Many who
came into the silver producing region were soldados who had
not received an encomienda and had no other enterprise from
which to derive their livelihood. These individuals
encouraged differences between rival groups of miners,
hoping to spark an armed confrontation during which they
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could rob and plunder.
Developments at PotosI, and in Peru generally, ran
counter to the letter and the intent of the New Laws. An
overzealous Viceroy Blasco NQfiez de Vela (1544-1546) tried,
nevertheless, to implement them without any modification
whatsoever. His actions provoked an armed insurrection in
1546 led by Gonzalo Pizarro. The Viceroy was killed, and
the realm lapsed into two years of civil war.^^ PotosI
was plundered continually by factions needing funds;
Gonzalo Pizarro's field commander, Francisco Carvajal,
took 700,000 pesos in just one raid.^^ m the end, the
royalist forces were able to quell the uprising, and
Pizarro and his comrades were executed.
Peace was restored under the direction of Pedro de La
Gasca, President of the Audiencia de Lima.^^ Hapsburg
officials had weathered the civil war, but they now had to
cope with the aftermath. The Indians had suffered death
and displacement, their agricultural activities had been
disrupted, and mange was epidemic among their llamas.
The condition of Peru demanded a cautious balancing of
royal intentions and local realities with regard to the
encomienda and Indian labor in the mines. Unbridled
execution of a crown order had led to violence once, and
might well again.
La Gasca sent Juan Polo de Ondegardo to Charcas in 1549
to establish tribute quotas and do whatever he could to
40limit the domination of the Indians by the encomenderos .
The President ordered Polo to enforce the crown's order
that no encomienda Indians be sent to the mines, and that
those who were already at PotosI be sent home/^ when he
arrived in the villa. Polo found seventy-two contingents
of sixty-five to seventy-five hatunrunas working in the
cerro, most of them from the altiplano
. m response to La
Gasca's order that they return home, the Indians claimed
that they were not working at PotosI against their will,
and that they would not return home. Their caciques balked
when Polo suggested that they had been manipulated by their
encomenderos in the formulation of their answers. The
caciques argued that the Indians were working at Potosi to
raise the money to pay their tribute, and that they were
much better off than their counterparts at home/^
In 1550, the crown reiterated its order that the
Indians were not to serve at PotosI against their will, and
that no encomienda Indians were to be sent to the mining
centers. La Gasca had returned to Spain to argue against
the earlier cgdulas banning personal service. Viceroy
Antonio de Mendoza (1551-1552) realized that enforcement of
such orders was virtually impossible. He delayed action on
the 1550 edict until he could send his son Francisco to
Potosi to investigate the situation there, and then to
Spam to argue against its execution.
When the Viceroy fell ill in 1552, the Audiencia de Lima
decided to comply with the crown's 1550 order. It drew up a
decree and presented it to Mendoza for his signature. He
refused, noting that La Gasca had gone to Spain to argue
against such measures; until the crown responded to his
positions, the Viceroy contended, no action should be taken
Despite Mendoza's opposition, the Audiencia published its
order, and just as the Viceroy had feared, the realm
responded with overwhelming opposition. Francisco
Hernandez Gir6n led a short-lived revolt that ended in
the deaths of 500 Spaniards and 2,000 Indians/"^
Antonio de Mendoza died in July of 1552, and the
Audiencia de Lima assumed command in his stead. Shortly
thereafter it received another cedula ordering an end to
personal service, but having learned its lesson, the
Audiencia chose to suspend the order. In 1554 the crown
conceded defeat and retracted its previous directives
45against personal service.
The goals included in the New Laws and the other
cgdulas were not discarded. They were put aside until
some future opportunity made their realization possible.
This shift in the crown's position is clear in the
instructions it provided the Marques de Cafiete in 1555.
As the new Viceroy of Peru, Cahete was ordered to do
whatever he could to end personal service and Indian labor
in the mines, but he was not to go so far as to provoke
another rebellion.
The crown yielded ground in other ways. In 1551 it
agreed to allow volunteer Indian labor in the mines, as
40
long as no encomendero
-miner employed his own Indians. Each
encomendero was to divide his Indians' tribute requirement
among their caciques on a pro-rated basis. The caciques
would then muster the Indians necessary to raise the silver
to pay their percentage. They, or their representatives,
would take the Indians to Potosl, where they would extract
the ore, refine it in their guayras
, and return home with
the silver.
^"^
This alteration of royal policy may seem minor, but it
carried important ramifications. First, the crown permitted
Indian labor in mining for the first time, overcoming its
earlier objections based on the Caribbean experience.
Second, Indians working in the mines to meet their tribute
quotas were no longer officially performing personal service
and were thereby removed from the struggle between the crown
and the encomenderos
. Third, it was now the caciques '
responsibility to force the Indians to work in the mines,
should force be required. Finally, the crown had given
ground and thus would bargain from a weaker position in the
future
.
Another royal concession came in a 1552 cedula that
permitted forced labor in activities which were in the
common interest. This determination was based on reports
from Peru that the Indians were the natural enemies of
work. The text of the order read:
lr.\r'
Iridians of that province [Peru] are proneto vice and do not care to work. Therefore theylack means and are poor. Be certain that lAdianofficials perform their duties; that those Indianswho have fields work them, others are to becompelled to work in public activities in thecountryside and the cities, but only with justice
moSrate!49 P^^-^^on that the work shall be
'
Mining was not included among the activities in which the
Indians could be made to work, but since the 1551 cedula
had already accepted Indian labor in the mines—albeit with
various restrictions—once service in the mines could be
construed to be in the common interest, then it would take
only a minor shift to extend the 1552 order to mineral
production.
Two other developments in the decade from 1555 to 1566
are important to note. The first is the ascension to the
throne, in 1556, of Phillip ii. The new King was more
concerned with royal finances than Charles I had been, and
less tolerant of those who questioned his sovereignty.
Charles may have allowed Bartolome de las Casas to publish
his Very Brief Account because of its usefulness in the
battle with the encomenderos
, but it would only have
appeared while he was on the throne.
Second, the Audiencia de Charcas (also known as the
Audiencia de La Plata) was founded in 1559. A high court
of appeals was placed within 170 kilometers of Potosi, the
realm's economic center of gravity. With the Audiencia 's
establishment, the Corregidor de La Plata was transfered to
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Potosi, bringing the villa under direct royal administration
for the first time. La Plata's dominion over Potosi was
lessened, however, when the villa 's residents purchased
their administrative independence from the crown for
79,000 assayed pesos
.
These developments were important because Potosi silver
production began to suffer severe problems during the
1560s, particularly from 1566 forward. Phillip ii's
approach to forced labor, the location of his government
officials, and his concern for royal revenue were all to
affect the government's response to the production crisis
at Potosl.
The high grade tacana ore, suitable for smelting in the
guayras, was depleted. Attempts to introduce amalgamation
processing—developed by Bartolome de Medina in Mexico in
1554—failed at Potosi because of the altitude. The
mines grew ever deeper, and the work done by the Indians
became more demanding. One visitor described the work
inside the cerro this way:
. . .
the work of descending and ascending in the
mines is very great, as the Indians have to retrieve
the raw metal and discarded rock and bring it to the
surface. There is no other way to extract the ore;
not in carts or any other fashion. All the weight
falls on the arms, because the ladders are made of
wooden bars joined with rawhide rope, and progress
is made from one bar to the next by pulling oneself
up by the arms. It is not difficult, even for one
who has not seen it for himself, to appreciate how
excessive this work is. Nevertheless, the Indians
are exceptionally skilled at it, and seem to do it
quite easily and happily. 55
The Indians' happiness with their tasks is questionable.
Their willingness to work in the mines depended upon their
personal profits. Deeper mines meant less ore produced in
a day and therefore less silver. Because the Indians
worked for a percentage of production, that meant less
profit for them. Many left Potosl to work elsewhere;
others remained in the villa
, but occupied themselves in
other activities. President Juan de Matienzo of the
Audiencia de Charcas wrote the crown in 1561 that of some
20,000 Indians living in Potosl, only 300 were working in
the mines—a dramatic decline from the 5,000 hatunrunas
counted by Polo de Ondegardo a decade earlier.
Meanwhile, Hapsburg administrators had grown accustomed
57to Potosl silver. Official production for the first
twenty years had exceeded 76 million pesos
. Royal guintos
were generally 300,000 to 400,000 pesos per year. As
contraband consumed one-half to two-thirds of actual
production, total output was probably double or treble
5 8that figure. By any measure, PotosI was the economic
backbone of Peru, and Peru was the most important financial
base of the Spanish Empire. Therefore, when a shortage of
labor developed at PotosI, it was of major concern to the
government, as well as to the miners.
Labor shortages were met elsewhere with Black slaves.
In the Caribbean, Brazil and lowland Peru, Blacks filled a
labor vaccuum in activities from sugar production to gold
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mining. 5^ At Potosi they were not a viable alternative.
The cost of their importation would have had to have been
carried by the miners, who were not economically prepared
to do so. The slaves would have had to have come from
Brazil via the Rio de la Plata and TucumSn, an illegal
channel of contraband to Buenos Aires. The crown did not
want to encourage traffic along that route. Blacks were
also thought to be physically unprepared to withstand the
rigors of Potosi 's altitude and climate, let alone the
work of carrying ore out of the mines on their backs.
Altiplano Indians, by contrast, were biologically adapted
to the villa's environment.^^
As the tacana ore ran out, Spanish miners hoped to
compensate for less and lower quality ore with more Indians,
but the Indians no longer cared to work in the Potosi mines.
Harder work for less profit held as little attraction for
them as it did for anyone. Their refusal to work was
portrayed by the miners, however, as laziness and a natural
aversion to gainful employment.
Government officials suggested various means to coerce
the Indians back into the mines. La Gasca and Gabriel de
Rojas proposed that all tribute be demanded in silver,
thereby forcing the Indians to work in the mines to obtain
6
1
the metal. The miners themselves, supported by President
Matienzo and others, pressed for some form of draft labor.
Matienzo noted that the crown had allowed for forced labor
45
in other endeavors by its 1552 cgdula.^^ Throughout the
realm tindarunas presented themselves at city plazas to be
hired for public works and for large agricultural
enterprises. The Indians called their periods of service
"mitas," recalling the Inca m^ita. Provisions for good
treatment and payment of the Indians, Matienzo argued,
removed their labor from the status of personal service.
The President asked Phillip n to permit the
recruitment of tindarunas for the mines at Porco and Potosl.
His proposal was prefaced by an unflattering portrayal of
the Indians as lazy, stupid, enemies of work. Matienzo
said it was not only legitimate to compel them to work-
provided that they were paid and stayed close to home—the
crown and its officials were obligated to force them to
work, for their own benefit and that of the public good.
He dismissed any doubts based on the dangers of mining with
promises that tunnels (then under construction) and new
ladders would improve conditions significantly.^"^
Matienzo suggested that one-tenth of the Indians in
Charcas, Chucuito and the Collao serve both at Potosi and
at Porco. Some would work in the mines and receive three
tomines per day in wages; others would work in support
activities and earn less. Because of the distance from
their homes to Potosi, the Indians would remain in the villa
for a year and then return home, to be replaced by another
contingent. Some 1,500 Indians would be sent to Potosi, and
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another 800 to Porco.^^
The President of the Audiencia de Lima, Lope Garcia de
Castro, sent a similar proposal to the crown in 1565, after
the 1552 cgdula and another edict of 1563 had softened the
crown's earlier opposition to personal service and Indian
labor in the mines. He argued that forced labor would only
be a temporary measure, and would soon be unnecessary. The
Indians could be made to work, he added, as long as they
were treated well, and enjoyed a profit.
Nevertheless, the crown turned down Matienzo's request
for permission to import Indians from Cuzco and Chucuito in
a 1566 cedula. The distances involved, reports of harsh
working conditions in the mining centers, and falling
silver production at Potosi may have been responsible for
the denial. The language of the order offered little
explanation
:
In reference to what you [Matienzo and the
Audiencia as a whole] say about the mines of PotosI
and Porco needing Indians and able persons to assist
in their exploitation; and that many Indians could bebrought from the provinces of Cuzco and Chucuito,
which could be of great significance to the royal
quintos and the general good, of Spaniards and
Indians alike—here it has appeared that it is not
convenient to do so, for it is against our royal
intention; therefore, you should guard and ensure
compliance with our previous cedulas and provisions
on the subject, without any novelty whatsoever . 67
Whatever the reason for the crown's refusal to allow the
importation of Indian laborers from around Lake Titicaca,
the answer was "no." The issue was not dead, however.
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AS a matter of fact, there was already such a system
in place at Huamanga. m 1562 Polo de Ondegardo ordered
the caciques of that province to provide him with 700
Indians. These were distributed among local miners each
Monday, at a central plaza, for periods of one week at a
time. On Saturday the Indians were paid directly by the
miners for their weeks' labors.
When Phillip II assembled a junta in 1568 to consider
means "to centralize royal authority and make it more
effective, and to increase substantially the flow of
revenue by stimulating the production of precious metals,"
the question of draft labor for Potosl was raised again.
Francisco de Toledo was a member of that junta, and soon
thereafter he was sent to Peru as Viceroy.
Viceroy Francisco de Toledo
• Toledo arrived in Peru in 1569 with a clearly defined
mission: to establish crown dominion in an unruly realm
and to organize all aspects of revenue production. His
instructions concerning Indian labor in the mines read:
Presupposed that the mines of Peru cannot be worked
by Spaniards, for those who are there will not work
in them voluntarily; and it is said that slaves
cannot work in them either, owing to the nature and
coldness of the land; and thus it is necessary to
occupy Indians--while these are not to be forced
nor compelled, as had already been ordered, they
must be attracted with all just and reasonable
means, so that there will be the required number of
laborers for the mines. To this end, it appears
that great care must be given to the aggregation of
48
^^""it
°f Indians in nearby towns andlandholdings, so that they might more eas??v aoolvthemselves to the work involved.
ily pp y
The Indians were to be well-paid and well-treated; they
were to work reasonable hours; and they were not to be
detained once their shift had been completed. Good
conditions and ample profits would ostensibly attract
the required number of Indian laborers; the use of force
or compulsion was specifically banned.
The solution of Potosi's problems was only one part of
a comprehensive viceregal program. Central to Toledo's
effort was the final legitimization of the Hapsburg claim
to sovereignty in Peru. Indeed, the conquest was still
incomplete, for Manco Inca continued to hold out. Not
until 1572 were the forces of Vilcabamba finally
72
overcome.
Toledo confirmed the crown's right to rule Peru with
a three-pronged campaign. "First, he inspired the
composition of a treatise against Las Casas; second, he
embarked upon an investigation of the justice of Inca rule
by collecting the so-called Informaciones ; and finally, he
arranged for the preparation of a 'true' history of Peru's
past by Pedro Sarmiento de Gamboa." The Incas were
deemed usurpers and tyrants; the conquest had freed the
Indians and brought them the true faith. Divine
Providence, Sarmiento de Gamboa determined, had guided
74Peru into the care of the Spanish crown.
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Concurrent with the consolidation of Spanish
sovereignty was the replacement of the Inca life-style with
a more hispanized existence. A general census, conducted
by Toledo, found 1,067,696 Indians within 614 ayllus
(excluding the areas of the Rio de la Plata, Chile, Quito
and Tucuman)
.
Of these, 277,697 were able-bodied men
subject to tribute. The Indians were settled in new
villages to facilitate control, collection of tribute, and
religious instruction. Members of one or more ayllus
were settled in one of two parcialidades—hanansaya and
hurinsaya—and each parcialidad was governed by an Indian
gobernador and other caciques
.
The settlement of Indians in new villages had been
proposed by La Gasca as early as 1550 and was underway by
1567, but under Toledo the program became extensive
.
This pattern was characteristic of his viceroyalty—the use
of extant policies and practices in a larger, more organized
fashion.
Another of Toledo's goals was the eradication of the
encomienda
. The crown continued to fret about the prospect
of feudal kingdoms headed by the encomenderos
. Previous
efforts to control them had enjoyed very little success.
Toledo's approach centered on the direct administration of
the rural provinces with correqidores de indios . These
officials were assigned the administrative, jurisdictional
and fiscal duties previously left to the encomenderos. The
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Viceroy Marques de Canete (1556-1560) had been the first to
try to introduce corre^idores de indios, but the opposition
of the encomenderos had forced him to recall all but those
for Chucuito and Chincha. m 1565, Governor Garcia de
Castro revived the idea, and despite little headway, the
program was ongoing when Toledo arrived in Peru. Under his
leadership, corregidores were again sent to all corners of
the realm. Toledo named prominent soldados to the
newly-created posts, thereby using the encomendero
-soldadn
rivalry to further the government's aims.^^
All of these programs were carried out during Toledo's
entire viceroyalty. There was little doubt that the crown
supported each of them. The solution of the labor shortage
at Potosl was more troublesome. Toledo, like his
predecessors, found himself faced with a dilemma: the
crown wanted work in the mines to be voluntary and paid,
but the lack of Indians willing to hire themselves out
made force labor appear to be unavoidable.^^ Subtle means
of persuasion had not been sufficient. In October, 1570,
the Viceroy called a junta in Lima to consider the pros and
cons of a forced labor system for Potosi. In the group
were the Archbishop of Lima, Ger6nimo de Loaysa; the Dean of
Lima, Pedro Muniz; and President Juan de Matienzo. It said
. . .
that legitimately, and without injury to the
Indians, His Majesty, and in his name his viceroy,
could compel the Indians, in a determined number,
to work in the mines at Potosi and elsewhere in
Peru, given certain provisions for their good
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anrSer^tfS!io^^" ^'^^'^^ compensation.
The junta's decision reflected the terms of the crown's
earlier position on forced labor for non-mining ventures.
The extension of its provisions to Potosl may well have
been facilitated by Matienzo's argument that the Indians
were already working in any number of legal and illegal
activities for the colonists, and that their labor would
better be employed in service to the crown.
Despite the junta's determination, Viceroy Toledo
embarked upon a five year visita of Peru still bothered
by doubts about forced labor. At Huamanga he found
Polo de Ondegardo's system going strong. Impressed by its
success, he consented to its continuation, but added
ordinances for good treatment, adequate payment, and
religious instruction of the Indians; and exaction of royal
quintos—to bring the system into line with the junta's
8 3
ruling. By the time he left Huamanga, therefore, Toledo
was not only armed with the junta's assurances that
draft labor at Potosi would be justified, he had also seen
a smaller system at work.
While Toledo was in Cuzco, developments at Potosi took
a dramatic turn for the better. Pedro Fernandez de Velasco
perfected a patio (amalgamation) process that overcame the
difficulties presented by Potosi 's elevation. Toledo
called him to Cuzco to demonstrate his method; encouraged
52
by the results, the Viceroy moved on to PotosI, arriving
in December of 1572.^^
once in Potosi, Toledo's attention was immediately
drawn to the large piles of desmontes left by twenty-eight
years of mining. These were composed of ore that had eluded
the 2ua^'s capabilities, but was suitable for amalgamation
processing. Toledo believed that the combination of
desmontes and quicksilver ensured the rejuvenation of silver
production at PotosI. The potosinos were not so certain.
Their reluctance to commit themselves and their capital to
the construction of mercury-using mills was linked to the
labor question. Technological gains, and available
stockpiles of ore, were of little value unless there were
Indians to work in the mines and mills.
Any remaining doubts that Toledo had about forced labor
were removed by the promise of fabulous production and his
need to persuade the potosinos to build the requiste mills.
The Viceroy entered into a pact with them: they would build
the mills at their own expense; he would provide mercury
and guarantee an Indian labor force, both at reasonable
cost. For its part the government would receive one-fifth
of the silver produced, a profit on mercury sold in the
villa, and other tax revenues. Mill and mine owners (who
would come to be known as azogueros ) would keep four-fifths
p r
of production less costs.
Toledo assured the government a means of controlling
production at PotosI with a royal monopoly on mercury.
He considered claiming exclusive rights to the desmontes
.
but opted for mercury because he felt it would be more
easily monitored. Royal orders to find mercury deposits
in Peru had followed the invention of the amalgamation
method, and they had led to the discovery and exploitation
of Huancavelica after 1566. The Viceroy expropriated the
mines there and he prohibited the production of mercury
elsewhere in Peru.^^
Toledo's guaranteed labor force meant the establishment
of the mita at Potosl. He did not create the system; nor
did he resurrect an Inca one. Rather, he marshaled the
ideas and practices which were extant upon his arrival.
Toledo's mita was a descendent of the Inca m'ita
, but via
the systems that required hatunrunas and tindarunas to
work for the Spaniards. The Viceroy's system followed
the proposals of Juan de Matienzo closely, and it resembled
the system founded at Huamanga by Polo de Ondegardo.
The first repartimiento de la mita for Potosl was
9
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drawn up in 1573. Toledo noted that the Indians had
been accustomed to serving one year shifts at Potosl, but
had stopped doing so when the tacana was depleted. He
now obliged their caciques and corregidores to send them
once again, and he based each province's quota on its
pre-hispanic population. Some 1,300 Indians were required
from the provinces around La Paz; 500 were to come from
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Chucuito; and various other amounts for provinces as far
away as Canas y Canches, and as close as Porco. The regions
so obligated shared Potosl's altitude and climate. They
were the closest to the villa that were also under crown
control. other provinces that were on the frontier with
unconquered Indians, or of lower elevation, were spared.
A total of 4,300 mitayos were brought to PotosI to swell
the ranks of 4,200 resident Indians, hatunrunas who had not
returned home, and 900 yanaconas
. Of the mitayos
, 3,738
were assigned to work in the mines and the mills, in three
shifts of 1,430 at a time." in addition, the Corregidor
de Potosi was empowered to assign up to 1,000 Indians
more to those who required their assistance, on the premise
that the profits generated by amalgamation processing would
cause them to work gladly. The remainder were free to rest
or engage themselves in personal enterprise
.
Toledo then went to La Plata, where he drew together
and published his ordinances in 1574. When he returned to
Potosi, he was confronted by caciques complaining that the
Corregidor was assigning more than the 1,000 Indians he
was permitted, and not on a pro-rated basis. The azogueros
preferred some Indians to others, and while some groups
found themselves working constantly, others were left idle.
The caciques argued that the one-third fraction should be
strictly enforced, and that the number required from each
province should be based on the census conducted by Toledo
during his visita. 95
In response to the increased demand for mitayos
, and
the problems identified by the caciques
, Toledo devised a
second repartimiento de la mita in 1575. This time he drew
varying percentages of Indians, based on his census, from
the provinces, depending upon their distance from Potosl.
Seventeen per cent was required from the region around
La Plata; 16 per cent from around La Paz; 15 per cent from
the vicinity of Cuzco; and 13 per cent from Canas y Canches.
Within each of three shifts, 615 Indians were assigned to
labor in the mines and 2,498 to the mills, either in
construction or refining. Others, assigned to support
activities, brought the total to about 4, 000.^"^
Two years later, with some of the mills having been
completed and others abandoned, some azogueros required
more mitayos while others no longer needed them. A third
repartimiento was drafted, this time in Lima. Toledo based
the distribution of mitayos on information provided by
local government officials and individuals, including the
results of a thorough visita conducted by Matienzo in
981577. The mita gruesa (total) grew to 14,296 Indians,
with three mitas ordinarias (shifts) of 4,426. To meet
these larger numbers the provinces of Paucartambo,
Chumbibilcas and los Collaguas were added. Uros were now
obligated to serve at 11 per cent, but with the provision
that two serve for every one assigned—Uros were very
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uncooperative. Within each of the mitas ordinarias
. 1,119
Indians went to the mines; 3,073 went to the mills; and the
remainder were assigned to deserving soldados, most of them
at Porco.l°° The 1578 repartimiento de la mita was revised
in 1580, after irregularities in the distribution had
become apparent, but the changes were never implemented
.
Toledo's priority was on providing ample numbers of
Indians to work at PotosI, but he was also concerned that
the mita be attractive to the Indians. ordinances
governed almost every aspect of mita service. Mitayos were
to serve one year, after which they would return home.
While in the villa a mitayo would work one week and then
receive two weeks rest. Each Monday those included in the
^^ta ordinaria were to present themselves at Guayna (a
smaller hill at the base of the cerro) for distribution.
That afternoon they would ascend to the mines or go to the
mills. Work would then continue until Saturday evening,
when the mitayos would be paid their wages for the week.''"^^
Indians in the mines would earn three and one-half reales
per day; those in the mills, two and three-quarters
104 105reales. No quotas were allowed. Half-wages were to
be paid for every day of travel from the home province to
^ 106Potosi, based on a fixed number of leagues per day. In
the villa ^ Indians were to live in their province's
rancherla ; segregation was meant to protect them from the
107designs of Spaniards , mestizos , Blacks and others
.
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Two veedores and an alcalde de minas were to assist
a eroteotor de naturales and capltanes de la mita in
overseeing work in the ™ines and mills, and ensuring that
the mitayos were not mistreated. "^^^
The Indians were provided with other incentives. They
were taught the patio process; and one-third of the ore
suitable for smelting in guayras was to be distributed to
them, so the art would not be lost and their profits would
be augmented. The right of capcha permitted the mitayos
to work the mines for their own benefit from Saturday night
to Monday morning. The ore they produced, and that which
they secreted out of the mines during the week, was traded
in the 2hatu plaza. This traffic in raw silver came to be
known as rescates and was the exclusive domain of the
Indians. -"--^^
Mitayos from Cuzco or Chucuito had to travel for two
months, and walk well over 1,000 kilometers, to reach
Potosi. They had willingly covered the distance in earlier
years, when great profits awaited the end of their trek.
Wages, travel allowances ( leguas ) , capcha rights and
rescates were all meant to restore the economic incentive
for the Indians to come and work at PotosI again."'""'""''
The responsibility for delivering a province's quota
of mitayos lay, according to Toledo's design, with the
corregidor of the province. The Corregidor de PotosI, in
turn, was in charge of the overall entero (delivery; also
58
compliance)
.
m practice, however, the correcridores held
caciques accountable, for while they had little real power
over the Indians, the caciques were quite effective. The
caci^ occupied a focal position, where the Spanish and
Indian republics intersected, and they were the crucial
link in the mita 's delivery mechanism.
The importance of the caciques ' job stemmed from the
communal nature of the mita. it was the obligation of the
parcialidades and villages, not of individual Indians.
As the size of the resident population changed, usually
downward, the mita quota remained the same, until the '
viceroy could be persuaded to conduct a revisita
. Thus,
when the number of Indians in a village declined, the
pressure on the caciques in that village to meet their
obligations increased.
Throughout the 1570s, and especially after 1575, the
combination of desmontes
,
mercury and mitayos met all of
Toledo's expectations, and Potosi enjoyed a renaissance.
When Matienzo visited the villa in 1577, he marvelled at
the transformation that had taken place. The Spanish
population of Potosi had increased ten-fold from 200 to
2,000; the number of Indians now exceeded 20,000. The
azoqueros
, the Indians and the crown were all making
handsome profits, thanks to the Toledan production
formula.
Despite the rebirth of Potosi, the mita was opposed
from the outset-by those who competed with the mining
center for Indian labor. An increasing number of Spaniards
in Peru combined with a declining number of Indians to
create a fierce competition for their services. Among the
azogueros' competitors were the encomenderos
. priests,
"^^^^^^^ obraje owners, and the same corregidores and
caciques who were responsible for compliance with mita
obligations. These groups were joined in their opposition
to the mita by the Audiencias of Lima and Charcas. The
Lima court had been infuriated by Toledo's expropriation
of Huancavelica, for its members had been interested
parties there. The Audiencia de Charcas was involved in
agricultural activities in Chuquisaca and had been denied,
by Toledo, any interest in mining whatsoever . "'"'^
The voices of opposition, therefore, reached the crown
via official and private correspondence. The evils of mita
service were exaggerated by its enemies, while its role in
the rejuvenation of PotosI was downplayed. These
manifestations were effective enough to prevent confirmation
of the mita by the Council of the Indies and the crown,
despite Toledo's continual requests for approval. The
Viceroy told the Council in 1576, after it had undertaken
an investigation of the system, that without the mita there
would be no PotosI, and without Potosi no Peru. In 1578
he challenged the crown to consider whether it was prepared
to do without the income it received from Potosi. The
council never countermanded the Viceroy, but it refused
to grant him royal affirmation of his actions. Toledo
reiterated his reasons for establishing the PotosI mita
in his memoriales (1581) :
It has been necessary on the one hand to make theIndians work, so they will not be lazy ... andon the other to regulate and increase their wagesand ensure the payment of them ... and to makeknown who is to distribute the Indians to theselabors. In the past, audiencias, corregidores
,
treasury officials and alcaldes
-and even thP Lm^
encomenderos who benefit from their service—havedone this. They have done so without title fromHis Majesty
. . . they have taken those theydesired, and paid what they liked—often nothing
at all. To end such practices it was necessaryfor me to prohibit the assignment of Indians by
anyone but the viceroy, in the name of His MajestyTo do this, a record was made in all the realm and
cities of it, of the quantity of Indians in eachprovince, and those that could with the least
trouble come and serve in the cities and mining
centers.
Clearly, Toledo felt he was bound by the need for forced
Indian labor, but the sentiment that is strongest in this
statement is the belief, noted earlier with regard to
Matienzo, that forced labor was a reality, and one that
should be turned to the advantage of the crown . "'"'"^
The question arises whether the mita was necessary at
all. Given the profits generated by mercury and desmontes
would enough volunteer labor have gravitated to Potosi as
it had earlier? The mita was necessary, first as an
incentive and guarantee for potosinos— so they would build
the mills and commit themselves to silver production on a
long-term basis. Second, one-third of the mitayos worked
in the mines as apiris, producing ore to supplement the
desmontes; others were used to build the mills, while
there were sufficient numbers of Indians in Potosl before
Toledo arrived to meet the miners' needs, they were not
willing to work as apiris for the wages they received.
The mita served other functions as well. it was also
a recruiting mechanism. As Indians came to Potosl in the
mita, many found that the opportunities for individual
profit had been restored and stayed on after their year
of service was completed. Others fell into debt and were
forced to continue working as debt-peons
. The number
of mingas at Potosl was increased through both these means.
^^^^yQ^ ^Iso brought products from their home provinces to
sell or trade at Potosi. The mita was therefore important
to the commerce of the villa . ''""'^
The role that the mitayos increasingly came to play,
once the desmontes began to dwindle, was as apiris
. Juan
de Matienzo observed that the desmontes were already gone
when reported on Potosi in 1577. The Indians were then
removing piles of discarded ore from within the cerro for
120refining in the mills. The one-third of the mitayos who
were originally assigned to the mines was gradually expanded
during the next two decades until nearly all of them were
compelled to work in the cerro . Mingas assumed their places
1 ? 1outside, but they refused to serve as apiris
. The
seventeenth century would bring still more changes.
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Ten years after Toledo had first set foot in Peru,
Potosi was an industrial center. Everything from the
extraction of ore to the minting of silver coins was
performed there. introduction of amalgamation
processing had saved Potosi; the desmontes
, mercury and
the mita had fueled a spectacular increase in silver
production. Industrialization gave birth to a series
of fundamental changes. The first was the marriage of
Potosi with Huancavelica. Silver production was now
dependent upon adequate supplies of quicksilver; and a
mercury lifeline was created, overland from Huancavelica
to Chincha, by sea to Arica, and overland again to
Potosl.-'-^'^
Second, the azogueros were now interested in the Potosi
125mines on a long-term basis. They had invested 3 million
pesos in the construction of 132 mills. "^^^ As property
owners, the azogueros were no longer low-investment,
low-risk miners, but businessmen with interests to
^ 4.
127protect
.
Third, production was now dependent on water, and
subject to vacillations in a climate notorious for its
128
all-or-nothing rainfall. Reservoirs were built to
minimize the effects of nature, but these came at a high
cost: 300,000 pesos for Cari cari and San Pablo alone;
129
and 280,000 pesos for five other lagunas .
Fourth, and the effect that is most significant.
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control of production was removed from the Indians.
Despite all their perquisites, the Indians were now merely
wage earners. Silver production was now controlled by the
crown and the azogueros
. Removed as interested parties,
the Indians were nevertheless crucial to continued
production at Potosi. The crown and the azogueros relied
on the caciques to deliver mitayo laborers. The Indians,
however, would cooperate only as long as their wages,
capcha rights and rescates were sufficient to compensate
them for their hard work, when the Indians' profits fell
for a second time, they would have little reason to comply
with their mita obligations. When that happened, the
crown, the azogueros and even the caciques would discover
just how difficult it was to force them to work.
1580 to 1600 ; The Mita after Toledo
The problems that plagued the mita in the seventeenth
century began during the 1580s and 1590s. As soon as the
desmontes were exhausted, and the boom of the 1570s ended,
weaknesses in the mita ' s design began to manifest
131themselves. Silver production fell markedly and
compliance with the mita fell with it, each feeding on
the other. The Indians and the azogueros reacted to the
changing circumstances by protecting themselves as best
they could. Hapsburg officials, in turn, responded to
their actions in a vain attempt to maintain some degree of
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control over the situation.
Without the desmontes, the mills had to rely entirely
on newly-mined ore. More and more mitayos were forced to
enter the mines. The one-third formula used by Toledo
yielded to three-quarters and more.^^^ ^^^^^^^ ^^^^ ^
critical element in the production formula; but their
increased importance was accompanied by worsening working
conditions
.
The mines plunged deeper, the work grew respectively
harder, and accidents became more common. Indians were
buried in cave-ins, they suffered broken limbs in falls,
and a respiratory disease—pneumoconiocis--became an
133occupational hazard. Father Acosta described life
within the cerro this way:
They labor in these mines in perpetual darkness, not
knowing day from night. And since the sun never
penetrates to these places, they are not only always
dark but very cold, and the air is very thick and
alien to the nature of men, so that those who enter
for the first time get as sick as at sea—which
happened to me in one of these mines, where I felt
a pain at the heart, and a churning in the stomach.
The miners [apiris ] always carry candles to light
their way, and they divide their labor in such a
way that some work by day and rest by night and
others by night and rest by day. The ore is generally
hard as flint, and they break it up with iron bars.
They carry the ore on their backs up ladders made of
three cords of twisted rawhide joined by pieces of
wood that serve as rungs, so that one man can climb
up and another man down at the same time. These
ladders are twenty meters long, and at the top and
bottom of each there is a wooden platform where the
men can rest, because there are so many ladders to
climb. Each man usually carries on his back a load
of twenty-five kilograms of silver ore tied in a
cloth, knapsack fashion; thus they ascend, three at
lild lo i-Mo ^^^^t carries a candle
both hLa. \l ' holding on with
more ^han 300^L^'""^ ^^^^ ^^^^^ distance, often
k2 °? "meters—a fearful thing, the merethought of which inspires dread. 134 ^
Toledo had ordered a maximum of two trips per day, but as
many as twenty-five were made. During the 1590s the
common tarea (quota) was nineteen montones (mounds) in a
day. Quotas had also been prohibited by Toledo, but they
were the rule rather than the exception . "'^^
Springs flooded many of the richer mines. Some had
to be abandoned, but others were worked by mitayos in
knee-deep water. This practice was also illegal, but
continued nonetheless, and pneumonia struck the Indians
working under such conditions . ''"'^^
Deteriorating working conditions were bad enough, but
Indians were further oppressed by their treatment at the
hands of mayordomos and pongos . Mitayos were whipped,
beaten, struck with rocks, made to carry heavy loads on
their backs, and forced to work day and night, and on
137Sunday. The Indians no longer received two weeks of
rest for every one they worked. Of the mitayos who were
"resting" nearly a thousand were obliged to serve as meses ;
and offer their services in supply trains, reservoir
maintenance, and other support activities. The one-to-three
relationship between the mita ordinaria and the mita gruesa
, 138
collapsed
.
Ill-treatment and increased pressures on the mitayos
66
were caused by the azogueros ' financial woes. They were
squeezed by rising production costs and less and
lower-quality ore. Many had over-extended themselves by
pouring their profits into construction, or had otherwise
spent the money they made during the boom years. The
azogueros now found themselves pressed for capital, and
the cost of mercury was the principal reason. The price
per quintal had not changed appreciably, but more of it was
needed to refine the less-rich ore. Other elements—the
transport of ore from the mines to the mills, wood, salt,
copper, etc.—also cost more; and volunteer labor commanded
nearly nine pesos per week by century's end."''^^
The azogueros petitioned the government for more
mitayos, lower-priced mercury, and a reduction of the quinto
to the diezmo (10 per cent of production) ."^^^ Meanwhile,
they tried to compensate for rising production costs by
demanding more of the mitayos while paying them less.
Travel allowances were not paid, and wages were withheld in
141part or in their entirety. Capcha perquisites and the
rescates trade were attacked, as the azogueros charged that
the Indians were stealing the rich ore—either by sneaking
it out of the mines during the week or stockpiling it until
Sunday when they could take it for themselves—and leaving
the mills with the inferior metales .
The pressure on the Indians may have been caused by the
azogueros ' financial problems, but it was encouraged by
by the coimnunal basis of the mita. There was little reason
for an azo^uero to treat his mitayos well, for if one were
injured or died, he was soon replaced with another.
Some azoc^ueros also balanced higher production costs
by selling, or renting, a portion of the Indians assigned
to them. The best workers were selected and kept; those
that were old, feeble or uncooperative were sent to other
mines, chScaras, obrajes and elsewhere. The demand for
Indian labor was such that these Indians brought 150 pesos
apiece or more. Some azogueros produced no silver at all,
but lived off the income generated by the sale and rental
of their mitayos ^
^
In response to the worsening conditions in the mines,
the Indians used every available means to avoid the mita.
Some evaded future service by staying in Potosi once their
year's obligation had been met, for the villa was exempted
from mita recruitment. Others escaped to cities, chlcaras
,
distant valleys and other mining areas—Salinas and
Aullagas in particular. Fewer than half returned to
their pueblos . ''"'^^
Those who did go home found oppression similar to what
they had suffered in Potosi. Indians living in the pueblos
were forced to work for caciques
,
corregidores and priests
in transport, agriculture, animal husbandry and small
industry. They had to buy goods they did not need, and
pay taxes and tribute to boot. They received little or
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nothing in return, and so fled to avniri i-u^j-xeu r oid the work required
in the pueblos and future mita service at Potosi.
Returning mita^ often discovered that their lands and
homes had been sold while they were away, with little or
no property to bind them, they were free to move to where
the work was better and their responsibilities were fewer.
Some went completely outside the colonized zone, and joined
the ranks of the unconquered "infidels . ""''^^
Indian migration was unwittingly encouraged by Toledo's
attempt to make the mita less burdensome for the Indians.
He provided for two months' notice to those selected for
the next mita contingent, so they could put their affairs
in order. The warning actually gave them time to escape.
Once absent from his pueblo, moreover, an Indian became a
forastero—a non-landed outsider whose lack of property
freed him from mita, tribute and tax obligations—even if
he moved from one mita province to another."'"'*^
Designed to lessen the weight of the mita on the
Indians, these provisions hampered its effectiveness. As
the Indians fled from their pueblos, and failed to return
to them, those originarios who remained were obliged to
support their villages' responsibilities. The increased
pressure on them encouraged them to join the exodus. """^^ At
Potosi, fewer mitayos arrived from the depleted provinces,
forcing those already there to serve longer, and causing
them to flee from the villa.
As the increased demand for Indian labor at PotosI
was met with decreasing numbers of mitayos, the azogueros
focused their wrath on the caciques
. They were whipped,
beaten, imprisoned, humiliated in public, and forced to
hire two mingas for every mitayo they failed to deliver
To protect themselves, the caciques forced their Indians to
serve more often than once every seven years, denied them
rest, and brought older and younger men than the draft
allowed. The result was more pressure on the mitayos
at Potosi and originarios in the provinces, and thus the
acceleration of Indian flight.
The year 1590 brought yet another cause of the
downfall of the Toledan mita. The realm was visited by
a series of epidemics—smallpox, measles, influenza and
typhus. Many pueblos were completely destroyed, and
Potosl—normally spared the effects of epidemic disease
because of its altitude and cold climate—was hit hard."*"^^
By the end of the sixteenth century the original form
f the mita had broken down completely. Travel allowances
re not paid, quotas were common, and wages were withheld.
Indians and their caciques were beaten, whipped and
otherwise abused. The fractions employed by Toledo
—
one-seventh (for example) from a province, one-third of the
mita gruesa for the mita ordinaria
, and one-third of the
mitayos for the mines—crumbled. Every provision for the
adequate payment and good treatment of the mitayos was
o
we
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routinely disobeyed. At the same ti.e, conditions in the
mines were worse and the countryside was less able to
support mita recruitment . "'•^^
Another technological breakthrough was needed. Hopes
were raised when the beneficio del hierro ("iron method")
was invented by Carlos Corzo in the late 1580s, but mercury
interest groups were able to delay crown approval for its
use by complaining that their profits would be hurt. But
even when the Corzo method was introduced, in the last
years of the sixteenth century, it could not reverse the
overall downward trend of PotosI silver production
.
Hapsburg officials responded to the mita's problems
in disjointed fashion, from many different directions, and
clashed with one another over how best to act. Corregidores
de Potosl were responsible for overseeing compliance with
mita obligations, and maximizing silver production. They
supported the azogueros in their quest for a lower mercury
price and the exaction of the diezmo. They also were
active in pressuring the caciques to deliver their full
quotas of mitayos, and tried to subjugate the provincial
corregidores, whom they blamed—along with the caciques—
for the failure to meet their mita obligations
.
The Audiencia de Charcas was charged by the crown with
monitoring abuses, and ensuring that the mitayos were
treated well and received their wages. "^^^ Except for
Matienzo, the Audiencia opposed the mita from the start.
and it supported the agricultural interests that competed
with Potosi for Indian labor. The oidores viewed the
^^^^^^^^^ haughty, unruly, greedy and disloyal; and
they blamed them-their greed and vicious treatment of the
indians-for the mita's failings. The Audiencia tried
to win a lower mercury price for Potosi, with the hope that
cheaper mercury would lessen the pressure that the azogueros
exerted on the mitayos.^^^ It resisted every effort by the
Corregidor to bring the mita under his exclusive control.
Toledo's successors in the viceroy's position pointed
to flaws in the mita 's design rather than blame any one
group for its shortcomings. Viceroy Martin Enrlquez
(1581-1583) felt that Toledo had over-stepped the bounds of
his instructions by establishing the Potosl mita .-'-^^ The
Viceroy Conde de Villar (1585-1590) and the second Viceroy
Marques de Canete (1590-1596) bemoaned Toledo's lack of
161foresight. Despite their belief that the mita was
flawed, these viceroys did not question its importance.
They understood that the future of Peru depended on Potosi,
and Potost depended on the mita. They sought to repair or
replace those parts of the system that they believed were
responsible for its demise. They tried, in essence, to
re-design the mita in light of contemporary realities . "''^^
Enrlquez hoped to overcome the difficulties presented
by Toledo's 1578 repartimiento de la mita . His distribution
(1582) included 4,453 Indians in the mita ordinaria, of
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which 1,369 were assigned to the mines, 2,047 to the mills,
and 222 to ore-washing facilities. The remaining 195 were
lost when complaints led to the lowering of quotas for some
provinces. Of those "resting," 1,070 were obliged to serve
as meses in support activities and public works. Enrlquez
was careful to provide Indians only to those who were
legitimately involved in silver production. He turned down
the suggestion of Diego Lopez de Zuniga, Alcalde de Lima,
that the mita gruesa be composed of only two parts, so that
each mita ordinaria might cover all the activities that
required Indian laborers . -^^^
When Martin Enriquez died in March of 1533, he was
replaced with the Conde de Villar. The new Viceroy convened
a junta in 1586 to discuss the crisis at Potosi, and
particularly the difficulties with the mita . The junta's
members included Lopez de Zuniga, Father Acosta, and Martin
Garcia de Loyola. It focused on the problems of increased
costs and the controversy surrounding rescates
. It agreed
to recommend to the crown that the quinto be lowered to the
octavo or diezmo
,
and to lower the price of mercury by ten
pesos to seventy-five per quintal for the first 6,000 to
7,000 quintales used at Potosi each year. But despite the
legitimacy of some of the arguments linking rescates and
capcha with the theft of ore by Indians, the junta ruled
that the ghatu ' s activities were necessary to keep an
Indian work force at Potosi. As the mita was a necessary
evil, so too was the theft of rich ore by the Indians for
sale in the ghatu plaza. "'^'^
The junta hoped to ease the pressure on the mitayos by
adjusting other production elements. The Conde de Villar
considered, meanwhile, a more extensive alteration of the
mita. The Audiencia de Charcas had suggested that a
resident Indian labor force be created for Potosl.^^^ The
Viceroy's instructions had allowed him to implement such a
program if he believed it worthwhile
. Proponents of the
idea argued that a resident labor force would eliminate the
problems caused by shuttling the Indians back and forth
across the altiplano
, and that it would end the disruption
caused by the recruitment of mitayos in the provinces.
Opponents argued that provisioning such a large resident
population would be difficult, and that the Indians chosen
to live and serve at Potos£ would be little more than
slaves. The Viceroy finally decided against the idea, for
he felt that the Indians would be aggrieved—and run away."*"^^
Thus, when the Conde published his repartimiento de la mita
in 1588, little had been changed from that of his
predecessor: the mita ordinaria included 4,143 Indians,
and 13,016 made up the mita gruesa ."*"^^
Throughout the 1580s the crown refused to confirm the
establishment of the Potosi mita. In 1584 Phillip II gave
hesitant consent to other mitas , but he withheld it from
that at Potosi. His approval did not come until 1589,
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sixteen years after the system was inaugurated. Villar was
then told to follow Toledo's program for sending Indians to
work in the mines at Potosi; all earlier cgdulas and
provisions to the contrary were superseded. Royal consent
for the mita was predicated on the theraputic value of work
for the otherwise lazy and frivolous Indians; and it was
contingent upon their good treatment, religious instruction
and general conservation. The crown's support really
came, however, in exchange for the revenue generated by the
1570s boom.-'-'^^
The mita was assigned more than its fair share of the
credit for the increase in silver production at Potosl.
The desmontes, mercury and a huge capital infusion were
more important. The mita was a part of the success story,
but to assign it responsibility for Potosi's resurgence
was a gross overstatement. It is ironic that royal support
for the mita came at a time when it was failing, and
government officials in Peru were scrambling to hold it
together
.
Phillip II 's confirmation of the mita was followed in
1590 by the epidemics of that year and an acceleration of
the production crisis at Potosl. Black slaves from Brazil
and a resident mitayo labor force received renewed interest
as alternatives to the mita. Indeed, the crown granted
permission to import Blacks for Potosl on a limited and
experimental basis
.
Peru also received a new Viceroy in 1590-the second
Marques de Canete. He wrote the crown in 1592 that he
believed that Toledo's mita required a major reformation.
The Audiencia de Charcas had called for the forced
resettlement of Indians in their pueblos, and he agreed,
noting that many Indians were absent from their homes to
evade mita and other obligations.!^^ In 1593 the Viceroy
petitioned the crown to lower mercury and food prices for
PotosI, and grant other concessions that would return
profitability to silver production there. Meanwhile, he
drafted fifty-five ordinances, to be implemented by
Oidor Juan Diaz de Lopidana of the Audiencia de Charcas.
The Oidor had gone to Potosi at Canete • s behest, to
determine whether a new repartimiento de la mita was
needed, and to investigate the general situation there.
The new ordinances were issued in response to his
recommendations. Canete reiterated his predecessors'
prohibitions of the sale or rental of mitayos
,
their use
in other activities than those to which they were assigned,
and other means used by the azogueros to adapt the mita to
their personal needs. He also banned the extraction of ore
from the cerro from Saturday evening to Monday morning,
effectively ending capcha—a measure meant to halt the theft
of rich ore by the Indians . ''"^^
Canete 's ordinances are impressive in their number and
scope, but they had little effect on the situation at
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Potosi. By 1595 the Viceroy had given up on the villa and
its residents. He wrote the crown that the mines were so
deep and the ore was so poor that the government would do
better to promote other mining centers instead. The
azogueros
,
he reported, now forced the Indians to work
beyond their physical limitations, in a desperate attempt
to cover their production costs. The government could not
prevent the azogueros ' abuse of the Indians; the more it
tried to govern PotosI the more ungovernable the place
became
.
"'"^^
Viceroy Luis de Velasco (1596-1604) received his
instructions in 1595. PotosI, he was told, was the "nervio
principal" of Peru and demanded his special attention. "'•'^^
The crown had not yet received Cafiete's assessment. A year
later Velasco received a separate set of orders concerning
the royal treasury, in which mercury problems were the
177central issue. The use of quicksilver was down at
Potosi; the crown was not worried about the stockpile of
unsold mercury, but it missed the silver that could have
been produced with it. Velasco was told to reduce the
price to sixty pesos per quintal
, with deferred payment if
necessary. He was also ordered to assign more Indians
178to PotosI, but only to verified mine and mill owners.
The Viceroy's instructions called, nevertheless, for
the eventual abolition of the mita. The crown supported
the Audiencia de Charcas' concept of a resident labor force,
and encouraged Velasco to settle Indians in the vicinity of
Potosl by providing them with land in nearby valleys. The
transition to a resident labor force was to be gradual
because of the difficulty of the task. Direction of the
settlement program was to be entrusted to the Corregidor de
PotosI; the Audiencia de Charcas was not to interfere . ^"^^
So while steps were to be taken to increase silver
production in the short run—primarily a reduction in the
price of mercury—the crown expressed its hope that the
mita could eventually be phased out of existence.
After an extensive investigation, including a visita
and other information gathering, Velasco issued his
repartimiento de la mita and a series of ordinances in
1599. He included 4,634 Indians in the mita ordinaria
, in
accordance with the crown's instruction that he assign more
180Indians to Potosl. His twenty-six ordinances focused on
the sale or rental of mines and mills; no such arrangements
were permitted, and in no way was an azoguero to receive in
money what was allotted to him in labor. The Viceroy's
ordinances were added to those of Toledo and Cafiete and
superseded any that were not consistent with his own."'"^"'"
Luis de Velasco was the last viceroy to rule Peru in
the sixteenth century, and the first to govern it during
the seventeenth. No sooner had he published his
repartimiento and ordinances than the crown and Council of
the Indies responded to Canete ' s indictment of Potosi, and
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other complaints about the mita, with a cgdula ordering
the abolition of the system. Velasco's response to that
order and its impact on silver production at PotosI will
open the story of the mita in the seventeenth century.
Summary
For the first twenty years of silver mining at
Potosi-the center's most productive period-the mita was
unnecessary. From 1545 to the 1560s, volunteer Indian
laborers flocked to PotosI; and once there they dominated
every stage of production, from the mining of ore to
refining the silver in their guayras
. The Spanish miners'
contribution was therefore limited to legal ownership of
the mines and protection of their claims against
interlopers. The miners began to press for forced Indian
labor only after falling ore quality had lowered the
Indians' profits, and they refused to work voluntarily.
The Spanish crown opposed forced Indian labor in mining
for a combination of reasons. First, it did not want to
repeat the demographic disaster that had characterized its
initial colonization efforts in the Caribbean. Charles I
and Phillip II understood that the long-term value of their
American realms lay with their Indian vassals. Second,
the crown was locked into a mortal struggle with its own
colonists for control of Indian labor, primarily with the
encomenderos
. Clearly in the weaker position, the crown
ordered legal restrictions on the colonists' access to
Indian labor to protect its econoir.ic interests, as well as
the Indians themselves. While royal directives were rarely
obeyed, they indirectly furthered the crown's cause by
providing local government officials with legal leverage
over the colonists. Meanwhile, the crown ensured its
representatives use of that leverage by playing groups of
colonists— soldados and encomenderos for example—against
one another. Disputes were settled by government officials
or in the king's courts.
The crown's position in the colonization process was
analogous to the Spanish miners' position at Potosl. Both
maintained a degree of control via legal channels, but in
truth the Indians were in charge at Potosi, and the
colonists in Peru (as far as the Indians permitted them to
be) .
The economic crisis at Potosi in the 1560s created a
problem for the miners and the crown alike. The miners'
profits fell, and they looked to restore their earnings
to earlier levels with forced Indian labor. The
government had grown accustomed to receiving Potosi silver,
and had a vested interest in the future of the mining
center. Draft Indian labor had proven necessary in other
sectors of the Peruvian economy, and had been permitted by
the crown. Royal opposition to forced labor for the mines
was stronger, however, because the crown feared both the
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effect Of such a system on the Indians and the concession
Of more power to the miners. The risks simply outweighed
the potential benefits, and the crown refused to permit
draft Indian labor at Potosl.
The relationship between the risks and the potential
benefits changed soon after Viceroy Francisco de Toledo
arrived in Peru. An amalgamation process suitable to
Potosl
-s unique environment was perfected that made the
desmontes produced during the preceding quarter-century a
bonanza of easily accessible ore. The prospects for
spectacular levels of silver production at Potosl—and thus
greatly increased guintos reales—caused Toledo to break
with the crown's position against forced labor for the
mines. The desmontes and amalgamation technology were only
two parts of a four-part production formula, however, and
labor and capital were still needed. To convince the
potosinos to invest their capital in new refining mills—to
secure the fourth element in the formula—the Viceroy had
to guarantee them a large Indian labor force. The mita was
founded, therefore, not only as the third part of the
Toledan formula, but also as part of his agreement with the
potosinos to provide the fourth.
The crown withheld royal consent from the mita because
it was afraid that Toledo had created another privileged
interest group, like the encomenderos
, and unsure that his
provisions for the protection of the mitayos would be
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sufficient. When the boom of the 1570s convinced
Phillip II that the Toledan formula had worked, he put
aside his earlier doubts and endorsed the mita.
Unfortunately for all concerned, the Toledan miracle
lasted only as long as the desmontes. As the boom of the
1570s fizzled, the azogueros
, the crown and the Indians all
scrambled to protect their interests at the expense of the
others. The mitayos had enjoyed substantial profits during
the boom, but they soon found themselves forced to work in
the mines rather than in the mills, and treated more
harshly. As their earnings fell, and mistreatment became
more prevalent, the Indians began to flee from PotosI and
from their pueblos to avoid mita service. The remaining
Indians had to serve more often, increasing the pressure on
the mitayos and contributing to more Indian flight. Indian
migration and the decline of the mita fueled one another in
a vicious circle. The provinces were not depopulated by
the mita. Rather, the mita contributed to the demographic
disruption of the realm, and suffered by it as well.
The group that was caught between Indian flight and
increased azoguero demand for mitayos was the caciques
.
They were the key to the entire system, for they delivered
the mitayos to PotosI. The caciques kept the mita going
throughout the 1580s and the 1590s, because they ignored
the guidelines established by Toledo—to spare themselves
the temporal reprisals of angry azogueros .
By 1600 the mita had begun to evolve, in concert with
developments at Potosi and in the provinces. The vehicle
of that evolution was the caciques
. As long as they were
able to appease the demands of the azogueros
. and still
maintain control over the Indians, the mita-the de facto
n^lta—could continue.
The crown could do very little to prevent the
transformation of the mita. The limitations of its control
over PotosI were very clear. Government officials, however,
began to explore alternatives to the system, and the crown
lent its support to the concept of a resident labor force
to replace the mita. But the crown had permitted the
creation of another privileged sector of Peruvian society—
the azogueros. It would have to contend with them was well
as the encomenderos in any future efforts to limit the
colonists' access to Indian labor.
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reforms introduced by the Viceroy Duque de la Palata; see
Chapter VII for more on these complaints. The respondents
to a 7.x. 1660 cedula asking for information about the mita
noted that frontier provinces had been spared (AGI, Charcas
267, no. 16— see note 91; and no. 25, Bartolome de Salazar
to the crown, 8. IV. 1662, 12 fs.). Gunnar Mendoza
contradicts ArzSns' statement that fourteen provinces were
obligated to the Potosi mita
, in ArzSns, Historia, II, 52,
note 4 :
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?^?^Pf°5^^so y estado de las minas del cerro de PotosI,"(Biblioteca Nacional de Madrid, Ms. 6225). The division
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93. AGI, Charcas 266, no. 45J (see note 91), llv.
94. Castillo (AGI, Charcas 270, no. 33C~see note 30),3v. '
95. Ibid
. , 4-4v.
96. AGI, Charcas 266, no. 45J (see note 91), llv-12-
Castillo (AGI, Charcas 270, no. 33C~see note 30), 5-6;'
ArzSns, Historia
, I, 157-158, says 4,000 Indians wereinvolved in the construction of mills in December of 1574,
and on page 171 he adds that mills and reservoirs were
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97. Zavala, Servicio personal
,
I, 103.
98. Ibid.
99. Castillo (AGI, Charcas 270, no. 33C~see note 30),
7-7v; the addition of three provinces would bring the total
to seventeen.
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I, 455^65.
109. Bakewell, "Technological Change," 65, for theinstruction of Indians in amalgamation processing; Zavala,
Servicio personal
,
I, 159-160, for Garcia de Loyola's
1581 account, with mention of the distribution of rich
ore for the guayras .
110. Cobb, "Potosi
. . . Frontier," 47; Basadre, "El
Regimen," 345-346; Holmes, 84-88; Cobb, "Potosi and
Huancavelica," 12-13, for the establishment of the mint
and theft of ore; Zavala, Servicio personal
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I, 85.
111. Antonio de Ayanz, "Breve Relaci6n de los agravios
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{?7n*i ir^^^' Servicio personal, I, 64-65, for Toledo's1570 letter noting all the activities that the Indiansworked m; and page 72 for the Church being the worst
oppressor of the Indians. For the two Audiencias, see
n^^K^'^ii'. "^5''^''°^°^^''^^ Change," 64; and Capoche, 135.
? ^""^ Huancavelica," 66-67, discusses the cause
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116. Zavala, Servicio personal
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, 103-104 (1578 statement)
J
Campo y de la Rynaga, 17, quotes a 1575 letter from theCouncil of the Indies giving encouragement:
"Para la claridad que pedis se haga de lo que aveis
proveido en la ocupacion de los Indies en las minas
por ser cotra lo que por nos estS mandado; y B. que
se OS respondi6 lo aula desproveido bien, se ha
hecho por la Cedula q os mand6 embiar por esta, que
es en conformidad de lo que tenemos proueido para
la Nueua Espana, y otras partes de las nuestras
Indias, hareis que se guarde como cosa que ha
parecido aca ser justificada, y de que no se seguirS
dano a los Indies. Y si otra cosa tuuieredes
entendido al contrario, no dareis auiso para que se
97
prouea .
"
service instrument,
description.^'"'"'''' ^^^"^ Velasco's 1571
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122. Bakewell, "Technological Change," 65; Zavala,
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37-38;
Bakewell, "Technological Change," 57-59; Capoche, 14 7.
124. Zavala, Servicio personal
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"Technological Change/' 65.
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1793), 36.
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131 Campo y de la Rynaga, 20, says that 1582 was the
very last year of the boom.
132. "Descripci6n de la villa y minas de Potosi," 377.
133. ANB, M 125, no. 13, "Competencia de jurisdicci6n
suscitada entre don Francisco Sarmiento de Mendoza y elcapit5n Pedro de Montalvo, corregidor y alcalde mayor de
mmas de Potosi, respectivamente
, sobre los autos delhundimiento y la muerte de unos indios en el socavon del
veinticuatro Juan Bautista de JSuregui," 1652-1656, 72 fs(MC_859; MOM 637). Fs
.
217-226 (the legajo has a running*
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used as precedents. See Lewis Hanke, Th^ Imperial City
of Potosi. An Unwritten Chapter in the History of Spanish
Ainerica (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1956), 25, for a
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the crown, Potosi, 28.11.1599 (see note 119); and Cepeda
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II, 30-41.
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-y-,-, r. ^ .
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, 1,183,for^Canete to the crown (1593) ; "Instrucci6n al virrey delPeru don Luis de Velasco sobre hacienda," 11 .VIII . 1596
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Audiencia de Charcas. Correspondencia (ed. by Levillier)
,
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141. Zavala, Servicio personal
,
I, 165-166.
142. Ibid
. ,
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polgmica colonial: Potosl, 1579-1584," Jahrbuch fiir
Geschichte von Staat, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft
Lateinamerikas
,
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the Black slave trade; Helmer, "Comercio e contraband©,"
197; Lewis Hanke, "The Portuguese in Spanish America, with
Special Reference to the Villa Imperial de PotosI,"
Revista de Historia de America
, LI (junio de 1961)
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Velasco en 31 de agosto de 1599, que se han de guardar en
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CHAPTER III
1600 TO 1633
The mita at PotosI had begun to change within a decade
of its establishment by Viceroy Francisco de Toledo. The
system was forced to evolve by Indian migration in the
provinces and declining silver production at Potosi, the
latter caused by the depletion of the desmontes. m turn,
the mita contributed to Indian flight from PotosI and the
obligated villages. Before 1600, the mita's metamorphosis
was confined to the assignment of more mitayos to the mines,
and the caciques and azogueros ' failure to comply with
Toledo's restrictions on their recruitment and treatment.
During the first third of the seventeenth century a more
fundamental change in the mita would become necessary.
Hapsburg government had been unable to prevent the
transformation of the mita during the last years of the
sixteenth century. in 1601 the crown responded to its
weakened position vis-a-vis the encomenderos and azogueros
by issuing a cgdula banning Indian personal service for the
former and abolishing the mita. Viceroy Luis de Velasco's
response to that order opens the history of the
government's seventeenth century struggle to control the
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de facto mita.
Viceroy Velasco and the 1601 Cedul
Viceroy Luis de Velasco was aware of the vast
differences between Toledo's original design and the de
facto mita. He, like his predecessors, hoped to close
that gap with more effective administration of the system.
In the first years of the seventeenth century, the Viceroy
sent detailed instructions to government officials—from
the correqidores de indios in the provinces to the veedores
and alcalde mayor de minas at PotosI~to do everything in
their power to make the mita function as it was supposed
to."'" These orders were to be as ineffective as the ones
they were meant to reinforce.
Meanwhile, the crown had grown toubled by the reports
it had received from Canete, Velasco and others about the
plight of Indian workers in Peru, and the growing
independence of the colonists. On November 24, 1601
Phillip III responded with a cedula banning Indian personal
service, including the mita . Services rendered individuals
were flatly prohibited; the order was another volley in the
2
royal crusade against the encomenderos
.
The 1601 directive was less drastic where draft Indian
labor for public enterprises was concerned. Those services
were to continue, but without the overt coercion of mita
obligations. Thenceforward, Indians would be obliged merely
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to report to central locations for employment, and they
would be joined there by indolent Spaniards, Blacks,
mestizos, mulatos and zambaigos . ^ To facilitate their
participation in public enterprises, the crown ordered
that the Indians be settled near the activities that
required their labor, so that travel to and from work
would not be a burden on them/ Phillip m's call was
therefore for a resumption of the old system of tindarunas
,
with the inclusion of non-Indians and elements of the
resident labor force plan as well.
The mines received even greater dispensation. The
crown conceded that gold, silver and mercury production
were fundamental to the survival of the Spanish Empire,
and that some mines could not be worked by anyone but the
Indians. Miners were therefore provided with one year to
acquire slaves or volunteer labor, including those who
would be compelled to report for hiring in the mining areas.
The edict also provided the means to continue mineral
production while the mining mitas were replaced. At Potosi,
an inspection of the city and its vicinity would determine
whether there were 15,000 Indians available—enough to
comprise three shifts of 5,000 each. If so, Velasco was
to assign them to labor in the mines for the transitional
year; if not, the mita could continue for that period.
The 1601 cedula included no major reforms of the mita
because the system was ostensibly to be abolished. The
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provisions for mita labor that were included in the order
Simply reiterated earlier royal and viceregal directives:
only mine and mill owners were to receive mitayos
, and
they were not to be rented, sold or transfered in any way;
adequate wages, good treatment and health care were to be
provided; travel allowances were to be paid on the basis
of six leagues traveled in one day; corregidores were
responsible for the delivery of mitayos ; and caciques were
not to be punished for incomplete quotas.^
Despite the language of the cgdula
, the crown did not
expect to abolish the mita. Rather, it hoped to keep the
colonists—both the encomenderos and the azogueros
— from
completely subjugating the Indians for their personal
profit. Indeed, the twenty-fifth and final chapter of the
order instructed the Viceroy to consult with experienced
and knowledgeable persons and make any modifications that
he deemed necessary. it was therefore less a directive
than a list of suggestions; a rough draft that Velasco was
to edit into effective policy. The cedula was also an
arsenal, from which the Viceroy would choose those weapons
that were necessary to battle the encomenderos and azogueros
while protecting the crown's economic interests.^
Velasco understood the intent behind the order, and he
also realized that any effort to enforce the cedula in full
would throw the realm into armed rebellion, and destroy any
chance of ever attaining the crown's objectives. Thus, he
108
suspended adoption of the order in October of 1602, until
it could be studied by local government officials. His
decision was in keeping with a second royal order of
.
November 24, 1601 that counseled against the enforcement
of the first if a violent response was to be anticipated .
^
The council of the Indies accepted Velasco's suspension of
the cgdula in February of the following year.^
In 1603 the Viceroy initiated an enquiry into the
prospects for implementing various sections of the 1601
order. in the process he solicited the advice of a number
of advisers, including Dean Pedro Muniz, Father Miguel de
Agia, Jesuit Father Alonso Mesia Venegas, Father Ger6nimo
Valera, Father Francisco de Sosa and Father Feliciano de
Vega
.
The written opinions of Agia, Muhiz and Mesia have
survived the centuries. Because the Viceroy had been
afforded the power to modify the cgdula
, these counselors
discussed each part of the edict separately. They supported
those sections that they believed were valuable and rejected
others that they considered unrealistic or unadvisable.
Miguel de Agia broke his essay into three parts. In the
first he considered the crown's intentions; in the second,
the cfdula's justness; and in the third, the Viceroy's
responsibilities with regard to its implementation. He
argued that the crown wanted to halt the abuses suffered
by the Indians, not necessarily to abolish the Potosi mita
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and other forms of repartimiento labor. Personal services
for the encomenderos had been rightfully banned, but draft
labor was necessary for many public activities. Agia felt,
moreover, that the well-being of the republic came before
that of the Indians, for unless they worked the republic
could not be sustained; and the Indians would not work
voluntarily.
The crown's requirement that the Indians report to
public places for hiring was just, in Agia • s opinion,
because the Indians would be spared the evils of laziness,
Spaniards and others were also included, and the duties to
be performed were for the public good. Furthermore, the
crown had the right to oblige its vassals to work. German
princes, he noted, assigned their subjects to labor in gold,
silver and copper mines, and nobody questioned their right
to do so
.
Agia said that Indian service in the mines at PotosI
was permissible because it was not mortally dangerous.
Mingas
,
he argued, would not have hired themselves out in
large numbers if it were. The problems with the mita had
arisen from the distances that the Indians had to travel
to reach Potosi and the length of time they were away from
their pueblos. The alternatives to the mita suggested by
the cgdula
,
however, were not viable. If all Peruvian
mines were worked by slaves, 80,000 Blacks would be needed;
a resident labor force at Potosi would entail 40,000
110
Indians and their families. Provisioning that large a
population would be difficult, if not impossible. Agia
therefore urged the maintenance of the PotosI mita, with
a modified resident labor force program to ease the
problems created by travel to and from the villa
.
Agia was less happy about the situation at Huancavelica
,
for most of the Indians who were assigned to the mercury
mines died. He tried to compare their obligation to armed
service in wartime, but his argument in support of the mita
at Huancavelica was half-hearted. Indeed, after visiting
the main tunnel there in 1603 he issued a retraction of
that lukewarn affirmation. Agia then called for an end to
all work in the main tunnel, and argued for the exploitation
of other nearby mines in its place. But the Potosl mita
was not mentioned in that retraction . -"-^
Pedro Muniz offered Velasco a very different point of
view. He argued that no one—Indian or Black—should be
forced to labor in the mines against his will. Black
slaves were actually less prepared to work in the mines than
the Indians, he said, and would die quickly if assigned to
them. While Indian service in the mitas at Huancavelica
—
except the main tunnel—and Potosi was not fatal for all,
it was nevertheless reprehensible and unnecessary. Potosi
silver was not indispensable, Muniz argued, for Spain had
carried on the war against heresy long before the cerro was
discovered
.
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Alonso Mesia Venegas advised the Viceroy to suspend the
c|dula indefinitely, for in his view its execution would
cause more harm than the mita itself. He believed, unlike
Muniz, that the Empire-and Catholicism in general-depended
upon Potosi, and Potosl upon the mita. The system needed
repair, he conceded, but its abolition would bring the
entire economic structure of the realm to the ground; and
once lost it would be irrecoverable. Like Agia, Mesia said
that no other labor procurement system could take the place
of the mita. Black slaves, volunteers and a resident labor
force were all unrealistic: Blacks would cost too much,
and the azogueros could not afford them; a resident labor
force would be plagued by provisioning problems, and the
Indians would run away anyway. '^'^
Mesia saw value in the selective application of specific
chapters of the 1601 cedula
, and he argued that the
twenty-fifth chapter gave the Viceroy carte blanche to
modify the mita. Velasco could therefore act to solve the
problems of travel, the non-payment of travel allowances,
high food prices and the excessive tribute the mitayos
paid, without destroying the economic foundation of the
Catholic world.
Velasco 's subsequent actions followed Mesia 's counsel
closely. Beginning in October, 1603, the Viceroy ordered
a series of reforms for the mita, most of them based on
15sections of the 1601 order. He decreed that travel
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allowances be paid on the bases of one real and five leagues
16per day. He exempted the eldest legitimate son of each
caci^ principal from tribute and the mita, and his other
legitimate sons from the mita.^^ The number of exempted
artisans in each village was narrowed down, for positions
had been created simply to evade mita service. Once they
were in Potosl, the Indians were not to be sold, loaned,
transfered in the sales or rentals of mines and mills, or
in any other way.""-^ Finally, the Indians were not to be
used as beasts of burden.
Velasco also extended a 1596 plan for mita deliveries
from Chucuito to other obligated provinces. All the
mitayos from a province were now to come to PotosI as a
unit, leaving from a designated place on the same day. A
list of those included in the contingent was to be prepared
in triplicate, with the names, ages and ayllus of the
Indians specified. A copy was to be carried to Potosi by
a capitan enterador de la mita
, selected by the corregidor
of the province to escort the year's contingent. The
corregidores were held responsible for the despatch of the
mitayos
,
and the Corregidor de PotosI was provided with
powers over his provincial colleagues, so that he might
monitor their compliance with their mita obligations.
After a year in Potosi the entire squadron of mitayos was
to be sent home by the Corregidor de PotosI, again under
21the capitgn enterador and accompanied by a list.
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The Viceroy hoped that these reforms would relieve some
of the pressure on the Indians and their caciques
, and
resolve the most troublesome aspect of the Potosi mita-
travel to and from the villa
. More extensive alterations
were considered imprudent, given the economic dependence
of Peru on Potosi, and the prospects for violence should
Velasco attempt to enforce the 1601 cgdula in its original
form.
The investigation of the mita that preceded Velasco 's
reforms had reinforced the basic fact that the mita was
crucial to the survival of Potosi silver production, and so
to the future of the Hapsburg Empire. The 1601 edict had
offered only time-worn alternatives to the mita, which were
no more viable in 1603 than they had been in the sixteenth
century. The counselors who submitted written opinions on
the cgdula could offer no alternatives that were any more
realistic. Had one existed, Toledo would not have been
forced to establish the mita in the first place. The
generation since its inauguration—especially with the
exhaustion of the desmontes by 1582—had made it all the
more necessary. Thus, the mita emerged from the Viceroy's
scrutiny more firmly entrenched than ever.
Silvio Zavala has likened the 1601 cgdula to the New
Laws of 1542. He feels they were both unable to overcome
the fundamental contradiction between Indian liberty and
22the need for forced Indian labor. Juan Perez de Tudela
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agrees with the seventeenth century jurist Juan de
Sol6rzano Pereira that the contradiction was between
republicanism and despotism. ^3 On the functional level,
however, there was no contradiction. Phillip III and the
Council of the Indies employed "Indian liberty" and "the
public good" to justify the abolition of the services
performed by the Indians for the colonists while preserving
those that benefited society as a whole-and thus the crown.
Access to forced Indian labor was thereby declared to be a
state monopoly.
The legal foundation of the 1601 cgdula was sound, but
it could not be implemented because of the prevailing power
balance in Peru. Not only was the order opposed by the
powerful encomenderos, but by the azogueros of Potosl as
well. Faced with the prospect of their united opposition,
Velasco chose limited gain over total defeat. His inability
to make even his few reforms effective, however, is clear
when one looks at the de facto mita.
The de facto Mita
While the crown drafted its 1601 cedula
, and as the
Viceroy investigated the Potosi mita
, the processes that
had begun in the late sixteenth century—the shifting of
mitayos from the mills to the mines, and the deterioration
of their working conditions—continued. Soon thereafter,
the mita began to change into a system that was totally
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different from anything that Toledo had imagined.
At first glance the number of mitayos working at
Potosi seems to belie the importance assigned to them by
the crown and viceregal officials. The mitayos were only
a small fraction of the total work force at PotosI, as
this anonymous 1603 description—quite possibly from the
Velasco enquiry—reveals:
4,000 mitayos worked in the mines of the cerro
6 00 mingas did the same
400 or more mingas were involved in cleaning
the ore
—
young men wh9 earned one peso
per day
1,000 Indians (men and women) sorted the ore
at the mine entrances
600 mitayos worked in the mills
4,000 mingas worked in the mills, for seven
reales per day
3,000 Indians (men and women) refined lamas
for one peso per day
320 Indians worked with llamas, carrying the
ore from the mines to the mills
180 Indians brought salt to Potosi
1,000 mingas brought salt
1,000 Indian merchants brought wood
1,000 Indians brought firewood
500 Indians brought llama dung for fuel
200 Indians brought llama dung for fuel— for
use in melting the lamas
1,000 Indians made and brought charcoal
200 Indians made candles
19,000 Indians were therefore working in the larger
silver production industry
To these 19,000 should be added the 10,000 Indians who were
engaged in bringing food from Tomina, Cochabamba, Petantora,
Chuquisaca and elsewhere; families; and 30,000 other Indian
24
residents of Potosi. V7ell over 60,000 Indians lived in
25the villa—a 1611 census counted 76,000. Less than a
third were involved in any way with mining, and only
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one-quarter of those were mitayos
.
The mita^ were more important, however, than their
relative numbers suggested, of the 4,600 mitayos included
in the 1603 description, 4,000 worked in the cerro. As
apiris, they produced the ore upon which the well-being of
everyone else depended. The Indian labor problem at PotosI
was not caused by a lack of Indians, but of those who were
willing to enter the mines and haul silver ore up the long
rawhide ladders to the surface. The 600 mingas who worked
in the mines demanded twelve reales per day; skilled
pick-and-axe men commanded as much as twenty-four reales
per day. The mitayos were paid a paltry two and one-half
£esos per week, from which a half-peso was deducted to pay
the veedores and alcalde mayor de minas
. Thus, while the
mita was crucial to the extraction of ore, it was also an
important subsidy, saving the azogueros the expense of
hiring mingas, less two and one-half pesos per mitayo.^^
The increased importance of the mitayos was not
accompanied by a concomitant improvement in their status,
however. Working conditions were bad and their treatment
worse. Royal and viceregal orders, including Velasco's
St recent reforms, were constantly disobeyed. Mitayos
re forced to produce fixed quotas of montones or suffer
whippings, other physical abuse, extended service, or a
27
cut in pay. They were beaten with clubs, swords and
rocks. A case in point was Alonso Pucho, whose bag of ore
mo
we
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sprung a leak while he was carrying it to a mill. He was
punished with blows to his head and legs. Another mitayo,
Juan Azero, was forced to work in an unbuttressed tunnel.
A cave-in smashed his leg and he died in the hospital. ^8
Indians who were hurt while serving in the mita were
supposed to be paid two reales per day while they were in
the hospital. In truth, they were forced to hire mingas to
take their place, even after the Audiencia de Charcas ruled,
in 1615, that injured and dead mitayos were not to be
replaced under any circumstances. If they died, their wives
and children were forced to hire a substitute or serve in
their stead. Hospitalized mitayos and their families were
also preyed upon by priests, who charged exorbinant sums
for religious services and demanded devastating compensation
29for funerals.
Food costs at Potosi were so high that the two pesos a
mitayo earned in a week were insufficient to cover his
needs. Only by working as mingas during their occasional
weeks off could the mitayos hope to feed themselves and
their families. Rescates were now illegal and suppressed,
and those Indians who were involved had to compete with
Spaniards and mixed-bloods. The Protector de naturales
of Potosl sent petition after petition to Lima asking for
lower food prices, but his efforts were fruitless.
Desperate for food, the Indians often resorted to eating
4-U • n 30their own llamas.
118
Under circumstances such as these it is hardly
surprising that the Indians continued to flee from the
mita, either from PotosI or from their villages. As in the
sixteenth century, however, the mita was only one of the
reasons why the Indians abandoned their pueblos. The
mistreatment of the Indians by their caciques and
corregidores was also responsible for their migration.
Disease took its toll on the natives as well. The Indians
were still recovering from the 1590s epidemics when Cuzco
was struck by diphtheria in 1614, with a serious loss of
1 • ^ 32lite. Measles and smallpox made their way to PotosI in
1619 and 1628, respectively.^^ As the number of originarios
in the villages fell, those who remained were forced to meet
the obligations of those who had died or run away.^^
The extent to which the provinces were depopulated was
clouded by the deception practiced by the caciques
, priests,
corregidores
, chacareros and others. President Luis
Maldonado de Torres of the Audiencia de Charcas claimed
that nearly a third of the Indians in any province could be
hidden during a revisita. Apparently that is what
happened in Sipe-sipe in 1606. The Corregidor de Cochabamba
conducted a census that determined a severe population loss,
and he asked the viceroy to lower the mita obligation of
the pueblo accordingly. The Corregidor de Potosi claimed
that the revisita had not reflected the true resident
population of the village, and argued against any adjustment
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Sipe-sipe's mita obligation
. A 1619 memorial by Juan
Ortiz de Cervantes claimed that the corregidores were
particularly adept at falsifying population figures, but
his list of perpetrators was long enough to cover anyone
living in the provinces. The 1601 cgdula had been
correct when it asserted that everyone depended upon the
Indians for their welfare. "^^
The Indians practiced the art of deception as well.
When the Viceroy Principe de Esquilache (1615-1621) looked
into the cause of an unusually high female birth rate in
the obligated provinces, he discovered that boys were being
baptized as girls to save them from future mita service.
The number of forasteros living in the pueblos, and on
rural chScaras, was rarely— if ever—disclosed.
The number of Indians lost to the mita because of
death, flight or deception was as unclear at the time,
therefore, as it is now; and it was the subject of
continual controversy between provincial and potosino
interests. The corregidores and caciques claimed that
there were not enough Indians to send to Potosi in the
mita. The azogueros accused the provincial interests of
pure deception, and denied that there had been any
depopulation at all. There was sufficient evidence on
both sides of the question to give both factions' claims
an air of credibility.
The controversy over the depopulation of the provinces
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reflected the competition for Indian labor between PotosI
and those in the provinces who needed it as well. Thus,
depopulation was not the real issue, but the rhetorical
tool used by the provincial interests against the mita.
With the discovery of rich deposits of silver at Oruro in
1606, PotosI was faced with a special kind of competitor.
The initial purity of the ore at Oruro, and the ease with
which it was extracted, attracted Indians from all over
Upper Peru, including—according to the Cabildo de PotosI
—some runaway mitayos from PotosI.'*^
The Cabildo, which was controlled by the azogueros
and reflected their interests, claimed that mercury and
Indians were being diverted from PotosI to support the new
. 41mining center. More specifically, the azogueros charged
that Oruro had been responsible for the failure of 560
mitayos to come from Pacajes and Omasuyos in 1609.^^
Competition from Oruro was a serious, but short-term,
threat to PotosI. Hurt by the denial of mita labor and
mercury by the Viceroy Marques de Montesclaros (1607-1615)
,
the mines there were played out by 1612."^^
The battle for Indian labor pitted provincial interests
against the azogueros
, and Oruro against PotosI. The
caciques and corregidores were provincial interests who
were also responsible for delivering mitayos to PotosI.
The corregidores successfully evaded the efforts of the
viceroys and Corregidores de PotosI to hold them responsible
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for mita deliveries, and left the cacicrues to deal with
the azoqueros at PotosI and other economic interests in
the provinces. The difficulties faced by the caciques
are illustrated by a number of examples from the period.
In 1608 the cacique principal of Puna (Porco)
,
Francisco Michaca, complained to the Audiencia de Charcas
that Pedro Andrada Sotomayor was retaining four Indians
from his village on a chScara, for the purpose of renting
them at Potosl. A local judge had ordered that the
Indians be returned to the cacique
, but Andrada responded
with evidence that the four had lived on his chacara for
thirty years. Velasco and the Viceroy Conde de Monterrey
(1604-1606) had both ordered that an Indian who was
resident in one place for ten years could not be returned
to his original pueblo against his wishes. Andrada denied
that he had any intention of renting the Indians.
Although the Audiencia 's decision is not known, the ability
of a chacarero to frustrate the efforts of a cacique is
quite clear.
The capitan enterador for the province of Pacajes,
Gabriel Fernandez Guarache, was frustrated in his attempt
to deliver the mita contingent for 16 34 by the Corregidor
de La Paz. The cacique spent most of 1633 rounding up
Indians, identifying them with the help of other caciques
,
and holding them in a La Paz jail. He acquired a
commission to conduct the reduccion and hired a Spanish
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^^^^^^^^ ^ith his own funds. The Corregidor de La Paz,
however, refused to honor the commission and set the entire
group of Indians free. Once they were loose they fled to
even more remote areas. Fernandez Guarache then asked that
he be allowed to resign.
The number of Indians available for shipment to Potos£
was also restricted by the assignment of mitayos to other
endeavors. The Jesuit colleges at Juli and Arequipa, for
example, enjoyed the services of Indians on their chacaras
.
They had obtained the rights to those Indians when lands
were acquired from private grantees. Throughout the
seventeenth century the Jesuits won exceptions to royal
orders banning personal service and successfully fought
the efforts of caciques to include their Indians in Potosl
46
mita contingents
.
The caciques were willing to do legal battle over just
a few Indians, such was the value of each. Pedro Uychu of
Tinquipaya (Porco) complained in 1610 when he was obliged
to deliver four more Indians than Viceroy Velasco had
required. Twenty-five Indians was the traditional quota
from his pueblo, with sixteen coming from his parcialidad
and nine from the other. A revisita had determined a total
population increase of nine Indians, warranting one more
mitayo from the village. But when a new repartimiento de
la mita was published in 1610 (that of the Marques de
Montesclaros) , he found himself obligated to send twenty of
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the total of twenty-six . ^"^
Uychu's case was unusual in that his pueblo had
experienced an increase in population. More common were
the villages that were only lightly inhabited, their
residents either absent or having moved away. The Indians
were accustomed to traveling, with economic enterprises
spread throughout various ecological zones, and they
resisted any effort to keep them in one place all year
round. The obligations imposed on the Indians by their
caciques and corregidores made life in the pueblos even
less attractive. Religious indoctrination by priests,
and their prevention of pre-hispanic sexual practices,
were also very unpopular with the Indians.
One priest, Pedro Ramirez del Aguila, wrote the
Corregidor de PotosI in 1629 that his village of Tacobamba
was supposed to hold 200 Indians, but only he, a lieutenant
of the Corregidor de Porco, a few alcaldes and other
caciques lived there. The Indians, he said, were all off
working lands, tending to livestock, or run away to distant
4 8valleys and beyond. Another priest, Luis de Vega, was
accused of burning the pre-hispanic village of Tolapampa
in 1616 to force its residents to live in his pueblo.
The difficulties involved in the delivery of mitayos
had earlier led to the abridgement of the Toledan
ordinances by the caciques . Indians who were too old or
too young were forced to serve in the mita , and some mitayos
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were kept at PotosI for years at a time. By the early
1600s even those abuses were unable to fill the quotas
that the caciques were held responsible for. when they
could no longer meet their obligations the Corregidor de
PotosI began to fine the caciques
. At first nine, and
later seven and one-half pesos
, were collected for every
rnitazo the caciques failed to deliver in person, so a minga
could be hired in his place. The caciques were also forced
to pay when the azogueros rejected the Indians they did
deliver, as unfit for service. From these two exactions
came a new form of mita delivery: the entero en plata
, or
mita service in silver.
President Maldonado de Torres noted in 1606 that the
azogueros were already accustomed to receiving service in
silver, and two years later he estimated that 20 per cent
of the mita was delivered in that form.^-"- Ramirez del
Aguila said, in 1629, that his village routinely "served
in silver." He claimed that the caciques spent all their
time chasing Indians to collect the money with which to
make the payment. The Corregidor de Potosi, Rafael Ortiz
de Sotomayor, lowered the sum from nine to seven and a
half pesos to force the azogueros to pay the mingas hired
with the money the same two and one-half pesos per week
that they paid the mitayos . Some azogueros had apparently
begun to reject Indians simply because receipt of service
52in silver saved them the mitayos ' wages for the week.
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The fraction of the mita that arrived in Potosi in
the form of silver grew over time to rather significant
proportions. A source from the second decade of the
seventeenth century breaks the various mita deliveries into
their component parts:
1. The pueblos of Machacopoata
, Aymaya and others
^^^^"^ entirety, half in personand half in silver with which to hire replacementsfor those who chose not to come. 2. The Quillacas,Asanaques, Uruquillas, Aullagas and Punas come in
silver; only the Punas provide some in person; theUruquillas are lacking two-thirds because their
villages are destroyed and the caciques have no
control; the Quillacas fail to deliver a third. 3The Carangas arrive in silver primarily, and fewm person; this province is destroyed by flight onthe part of the Indians, and the caciques spend alot of time looking for Indians from whom to collect
the silver necessary for the entero. 4. The
Chayantas and Sacacas come in person; those of Santiagodel Paso and Tinquipaya comply in silver, and lack
one-half. 5. The Cochabambas
,
Tapacaris y Casayas,Capmotas, Toledos and Cipicipis come in silver; the
Cipicipis and Tapacaris lack one-half. 6. The
correqimiento of Umasuyo sends mostly persons, a
sixth or seventh in silver, and the pueblo of Pucarani
fails usually to send two-thirds. 7. The Copacabanas
of the same correqimiento come in person, save for a
sixth or seventh in silver. 8. The correqimiento
of Caracollo y Cicacica complies in person, and a
sixth or seventh in silver. 9. The correqimiento
of Pacajes complies in person, and a seventh or
eighth in silver. 10. The province of Chucuito
complies in person, save for a seventh or eighth in
silver. 11. The correqimiento of Cabana y Cabanilla
comes mostly in silver; the pueblos of Cabana and
Cabanilla and Hicasio do not sent one for every six
that are obligated, and with an obligation of 300
they send less then 30. 12. The correqimiento of
Paucarcolla comes half in silver, half in person,
save for the pueblo of Capachica which is in the
same condition as Cabana and Cabanilla, and that of
Puno usually fails to send one-third. 13. The
correqimiento of Asangaro y Asillo complies in person,
less a sixth or seventh that comes in silver, and the
pueblo of Asangaro is losing population and that of
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Arapa is already broken down. 14. The OrurncHunoas (who although thev are in ^ho ^
of Cabsn;^ w r^u^^ATi , ^ correqimientor u Dana y Cabanilla, because they are of th^Canas nation, have their own capitLrcomplv ?nperson two-thirds of the time-Jd-the ?es? in silverand they are always missing. 15. Another fSurpueblos of canas, in the sLe corregJmlento but
or :L?rtha^ in persgn/liU a'fifth
nLf 2 "'""'^ silver; and in this way alsocome those from the correqimiento of Quispicancha
person leg^'r'"'^;!^° ^ Canches'^comes
in si?;eJ! ^ ^^''^''^^ P^^^ ^^^^ complies
On the basis of this report, Silvio Zavala estimates that
half of the effective mita was delivered in silver and half
in person, while an eighth or ninth was not delivered at
53
all. A 1620 cgdula, responding to figures submitted by
Contador Alonso Martinez de Pastrana, also claimed that
over one-third of the mita arrived in Potosi in the form
54
of silver. in 1626 the crown asked the Viceroy Marques
de Guadalcazar (1622-1629) whether another report that only
800 of 4,000 mitayos served in person was true.^^
Whatever the true fraction of the mita delivered in
silver—one-third or one-half~the amount of money involved
was substantial. A cacique who was obligated to deliver
twenty Indians each week would have to pay seventy-five
P^sos if half of them were delivered in silver. One can
understand why Fernandez Guarache asked that he be allowed
to resign when it became clear that he would not be able to
meet his province's quota in persons. Those who did comply
with their obligations requested prizes from the crown, for
accomplishing the impossible. Other caciques responded
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to the news that they had been named to serve as capitanes
de la mita by joining the Indians in fleeing from their
home provinces.
Service in Silver and the Azogueros
The emergence of mita service in silver was encouraged
by developments at PotosI was well as in the provinces.
From 1600 to 1633, the azogueros suffered setbacks in
aspects of silver production that were outside their
control: water and mercury. There were minor technological
gains in 1602 and 1603 involving the use of small ovens and
copper, and an innovation in 1621 that reduced the number
of mingas required in the mills, but these discoveries were
unable to reverse the overall decline in the azogueros '
57fortunes. The delivery of silver by the caciques to
meet their mita obligations provided the azogueros with a
badly needed source of capital at a time when their own
reserves were exhausted.
The closing of the main tunnel at Huancavelica, in
accordance with the suggestions of Agia and others, had
aggravated an already tight supply of mercury. Quicksilver
became scarce just as ore quality at Potosi took another
5 8
turn for the worse. The mercury shortage was then
59
joined, in 1608, by the effects of a severe drought. The
azogueros again asked the crown to lower the price of
mercury and reduce the quinto to the diezmo , and warned
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that they were spending their personal fortunes to keep
the mills in production; unless aid was forthcoming—either
from God or the King—they would soon go bankrupt and
Potosi would collapse.
While the azogueros clearly exaggerated their plight,
to convince the crown to grant them more assistance, their
position had deteriorated. The best indication of that
fact was their loss of control over capital to silver
merchants (mercaderes de plata ) and moneylenders
(aviadores ) . As early as 1602 many of the azogueros were
unable to repay the loans they contracted to allow them
to purchase mercury upon its arrival from Huancavelica
.
Although they were protected by Toledan and royal
provisions from imprisonment for debts, some of the
azogueros had renounced that right to secure an agreement
with a merchant or money lender. As more and more of its
members found themselves jailed, the Gremio de azogueros
petitioned Velasco to extend their immunity to cases where
the right had been waived. After considerable vacillation,
and interim decisions by the Corregidor de Potosi and his
lieutenants, the Viceroy ordered the extention of immunity
to cases where it was renounced, but he refused to make
the order retroactive. Soon thereafter, he permitted the
royal treasury officials at Potosi to rent an azoguero '
s
mills to satisfy his creditors. The Viceroy agreed to
the inclusion of the azogueros ' mitayos in the rental
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agreement.
There are other signs that the azogueros were in dire
financial straits. In 1603, for example, Mesla argued that
only eight of them had the means to buy Black slaves.
When the Gremio voted to construct new reservoirs and
aqueducts after the 1608 drought, many of the azogueros
failed to make their promised contributions. The attempt
to collect those donations caused one of the few
intra-Gremio squabbles of the seventeenth century.
The glory years for the azogueros were clearly past.
Their battle for protection from imprisonment for debts was
a struggle to retain their privileged status in the face of
their diminished importance; the silver merchants and
moneylenders had replaced them as the financial backbone
of Potosl. The azogueros could no longer base their claim
to privileges on Potosl's future production of silver. Now
C A
they pointed to their past service and current need.
When the Cabildo de Potosi sent Cristobal de Molina to
Lima in 1608 to argue against Oruro ' s request for mitayos
,
he asked Viceroy Montesclaros to grant a reduction in the
price of mercury and other concessions. Molina was
followed in 16 09 by Diego Caveza de Vaca, who presented
the Viceroy with a statement outlining the azogueros '
difficulties with water, mercury, poor ore and the mita.
The solution of problems with water and ore were obviously
beyond the Marques' capabilities. Processions and prayers
130
called upon heaven for rain, and plans were made to bring
water from Tabaconuno. The royal share of production,
the delivery of mitayos, and the price and availability
of mercury, however, were all matters that the Viceroy
could influence.
When the azogueros requested Montesclaros • permission
to send a procurador to Spain, he asked them to consolidate
their position. They responded with these seven points:
Their financial difficulties were now caused bypast debts and production costs that outran profitsThe burden of old debts needed to be lifted.
There were not enough mitayos
. The corregidores
and priests conspired to strangle the mita ,~so
—
that the Indians would be free to work in their
enterprises
.
The Indians were spread far and wide, for the
corregidores had failed to keep them in the pueblos.
The Viceroy's order that Oruro was not to divert
mitayos from Potosi had not been enforced, and
the failure to do so was dangerous for the future
of silver production at Potosi.
Mercury was absolutely crucial and had to be
readily available at Potosi. A reserve of
quicksilver was therefore necessary.
In recognition of the azogueros ' previous service
to the crown, the quinto should be lowered to the
diezmo
,
as had been done in New Spain. Mercury,
moreover, should be distributed at Potosi at
cost.
The mitayos should work on feast days. The priests
preyed upon the Indians to collect money for their
festivals, which always ended in drunken spectacles.
It was better for the Indians to work than get drunk.
Lest the Viceroy or the crown take their arguments lightly,
the azogueros again warned that unless their needs were met
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silver production at Potosi would come to an end. They
even threatened that the cerro might fall into the hands
of the Protestants!^^
The threat that Potosl would collapse without further
concessions was the key to the azogueros ' bargaining
position. They were, to an extent, holding the cerro for
ransom. The azogueros continued to apply pressure for
more government assistance. They sent yet another petition
to Lima in 1610, in which they asked that the quinto be
reduced to the diezmo and that mercury be sold at cost.
They now called for the mitayos to work on Mondays rather
than on feast days, and added a request that alcabalas be
6 7
abolished. In 1612 the Gremio sent Juan de Ibarra to
Spain to plead the azogueros ' case before the crown and
the Council of the Indies; and in 1616 it despatched Juan
6 8de Ayala to Lima. Finally, in 1617, the azogueros asked
the Principe de Esquilache to assist them in their efforts
to restore the mita, and the Toledan production formula in
69general, to earlier levels.
Montesclaros was responsive to the azogueros ' demand
that they retain exclusive access to mercury and mitayo
labor. The Viceroy denied Oruro's request for mercury in
1608, and in 1612 he prohibited the assignment of mitayos
70to new mining centers, including Oruro. Thus, old
azoguero privileges were upheld, but despite the efforts
of a parade of Cabildo and Gremio procuradores , and threats
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that PotosI would collapse without further aid, no new
concessions were granted.
The azogueros
' use of mita service in silver allowed
them to survive the production crises of the early
seventeenth century despite their failure to win the new
concessions. They not only used the money the caciques
delivered to hire substitutes, but also to pay operating
costs and their personal expenses. Money that was not used
to hire a minga was called an "indio de faltriquera , " or
"pocket Indian." The azogueros claimed, in their petitions,
that they were spending more to produce silver than they
gained in profits. While their profit margin had grown
smaller, their claim that they were supporting production
with their own fortunes was untrue. They were still making
a profit, but only via illegal means. Misuse of service in
silver, the rental or sale of mitayos
, and contraband were
the principal means the azogueros used to ensure that their
costs remained less than their gross profits. "^"^
The continued profitability of silver production for
the azogueros is demonstrated by their response to two
crises of the 1620s. The first was a "civil war" between
the predominantly Basque azogueros and an alliance of other
Spaniards and Creoles—known as the Vicunas because of their
vicuna-skin hats. The struggle had its roots in the late
sixteenth century, when the Basques had established
themselves as the largest single force within the Gremio
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de azogueros and the Cabildo de Potosl. Their political
control of PotosI was resented by the Vicunas. As their
economic fortunes declined in the early years of the
seventeenth century, the Basque azogueros moved to
monopolize the control of the larger mines at the expense
of other groups. The Vicunas tried to block their move
through a legal attack on the Basques' control of the
Cabildo and other legal means, but when those efforts
failed they resorted to force of arms. Hostilities
smoldered from 1615 onward, bursting into violent
confrontation in 1622. After three years of intermittent
warfare a fragile peace was finally re-gained only through
mutual exhaustion. Because no victory had been won,
however, violence continued to flare from time to time."^^
No sooner had the "civil war" at Potosi calmed down
than the villa was inundated by a disastrous flood. After
the droughts of the early 1600s, and with the construction
of new aqueducts and reservoirs, water had not been a great
problem. But on March 15, 1626, the largest of the lagunas
,
Cari cari, collapsed. Water rushed down on the mills and
villa
,
and the destruction was catastrophic. With the
help of government loans of mercury, a reduction of the
quinto for a short while, and the assignment of Porco's
mitayos to reconstruction, however, the azogueros were
7 3
able to rebuild their mills.
Both the "civil war" and the flood disrupted silver
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production, but they did not end it. The azogueros '
response to those crises demonstrates that silver mining
at Potosl was still a profitable undertaking. The battle
between the Basques and the Vicunas for control of the
villa would not have been waged had there been nothing
to fight for. The mills would not have been rebuilt after
the flood unless there were prospects for future profits.
Had the silver industry really been on the verge of
collapse, as the azogueros claimed, surely the events of
the 1620s would have brought it down.
The emergence of mita service in silver provided the
azogueros with an element of flexibility in an increasingly
inflexible and hostile environment. The mita was therefore
an unofficial capital subsidy as well as a forced labor
system. The azogueros ' misuse of service in silver—not
to be confused with their mistreatment of mitayos who
served in person—and their involvement in contraband
allowed them to make a profit despite the crown's refusal
to grant them new concessions. At the same time their
participation in those illegal activities was responsible
for their inability to secure further aid from the
government
.
The Government and the de facto Mita
The crown's position vis-a-vis the azogueros was eroded
further by the appearance of mita service in silver. The
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new form of the mita was an unauthorized arrangement
between the azo^ueros and' the caciques to which it was not
a party. Government officials in Lima and Madrid, moreover,
were unable to determine whether the money delivered by the^
caci^ was used to further silver production or for the
private aims of the azogueros. As with earlier changes in
the de facto mita, however, the crown could only condemn
service in silver as an abuse of the Toledan system, and
await an opportunity to counter it on a functional level.
The crown conceded its relative weakness with regard to
the encomenderos and the azogueros in 1609, in its second
c|dula on Indian personal service. All of the goals of
the 1601 edict were preserved, but Phillip m instructed
the Marqugs de Montesclaros to delay their implementation
until the prospects for their realization were more
. . 74promising
.
The azogueros ' requests for new concessions presented
the crown with a dilemma. Each of their proposed measures
would have lessened its share of silver production without
any firm guarantee that the azogueros would use the aid to
increase production. The King did not want to grant the
concessions if they would only enhance the azogueros '
position at his expense, but he also worried that their
warnings about Potosl's imminent collapse might be true.
He denied their requests to punish them for their misuse of
the mita ; and because Potosi did not break down as they
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had threatened, the King was convinced that his denial of
aid had been correct. But because no new concessions were
forthcoming, the azogueros grew ever more dependent upon
their misuse of service in silver and other illegal
practices.
Viceregal efforts to counter the azogueros ' abuses were
ineffective for a number of reasons. One was the isolation
of the viceroys in Lima. Luis de Velasco's successors did
not venture to Upper Peru, but relied upon officials in La
Plata and Potosi to administer the mita. The Conde de
Monterrey died before he was able to visit the realm. The
Marques de Montesclaros traveled only as far as
Huancavelica, arriving in 1608. He found that mining
center plagued by similar problems as those at Potosl, and
abandoned his plans to increase mercury production there.
He chose instead to confirm President Maldonado de Torres'
order that new deposits of mercury be discovered and
exploited for use at Potosi."^^ The Principe de Esquilache
and Marqugs de GuadalcSzar both followed precedent, and
did not go to Charcas
.
The removal of the viceroys from the everyday reality
of Potosi silver production caused them to depend upon
governing techniques much like those that were used by the
crown; and it resulted in greater opportunities for delay
and confusion. An order issued by the king would be
modified in Lima to conform to the viceroy's view of its
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propriety and chances for success. As noted with regard to
the 1601 cidula, the crown and the Council of the Indies
expected that to happen. But once the viceroys began to
direct the mita from Lima, their own provisions, as well as
the adjusted orders of the crown, were subjected to similar
modifications by government officials at Potosl. Thus, not
only were the crown's orders vulnerable to wider
interpretations of their intent and the extent to which
they could be executed, the procedure also took years to
complete. The result was even greater isolation of the
crown and the Council, and the complication of Hapsburg
administration of the mita.
The assignment of responsibility for the mita to
officials in Charcas might not have been so significant
had authority accompanied responsibility. But the
viceroys insisted that they remain in the position of
authority where the mita was concerned. Luis de Velasco
held to Toledo's premise that only the viceroy, in the
name of the crown, could force the Indians to work in the
mines. His personal involvement ranged from making broad
policy decisions to minor adjustments of his repartimiento
to reward or punish individual azogueros . "^^ The Conde de
Monterrey expressed his intention to continue at the head
of the mita in a direct order issued to the Audiencia de
7 7Charcas not to meddle in mita matters.
Monterrey's successors reaffirmed his insistence on
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viceregal supremacy. The Principe de Esquilache, for
example, ordered the Audiencia de Charcas not to hear the
appeals of the azogueros he had denied Indians in his
repartimiento .'^Q But the viceroys, despite their expressed
intentions, were unable to exercise the authority they so
ardently protected. Apart from the problems caused by
'
distance and their reliance on local officials, they were
distracted by their other responsibilities. The Marques de
GuadalcSzar had to contend with civil strife at Potosl,
Dutch attacks on the port of Callao, Indian wars, drought
and famine—as well as the Potosl mita.^^
A second cause of viceregal ineffectiveness was the
fact that ultimate authority really rested with the crown.
There were, therefore, two centers of authority: one in
Lima and the other in Madrid. The former was more '
immediate while the latter was theoretically superior.
An official who disagreed with a viceroy could appeal to
the crown; one who disapproved of a royal order could argue
for its suspension by the viceroy. No decision was ever
final, and there was little incentive to come to an
accomodation with other sectors of government. Finally,
orders could come from either center of authority, or both,
and could therefore be inconsistent and contradictory.
A third reason for viceregal ineffectiveness was the
means used to administer the mita from a distance. The
crown divided the responsibility for overseeing the mita
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among the various government officials at PotosI and in
La Plata. The Audiencia de Charcas was assigned the task
of protecting the Indians from abuse, but only by reporting
incidents of mistreatment to the viceroy. The viceroys
held presidents of the Audiencia responsible for directing
the shipment of refined silver from PotosI, distributing
mercury from the royal warehouses, and drafting their
repartimientos de la mita. Corregidores de PotosI were
assigned to the daily administration of the mita and the
supervision of the provinces' compliance with their mita
obligations. The division of responsibility was deemed
necessary to ensure that the viceroys and the crown would
receive information from more than one source, and to
prevent the azogueros from subverting the officials who
were sent to govern PotosI.
Competition among officials was encouraged by the
design of Hapsburg bureaucracy, but in the case of the mita
the division of duties further compromised the government's
ability to administer the system. As greater problems
developed at PotosI from 1600 to 1633, professional
jealousies and the protection of personal interests by
officials combined to foment conflicts that went beyond
healthy competition. Feelings were particularly bitter
between the Audiencia de Charcas and government officials
in Lima. Traditional rivalries between La Plata and Lima
had been heightened when Velasco selected the Corregidor de
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Potosl, an official who was subordinate to the Audiencia
within the legal hierarchy, as his personal representative
in mita matters; and Monterrey's order to the court not to
meddle added insult to injury. The Audiencia responded
that it would continue to protect the Indians, for the
crown had instructed it to do so.^^ La Plata, it argued,
was much closer to PotosI than Lima, and the court's
proximity to the cerro guaranteed the quick resolution of
mining disputes and an ongoing concern for the mitayos.
Government officials in Lima, the Audiencia charged, cared
only about the amount of silver they sent to Spain.
When the Conde de Monterrey died after only a year in
Peru, the Audiencia de Lima claimed the right, in accordance
with a 1550 cgdula
,
to govern the realm until the arrival
of his successor. The Audiencias of Charcas and Quito
replied to the Audiencia de Lima's pretension that they
were its equals and would administer their respective
territories. Both courts were dismayed when the crown
backed the Audiencia de Lima in an order of November 20,
841606. That was not the end of the matter, however.
The silver deposits at Oruro were discovered in 1606
as well, and by the time the crown's order arrived in
Peru, Oruro and PotosI had become pawns in the struggle
between the Audiencias of Lima and Charcas. The former
supported the new center's request for mercury and mita
labor; the latter argued that only Potosi should receive
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government assistance. The Marques de Montesclaros adopted
the Audiencia de Lima's stance when he arrived in Peru, and
he ordered the Audiencia de Charcas to obey his ban on the
delivery of mitayos or mercury to Oruro.^^
The Viceroy fined the Audiencia de Charcas 1,000 pesos
in gold per member when it continued to oppose his orders.
Undaunted, the court argued for the sustenance of Oruro in
its correspondence with the crown. It claimed that the
new mining center was the heir apparent to a failing
PotosI, and should be assisted with mercury and a mita of
8 7its own. The Audiencia 's support for Oruro, it claimed,
was a courageous defense of the crown's interests—royal
quintos and other tax revenue there had totaled 106,796
P^sos during the first six months of production; and the
sale of offices in the new villa of San Phelipe de Austria
would net its namesake another 109,800 pesos .
Other government officials joined in the battle over
Oruro. The Cabildo de PotosI, as one would expect, opposed
the new mining center, and its representatives—Molina and
Caveza de Vaca—were instrumental in winning Montesclaros'
rulings against concessions for Oruro. The Corregidor de
PotosI was also pro-azoguero and anti-Oruro. When he sent
judges to San Phelipe to retrieve the Indians who had gone
there from PotosI, however, the Audiencia de Charcas
8 9suspended their powers. In retalitation for his alliance
with the Audiencia 's limeno enemies, moreover, it withdrew
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the commissions of the judges the Corregidor had sent to
increase the number of mitayos delivered from the
provinces. The Audiencia's right to suspend the
Corregidor 's commissions was hotly contested by officials
in Potosi, La Plata, Oruro, Lima and Madrid, but the most
important effect of its actions was that provincial
corregidores and economic interests found themselves with
an important ally in their effort to keep their Indians
from being taken off to serve at Potosl in the mita.
The clearest indication of the viceroys' inability
to administer the mita from Lima was the constant stream
of their reiterated, and disobeyed, orders. In 1616, for
example, the Principe de Esquilache reissued Velasco's
1603 provision for the delivery of mitayos
, as it was being
91ignored. The Marques de Guadalcazar was compelled to
repeat Velasco and Canete's orders that the mitayos were to
work only in those activities to which they had been
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assigned. All of the viceroys ordered the azogueros to
pay the Indians their travel allowances, but they were
93
never paid.
Indeed, it seemed as though the only impact a viceregal
order could have was the opposite of that which had been
intended. The Principe de Esquilache found it necessary to
revoke Velasco's order empowering the royal officials at
Potosi to rent mills to pay the azogueros ' debts. He noted
that other creditors were always paid before the crown, and
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that some azogueros had indebted themselves to the crown
simply to allow the rental of their mills, and thus the
Indians assigned to them.^'*
The viceroys were very much aware of the limitations
of their power over the Indians and the azogueros
. when
the crown pressed the Principe de Esquilache to begin
establishing a resident work force at PotosI in 1619, he
responded that there was no way the required number of
Indians could be settled, with the required lands, near
the villa. He said that a total of 38,241 laborers would
be needed, and allowing for four-person families the total
Indian population would reach 191,205. The Council of the
Indies argued that an exemption from tribute would attract
the Indians to PotosI, but the Viceroy pointed to the much
cleverer means they already used to keep from serving in
9 5the mita or paying tribute. Another cedula of 1619
instructed the azogueros to pay the veedores and alcalde
n^ayor de minas
, rather than deducting the half-peso per
week from the mitayos ' wages. Esquilache suspended that
order, noting that the azogueros would reject any attempt
96to enforce it.
The Marques de GuadalcSzar received a royal cgdula in
1621 that ordered him to abolish service in silver. He
realized that execution of the order was impossible given
the extent of the abuse and the violence engulfing PotosI.
He tried, instead, to increase the percentage of the mita
144
that was delivered in person, and so empowered the
Corregidor de Potosl to suspend and replace any corregidor
who failed to comply with his mita obligations.^^
Royal and viceregal orders were reissued to remind
their recipients of the goals toward which they were
supposed to be striving. Viceregal directives, like the
crown's cgdulas, were also designed to increase the
ability of local officials to control those who were living
under their jurisdiction. Thus, as with the kings' orders,
the viceroys' edicts were at times exaggerated so that
the goal of the order might survive its modification by
officials at the local level. One of the keystones to the
viceroys' directives on the mita was their insistence that
the Toledan system was still viable, and that any departure
for its tenets was an abuse of the mita.
In reality this "official" position was untenable, but
as an administrative tool it was employed with some success.
Each time a new repartimiento de la mita was published some
azogueros found themselves denied mitayos for their misuse
of service in silver and other abuses. Both Velasco and
Esquilache spoke of having deprived guilty azogueros
.
The assignment of mitayos to the azogueros therefore
acquired a similarity to the granting of encomiendas
, for
the grantees received the Indians in recognition of their
past performance. The azogueros did not immediately protest
this shift away from the concept that the mita was part of
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their pact with Francisco de Toledo, because they had
adopted the same tenor in their petitions to the crown
for new concessions; and because those who lost their
""^^^y^^ ^^^^ fe^' and were usually able to secure Indians
in one way or another.
An example of the relationship between the viceroys in
Lima and officials in Potosl is that of the Marques de
Montesclaros and President Maldonado de Torres. Maldonado
was not involved in the Audiencia de Charcas' battle with
the Viceroy because, after 1604, he spent most of his time
in Potosi, overseeing the despatch of silver and the
distribution of mercury to the azogueros .^^ He supported
Potosi against the Audiencia on the question of aid for
Oruro, and he wrote his oidores that mercury and Indians
were indeed being diverted to the new mining center. "^^^
The President was greatly appreciated by the azogueros for
his flexibility and understanding; when he prepared to
leave the villa in 1607, for example, the Cabildo begged
him to stay.'''^''"
Maldonado proposed a series of mining ordinances in
1608 that would have greatly assisted the azogueros . ^^'^
The Viceroy was impressed with the thorough knowledge of
silver production that they demonstrated, but he was not
prepared to adopt the new guidelines. When the crown's
second cedula on Indian personal service arrived in 1610,
however, Montesclaros empowered Maldonado to investigate
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the prospects for its implementation. The President
brought a junta together in March to consider the crown's
plan for the replacement of the mita with a resident labor
force, but it could reach no firm resolution. The junta
disbanded with promises to provide Maldonado with written
position papers on the matter.
Two of those papers have survived. One was authored
by the Jesuits of Potosl. it reviewed the evils of the
mita as the Fathers knew them in 1610, but argued against
the introduction of any major novelties. Although they
were attracted to the concept that voluntary labor might
someday replace the mita, the Jesuits believed that the
resident labor force plan was unrealistic. They suggested
that the crown order the repopulation of the provinces
that were obligated to the mita instead, so that the
weight of the system would fall on the shoulders of more
Indians
.
A second paper is identifiable only by those who signed
it: Juan Martinez de Mecolaeta, Juan Maria DSvalos de
Castillo, Juan Ndfiez de Ovando, Pedro de VerSstegui and
Fernando Joan de Ibarra. These gentlemen were all members
of the Cabildo de PotosI, and as one might expect, they
also supported the continuation of the status quo."^^^
Maldonado 's investigation of the 1609 cgdula repeated
the process that Velasco had undertaken in 1603, in response
to the 1601 edict, and it arrived at the same conclusion:
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the mita was necessary and irreplaceable. In keeping with
that decision, the President prepared a new repartimiento
in June of 1610 that involved no major changes of the
system; the mita ordinaria included 4,413 Indians . '"^^
When the Principe de Esquilache published his repartimiento
in 1618, the only changes he had made were to limit the
number of mitayos assigned to the soldados (to 200) and to
reserve some 200 others for use in future adjustments
caused by complaints or unforeseen need. His mita ordinaria
totaled 4,29 4.^°^ The Marqugs de GuadalcSzar followed the
lead of his predecessors in 1624, and assigned the
responsibility for his repartimiento to President Diego de
Portugal of the Audiencia de Charcas. On that occasion the
"^ita ordinaria was reduced to 4,175 Indians— 3,982 for the
azogueros and 283 for the soldados °
^
None of these repartimientos gave any indication that
mita service in silver existed, and the first two ignored
the fact that the provinces were having a difficult time
supporting the system. Everyone knew that the number of
Indians an azoquero really had, or how he used them, bore
little resemblance to the number of Indians he received on
paper. These repartimientos simply ensured that the status
quo would not be disturbed.
President Portugal's repartimiento
,
however, did show
some signs that the originario population of the provinces
was no longer able to support a 4,000-Indian mita ordinaria.
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The Indians who habitually failed to come to Potosi were
now distributed among all of the azogueros
, so they would
all share some of the burden of the missing and
uncooperative ayllus
. The meses, who had earlier been
assigned to support activities in and around Potosi,
now found themselves included in the contingents that were
sent to the mines and the mills. -"-^^
The government's efforts to reverse the effects of
Indian migration had been as unsuccessful as its attempts
to control the azogueros
. Velasco had been encouraged by
the crown to return the forasteros to their villages, and
the Marques de Montesclaros received very explicit orders
to do so in 1607. The Marques ordered two oidores of the
Audiencia de Charcas to conduct the reducciones, but they
refused; the task, they argued, was impossible for two men
to perform. ^ The Principe de Esquilache ordered the
forasteros in La Plata and at Potosi either to return home
or serve in the mita, but most of them did neither.
Because no local official took an interest in the matter
the Viceroy's order had little effect.''""'""'" In 1623 the
Marquis de GuadalcSzar told President Portugal to have
each corregidor hold the forasteros who were living in
his district until their own corregidores or caciques
112could come for them. Like the earlier edicts, this
last directive was thoroughly unenforceable.
Guadalcazar was convinced, nevertheless, that the Indian
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population of the pueblos would not support the mita at its
current levels for very long. He wrote the crown that the
quotas demanded of the provinces should be reduced to
one-seventh of their originario population, no matter what
the effect on silver production at Potosi might be. He
received the King's permission to proceed, but because he
feared that the azogueros might revolt if the downward
revisions were implemented all at once, the Marqugs waited
for the pueblos to request revisitas before lowering their
quotas. Seven such revisitas were conducted during the
last years of his viceroyalty, and the mita obligations of
Caquiavire, Macha and other villages were lowered. The
"^i^^ ordinaria was reduced by a total of 147 Indians ^
The Marqugs de Guadalclzar was replaced in 1629 by the
Conde de Chinch6n (1629-1639)
. Phillip iv sent the new
Viceroy a cedula on February 18, 1631 that ordered him to
determine whether mita obligation should be extended to
more provinces. A 16 30 memorial had claimed that one-third
of the Indian population in the mita provinces had been
lost since Toledo's viceroyalty. The crown was now
convinced that the reducciones that it had so often ordered
were impossible and that a resident labor force was also
unrealistic. The Conde was instructed to sell the lands
that had been left by the long-absent Indians.''""'"'^ ChinchSn
was reluctant to concede defeat on the reducciones
,
however,
and he responded that there already were not enough lands
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on which to settle the few Indians who were returning to
their pueblos. He warned that the sale of their lands
would permanently remove any possibility of resettling the
Indians in their villages in the future, but the crown
insisted that the Viceroy comply with its earlier order
in another of 1634.^^^ The Conde de Chinchon was therefore
faced with the need to develop another means for reconciling
Potosl's insatiable demand for mitayos and the depleted
originario population in the provinces.
Summary
The seventeenth century opened with a royal order to
abolish the mita
, included in the crown's 1601 cedula
banning Indian personal service. The edict came in
response to the King's deteriorating position vis-a-vis
the colonists, both the encomenderos and the azogueros
,
and it was meant to strengthen Viceroy Velasco's ability
to combat those powerful Peruvian interest groups. The
mita, in fact, was never really threatened. Indeed, the
investigation conducted by Velasco in 1603 underscored
Peru's dependence upon Potosi silver production, and
Potosl's dependence on the mita .
Mitayos constituted only a small percentage of the
total Indian labor force at Potosl, but they were the most
important workers there. The mitayos toiled inside the
cerro as apiris
,
hauling silver ore out of the mines for
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refining in the amalgamation mills. Mingas worked
voluntarily in the mills and in support activities, but
they would rarely do the work that the mitayos were forced
to perform; and when they did, they demanded very high
wages
.
The mitayos' increased importance was not reflected in
their working conditions. Indeed, the work inside the
mines was harder than ever, and they were seriously
mistreated as well. The mitayos ' wages were insufficient
to meet their needs, let alone to make service in the mita
attractive to them. The perquisites that Toledo had
provided for that purpose, and his provisions for their
good treatment, were now things of the past. In response
to their deteriorating situation, the Indians fled from
the mita.
Indian migration was also caused by their flight from
the provinces to escape the oppression they suffered at
the hands of their caciques
,
priests and corregidores
.
Viceregal immunity from taxation and mita obligation for
forasteros, the growing need for labor on chacaras and in
other enterprises, and the opening of new mining centers
also caused the Indians to leave their pueblos. Many
migrated to completely outside the provinces obligated to
the Potosl mita. The economic interests that competed
with the azogueros for Indian labor blamed the mita for
depopulating the provinces, but it was only one of many
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causes. The magnitude of the demographic decline in the
mita provinces is unclear, moreover, because of the
deception practiced by the provincial interests, the
failure to include forasteros in censi, and the various
means used by the Indians to evade their obligations.
The caciques were the key to the mita, as they had
been in the sixteenth century. The developments in the
provinces and at Potosi from 1600 to 1633 made it even
more difficult for them to deliver mitayos to the
azogueros than before. The methods they had used
earlier—keeping Indians at Potosi longer than was
permitted, bringing old men and boys to serve in the mita,
etc.—were no longer adequate by the early 16 00s. The
caciques were fined nine, and later seven and one-half,
P^sos for every Indian they could not deliver in person,
ostensibly so that a minga could be hired in his place.
The azogueros ' efforts to maintain their profits in
the face of production crises—caused by mercury and water
shortages, and lower-quality ore—coincided with the
caciques ' difficulties with the delivery of mitayos . A
marriage of the azogueros ' need for capital and the
caciques ' payment of fines led to a new form of the mita:
service in silver. The azogueros used some of the money
they collected from the caciques to hire mingas , but they
also used some to defray production costs and other
expenses. The mita, therefore, became something more than a
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draft labor system. it was now an unofficial capital
subsidy as well. By 1630, the percentage of the mita that
the azogueros received in silver had grown to between
one-third and one-half of the total entero.
Service in silver could not be stopped by the Hapsburg
government. The crown's relative powerlessness to affect
developments in Peru was admitted in its second cedula on
personal service in 1609. Not only did the King suffer
the effects of spatial isolation, however, he also found
himself atop an ever more complicated colonial bureaucracy.
The viceroys in Lima were also ineffective, in part because
they depended upon government officials in Charcas to
administer the mita, and employed the same techniques to
rule Potosi from afar that the crown used to govern the
Indies: exaggerated legal demands, and the division of
responsibilities among local officials. A second tier of
bureaucratic flexibility was created, and authority was
divided between Lima and Madrid. The viceroys' efforts
were also compromised by the vigorous infighting between
the Audiencia de Charcas and other government officials.
The government was also unable to conduct new
reducciones
,
or otherwise control the Indians who lived in
Upper Peru. The crown's plan for the establishment of a
resident work force at Potosi to replace the mita was
deemed impossible to execute as well. But some means were
needed to solve the problems created by the inability of
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the provinces to support the system.
The Viceroys' direction of the mita from Lima, and thus
their dependence on the officials stationed at PotosI,
caused their orders to become exaggerated, so they could
withstand modification at the local level. One of the
official positions the viceroys' adopted for that purpose
was that the Toledan mita was still viable, and that any
digression from its tenets represented an abuse. On the
basis of that stance the viceroys removed mitayos from
some of the azogueros for their indulgence in "pocket
Indians" and other abuses. The azogueros did not quickly
challenge the viceroys on the issue because their
directives were generally defused in practice by the
presidents of Charcas and corregidores de Potosi. Those
officials were the buffer between viceregal orders and
potosino reality that allowed the de facto mita to
continue despite the viceroys' "official" position.
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50. For the origin of mita service in silver, see
Zavala, Servicio personal
,
II, 69. His information comesfrom an anonymous and undated paper entitled "De la mitade Potosi, y reducciones del Reino." The paper is
published in a Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Relations
edition, Livro Primeiro do Governo do Brasil, 1607 -1633
(Rio de Janeiro: Departamento de Imprensa Nacional, 1958)
,
7-28. A margin note on the document says it was obtained
from "Dom Rafael Ortis." Don Rafael Ortiz de Sotomayor was
Corregidor de PotosI from 1608 to 1617, and from the
context of the paper I believe it was produced during his
tenure (the Principe de Esquilache is said to be the most
recent viceroy)
.
Zavala discusses the paper on II, 67-70.
A 1620 cgdula against the entero en plata said it responded
to Contador Alonso Martinez de Pastrana's report; perhaps
he was the author of the paper. The 1620 edict is noted
in note 54, below.
51. ANB, M 123, no. 2 (see note 35); and Zavala,
Servicio personal
,
II, 32, respectively.
52. Ramirez del Aguila, 118-120; Jesuits of Potosi,
"Pareceres de los Padres" (see note 26), 120. Both sources
note the cause of the reduction from nine pesos per week.
164
lb ™! described in note 50.quoted passage is fro. Zavalari^^ personal
, i?? 68-69
andf^;^.^''^ nt^ ^ ' ' 251v-253, "Cidula real a lau iencia de Charcas: Informe al virrev sobre lo oi
™f^'I'^'^'r ^^"^^^^^ Pastrana pLpone qie ^ara
respec^Lame^S""'" ""'"'"^ ^ '^^^^ le m??ayos,
el cerro de nar;.^
socavones que atraviesen
enc^r^^?. ! ? - P^""^^' ^ ^^^^^^ mitayos y se
h2 ?o= ^
los senores de minas e ingenios que recibende l s indios siete pesos semanales para no trabaiar enlas minas
. .
.
/' Madrid, 15. VII. 1620 (MC 6^?; mSm 525)Another copy of the order is AGI, Charcas 266? no 25B
"tanto de el CapO de Carta de Su Magd al Priniipe deesquilache virey sobre Los indios de plata de Potossi,"Z fs., of the same date. See, also, Zavala, Servicio
??^^''rh \ ^^^^^"^ Escalona y Aguero—see note116, Chapter II). Crespo, Guerra, 19, cites a letter
Q S"'J^q''';J^^5°
Sarmiento de Sotomayor to the crown, Potosi,
9 V. 1619 (AGI, Charcas 52), that claims that one-third ofthe mitayos were missing.
55. Zavala, Servicio personal
, II, 79-80.
56. Castillo (AGI, Charcas 270, no. 33C—see note 30,Chapter II), 8, says that the entire population of Condes,
some 1,240 Indians, failed to come in the mita. They werejoined, he says, by Moromoros, Chachacas and~Ancocabas
.
I have seen two instances were caciques sought compensationfor their service as capitanes : a) ANB, ACh.LA 14, fs.14V-15, "Parecer de la Audiencia de La Plata en lainformaci6n de servicios de don Antonio Peraza de Ayala
y Rojas de Gomera, gobernador de la provincia de Chucuito,"
La Plata, 23. XI. 1601 (MC 454; MOM 426); and b) AGNP,
Derecho Indiano, C. 79, "Testimonio de los autos seguidos
por D. Bias Ignacio Catacora, Cacique principal de Accra
en la provincia de Chucuito, a fin de que se le acordasen
las gracias y premios a que sus mayores se habian hecho
acreedores por sus servicios al Rey, y su continua
asistencia a la pesada mita de Potosi," (incomplete),
1625, 152 fs.
57. ANB, C 799, "Capltulo de carta de la Audiencia de
La Plata al virrey del PerQ: Se espera un acrecentamiento
en la saca de metales de Potos£ en raz6n de un nuevo
beneficio de los metales negrillos en que han venido a dar
algunos mineros," La Plata, 26. XII. 1602, 1 f. (MC 464);
ANB, C 866, "Capitulo de carta de esta Audiencia al virrey
del Peru: Aunque los metales de Potosi no tienen la
riqueza que solian tener no hay disminuci6n en los quintos
reales, gracias a los nuevos procedimientos de beneficio
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como el del cobre v la r^^i =
La Plata ?fi YTT iLt ? ^ "^ue se da toda ayuda,"
t '
Capltulo de acuerdo del cabildo de Poto^T.nombran al alcalde ordinario Salvador de Campos v^lveinticuatro Antonio de Rueda como diputados para aLmformen sobre el nuevo cedazo de cerner meLles ofrLn^oper Gonzalo Atanez," PotosI, 8.va62nMC eo^arM^M IsSa)
.
A J^' .^^i^^ ^® Ugarte to the crown, La Plata, 10 XI 1600Aud^^^de^Charc^ Correspondencia (ed. by ^Leviuler??
'
CPl1^2 ^7. ^9^.^^?gr^»g ' r^P°^s^ to the drought, BNB,
Z '/ ' 263V-264, "Capltulo de acuerdo del cabildode Potosi: Habigndose quejado los azogueros del rigor conque se les cobra lo que deben dar para la obra de JIslagunas de Tabaconuno, se nombran diputados que lo vean,"PotosI, 20.XI.1609 (MC 549). The President of theAudiencia commented on the shortage of water in ANB, M 3,
5^^^ presidente, el licenciado AlonsoMaldonado de Torres, estante en PotosI, a esta RealAudiencia: Los ingresos de real hacienda estSn quebrantados
en PotosI por falta de agua y azogue con que hacer funcionarlos ingenios y beneficiar los metales," Potosi, 8.1.1609,
1 f. (MC 508). The following day he reported that the water
was all gone: ANB, M 3, no. 16, "Carta de su presidente,
ei licenciado Alonso Maldonado de Torres, asistente enPotosi, a esta Real Audiencia: La escasgz de agua para los
mgenios es absolute," Potosi, 9.1.1609, 1 f. (MC 539)
ArzSns, Historia, I, 262-265, says that the drought tookplace in 1606.
60. These claims were made continually. They areincluded in BNB, CPLA 12, fs. 139-140v, "Acta de cabildo
abierto celebrado en Potosi para ver lo que se ha de hacer
en vista de que de seis anos a esta parte los metales del
Cerro Rico son de ley tan pobre que no alcanza su valor
a cubrir los costos," Potosi, 30. IX. 1608 (MC 535); and
BNB, CPLA 12, fs. 144-145v, "Acuerdo del cabildo de
Potosi: Sobre una peticion de los azogueros para que se
busque remedio a la ruina que amenaza a las labores mineras
por la diminucion de la riqueza del Cerro y otras causas,
"
Potosi, 14.x. 1608 (MC 535b). Nearly a decade later the
problems had not changed: BNB, CPLA 15, fs. 346-348v,
"Acuerdo del cabildo: Escrlbase al virrey encareciendo
la necesidad y urgencia de proveer lo conveniente ante la
decadencia actual del servicio de mita que sefialen los
azogueros en memorial inserto, presentando ante este
cabildo y amenaza para en definitiva las labores mineras
de esta villa," Potosi, 29. VII. 1617 (MC 590; MOM 518).
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• ANP rl 5^
azogueros' problems with mercury, see
^ ^n^f ^' 9^^-85. "Carta del sr President^ Don DiOde Portugal, escrita a nos Los Juezes/ officiales De laHazienda de Su Magd desta Villa impl de Potossi en Veinticinco de novi.e de mill seisciOs y diez y siete aOe " "La Plata, 25. XI. 1617. ^'
61. ANB, M 143, "RepresentaciSn dirigida a esta realaudiencia por ... los azogueros de PotosI, sobre que seles guarde el privilegio de no poder estar presos ni
rematarse sus bienes por deudas aunque hubiera precedido
cualquier renunciaciSn de esos privilegios , " PotosI28.X.1602, 1 f. (MC 462); BNB, MSS 2, f s . 119-128, "ContradiciSn suscitada entre los mercaderes y los duenos demmas e mgenios de Potosl sobre el cumplimiento de laprovisi6n librada por don Luis de Velasco, virrey del PerU,para que estos Qltimos no puedan ser presos por deudas
aunque en las obligaciones hayan renunciado al privilegioque en esta raz6n les estaba concedido," Potosl, 7.IV-9 V1603 (MC 468a); BNB, MSS 2, fs. 181-181v, "Testimonio
autorizado de un capltulo de carta escrita por don Luis
de Velasco, virrey del PerQ, a don Pedro de Lodena,
corregidor de PotosI: C6mo se comprenderS el privilegio
de que gozan los duenos de minas de PotosI para no ser
presos por deudas," Lima, 14. V. 1603 (MC 469a); BNB, MSS 2,fs. 14 3-144, "Provisi6n de don Luis de Velasco, virrey
del Perta: Los privilegios concedidos a los duenos de
minas e ingenios de PotosI para no ser presos por deudas
a pesar de cualesquiera renunciaciones en contrario, se
entiendan desde la fecha en que se pregonaran en dicha
villa," Lima, 16. VI. 1603 (MC 469b). For permission to
rent mills and mines, BNB, MSS 2, fs. 140-142v, "Provisi6n
librada por don Luis de Velasco, virrey del Perta, dando *
licencia a don Luis DSvalos de Ayala para poder arrendar
el ingenio y minas que tiene en Potosl durante cuatro anos
y pagar la deuda que reconoce a dona Blanca de Montoya,
y para que a los arrendatarios se les acuda con los
mitayos que en el repartimiento general hecho por este
virrey se aplicaron a dichas haciendas," Los Reyes,
9. V. 1603 (MC 469; MOM 434).
62. Mesia Venegas (see note 3), 96.
63. BNB, CPLA 12, fs. 263v-264 (see note 59).
64. BNB, MSS 2, fs. 119-128 (see note 61).
65. BNB, CPLA 12, fs. 80v-82, "Acuerdo del cabildo:
Habiendo pedido el corregidor licenciado Juan de Ibarra se
nombre procurador de esta Villa ante el Virrey para cosas
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tocantes a las minas, se eligi6 por voto a Crist6bal deMolina, tesorero de estas cajas reales " PotosT ii t i^no(MC 518; MOM 466); BNB
,
CPLa'i2, Is 168-169 "6aMido
SmIdJo fla°fa?rT^?^ Para'conkrir^obre elremedi a a falta de la mita y de azogue para las labores
478rBNf CPLA lo'^V" ^^S^^^f' ll.XIl!l60l (MC 535ffSSr/8)
,
B, 12, fs. 189v-190, "Acuerdo del cabildo-Vista la necesidad de que vaya un procurador a representaral virrey el perjuicio de la falta de azogue se determ?n6convocar a cabildo abierto para elegir procurador generalante el virrey a pedir remedio para la ruina de las laboresmineras por la falta de la ley de los metales, de la mi?a
y del azogue," Potosl, 25.1.1609 (MC 540b; MOM 480). Forthe azogueros' determination to get water, in one way oranother: BNB, CPLA 12, fs. 94v, 98 and 102, "Capltulosde acuerdos del cabildo de PotosI: En vista de la sequla
y falta de agua en las lagunas para la molienda de los
metales, t6mense las providencias necesarias para hacer
?^nr^M?''??J
rogativas," Potosi, 21. II, 11. n, and 14. III.1608 (MC 521); and BNB, CPLA 12, f. 208, "Capltulo de
acuerdo del cabildo de Potosl: Que en vista de la escas^zde agua en las lagunas para la molienda de los metales, setrate con el presidente de la audiencia de Charcas, los
oficiales reales, los azogueros y demSs interesados en la
molienda, la tralda del agua de las lagunas de Tabaconuno,"
PotosI, 6. III. 1609 (MC 541b). See, also, the sources citedin note 59.
66. BNB, CPLA 12, fs. 158-164, "Cabildo abierto reunido
para responder a la carta (inserta) recibida del marqu€s
de Montesclaros, virrey del Peru, de Lima, 1608. XI. 1, en
respuesta a la que este cabildo le escribio (asimismo
inserta) en 1608. IX. 1 sobre el empobrecimiento de los
minerales del Cerro," PotosI, 5. XII. 1608 (MC 535e; MOM
477)
.
The threat that the cerro might come into the hands
of the Protestants was inserted for shock value, and was
born of the azogueros ' long-held contention that Potosl
silver financed the Spanish crown's defense of Catholicism
against the heretics.
67. ANB, M 3, no. 17 (see note 52, Chapter II).
68. BNB, CPLA 15, f s . 211-211v, "Acuerdo del cabildo:
Se elige procurador general de esta villa ante el virrey
(Esquilache) a don Juan de Ayala Figueroa para cosas
tocantes a la labor minera y particular a la mita," Potosl,
11. V. 1616 (MC 583; MOM 515) . For mention of Ibarra, see
BNB, CPLA 12, fs. 80v-82 (see note 65); and Sandoval y
Guzman, 20-21.
69. BNB, CPLA 15, fs. 346-348v (see note 60).
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70. See the sources cited in note 43.
H^ll^; "n^
the azogueros' involvement in contraband, seee mer, Comgrcio e contrabando" ; and Hanke, "ThePortuguese/' 27. The Audiencia de Charcas said that theycould make 150 £esos for every Indian they rented in ayear: ANB, M 123, no. 3, "Carta de esta audiencia al reyen su consejo de Indias: De los arriendos de minas emgenios en Potosi y de los envlos de jueces de comisi6n
a las provmcias de mita se siguen graves danos para losnaturales que es menester remediar; en nueve meses lasmmas de Oruro han producido doscientos mil pesos ensayados
a su Magestad," La Plata, 13. III. 1608 (MC 522; MOM 468)Juan de Ayala was prosecuted for renting Indians in 1621,for a reported 112 pesos apiece (seventy-five were rented)
•
BNB MSS 3, fs. 59V-60, "C§dula real a don Diego de Portugal,presidente de la audiencia de La Plata: Que informe sobre
el estado de la causa seguida contra don Juan Ayala poramende de indios de mita contra lo dispuesto en esta
materia, y se cele estrictamente el cumplimiento de las
ordenanzas y disposiciones que prohiben tales arrendamien
tos," Madrid, 14. IX. 1621 (MC 606; MOM 527). See, also,
~
the "Relaci6n del Principe de Esquilache," Los virreyes
(ed. by Hanke and Rodriguez), PerG II (no. 281), 164 (from
Biblioteca Nacional, Ms. 3078; it is undated, but responds
to a cgdula of 1620)
. SSnchez-Albornoz
,
71, notes the
transformation of the mita in general terms:
"Los titulares de las minas no siempre vieron
con malos ojos la sustituci6n de trabajadores manuales
por dinero, de las mitas personales por los indios de
plata o de faltriquera. Disfrutaban as£ de una renta
segura sin los inconvenientes de la mineraci6n, o por
lo menos les entraba numerario para reclutar indios de
minga—mSs efectivos
—
quienes se contrataban a cambio
de un salario. La mita comenzaba, pues, a tornarse
un tribute pecuniario en favor de un grupo econ6mico
privilegiado o una contribuci6n de las comunidades
indlgenas al abaratamiento de los costos de producci6n
del cerro de Potosi. De esa manera se cubria parte de
los salaries insumidos por la explotaci6n.
"
He refers, however, to the period of the 1660s, and the
transformation started much earlier than he suggests.
72. The best source on the "civil war" is Crespo,
Guerra entre Vicunas y Vascongados . Arzans, Historia ,
includes information on inter-national battles throughout
the work. I have relied, for this brief summary, on
Padden, xxvii-xxviii . An example of the continuing violence
took place in 1628, when a miner and his men caved in the
the mine of another; the Indian barretero sued them for the
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ri25''''no°''7;''''
"^^^'^
""^^ ^^^^ ^^^^^^ the cave-in (ANBM 125, no. 13—see note 133, Chapter II— f. 232v)
.
GuJ^V/''^' ""^^ ^' ^^-^2' "Provisian del marqugs deadalcSzar, virrey del PerG: El corregidor de Potosfreparta por via de dep6sito a los duenol de los iSgenios
Carica^i en'l? T^^" ^"^S inundacion de la ?Iguna der 15 de marzo de este ano todos los indios auehubieren vacado legitimamente y vacaren de aquJ adeLntecomenzando por los ingenios mSs necesitados y que huMesen
esTaTo au/t hasta ponerlos en\l mismot d q e tenlan antes de la reventaz6n " j im^ \t icoc
C^ovio'pi Tsl''^'' T' '''' fs:Totls, "Pr^k^^Ioi'del
r ,1
socorro de azogue por la innudacion de laLaguna (by the Marques de GuadalcSzar)
, Los Reyes, 30. V.1626 (a copy); BNB, CPLA 18, fs. 19-19v, "Capltulo deacuerdo del cabildo de Potosi: vi6se la petici6n deCristobal del Salto, procurador general, para que se
suplique a la audiencia de La Plata suspenda la ejecuci6nde las sentencias pecuniarias y de prisi6n pendientes
contra azogueros de esta villa en causas criminales de
maltratamientos y muertes de indios en las minas de Potosi,por hundimiento y sueltos que han caido de lo alto, en
consideraciSn de los grandes trabajos y pgrdidas que han
'
sobrevenido esta repQblica por la inundaci6n de la lagunade Caricari," PotosI, 5. VI. 1626 (MC 629; MOM 541). Thislast request was not granted.
74. Zavala, Servicio personal
,
ll, 36-40; Cobb,
"Potosl and Huancavelica , " 96-97; and Pereyra, 19.
75. BNB, CPLA 12, fs. 135v-136v, "Provisi6n del virrey:
Aprugbase el auto inserto, de Potosi, 1608. VI. 28, del
licenciado Maldonado de Torres, presidente de la audiencia
de Charcas, para que ante la declinaci6n de las minas de
azogue de Huancavelica y la falta de este ingrediente todos
los que sepan de minas de azogue las descubran," Lima,
9. VIII. 1608 (MC 534; MOM 473).
76. BNB, MSS 2, fs. 65-69v (see note 180, Chapter II);
BNB, MSS 2, fs. 81-81V, "Provisi6n librada por don Luis de
Velasco, virrey del Peru, para que el corregidor de Potosi
d§ sin lugar a queja los 10 indios de mita que se han
senalado a Leandro de Valencia para el trabajo de las minas
que este tiene en la veta Rica," Lima, 12. V. 1602 (MC 457;
MOM 428)
.
77. ANB, M 122, no. 10, "Carta del Virrey a la
Audiencia de Charcas: Los asuntos de la mita de Potosi
corresponden privativamente al virrey y esa a s61o resolverS
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79. Cobb, "Potosi and Huancavelica , " 101-102- and i-h*=
"Razon del estado en que el Marques de GuadalcSz^r Sena elgobierno del Perta al Virrey Conde de Chinch6n? la cual sedivide en cuatro materias que son las princip^les a que se
iTxTl ^^,^°-^-P°ndencia con el Consejo de las Indi^s?"^
Perfli lla ttI (ed. by Hanke and Rodriguez),£ rQ II 249-273 (from Real Academia de la HistoriaColecci6n Mata Linares, vol. XLIV, fs . 56-74v)
.
i^Jl'i:^
Examples Of the division of responsibilites
, andIts effects, follow in the text and in the notes.
w"^; ^5
overview of the correspondence between Luis
ft
^^^.Corregidor Pedro de Lodena, see BNB, MSS 2,ts. i79-180v, Testimonio autorizado de capltulos de cartasmisivas escritas en Lima a 1603. VI. 6, Lima a 1603. VII 1Lima a 1603. VIII. 1, Lima a 1603. IX. 1, y Lima a 1604 . V.'l'por don Luis de Velasco, virrey del PerG, a don Pedro deLodena, corregidor de Potosi encareciendo que las mitas demdios para el trabajo del Cerro anden cumplidas y que secastigue rigurosamente a los corregidores que omitieron
V?Sf^. respecto," Lima, 16 .VI . 1603-1 .v.1604 (the testimonio is dated 18. VI. 1605) (MC 487; MOM
448) See note 77 for Monterrey's letter to the Audienciade Charcas.
82. ANB, M 122, no. 11, fs. 273-274, "Carta de la
audiencia de Charcas al virrey: A esta audiencia corresponde por reales cedulas el amparo y defensa de los indlosde mita de Potosi y a ello acude cuando se ofrece," La
Plata, 1. VIII. 1605 '(MC 492; MOM 452).
83. Ibid
. ; and ANB, M 123, no. 3 (see note 71).
84. Engel Sluiter, ed.
, "Francisco L6pez de Caravantes'
Historical Sketch of Fiscal Administration in Colonial
Peru, 1533-1618," The Hispanic American Historical Review,
XXV (Durham, 1945), 243.
85. ANB, M 86, no. 10 (see note 43).
86. ANB, C 1083, "Tanto simple de capitulo de carta de
esta audiencia al rey: justifica la fundacion de Oruro,
no habiendo raz6n para decir que la fundacion de Oruro ha
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de esta villa y en cumplimiento de disposiciones de su
asistente en PotosI: Dada la gran riqueza de las minas deOruro, convendria asignarles una razonable cantidaS demdios,' La Plata, 19. IV. 1607, 1 f. (mc 517; MOM 459).
rnnll'r. ^""^ r S-^^^^'
"^^^^^ audiencia de La Plata alCo seco de Indias: A pesar de la enorme riqueza de las
minas nuevas de Oruro no se les ha asignado para la labor
y menos se ha quitado un solo mitayo a PotosI, siendoinexactas las mformaciones que en contrario se hubiese
^^r^M^n.^L^f''^^ villa," La Plata, 6. XII. 1607, 3 fs. (MC515; MOM 465). The amount of revenue generated was upto 200,000 pesos after nine months, according to ANB, M
123, no. 3 (see note 71). See, also, ANB, Minas
complemento, "Carta de esta Real Audiencia de La Plata alConsejo de Indias: Se ha provisto auto para que los
mitayos de PotosI no puedan desviarse al trabajo de las
minas nuevamente descubiertas en Oruro," La Plata, 13 III
1607, 3 fs. (MC 501; MOM 458).
89. See note 40 for the pressures that eventuated in
the Corregidor sending judges to Oruro to retrieve Indians.
For the Audiencia 's suspension of one judge's commission,
BNB, CPLA 12, fs. 293-293v, "Acuerdo del cabildo:
Supllquese del auto de la Audiencia de Charcas para que don
Juan de ZGniga cese en su comisi6n de sacar de Oruro a los
mitayos de esta Villa, y escribase al Virrey sobre lo
mismo," PotosI, 23. IV. 1610 (MC 557g; MOM 497).
90. BNB, CPLA 12, f s . 54-54v, "Capltulo de acuerdo del
cabildo de PotosI: N6mbrase al contador Juan Martinez de
Mecolaeta para que contradiga en nombre de este cabildo
ante al audiencia de La Plata el auto provista por dicho
tribunal suspendiendo a los comisionados que el corregidor
de esta villa habia enviado contra los corregidores de
diferentes partidos para el despacho de los indios de mita
en vista de los muchos que faltan," PotosI, 31. VIII. 1607
(MC 507a)
.
91. BNB, MSS 9, fs. 294-311V, "Provisi6n del virrey
al gobernador de la provincia de Chucuito y a los
corregidores de las demSs provincias mitarias: Vean y
cumplan las provisiones y cartas insertas so pena de
suspensiSn, para el puntual entero de la mita de PotosI,"
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Lima, 20. III. 1616 (MC 589); this is a copy from 9. X. 1790.
92 BNB, MSS 7, fs. 79-80, "Provisien librada por elmarques de GuadalcSzar, virrey del Perta, para que en vJstade los grandes inconvenientes que resultan de arrendarse
derL^.r^^^'°" P^^^ 1^ -^^^ y beneflciol metal como para el menoscabo de los reales quintos yel mal uso de los indios de mita que son vendidos por losarrendarios a otras personas para trabajos ajenos, no sehagan mSs los arrendamientos sin expreso consentimiento deeste gobierno," Los Reyes, 30. IX. 1626 (MC 633; MOM 544)This was m keeping with royal orders: BNB, MSS 3, fs
*
59-59V, "Real cgdula al presidente Portugal de la audiinciade Charcas: Sabigndose que de Potosi se sacan muchosindios de mita a otras partes despoblando minas e ingenios
en el Cerro y la Ribera, cumplase la ordenanza del virreyToledo tocante a este punto," Madrid, 28. V. 1621 (MC 605-MOM 526) . '
93. For two examples: the "Relaci6n del Principe de
Esquilache" (see note 71), 161; and ANB, RC 325, "Cartadel marques de GuadalcSzar, virrey del PerG a la Audienciade La Plata: Con copia, inclusa, del real cidula de
Madrid, 1627.1.13, a dicho virrey, ordenSndole que haga
pagar, sin observaci6n a los mitayos de Potosl los leguajesde ida y vuelta," Lima, 13. XI. 1627, 4 fs. (MC 655; MOM
560)
.
The c§dula referred to in the second is BNB, MSS 5,fs. 230v-231v, "Copia de real c^dula al virrey del Perta
marques de GuadalcSzar: PSguese a los indios de mita de
Potosi sus jornales de ida y vuelta en cumplimiento de las
c§dulas reales de 1609. V. 26 y 1618. XII. 10, no obstante lo
arguido por el corregidor Sarmiento de Sotomayor y los
azogueros en carta de 1621 . Ill . 17 , " Madrid, 13.1.1627
(MC 644; MOM 551)
.
94. "Relaci6n del Principe de Esquilache" (see note 71),
166. This order was later reinforced by the Marques de
GuadalcazSr (see note 92 for BNB, MSS 7, fs. 79-80), after
the crown had ordered Toledo's ordinance against mill
rentals followed (see note 92 for the cedula as well) . See
note 71 for what happened in the specific case of Juan de
Ayala
.
95. "Relaci6n del Principe de Esquilache" (see note 71),
160. For comments on the Viceroy's statement, see Zavala,
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II, 71; and Cobb, "Potosi and
Huancavelica, 98.
96. "Relaci6n del Principe de Esquilache" (see note 71),
161.
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see BNB, CPLA 18, fs
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40v-52, "Diligencias rela^Ivafa ' ladesignaci6n del capitSn Juan Serrano de Amalgro como
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9. IX. 1626 (MC 632; MOM 543). Guadalclzar also provided
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his duties as Corregidor de PotosI—AGI, Lima 39, vol. 2(transcript provided by Lewis Hanke)
. Castillo (AGI,
Charcas 270, no. 33C—see note 30, Chapter II), 12-12v,
says that Guadalclzar also sent Juan de Sandoval and Suero
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of 20. III. 1616 (see note 91).
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de Torres, asistente en PotosI: Al trajinero para Arica
se han entregado mas de 120 barras de plata con un valor de
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113. Ibid
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44) . Esquilache prohibited judges from chasing forasteros
who had gone outside the mita provinces, and so encouraged
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presentada por los azogueros sobre los nuevos inconvenien
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proposici6n al virrey para que provea remedio," Potosi,
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169; Castillo (AGI , Charcas 270, no. 33C—see note 30,
Chapter II), 17-17v, says the order was dated 15 . Ill . 1617)
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These viceregal directives were issued in a spirit of
fairness, both for the Indians and their new employers, but
like Toledo's earlier protection of forasteros , they added
to Indian migration away from mita service.
115. Campo y de la Rynaga, 85; and Zavala, Servicio
personal
,
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CHAPTER IV
1633 TO 1648
The appearance of mita service in silver and the
creation of a viceregal bureaucratic mechanism to
administer the system from Lima were the major developments
of the first third of the seventeenth century. During
the subsequent fifteen years the consequences of those two
developments were to be profound.
The Viceroy Conde de Chinch6n broke with tradition in
1633 to send an outsider to conduct his repartimiento de
la mita. The flexibility theretofore afforded to the mita
by assigning that task to the presidents of Charcas, and
having the corregidores de PotosI administer the mita on a
daily basis, was eliminated. The result was a collision
of the de facto mita with unmodified viceregal orders,
and a battle between the azogueros and the President of
Charcas on one side, and the Viceroy and his representative
on the other.
The crown and its Council of the Indies were too
isolated by distance, time and bureaucracy to play any
other role in the struggle than as referees. The conflict
at PotosI produced hyperbolic charges and counter-charges
178
however, and the crown was unable to determine what was
really happening in Peru. It had no choice, therefore,
but to leave rectification of the controversy to Chinch6n's
successor, the Marques de Mancera (1639-1648)
.
The same difficulties that prevented the crown from
determining the true situation at Potosi make quantitative
observations about the mita from 1633 to 1648 extremely
precarious. For example, the azogueros claimed that the
effective mita ordinaria in 1636 was only 1,500 Indians.
Ten years later they set the figure at 2,600 and said that
2things had gotten worse. To understand what was going
on
, therefore, one must keep a keen eye out for the
arguments behind the numbers, and the reasons behind the
arguments
.
The Azogueros
The status of the azogueros is especially difficult to
ascertain. On the one hand the Cabildo de Potosi was able
to provide a procurador , Sebastian de Sandoval y GuzmSn,
with ample funds to publish his arguments on Potosl's
behalf before the Council of the Indies. On the other
hand the azogueros claimed that they were near ruin and
needed further crown assistance if silver production were
to continue.
Sandoval y Guzman's Pretensiones de la Villa Imperial de
3
PotosI were published in Madrid in 1634. The first section
of the work proposed means to improve silver production at
Potosi; the remainder concerned viniculture and other
matters. The essay on mining was the azogueros ' official
response to the viceroys' position that mitayos should be
distributed on the basis of merit. At the same time, they
continued to argue that their right to receive government
assistance was based on their history of service to the
crown. That sentiment was expressed in Sandoval's opening
letter to the President of the Council of the Indies:
[Potosi,] which until recently has supported the
the full weight of the Monarchy with its great
riches, now places itself humbly at the feet of
Your Excellency, needing your protection and
asking for justice.
The Potosi silver industry deserved consideration because
of its past service, and it required justice if it were to
continue to serve. The shift in the basis for the
azogueros ' privileges, apparent in their arguments against
Oruro and their imprisonment for debts, was now formalized
4by Sandoval y GuzmSn.
The procurador proposed four innovations for the
mining sector, which he argued would contribute to the
regeneration of Potosi, and therefore Peru: a) the
reduction of the quinto to the diezmo; b) the execution
of a reduccion general ; c) the distribution of mercury at
cost and on credit; and d) the formation of a Consulado
5de azogueros. Sandoval's arguments in support of these
proposals were both legal and pragmatic, and thoroughly
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explored the relationship between the crown and its
vassals at Potosl.
The procurador predicated the reduction of the quinto
on a combination of fairness and the azogueros ' inability
to pay the 20 per cent tax.^ He noted that Phillip m
had ordered that mining centers should remit one-fifteenth
of production during their initial ten years in existence,
one-tenth during the second ten years, and one-fifth
thereafter. Potosi had not benefited by the King's
cgdula because it had been discovered in 1545, long before
Phillip III came to the throne; it was only fair, Sandoval
Q
argued, that it should benefit now. Furthermore, the
recently discovered mines at Castro Virreyna and Nueva
Potosl were paying only the diezmo
, and Potosi deserved to
be treated as well as those less-important centers.^
Sandoval said that the legal means for Potosi 's
payment of the diezmo already existed. Phillip II had
ordered that no more than one-tenth or one-twelfth of
production be taken by the government if ore quality was
below twelve ounces per quintal . The cedula in question
had been issued for Spain, but it applied to Peru because
it was included in the Recopilaci6n de leyes that was sent
to the entire hispanic world. "'"^ The current ore at Potosl,
he noted, was no richer than five or seven ounces per
quintal
.
Not only should the quinto be lowered, Sandoval argued.
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but production costs should be subtracted before the crown'
share was determined. King John I of Portugal had already
ruled that costs be deducted before his percentage was
exacted, and Spanish monarchs were always better to their
subjects than other sovereigns. it would not do the crown
well to be bettered in this instance.
Sandoval assured the Council that any revenue lost by
lowering the guinto would quickly be made up through
expanded silver production. To begin with, the quintos
currently sent to Spain were not as significant as they
appeared. Of one million pesos despatched from Potosl,
only 670,000 were derived from exaction of the quinto
real; the remainder came from the sale of mercury, the
quintos from other mines, alcabalas and the sale of public
13
offices. The change to the diezmo would permit the
refining of desmontes, and thus every stone that contained
silver would be milled, new exploration would take place,
the Indians would return to Potosi voluntarily, and the
boom of the 1570s would be repeated. Increased production
would more than offset the 335,000 pesos lost by lowering
the quinto to the diezmo
. The alternative, the procurador
warned, was the irrecoverable loss of Potosi.
Sandoval did not mention that Potosi had one advantage
that other mining centers did not: mitayos . His inclusion
of increased mercury sales among the factors that would
supplant lost quintos is interesting in light of the fact
s
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that his third proposal was for mercury to be sold at
cost. Moreover, his argument that the Indians would return
voluntarily was inconsistent with his second proposal that
new reducciones be conducted to augment the delivery of
initaxos. Clearly, he was prepared for the possibility that
the entire package might not be adopted.
Sandoval and the azoqueros requested that a reducci6n
be conducted in the entire realm, but said that they would
accept one that was limited to the provinces that were
obligated to the PotosI mita.^^ The crown had pursued that
goal since the first years of the century, the procurador
noted, but the viceroys had stifled its execution because
they believed the task was impossible."*"^ They had feared
that officials of sufficient ability and disinterest were
not available in Peru, and that less-competent judges sent
to undertake the reducciones would prey upon the Indians
like those that the Corregidor de PotosI sent to ensure
17that mita quotas were met. If the resettlement program
were not completed correctly, and fewer Indians were
counted than actually existed, those quotas would have to
1
8
be lowered. The viceroys had also argued that chacareros
would oppose the process, to protect the Indians who worked
on their chacaras ; if they were unable to corrupt the
19judges, they would resort to violence. The viceroys had
also worried that food production would suffer if the
20Indians were removed from those agricultural enterprises.
183
The procurador said that other viceregal reservations
had centered on the Indians themselves. The pueblos had
no attraction for them, and without their cooperation the
resettlement of the villages would be impossible. The
Indians currently left their pueblos, he said, because of
the mistreatment they received from their caciques
, priests
and correqidores. Many owed considerable sums in past
tribute ( rezaqos ) , which would be demanded should they
return to their homes. Finally, lands were not available
for the Indians who did return to settle on, as they had
been sold to Spaniards
.
Sandoval admitted the validity of the arguments that
the viceroys had given for not undertaking the reducci6n
general
,
but he argued that its execution was nonetheless
imperative. There was no alternative if Peru were to
return to its former prosperity. The program could be
successfully completed through a combination of fairness
and diligence, he said, as fairness would justify its
execution and hard work would ensure its conclusion. It
was unfair, for example, that chacareros who illegally
availed themselves of Indian labor should continue to
receive their services. It was also unfair that those
Indians who were living in their original pueblos should
bear the weight of obligations that were intended for many
more. Again, diligence in the conduct of the reducciones
22
would ensure their completion despite all the obstacles.
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Sandoval did not include the PotosI mita among the
factors that he blamed for the Indians' flight from their
pueblos. Nor did he identify the agricultural duties to
which they were assigned by the caciques and corregidores
.
The Indians were accustomed to mining and agricultural
service, he argued, because they had performed both under
the Incas. Indian migration was caused by their forced
participation in activities that were new to them, and
those that kept them from their wives, families and homes.
They liked to live on chScaras, he noted, because they
received a plot of land and stayed with their families.
Measures were therefore necessary to make life in the
pueblos more attractive than it was anywhere else. The
Indians' debts needed to be pardoned; their tribute waived
while they were serving in the mita; and their lands, even
if they were legally held by Spaniards, would have to be
returned to them. Once the pueblos were repopulated, the
procurador argued, the weight of the Indians' obligations
would no longer be excessive, for more of them would bear
24that weight.
Sandoval said that the reducciones were prerequisite
to the- conservation of Peru. Even if the mita had to be
constricted as a result, justice demanded that they be done
The azogueros had called for the reducciones because they
were confident that the large numbers of Indians that
were scattered throughout the provinces would be documented
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The caciques and corregidores had called for them to prove
that the provinces were devoid of Indians. This was the
crown's opportunity, Sandoval concluded, to prove who was
25
right. ^
The third proposal that Sandoval y GuzmSn put before
the Council of the Indies was that mercury be provided to
the azoqueros at cost and on credit. Quicksilver had
originally been distributed on credit, he said, but debts
that the azoqueros incurred during the sixteenth century
had prompted the crown to order that it be sold only for
cash. The procurador ' s arguments in support of this
proposal were almost wholly pragmatic. He noted that
President [ sic , Oidor] Diego Munoz de Cuellar had allowed
the distribution of mercury on credit in 1630, and silver
production had climbed to three and one-half million pesos ,
While it was true that the azogueros owed the crown one
and one-half million, they had paid back much more than
that, and had contributed sixty million pesos in quintos
since the introduction of amalgamation technology in the
1570s. Their debt would never be collected, he added, if
they went bankrupt. The azogueros ' needs were also a
reason to grant the third request; Sandoval said they were
too poor to pay for the mercury when it arrived, and had
no one to borrow from. They were deserving, furthermore,
by virtue of their hard work and sacrifice; for every
forty marks of silver they produced, they spent sixty on
materials and labor.
Sandoval manipulated silver production figures to
arrive at the sixty million peso total for the crown's
quintos. He left out all mention of moneylenders, mita
service in silver, or "pocket Indians." Bailey Diffie
has suggested that Sandoval's misuse of the production
figures might be excused as "lawyer's licence. "^^ It is
more significant than that, however. Sandoval y GuzmSn
was playing two games concurrently. On the pragmatic
level, the reduction of the quinto to the diezmo would
have increased the azogueros ' profits; the reducci6n
general would have augmented the delivery of mitayos—in
person and in silver; and the distribution of mercury on
credit would have allowed the azogueros to declare their
financial independence from the moneylenders and silver
merchants. The proposals were therefore designed to
return control of silver production to the azogueros—to
free them from their dependence upon other groups and
interests. But to win those concessions from the crown
Sandoval had to convince the Council of the Indies that
the concessions would also benefit the royal cause, and
that the azogueros were deserving of more government
assistance. The manipulation of the production figures
was part of that process, as was the omission of all
mention of the azogueros ' misuse of mita service in silver
The procurador ' s fourth proposal was that a Consulado
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de azogueros be established. That body would have made the
self-governing, and so have freed them from the
bothersome meddling of the Audiencia de Charcas in their
affairs. Sandoval argued that the Consulado would relieve
the tensions caused by the Audiencia 's interference in
mining matters that it did not understand. Once they were
freed from the court's unsympathetic and erractic decisions
the azogueros would be able to concentrate on production
.
Perhaps the phrase should have been "free to concentrate on
their profits."
Each of Sandoval's proposals was supported with legal
and pragmatic reasons why it should be granted. The crown
was assured that it would not lose revenue by granting the
new concessions, but would lose PotosI if it failed to do
so. Other petitions submitted by the Gremio de azogueros
in the past had carried similar warnings that the failure
to act would bring the quick and irreversible ruin of
Potosi. Yet despite their threats, the quintos flowed
from year to year—albeit in smaller amounts—and the
oft-promised demise of Potosi never materialized. Why
would the crown believe the azogueros in 16 34 when it had
not before? Did it really risk anything by not acting at
all? What did it risk if it did provide the azogueros
more aid?
Sandoval y GuzmSn's proposals, like the petitions that
preceded them, served to counter the reports of azoguero
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abuses the crown received from their enemies, and were
therefore necessary to prevent the King from ordering
measures that might have hurt them. Despite its isolation
and relative powerlessness
, the crown could—at any moment
—order the abolition of the mita or cut off the azogueros '
supply of mercury. Thus, more than the success of the new
proposals hinged on their ability to convince the crown
that they were loyal, industrious and valuable subjects.
Indeed, there was nothing in the procurador 's work to
suggest that the azogueros were involved in any abuses at
all. If they were unable to persuade the crown totally of
their merit and need, the azogueros could at least keep it
off-balance. Royal uncertainty in Madrid furthered the
preservation of the status quo. Assuming that the
azogueros were not operating their mills at a loss, the
status quo was preferable to a government campaign against
"pocket Indians," and other modifications of the mita that
were now integral parts of the system.
Unfortunately for Sandoval and the azogueros
,
however,
the real threat to the de facto mita was not to come from
Madrid, but from Lima. The Marques de Guadalcazar had
started to reduce mita obligations, based on revisitas,
and the viceroys had begun to deny mitayos to the azogueros
for their involvement in abuses. But because the viceroys
had left the local administration of the mita to the
presidents of Charcas and the corregidores de Potosi, the
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impact of those developments had been lessened in practice.
Most azogueros were able to use their personal influence to
retain their mitayos whether they were involved in misuse
29
or not. That situation changed dramatically in 1633.
While the procurador was in Madrid singing their praises,
the azoqueros were under attack at home by a direct
viceregal assault on the de facto mita.
Visitador Juan de Caravajal y Sandi
The Conde de Chinch6n decided not to leave his
repartimiento de la mita to the President of Charcas.
Instead, he assigned the responsibility for it to Visitador
Juan de Caravajal y Sandi. Caravajal arrived in Peru in
16 33 to conduct visitas of the Audiencias of Lima and
Charcas, and he began with the more difficult—the Audiencia
de Charcas. Upper Peru contained the richest provinces in
South America, but it was inhabited by colonists renown for
their irreverence and independence. Like other visitadores
,
Caravajal faced the role of Daniel in the lions' den, for
visitadores were so unpopular that usually antagonistic
groups closed ranks against them."^*^ The Marques de
Montesclaros had likened a visita to a gust of wind that
stirs up the rubbish in the streets but accomplishes little
31
else. That would not be the case in this instance.
Chinchon was discouraged by the failure of his efforts
to complete a reduccion general , and the crown had ordered
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him to abandon the program and sell the vacated lands.
The solution for falling mita deliveries that the crown
had pursued since the viceroyalty of Luis de Velasco had
been put to rest by the viceroys' arguments that the
reducciones were impossible to execute. Chinch6n
therefore had to find a new means to reconcile the failing
originario population in the provinces and the labor needs
of Potosl. He found the bases for a solution in the
concept that mitayos should be assigned on the basis of
merit, and the azogueros ' widespread misuse of mita service
in silver. The Viceroy instructed Juan de Caravajal to
employ misuse of the mita as his central criterion for
determining which azogueros would receive mitayos and which
would not. Chinch6n believed that misuse was so pervasive
that once those azogueros who were guilty of abuse had
been stripped of their Indians, there would be plenty of
32
mitayos for the remainder.
Chinch6n's decision was a compromise born of viceregal
inability to control the Indians—an accomodation with the
reality that reducciones were impossible. Had that
decision been implemented by the president of Charcas, its
effects might have been minimal. Upon his arrival in
Potosi, however, Visitador Caravajal began to enforce the
Viceroy's instructions without any modifications at all.
Caravajal denied mitayos to the owners of twenty-nine
3 3
of the one-hundred mills at Potosl. He did not lower the
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mita ordinaria by an significant amount, however; his
weekly total came to 4,115 Indians. He ordered that travel
allowances be paid, and he abolished the subtraction of the
half-£eso from the mitayos ' wages to pay the veedores and
the alcalde mayor de minas
.
The Gremio de azogueros was infuriated. The changes
that Caravajal had made in the assignment of the mitayos
,
on paper, were not very great; and in truth the mills that
were denied Indians had not been in production for some
time. It was the functional impact of the Visitador's
repartimiento that caused the azogueros ' outcry. The
mitayos were assigned in complete ayllus or pueblos, so
that their service in person would be more tolerable.
President Portugal had spread the Indians around, so that
every azoguero would share the burden of those ayllus that
did not come in the mita at all. Caravajal 's order meant
that some of the azogueros would receive entire squadrons
of Indians who normally complied with their obligations,
while others would receive contingents that were composed
of those who had not appeared in Potosi for decades.
Three more important reasons for the azogueros '
unhappiness with the new repartimiento were: a) their
acceptance of the distribution would mean their capitulation
on the issue of the removal of mitayos from azogueros for
misuse, and thus their confession that abuses existed;
b) the assignment of mitayos in complete ayllus disrupted
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the arrangements between the azoqueros and caciques for the
delivery of service in silver; and c) the owners of the
twenty-nine mills also owned active mills, and they were
used to having twice as many mitayos—in silver and in
person—as they would now receive. The Caravajal
repartimiento was unacceptable to the azogueros
, but they
could not condemn it for these reasons. They therefore
resorted to their traditional bargaining position.
The azogueros complained to Chinch6n that the new
repartimiento would seriously lower silver production, and
that it would impair their ability to keep the Potosl
silver industry in business. The Viceroy was not moved by
their appeals. He had expected their complaints, and the
outcry seemed to confirm that the medicine that he had
prescribed was having its intended effect. Nevertheless,
he instructed the Visitador to soothe any legitimate
grievances by adjusting the repartimiento when Indians
became available because of future azoguero abuses, death,
3 6
or the sale of their mills.
ChinchSn ordered the Audiencia de Charcas not to
consider the azogueros ' appeals. He told the court that
the mita was not their concern, for the assignment of the
mitayos to the azogueros was a privilege granted by the
crown which could be revoked at any time for abuses on the
part of the grantees. The azogueros , he said, had no
right to receive mitayos , and could therefore lose access
to them without recourse to the legal system. The
Viceroy's order repeated earlier such directives sent by
his predecessors to the Audiencia de Charcas, but the
precaution is nonetheless interesting in light of the
traditional animosity between the court and the azogueros .^'^
The Council of the Indies' role in the controversy
was limited to its service as a referee between the
azogueros and the Visitador. The Council was too isolated
to participate in a more direct manner, but it still
represented an authority superior to the Viceroy. It
could not force Chinchfin to act as it wished, but it could
discredit his actions. Both sides of the battle understood
that, and they wrote to Madrid with explanations of their
positions. Early in 1636, Caravajal told the crown and the
Council that Potosl's problems were not his doing, but the
result of maladministration at the local level. He
charged that the President of Charcas and Corregidor de
PotosI were immersed in personal business ventures that
compromised their effectiveness as representatives of the
38crown. Their letters, he warned, were not to be trusted.
The Council was flooded with the azogueros ' complaints
about Juan de Carava jal. They arrived just as the body
was considering Sandoval y GuzmSn's proposals and another
azoguero memorial written by Gregorio de Obiendo Luz6n.
One azoguero who complained was Pedro de Andrade Sotomayor.
His fifty-mitayo share of the Portugal repartimiento had
been pared down to forty. Caravajal claimed that Andrade
had indulged in misuse, and that his mill had been
39unlicensed. Another who protested was Ger6nimo
Garavito. Caravajal countered his complaint with the
charge that he had neither a mill nor honor to lose in
repartimiento, but was merely a bookkeeper who received
mitayos for his services as a procurador of the Gremio de
40
azogueros.
The Visitador's characterization of the azogueros as
greedy and disloyal did not correlate with their own
manifestations of sacrifice and faithful service to the
crown. The Council was unable to clearly determine what
was happening at PotosI, so it ordered the Conde de
Chinch6n to investigate the situation there and then act
accordingly. On April 6, 1631, Phillip IV signed a cgdula
instructing the Viceroy to resolve the difficulties that
had arisen because of Caravajal 's repartimiento
, and he
strongly suggested that another be conducted to replace
41that distribution of the mitayos .
In the meantime, the azogueros had found a champion in
President Juan de Lizarazu of the Audiencia de Charcas
.
Like many of his predecessors, Lizarazu participated in
the daily administration of silver production at Potosi,
and he supported the azogueros on mercury questions and in
their efforts to win new concessions from the crown. The
President offered the crown and Council his own solution
for the problems created by Caravajal's repartimiento : the
assignment of all aspects of PotosI silver production to
the President of Charcas. Lizarazu argued that the
administration of the silver industry depended upon four
elements: a) the delivery of mitayos ; b) the use to which
those Indians were put; c) the conservation of the mills;
and d) the distribution of mercury. Practical experience,
he said, was needed to understand and successfully direct
each of those factors. The crown and the Viceroy both
lacked the necessary experience, and decisions reached in
Madrid and Lima took too long to implement. Although his
bid for presidential control of Potosi production was not
successful, Lizarazu 's arguments would play a role in the
future of the mita.^^
The President's more immediate problem was that Juan
de Caravajal was still in Charcas. The Visitador's
uncompromising demeanor and Lizarazu 's strong personality
did not go together very well. The latter chafed under
the former's usurpation of his powers while in Charcas,
and he resented the charges that he and his Audiencia were
corrupt and incompetent. The two officials clashed openly
in 1636, over Lizarazu' s plan for the distribution of
mercury on credit to the azogueros . At issue was the
President's abridgement of the crown's ban on such
arrangements—his flexibility based on experience—versus
Caravajal 's demand that royal orders be followed to the
letter.
Lizarazu had ordered that 1,500 guintales of mercury
be distributed from the royal stores, with payment
deferred from April until June. if payment was not made
at that time the azoguero forfeited all access to his
mita^ until his debt was covered; and anyone who settled
his account received the use of those Indians in the
interim. Andrgs de Sandoval had been one of those who
was unable to pay for his mercury, and his mitayos were
therefore transfered to Juan Manuel. At that juncture the
Visitador intervened, removing thirty-four Indians from
both Sandoval and Manuel. Apparently the agreement had
provided for some sort of payment to the azoguero
, for
Caravajal treated it as misuse of the mitayos
. Without
his Indians, Sandoval was unable to raise the money to
cancel his debt, and Juan Manuel lost the money he had
paid to settle the former's account. The royal treasury
officials in PotosI had opposed the distribution plan, and
so sided with Caravajal against Lizarazu. The Viceroy
ordered the President's program terminated, and he decreed
that mercury be provided to the azogueros only when they
could pay for it in cash."^"^
Lizarazu lost the battle over Andres de Sandoval, and
his plan for presidential control of silver production was
turned down as well, but he did outlast Juan de Caravajal
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y Sandi. in 1638, Chinchon recalled the Visitador and
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ordered him to begin his inspection of the Audiencia de
Lima. Lizarazu would enjoy only a brief respite, however,
for he would soon have to contend with another visitador,
Juan de Palacios.^^
With Caravajal safely back in Lima, Lizarazu resumed
his efforts on behalf of the azogueros
. In 1638 he wrote
to the crown and the Council of the Indies to suggest how
he believed the April 6, 1636 cgdula should be implemented.
The order provided for a six-month period during which the
Viceroy was supposed to hear the azogueros ' complaints.
Lizarazu said that they were unable to travel to Lima—
a
distance equal to that from Madrid to Rome—for lack of
means, and they held no hope of recompense should they find
the means. Chinch6n was responsible for their plight, he
noted, and they had no desire to ever see Caravajal again ."^^
The President preferred the alternative offered by the
cgdula ; a new repartimiento
. He suggested that the new
distribution follow three guidelines: a) fixed quotas of
mitayos for the mills based on their number of stamping
mechanisms; b) a total of 300 mitayos for the soldados ;
and c) a provision that no azoguero could own more than
two mills. These parameters, Lizarazu argued, would
ensure that the Indians were distributed fairly, to as many
recipients as possible.
The azogueros supported the President's plan in their
own correspondence with the crown; and they reiterated
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their reasons for not traveling to Lima. Their support of
Lizarazu's proposal was born of their hope that its
adoption by the Council would mean the restoration of the
status quo ante—merit played no part in the proposed
repartimiento. Indeed, the azogueros asked the crown to
reinstate the 1624 repartimiento until the new one was
4 8
completed.
Lizarazu's arguments and his three-point program won
him the confidence of the Viceroy, who had grown disgusted
with Juan de Caravajal. Chinch6n would later note that
while it was generally impossible to please everyone, the
Visitador had managed to alienate almost everybody
.
Lizarazu and Chinch6n corresponded throughout 1639 on a
remedy for the problems that Caravajal had left in his
wake. On March 29, the Viceroy empowered the President
to make adjustments in the 1633 repartimiento
. Lizarazu
responded that adjustments would not be sufficient; that
more fundamental changes would be required. He openly
argued that the azogueros ' misuse of the mita had been a
necessary and natural result of declining ore quality and
rising production costs; that it was not an abuse, and
should not be the basis for deciding which azogueros
should receive mitayos . More specifically, Lizarazu said
that the rental of a mitayo by one azoguero from another
was not the rental of the Indian, but of his labor. The
legal distinction, the President noted, was the very one
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upon which the mita had been founded. ^0 This discussion
of the relationship between the de facto and Toledan mitas
was not included in Lizarazu's explanation to the crown
for his refusal to accept Chinch6n's commission . ^1 Perhaps
he understood that the Viceroy was prepared to be told the
truth, but that such an argument would probably hurt the
azoqueros
' chances of winning new concessions from Madrid.
The Conde de Chinch6n left the responsibility for any
further efforts to comply with the April 6, 1636 cgdula
to his successor, the Marqu€s de Mancera. He counseled
Mancera, however, that he should reinstate the 1624
repartimiento if he did not devise one of his own. The
greatest problem facing the Marques, he said, was the
discovery of some means with which to rectify the falling
originario population in the provinces and the labor demands
of the azogueros
. Some had suggested that forasteros should
be included in the mita, but Chinchon disagreed. He argued
that they would probably migrate further away, into
"infidel" lands, if any such effort were made.^^
By 1639 the Council of the Indies was thoroughly
confused, frustrated and worried. Its efforts to gather
information on the Caravajal visita and its investigation
into the prospects for Sandoval's four proposals had been
thwarted by the vehemence of the charges that were made
in the azoguero-Visitador struggle. From 16 36 forward
the Council tried to employ the Audiencia de Charcas as a
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relatively unbiased source of information.^^ As one would
expect, the Audiencia did not care for Sandoval's proposal
that a Consulado de azogueros be formed. The oidores
delayed their response to the crown's query on the subject
as long as possible, and submitted its opinion only after
the Gremio de azogueros demanded that it do so. Following
the lead of Fiscal SebastiSn de Alarc6n, the Audiencia
argued that abuses would increase under azoguero self-rule
and counseled the Council not to allow the establishment
of the Consulado.
In 1639 the crown asked the Audiencia how the azogueros
could call for the construction of more mills at PotosI
when Caravajal had closed twenty-nine of them; and whether
the Indians should be transfered in mill rentals, despite
the many laws prohibiting that practice. The azogueros
had claimed that the inclusion of mitayos was necessary
given current production realities.
The crown and the Council were vainly searching for
some common ground in the correspondence they received from
Peru. They had earlier deferred judgement to Chinch6n,
but he had not resolved the problems created by Caravajal.
Three and a half years later they had no other option but
to reissue the April 6, 1636 cedula to the MarquSs de
Mancera; the order was dated December 7, 16 39.^^
The Council's support for a new repartimiento was
made more explicit in the 1639 directive, however. Mancera
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was urged to conduct the new repartimiento in accordance
with President Lizarazu's three guidelines, and to include
at least 5,000 Indians in the mita ordinaria .^^ The
crown was concerned that the azogueros ' warnings that
Potosi would soon collapse if assistance were not provided
might be true. it chose to offer that aid in the form of
more mitayos, rather than selling mercury at cost or
lowering the guinto to the diezmo, both of which would have
cut into royal revenue.
The Marqugs de Mancera
Despite the vehemence of the Council's 1639 order and
Chinch6n's suggestion that a new repartimiento be completed,
the Marques de Mancera did not move quickly to resolve the
problems surrounding the mita. Instead, he studied the
situation at length, balancing his instructions and the
counsel of his predecessor against his ov/n investigation
of the status quo at Potosl. Like his predecessors, the
Viceroy did not go to Charcas himself, but depended upon
written reports from the officials who were stationed
there
.
Mancera did act quickly on minor measures for PotosI
that simply required his implementation of standing orders
or whose effects were temporary. In October of 1640, for
example, he reiterated the Conde de Chinchon's order that
Chucuito be represented by one capit^n enterador for each
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pueblo. Early in 1641 he permitted the short-term
exaction of the diezmo at PotosI to boost silver production
for the upcoming carta cuenta of March 15.^^ That measure
showed a degree of willingness to innovate to solve the
problems of falling silver production, but it was also
motivated by the Viceroy's desire to show an improvement in
silver output under his administration. The azogueros were
encouraged, but their hopes that Mancera would soon issue a
new repartimiento de la mita were not to be fulfilled.
By 1642, the azogueros were frustrated with Mancera 's
inaction, besieged by a new shortage of mercury and plagued
by Visitador Juan de Palacios. The Gremio and the new
President of Charcas, Dionisio Perez Manrique, both
complained to the Viceroy that Palacios was overzealous in
his efforts to collect past mercury debts. The current
year's supply of quicksilver had not arrived until
February 5, and the carta cuenta was scheduled to depart
in March. Faced with the Visitador 's unrealistic demands,
the azogueros reported, many of their comrades had followed
the Indians' example and fled from the villa .
The one bright spot for the azogueros was the assistance
they received from President PSrez Manrique. He gave them
the same support, where the distribution of mercury and
their petitions were concerned, as Lizarazu had. P^rez
Manrique warned Mancera that only three or four of the
azogueros could afford to pay cash for mercury when it
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arrived; and that Palacios' collection of debts would ruin
the silver industry if he were allowed to persist. The
Gremio informed the Marqu§s on October 8, 1642, that it
was confident that Pgrez Manrique would rectify all of the
azogueros ' problems if he were provided the opportunity.^^
The Viceroy responded that the President would indeed be
empowered to adjust the 1633 repartimiento de la mita to
their satisfaction.
Mancera signed the requisite order and sent it to
PSrez Manrique on December 1, 1642. By that time the
situation at PotosI had altered dramatically. The alliance
between the azogueros and the presidency of Charcas had
broken down when the President assigned the enforcement of
orders to punish three azogueros for their misuse of the
64
mita to his brother Pedro. Perez Manrique had apparently
not adopted Lizarazu's position that misuse was a natural
result of fluctuating mining fortunes. His brother had
taken seventy mitayos from the three azogueros and assigned
half of them to a soldado ^ Francisco Mexia, in addition to
the twenty-four he already received.
The Gremio de azogueros responded to Pedro Perez
Manrique 's actions on the night of October 26. It met in
an open forum, with Corregidor Juan VSzquez de Acuha
presiding. The azogueros complained that the ore they
mined and refined was no longer rich; that production costs
had increased; that there was not enough labor—only 2,600
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Of 4,116 mita^^os included in the last repartimiento really
served; that the crown continued to demand the quinto ; that
they had no assets left; and that their enemies had
prevented them from obtaining new aid from the crown with •
their endless, insidious, reports. There was no hope for
government assistance and no appreciation of their past
service to the crown. Their years of sacrifice had been
rewarded, the azoqueros cried, with the removal of their
mitayOS because they had not been used correctly.
The azoqueros drafted a statement encompassing all of
their complaints and problems. That document reflected
the arguments that Sandoval y GuzmSn had presented before
the Council of the Indies, but the procurador ' s logic
failed them where the removal of mitayos for abuse was
concerned. They had to fall back, therefore, on their most
effective bargaining tactic. The azogueros presented the
Corregidor with the rights to their mitayos
, and challenged
him to distribute them to those who could better employ them
in service to the crown. Why, they asked, should they
prolong the now inevitable demise of PotosI? VSzquez de
Acuna refused to accept the azogueros ' dejaci6n
, and the
fi 7
meeting disbanded without a final resolution.
The de jaci6n and the Corregidor 's refusal to permit it
were a ploy to pressure the Viceroy to act on the azogueros '
behalf. If future attacks for misuse were to be prevented,
then a new repartimiento
, based on Lizarazu's non-merit
guidelines, was absolutely crucial. The process was
cpmplicated, however, when the soldados and miners, led
by Pedro Pgrez Manrique, offered to assume responsibility
for Potosi silver production in the place of the
azogueros
.
The azogueros then warned that any attempt to
assign their "available" mitayos to the soldados would
mean serious trouble. Indeed, even without such a move,
the soldados and azogueros met in an armed confrontation
in the center of PotosI on November 30, 1642. Azoguero
Juan Antonio Munoz de Cu^llar was killed, and two
soldados and a miner were wounded.
President Pgrez Manrique and the Audiencia de Charcas
reacted to the dejaci6n in La Plata on November 29. They
ordered the azogueros to meet and decide upon a more
appropriate means to represent their displeasure than the
abandonment of their mitayos
. On December 2, the Gremio
met again, to draw up its reply to the Audiencia. The
azogueros asked what a soldado was going to do with more
than sixty mitayos
.
They argued that they had invested
some 30,000 to 40,000 pesos each in their mills, and
would not have done so had it not been for Toledo's pledge
that mitayo labor would be provided. Thus, the azogueros
established their claim that the receipt of mitayos was
their right, not a privilege. The Gremio voted to send
seven deputies to La Plata, to carry its response to the
Audiencia 's order, and then to Lima to argue its case befor
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the Viceroy himself.
Meanwhile, Pedro P€rez Manrique had journeyed to La
Plata to confer with his brother. The Audiencia met on
December 2, 1642 to consider the situation at PotosI, and
the President explained to the oidores that his brother's
actions had been taken on his orders. The directives of
October 26 were issued to castigate individual azogueros
for misuse, specifically "pocket Indians." The legal basis
for Pedro Pgrez Manrique 's actions and the exact nature of
the soldados' offer had been unclear to the azogueros
, the
President argued, and rumors had given rise to the violence.
The Audiencia voted to send the question of the dejaci6n
to the Marques de Mancera for resolution, and to despatch
President Pgrez Manrique to PotosI to settle matters down
71there. He left for the villa the following day.
On the road to Potosi, Dionisio Pgrez Manrique met the
Gremio de azogueros' seven deputies. When he learned of
their mission, and especially their intention to argue
before the Viceroy, he dashed off a quick letter to his
oidores. The President asked them not to be persuaded by
the deputies' portrayal of the events in Potosi, and not
to allow them to go on to Lima. His concern was caused by
his fear that he had made a grave mistake by leaving the
execution of his orders to his brother. In the letter,
PSrez Manrique confessed that he had erred in assigning the
mitayos to Mexia. He said that he had thought that the
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soldado was an azoguero
. Mexla's discoveries of silver
deposits at Potosi were legendary, however, and the
additional Indians would no doubt be used to uncover new
veins of rich ore. The President promised, finally, to be
more careful in the future.
From Potosi, on December 6, Perez Manrique reported
that the azogueros who were leading the dejaciSn were those
he had denied mitayos in October. Most of the azogueros
,
he claimed, were not involved in the maneuver. He also
ordered the oidores to send the Gremio's deputies back to
Potosi; one could stay as their representative, but the
other six had to work in their mills to pay their debts to
the crown. ^"^
The President wrote to the Audiencia again the next
day. He denied all wrongdoing on his part or that of his
brother. For the first time the source of the problems
came to light. The azogueros charged that Pedro had
collected two pesos from each of the soldados for his
services on their behalf. Perez Manrique said that the
azogueros ' initial reports of a military confrontation
between themselves and the soldados had been overblown.
They had claimed that the soldados marched on the central
plaza in columns of three, with the intention of razing
the villa
, but the President said that was not so. He
instructed the oidores to leave the resolution of the
de jaci5n to the viceroy, and he was joined by the azogueros
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74in that regard.
President Perez Manrique gathered the azogueros
together on December 9 to promise that he would do nothing
about the dejaci6n until he received word from Mancera or
the crown. With these assurances—and the knowledge that
the Viceroy would have to respond to their complaints—the
azogueros agreed to recall their deputies from La Plata as
7 5he requested.
Once the issue of the dejaci6n had been eliminated—
by the end of March, 1643—Pgrez Manrique and the azogueros
were again working together. Nothing more was ever said
about the events of November and December of the previous
year. Under the President's direction the azogueros drew
up another petition for the Viceroy. The document included
material from 1642 and 1643, and generally repeated the
requests made by Sandoval y Guzman in his Pretensiones :
the quinto needed to be reduced to the diezmo; mercury
sold at cost; and a Consulado de azogueros formed. The
azogueros also asked for an increase in the mita ordinaria
to 6,000 Indians. This last point may seem out of step
with reality, but it effectively pressed the issue of the
repartimiento without mentioning Caravajal or reducciones ;
7 6Mancera was known to consider the latter impossible.
Perez Manrique supported the azogueros ' petition with
letters to the crown, and later, by gathering supporting
testimony from the religious orders of PotosI that the
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villa's silver industry was indeed near ruin as the
azoqueros claimed. "^^ The President argued that mercury
should be distributed at cost, that the diezmo should
replace the guinto
, and that the azogueros should be
allowed ten years during which to pay their debts to the
crown for mercury they had received on credit. Those
debts, he added, would have to be adjusted in light of the
azogueros ' overpayment for quicksilver from 1609 to 1631;
they now claimed that they had paid ten pesos per quintal
too much because the crown's 1609 order to distribute
mercury at cost had not been obeyed. "^^
Other government officials joined Perez Manrique in
supporting the azogueros ' requests. The Corregidor de
Potosi, Bias Robles de Salzedo, wrote to Mancera on May 30,
1643. He said that the best way to improve upon mita
deliveries was to include the forasteros
, from their
current places of residence. The effective mita ordinaria
had fallen to 2,9 34 Indians, the Corregidor noted, with
2,693 of those going to the azogueros and 241 to the
soldados. The 1,088 that were missing, he argued, could
79be regained with the inclusion of the forasteros .
Despite the support of Perez Manrique, Bias Robles de
Salzedo and the religious orders, however, the Marques de
Mancera was not moved by the azogueros ' petitions. He had
begun to distrust them and their motives, and he accused
8 0them of greatly exaggerating their plight. Part of the
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reason for the Viceroy's demeanor was the ongoing
denunciation of one azoguero by another for his misuse
of mitayos
. Azoguero unity had been fractured by an
intra-Gremio struggle between the few azogueros who had
benefited by the 1633 repartimiento and the others, who
had been hurt.^^ The charges of abuse raised questions
about the azogueros' credibility and merit at the very
moment that Mancera was weighing his response to their
requests. The Viceroy sent ex-Corregidor Juan VSzquez
de Acuna back to PotosI to conduct a visita, and he
ordered the Gremio de azogueros to send a representative
to Lima.
In September, 1643, the azogueros answered Mancera 's
criticism and his order to despatch a representative. They
said their economic difficulties had made the collection of
seven pesos apiece, to pay the soldado who carried their
petition to Lima, very difficult; they could not afford to
support an emissary. The azogueros also heightened the
stakes on the mercury issue. They claimed that they owed
the crown 4 00,000 pesos
, and that their overpayment for
quicksilver had amounted to two million. They told the
Viceroy that they would not demand immediate payment of
the 1, 600, 000 -peso balance if mercury were provided to
8 3them at cost!
On December 1, 164 3, the azogueros wrote to Mancera
again, to complain that their requests had not been
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answered. They said that they were pleased with Bias
Robles de Salzedo and glad that VSzquez de Acuna was taking
only public testimony in his visita. Robles had improved
the mita ordinaria, they reported, by 163 Indians. They
were still having problems with mercury, however, and the
next carta cuenta would suffer as a result.
The azoqueros ' prediction was to come true, for in
January of 1644 both Robles and Perez Manrique reported
that the carta cuenta would indeed be lower than the last,
because of the problems with mercury and the azoqueros '
debts. The officials explained that in order to pay
their debts, the azoqueros had to sell the mercury that was
allotted to them, less 16 per cent interest on the loans
they contracted to buy it when it arrived. They then had
very little quicksilver to use in their mills. Mancera
had already chided Perez Manrique once for defeatism; his
earlier predictions that the carta cuenta would be low were
met with a viceregal lecture that a government official's
duty was to perform the impossible
.
The Marques answered the azoqueros ' September letter on
January 1, 1644. He told them to name someone already in
Lima to represent them if they would not afford to send a
deputy. He was preparing the new repartimiento de la mita,
considering their requests and ruling on matters left from
Chinchon's viceroyalty, he said, and it would do them well
8 7to be represented. The azogueros understood the Viceroy's
message, and they sent deputy Phelipe de Bollbar to
Lima at once.^^
Mancera took two more years to develop the new
repartimiento. The delay was caused by the need to
conduct a census in the obligated provinces, for the
Viceroy doubted that there were enough Indians to meet
Potosl's requirements. Should the enumeration demonstrate
that there were too few, then new provinces would have to
be added or the mita ordinaria reduced. The census showed,
however, that there were sufficient Indians in the sixteen
provinces and the Marques proceeded. He maintained the
quotas included in the 1633 repartimiento—a total of
4,116—but added to that figure the 380 mitayos previously
assigned to the mines at Porco and one-tenth of the
yanaconas living in the obligated provinces (about 700 per
week)
.
The mita ordinaria was thereby increased to 5,196
Indians, with the azogueros receiving 4,636 mitayos and
8 9the soldados 44 0.
Unsure about the feasibility of his distribution, the
Viceroy sent a draft of it to Potosi for comments. He
instructed the Corregidor to obtain the azogueros ' response
90in an open forum. This gesture of renewed cooperation
between the azogueros and the Viceroy was to be undermined
by the variety of responses that he received in return.
The requested meeting took place on July 29, 1646,
with most of the azogueros responding to the repartimiento
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favorably. The 5,196 Indians would be sufficient, they
said, if all of them served; but that was a problem. Only
2,600 mitayos were currently working at PotosI, and only
80 of the 380 who were assigned to Porco. The azogueros
were particularly unsure about the dependability of the
yanaconas. They expressed their continued concern that
whatever the number of mitayos
,
they should be distributed
fairly, on the basis of each mill's production capabilities
(that is, not on the basis of merit)
. Each azoguero '
s
contingent, they added, should be formed with the various
ayllus ' records of compliance in mind.^""-
Azoguero Pedro de Vallesteros wrote separately that
the types of Indians assigned to each azoguero were as
important as their total number. It was better, he said,
to assign the ayllus as units, however, than split them up
as Diego de Portugal had done in 1624.^^
The royal treasury officials counseled that a visita
of the cerro and the mills was needed to determine who
should receive the mitayos . They noted one case in
particular, the Barriales mill, where no silver had been
produced for many years. The mitayos that were assigned
to it were rented, and the proceeds were used to support
9 3the azoguero—a nun. The royal officials were holding,
therefore, to the importance of ensuring that azogueros
who were guilty of misuse were not provided with mitayos .
Corregidor Juan de Velarde confessed that he was
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worried about the proposed distribution. Some of the
azocfueros who were highly favored were known to be involved
in misuse, he said, and others who were conscientious and
received fewer Indians would surely object. Velarde
suggested that the royal officials draw up a list of those
who had complied with their duties and obligations; unless
the meritorious received the mitayos
, he warned, the villa
would be overcome by recriminations.^"* From the azogueros '
comments it is clear that the Corregidor did not show them
the details of the proposed repartimiento
. His insistence
that the distribution of mitayos be based on merit, echoed
by the royal officials, worked to nullify the azogueros '
demand that they be assigned according to each mill's
production capability.
This motley response to the repartimiento by the
azogueros and government officials in PotosI raised new
questions in the Viceroy's mind. Mancera sent back a list
of four queries, which he asked the azogueros to answer:
a) which mills were totally destroyed, and how long had
they been out of production? b) which ayllus were good,
which were bad, and which were mediocre? c) what problems
could be expected if the forasteros in the provinces were
obliged to make up the difference between 2,600 and 4,116
mitayos , and how could they be overcome? and d) why did no
95
more than eighty mitayos appear at Porco?
These questions were asked without the benefit of the
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Corregidor's visita of the cerro and the mills, conducted
with Carlos de Oviedo in August of 1646. Velarde included
the results of that inspection with a letter to the Marqugs
of August 31 concerning the failure of provincial
corregidores to improve upon their deliveries of mitayos
.
The contingent from Chucuito, he noted, had not arrived at
all, Paria's group was doubtful, and rezagos for both were
inevitable.
The azogueros wrote to Mancera the same day that he
wrote to them, September 1, 1646. They asked him not to
be persuaded by the opinions of five or six azogueros who
had benefited by the Caravajal repartimiento and hoped to
prevent the new one by spreading lies about their colleagues
in the Gremio. They noted that the Council of the Indies
had not confirmed the 1633 distribution of mi tayos
, and
they argued that the sooner it was replaced the better.
^"^
On October 3, 1646, the azogueros answered the four
questions the Viceroy had put to them in his letter of
September 1. They replied that the Velarde-Oviedo visita
should be the basis for distributing the mitayos
. The
determination of which ayllus were good, bad or mediocre
was difficult, for the Indians were delivered according
to their pueblos; the azogueros sent a list based on each
pueblo's history of compliance. The inclusion of forasteros
would be beneficial, they said, because the census had shown
that there were plenty of them in the provinces. The Gremio
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suggested that the forasteros be obliged to serve in the
mita from their places of residence, under the direction
of local government officials.^^
The azogueros argued, however, that strict penalties
would be required to keep priests and corregidores from
protecting the forasteros for use in their own schemes.
They believed, furthermore, that the 5,000 mitayos
included in the Viceroy's repartimiento would probably
result in an effective mita ordinaria of 4,000 Indians,
but that that number would be sufficient. The 300 mitayos
who failed to arrive at Porco were irrecoverable, because
Porco drew upon the same geographic area as Potosl. If
the 2,600 current mitayos were joined by 700 yanaconas
and 1,700 forasteros, the azogueros thought, then the mita
could be successful once again.
The Marques de Mancera was looking for a consensus
where there was none, and perfection where it was not
possible. Administration of the mita from Lima was
proving to be as difficult as trying to govern Peru from
Madrid. The more information the Viceroy received, the
less consistent it became. The royal treasury officials
did not help his indecisiveness when they alleged that the
crown's quintos were low because the azogueros were heavily
involved with "pocket Indians." They charged, moreover,
that the azogueros mistreated the Indians so that they would
leave Potosi, and then demanded service in silver from the
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caciques. Their inspection of the cerro and the mills,
the officials said, had shown that most of the azogueros
were refining desmontes, if anything at all, simply to
present the appearance of production. '"^^
The treasury officials' report did not correlate with
Corregidor Velarde's contention that the azogueros were
trying to hire mingas with the money they received from
the caciques, but that they could not find enough Indians
who were willing to work in the mines. These comments
were included in Velarde's letter to the Viceroy of
October 31, 1646, which served as the cover for the
azogueros ' answers to his four questions
.
By the end of 1646, Mancera was thoroughly frustrated
and vindictive. The crown's quintos
, the royal officials
reported, were down by 4 3,000 pesos despite the Marques'
suspension of the collection of mercury debts until the
crown could rule on the azogueros ' overpayment for mercury
102from 1609 to 1631. The Viceroy was particularly upset
with the reports he received that the azogueros were using
"^ita service in silver for their own purposes, and the
Corregidor 's statement that mita quotas were impossible to
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meet. The crown was at war and needed money, Mancera
argued, and thus anyone who did not labor to raise that
money was a traitor; the azogueros ' use of "pocket Indians"
was not just an abuse, it was treason. The Marques laid
down the law:
Those who merit assistance will receive it; thosewho do not, will not. And for now, the proof ofwho qualifies and who does not will be based on twofactors: the first is the punctual payment for
mercury; the second is the improvement of the royalquintos—not only must they not go any lower, they
must return to earlier levels. Any of you whofails me in this regard, I assure you, will feel my
response personally, and in his pocketbook . 104
The Gremio de azogueros asked Mancera to implement his
repartimiento on November 1, 1646, and he promised, on
November 30, that they would not have to wait long—he
would finish it once the end-of-the-month correspondence
had been despatched; he did not."'"^^ The Viceroy's
warning to the azogueros suggests the probable cause of
his inaction on the matter. He had rejected their argument
that the receipt of mitayos was their right, by virtue of
their pact with Francisco de Toledo. He was now an ardent
believer in the use of merit as the basis of the
repartimiento ; and he did not believe that the azogueros
were deserving of his assistance. The royal officials
reported, in April of 1647, that "pocket Indians" had
again caused a very low carta cuenta to be sent from
106Potosl. The report may well have been the final nail
in the repartimiento ' s coffin.
In his relacion for the Viceroy Conde de Salvatierra
(1648-1655)
, Mancera related his experiences with the
azogueros
. He said that he had tried to help them, but
without success. They habitually exaggerated their
problems; each year they said they were near ruin, but the
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^^^"^Q^ ""^^ nonetheless. His efforts toward a new
repartimiento had stalled, he said, because the information
he had received from PotosI was untrustworthy, and fairness
in the distribution was absolutely fundamental. He had
decided, therefore, that it would be better to leave the
azocjueros with the hope that a new repartimiento would be
completed than to risk doing it wrong. "'^'^
Thus, the azogueros did not get their new repartimiento
,
and their attempt to impose their view of the mita on the
Marques de Mancera had failed as well. The struggle over
the conceptual basis of the mita—whether it was their
right or a privilege—had important temporal consequences,
for not only did the azogueros fail to obtain new
concessions, they were unable to reverse the damage that
had been done by Juan de Caravajal in 1633.
The de facto Mita
The fifteen years from 1633 to 1648 were dominated by
the political machinations concerning the repartimiento .
Viceregal administration did little to improve the
faltering delivery of mitayos , but it did evidence some
movement away from the belief that the corregidores could
be held accountable for the failure of the Indians to
arrive in Potosl.
In 16 34, for example, the Conde de Chinchon ordered
that each pueblo in Chucuito was to be represented by its
220
own capitgn enterador. The Viceroy hoped that the
dispersion of the capit^n 's duties would increase the
province's compliance with its mita obligation, but it
.
. 108did not. Juan de Caravajal reported, in 1636, that
only 600 of the 1,800 mitayos required from Chucuito were
actually present in Potosl. The quotas from the other
provinces, he added, were unfilled as well. The Visitador
held the corregidores
, priests and caciques responsible.
He said that they drove the originarios from their pueblos
to make room for the forasteros they used in their own
109
enterprises.
That same year, Lizarazu claimed that there were more
Indians in the provinces than ever. He said they were
only spread wider than before, and that they had learned
to evade the mita. The President called for the inclusion
of yanaconas and forasteros in the mita, and for grave
penalities to be applied to corregidores and priests who
harbored runaway Indians. The priests, he said, should
not be granted continuance after three years unless their
cooperation with the mita was documented by the Corregidor
de Potosl. Corregidores should serve perpetually—a decade
at least—rather than the present two or three year term.
Lizarazu argued that the economic activities they used to
recover the initial cost of their offices would be run with
moderation if their tenure were longer . "^''"^
After Caravajal departed PotosI in 1638, Corregidor
Josg Slez de Elorduy and President Lizarazu agreed to send
Diego NQnez de Ovando to oversee the delivery of mitayos
from Canas y Canches, Carabaya, Chucuito, La Recaja,
Omasuyo, Pacajes, Paria and Paucarcolla. Their decision
was in accordance with an order from ChinchSn that the
Corregidor do whatever he deemed was necessary to increase
provincial compliance with mita quotas.
A more persuasive indication that the caciques were
unable—or perhaps unwilling—to deliver their full
contingents of mitayos was included in the azogueros '
reply to Mancera's second set of questions. After they
had expressed their concerns about the inclusion of the
forasteros and yanaconas in the mita, they argued that
every mitayo should serve in person. The azogueros said
that the caciques no longer delivered the silver that they
collected from the Indians for the purpose of meeting
their mita quotas, but kept it for themselves ^ The
azogueros no doubt expected that they would be able to
retain some access to service in silver extralegally , but
their confession that the de facto mita was no longer
meeting their needs was important. Velarde's reference
to the inevitability of rezagos de mita for Paria and
Chucuito in 1646 was another sign that the caciques were
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no longer satisfying the demands of the azogueros .
In addition to the traditional difficulties that the
caciques faced in delivering the mitayos to Potosl,
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they were now hindered, as Lizarazu suggested, by the
Indians' growing ability to evade mita service. An
example is the case of the Carrillo brothers.
From 1638 to 1640 Antonio and Agustin Carrillo held
the canity enterador from Potobamba at bay with the claim
that they were mestizos, and therefore exempted from mita
service. The two lived in Potobamba and their father was
an Indian, but their mother was a mestiza. The case was
ultimately brought before the Audiencia de Charcas, where
the Fiscal counseled that a ruling in favor of the
Carrillos would destroy the mita, for the judicial system
would soon be clogged by the petitions of Indians claiming
some degree of Spanish ancestry. He noted that the two
looked, dressed and lived as Indians. The Audiencia
rejected this ethnological definition of " Indian-ness"
and voted to prevent the caciques of Potobamba from
including the Carrillos in future mita deliveries . "^^^ A
century of miscegenation since the conquest of Peru had
created a new problem for the mita : just who was an
Indian?
In another case, the gobernador and capitgn enterador
of Santiago de Yanaoca, Fernando Surco, accused Pedro Alata
Arusi of changing his name to Pedro Gualpa and his place
of origin to Oruro to evade mita service. Surco chased
Pedro down after he had fled from Potosi after only a few
days working in the cerro, and had him jailed pending a
223
decision by the Audiencia de Charcas. Pedro said that he
had been born in Oruro and later moved to the estancia of
Gonzalez Pic6n at the age of seven, after his parents had
died. Evidence on both sides of the dispute showed that
he had then been entrusted to Domingo Arusi and raised along
with his three sons. Arusi was originally from Santiago de
Yanaoca, and served in the mita from the estancia ; when his
sons came of age they too traveled to Potosl from there.
Pedro fled from Potosl after his first taste of mita
service, and when he was captured by Surco he challenged
the legal basis for his obligation. Despite serious
questions concerning his true origin—he changed his
birthplace to Areguipa during the course of the litigation
—the Audiencia ruled that his adoption by Domingo Arusi '
did not oblige him to serve in the mita .'*""'-^
As in the first third of the seventeenth century, the
caciques who managed to deliver their full quotas in spite
of the obstacles were rewarded. In 1640, for example,
Fernando Ayra de Arriutu's family won a coat-of-arms and
the right to carry a sword in recognition of three
generations of faithful service as caciques and capitanes
enteradores de la mita . ^
More common were the capitanes who could not comply
with their responsibilities. In 1646 the Corregidores of
Colquemarca, Desaguadero, Chayanta and Paria all reported
that the mita contingents from their provinces could not
be delivered because the canitanes had followed the Indians
in flight from their obligations
. Corregidor Juan de
Velarde wrote Mancera, also in 1647, that the only
provinces that were sending any mitayos in person were
Canas y Canches, Collao, Asangaro y Asillo, Paucarcolla,
Chucuito, Omasuyo, Pacajes and Chayanta-eight in alL^^^
The azogueros ' struggle with the government over the
mita was focused on service in silver, not their treatment
of the mitayos who served in person. Therefore, while a
great deal of attention had been paid to the mitayos '
working conditions during the first fifty years of the
system's existence, reports about the life of mitayos at
PotosI from 1633 to 1648 are virtually non-existent. One
in-depth description was produced in 16 39 by Father Pedro
Ramirez del Aguila. He reported that the Spanish section
of Potosi was ringed by the Indians' parroguias
, one for
each of the provinces subject to the mita. Each parroguia
was governed by a capitan
, gobernador and other caciques
.
The caciques and Indians change each year, each
change being called a mita. This change-over is
the source of the problems, pressures and extortions
that afflict these poor Indians. The Spaniards
pressure them to come; the Indians resist. A
thousand injustices are perpetrated involving supposed
deliveries in person and others in silver, which end
up in the pockets of the miners, paid or taken at
times with force from the Indians who do not owe it.
All of these tricks and illegalities give vent to
legal confrontations. Most every Monday some of the
caciques are punished in the plazas, the women and
children of the fugitives are imprisoned, and the
mitayos are all in an eternal state of chaos and
confusion, pain and work ... at the top of Guayna
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each Monday the Indians that have to work thatweek come together with the Corregidor, veedoresminers and owners, and the capitaLs obl igated t^
arn,v ir^^ the Indians . The group is a small
dfv^ic^-^i^^ ^^u^^"" thousand persons. The entire
tt^Ll distribution. Indians sitabout on the ground, on millstones or wheels, intheir respective fields, that are corrals, dividedby province. Once the distribution is finished
and the Indians have been assigned, the barreteros
and apiris climb the cerro
, most of them drunkfrom the day's drinking and perplexed by the effectsof the chicha. They work all week, day and night,three or four hundred meters below the ground, more
or less. Once at work they do it with apparentpleasure, smiling as though they were at a fiestaThe risks that these mines hold for one's life aregreat, from falls or cave-ins, which many times haveburied two or three hundred. Because of the many
miracles granted by Our Lady these have escaped,but there usually are some broken limbs, deaths and
wounds despite the considerable effort to maintain
safe working conditions by the miners, veedores
and the alcalde mayor de minas. It is impossible
to prevent all such accidents because the cerro hasbeen mined infinitely with tunnels, shafts, wells
... it is like a sieve. Four or five thousand
work inside the mines all week, and then return down
the sides of the cerro on Saturday. They carry
candles in what appears to be a long procession. On
Sunday morning they are gathered by the priests for
religious instruction and mass, but most of them are
drunk and tired and the effort is not very successful.
After mass the Indians are paid their wages
—
mitayos
receive two and one-half pesos ; mingas are paid
seven and one-half—and immediately spent it all on
alcohol. 119
From other, fragmentary, evidence it is apparent that
the mitayos continued to face problems with disease, short
food supplies and the high cost of necessities. In the
mid-1630s the mitayos complained loudly when the price of
candles doubled, for they were now obliged to buy their
121
own
. It is difficult , however , to say whether Ramirez
'
description of PotosI was based on his personal experiences
I
or borrowed from other accounts. His passage concerning
work inside the cerro, for instance, is very similar to
Father Acosta's sixteenth century account; and his 4,000
to 5,000 total for the Indians working in the mines is
higher than a mita ordinaria of 2,600 would have permitted.
For want of another view of life at PotosI for this period,
therefore, Ramirez' report is as undependable as it is
invaluable
.
Summary
In 1634 SebastiSn de Sandoval y GuzmSn, procurador
^^^^ral of the Cabildo de PotosI, published a series of
Pretensiones in Madrid, including: a) the lowering of
the quinto to the diezmo ; b) the execution of a reducci6n
general; c) the distribution of mercury on credit and at
cost; and d) the formation of a Consulado de azogueros.
Sandoval's arguments in support of these. four proposals
did not mention the azogueros ' misuse of service in silver
or other unauthorized aspects of the de facto mita, because
to win the new concessions from the crown they had to
appear both needy and righteous. The requests were, in
part, an azoguero attempt to regain control of the silver
industry at PotosI. They were also meant to keep the
crown from believing the azogueros ' enemies. As Sandoval
y GuzmSn was arguing their case before the Council of the
Indies, however, the azogueros were under attack at home
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for their misuse of the mita
.
The Viceroy Conde de Chinch6n decided not to leave his
repartimiento de la mita to the President of Charcas, but
assigned it to Visitador Juan de Caravajal y Sandi. The
Viceroy had decided upon a new means for aligning the mita
with the falling originario population in the provinces;
he told Caravajal to use misuse of the mita as his central
criterion for granting or denying mitayos to the azogueros
.
Chinch6n believed that misuse was so extensive at Potosl
that the number of azogueros who received Indians, and so
the number of mitayos required, could be greatly reduced
in this fashion.
Caravajal did not lower the total number of mitayos
,
but he did implement basic changes that seriously
threatened the de facto mita. Indians were assigned to
the azogueros in complete ayllus or pueblos, and twenty-nine
mills were denied all access to mitayo labor. Those
alterations disrupted service in silver arrangements and
reduced the total number of mitayos that some of the
azogueros received by virtue of their ownership of more
than one mill. More fundamentally, the azogueros '
acceptance of the repartimiento would have meant their
capitulation to the viceroys' position that the mita was
a privilege. They argued that their receipt of mita labor
was their right, under the terms of their pact with Toledo.
Those were the real reasons for the azogueros '
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opposition to the 1633 repartimiento
. but they could not
argue against it on those bases. Instead, they had to
employ their traditional argument that silver production
would be hurt, and so royal income, and that PotosI might
collapse because of the meddling of an ignorant government
official
.
The azogueros' complaints received short shrift in
Lima, so they were sent to the Council of the Indies,
which tried to serve as a referee in the battle between
Caravajal and the azogueros. Because the combatants argued
on two completely different levels-the Visitador accusing
the azogueros of abuse and they warning that PotosI silver
production would be lost forever—there was no common
ground upon which the Council could base a decision. it
therefore left the resolution of the conflict to the
Viceroy, but suggested that he conduct a new repartimiento
.
Despite some cooperation between Chinch6n and President
Lizarazu—the azogueros ' advocate—the two officials were
at odds over the implementation of the Council's order.
The President wanted to conduct a new repartimiento
, with
no provision for the distribution of mitayos according to
merit, while the Viceroy merely wanted Lizarazu to adjust
the 16 33 repartimiento
. Their disagreement ended in a
stalemate.
The Council of the Indies then ordered the Marques de
Mancera to conduct a new repartimiento
,
according to
Lizarazu's guidelines. Mancera moved slowly, weighing his
instructions and the counsel of his predecessor against
his own investigation of the situation at Potosl. m the
meantime, the azogueros had to withstand an attempt by
the new President of Charcas, Dionisio Pgrez Manrique, to
remove some mitayos from three azogueros for misuse. Pgrez
Manrique, unlike Lizarazu, did not believe that misuse of
the mita was a natural result of fluctuating mining
fortunes. The azogueros countered the President's move
with a deiaci6n of their mitayos
, essentially shutting
down the silver industry. The dejaci6n was also meant to
force the Viceroy to conduct a new repartimiento
. It
apparently succeeded in bringing Perez Manrique back into
line, but Mancera continued to move very slowly toward
completion of the new repartimiento
. The project was
delayed for two years because he had doubts that there
were enough Indians in the provinces to support the mita.
His investigation discovered, however, that there were
sufficient numbers, and he drew up a 5,196 Indian mita
ordinaria : the 4,116 previously included by Caravajal;
380 mitayos theretofore assigned to Porco; and 700
yanaconas
.
That might have been the end of the repartimiento
problem, but the Viceroy then sent his proposed distribution
to Potosi for prior comment. The azogueros responded only
to the total numbers of Indians involved, and raised some
questions about the assignment of mitayos in complete
a^llus and the prospects for the inclusion of yanaconas
.
Corregidor Velarde was concerned about the implementation
of the repartimiento, because some azogueros who were
heavily involved in misuse of the mita were favored in
the distribution. He argued that the mitayos should be
assigned on the basis of merit—a sentiment that was
repeated by the royal treasury of ficials—and so countered
the azogueros ' arguments to the contrary.
The uneven response to the suggested repartimiento
caused Mancera to delay its execution, at first with more
questions—including the possibility of incorporating the
forasteros. Then charges of abuse leveled by some of the
azogueros against others, general confusion in the
correspondence between Potosi and Lima, and falling carta
cuenta shipments combined to frustrate the Marques. He
decided that only the meritorious should receive mitayos
,
and because he could not determine who they were, he left
the problem of the repartimiento to his successor.
Meanwhile, the caciques were proving less able to
deliver their quotas of mitayos , in person or in silver.
The azogueros claimed, in their correspondence with the
Viceroy, that the caciques no longer delivered the money
they collected from the Indians. In fact, they were unable
to raise enough money, and because rezagos de mita were
now demanded, each year's failures were added to the next
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year's obligation to compound their difficulties. The
caciques were prevented from meeting their quotas by the
falling originario population in the provinces, the
increased demand for Indian labor in them, and the growing
ability of the Indians to evade mita service.
In the battle between Lima and Potosi over the
conceptual basis of the mita the Indians who served in
person were virtually forgotten. The struggle was not
over how the azogueros treated the mitayos who worked for
them, but how they used those mitayos—especially the ones
who arrived in Potosi in the form of silver.
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Per^'^n el conde de'chinchsS? virrey delQ e Lima, 1635. X. 30, a don Juan de Carvajal y Sandi
^echo'con toda%ntf""f^ que'hLi:ndo'Qene?arL ?no ^''^^^'^^^^^ Y conocimiento el repartimiento
!o ?f i ^ ^e mita de PotosI segdn comisi6n que1632. X.l ahora, con la inteligencia
^
dP n^^i^f ^
materia dg los indios vacos a los sefiorese minas e mgenios que mejor los merezcan, y quite vmodere a los que crea conveniente, con calidad de confirmaci6n por el virrey y con inhibici6n total de la audiencia"de La Plata," Lima, 30. X. 1635 (MC 700; MOM 584).
33. Angulo (AGI
, Charcas 268, no. 36--see note 58,cnapter II), 2v, says twenty-eight duefios were deprived,
while Valera (AGI, Charcas 268, nos . 69A & 69B~see noteba. Chapter II), 9, says twenty-eight cabezas de ingenio.For the twenty-nine mills figure, AGI ,"ch^F^s"2667^^^2
,
12^V°1634 ^2^f^®
^lloa to the crown, Callao de Lima,
34. The terms of the repartimiento are included in theRelaciSn del estado en que deja el gobierno de estos
reinos del PerQ el Conde de Salvatierra al Virrey Conde deAlba de Aliste," 22. III. 1655, Los virreyes (ed. by Hanke
and Rodriguez)
,
Peru IV (no. 283), 38-40 (based on Jose
Toribio Polo, Memorias de los virreyes del Pert! ; Margugs
de Mancera y Conde de Salvatierra (Lima, 1899) ; and Angel
de Altolaguirre y Duvale, ed., Colecci6n de las Memorias o
Relaciones que escribieron los virreyes del Pert! acerca
estado en que de jaban las cosas generales del reino
(Madrid, 1930)). Angulo (AGI, Charcas 268, no. 36~see
note 58, Chapter II), 2v, for 4,115 Indians involved in a
repartimiento of 3. IX. 16 33; also the Archbishop of Lima
(AGI, Charcas 267, no. 16—see note 91, Chapter II), 2.
Crespo, "La 'Mita,'" 180-181 is mistaken in taking the mita
ordinaria for the mita gruesa
.
AGI, Charcas 26 7, no. 37,
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President Pedro VSzquez de Velasrn (n-F ^-^^ a ^
Charr;=»c!^ ^-^
v x co (of the Audiencia de«-adrcas; to the crown, 20 iv t; -p^ .,
Perfi ^ M
^^^/l Conde de Chinch6n deja el gobierno delrQ al arquSs de Mancera," 26.1.1640, Los virreyes (edby Hanke and Rodriguez), PerQ lii (no SftTT kI ,1
Plata Lv?f;^o ' "Consulta en que el Presidente de Laadvierte que aunque V. mag.d niando que se oyesse alos acogueros de potossi sobre el agravio de ave?lesquitado los yndios Don Juan de caravaxal no ha sido esto
if^^ni^/^?"''^ "^T ^^^d^dero desagravio a de nacer de
i;;^:; ' I J' azogueros * later comments on thedifferences between ayllus
, see AGN, Sala IX, 6-2-5, no
i : r azogueros to the Marques de Mancera,29 VII. 1646, 2 fs.; and AGN, Sala IX, 6-2-5, no.
Vallesteros to the Marques de Mancera, Potosl,Jl.vII.1646, 2 fs.
36. AGI, Charcas 266, no. 1, Chinch6n to the crown,Lima, 9 IV. 1634, 2 fs.; AGI, Charcas 266, no. 2 (see note33); and BNB, CPLA 20, fs. 359-360v (see note 32).
37. BNB, CPLA 20, fs . 359-360v (see note 32).
38. AGI, Charcas 266, no. 8, Juan de Caravajal y Sandito the crown, 18. III. 1636, 2 fs.
39. AGI, Charcas 266, no. 4, Juan de Caravajal y Sandito the crown, 25.11.1635, 1 f. For Andrade ' s side of the
story, AGI, Charcas 266, no. 4A, the disposition of Don
Pedro de Andrade Sotomayor, 31.1.16 35, 34 fs.
40. AGI, Charcas 26 6, no. 3, Juan de Caravajal y Sandi
to the crown, 25.11.1635, If., for the Visitador's
comments on the repartimiento as a whole and Ger6nimo
Garavito in particular.
41. AGI, Charcas 266, the crown to the Conde de
Chinch6n, 6. IV. 1636, 1 f.; and AGI, Charcas 266, no. 39A,
the crown to the Conde de Chinchon, 6. IV. 1636, If.; the
two are identical.
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^^^^^^^^^^^^^
PotossI vsso de los yndios Conserbacion de los yngenJos y
Celu^a^n'^''
Azogues, Prenobando con el esplcJal
^
d l Lo que en esta Parte esta mandado en otras," sent
nn^^
(probably with AGI
, Charcas 266, no. 10--seeote 35) and dated 1. III. 1636.
..m
information on the plan, ANB, M 114, no 4 2 f
"Testimonio de una provisi6n del coAde d^ ChiicA6n?•v^;rey
'
Pnin^?"" '
fProbando la conducta de los oficiales r^ales de
l^t. i ?
la contradicci6n que hicieron al presidente dees a Real Audiencia para que s61o al contado se dieseazogue a los azogueros de Potosi y revocando la multa de
T?L"'^^^f.?°f.?^^.^^ ^"^^""^^ ^i^h^ contradicci6n,"Lima, 12. VI. 1636 (MC 712). For Lizarazu's complaints
about Caravajal, and information on what happened when theloan could not be repaid, see AGI, Charcas 266, no. 9,President Juan de Lizarazu to the crown, 1. III. 1637.
44. Corregidor de Potosi Bias Robles de Salzedo wrotethe Marqu§s de Mancera about Andres de Sandoval on 1 IX
16 43 (AGN, Sala IX, 6-2-5, no. 43, 1 f.); Sandoval wis
still looking for recompense years after Juan de Caravajalhad stripped him of his 34 mitayos
.
45. Cgspedes del Castillo, 31-32.
46. AGI, Charcas 266, no. 10 (see note 35).
47. Ibid.
48. AGI, Charcas 266, no. 11, "Potossi suppca a VM se
serba de mandar a algun ministro de las provy^s satisfaga
a los agraviados en el Ultimo Repartimyto que por no averlo
hecho el Virey aunque VM se lo tiene mandado. y recusamos
a don Ju^ de carbajal suplicando a VM le mude a otro
consejo o le ocupe en otras cosas," Potosi, 17. III. 1638,
If*
49. Chinch6n, "Relaci6n" (see note 34), 48-49.
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50. AGI, Charcas 266. no 19 "n^^^^ ^ ^
por el conde de chinchon'arpress.te^f p^^"^ "="1^-de Licaracu," Lima, 30. III. 1639 and Copia de Ca?tf
^"
s?en!?i^^^^5r:?S
Lizfr^.n^?^^^^^''^^^ President Juan dea azu to the crown, PotosI, 12. VI. 16 39, 1 f.
cr. !?*
Chinch6n, "Relaci6n" (see note 34), 48-49 56-57
conteAt'with'th"" °" 2lita. kncerf^as'not
'
n e amount of information in the "Relaci6n "however, and asked for more in May, 1640 (the Marquis deMancera to the Conde de Chinch6n, ''Un informi vSraz sobre
T^h^^ S""?? virreinato en 1640," ed. by Guillermo
^^^^^S/^^i^^^' Revista Historica , XXIII (Lima, 1957),278-295). Pereyra, 24-25, says that some had suggestedthat yanaconas and forasteros be included in the new
repartimiento. Mancera notes Chinch6n's suggestion in hisown "Relacien del estado del gobierno del pl?a qie haSe elMarques de Mancera al Virrey Conde de Salvatierra," 8.X1648, Los virreyes (ed. by Hanke and Rodriguez), Peru III(no. 282), 148 (from the printed version in the BritishMuseum)
.
53. ANB, RC 335, "Copia simple de real cedula dirigida
a la audiencia de La Plata: Informe con su parecer sobreSI convendria que los azogueros de Potosi paguen solamente
el diezmo de los metales que sacan, o el quinto deducidas
costas, o el quinto de los metales ricos de minas nuevas yel diezmo o duodecimo de los metales pobres de minas
antiguas, segQn pide a nombre del gremio el doctor don
SebastiSn de Sandoval y Guzman," Madrid, 4. XII. 16 35 (MC
703)
.
The crown would later ask the age-old question about
Black slaves again, ANB, RC 392, "Tanto simple de real
c€dula dirigida a esta real audiencia: ordenasele informe
sobre si conviene traer a estas provincias esclavos negros
para el beneficio de las minas y la labor de los campos,"
Zaragoza, 12. X. 1645 (MC 764; MOM 615). Arzans, Historia
,
II, 57, mentions two cedulas by Phillip IV benefiting the
azogueros which came in response to Sandoval y Guzman's
efforts on their behalf: a) a 9. X. 1635 order that azogueros
could not be jailed for debts owed to the Real Hazienda;
and b) a 15. X. 16 35 order that debts would not prevent the
azogueros from obtaining government positions.
54. ANB, RC 356, "Expediente relative a las diligencias
practicadas en la real audiencia de La Plata con motive de
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la peticiSn hecha por don L6pe de Andrar^^ q^^^procurador general de la villa de pStoS?\ ° ^^P^ ''^^^gremio de azoqueros de L Potos£ y a nombre del
ii£-£,rt£^ ".-'.K^-s.'-
MO . ' -^o--'-V.1639, 2 fs. MC 731; MOM 594)- ANB Rr ^rqCopia simple de real cedula dirigida a esU ^diencia
'
Gafav?^n''°'' ^r^^^^ 1^ petici6n que Ger6n?mo
Potoli ha^r''''^^^^ de\zoguerSs de
en dfcha v^Tir""^ cualquiera pueda fabricar ingeniosi illa por la utilidad que se sigue a la real
Carvaifl'v^^^H^^^'^ ^"^^"""^ liclnciado don Juan de
despoblar'^a^anni; esta audiencia, hizoa ar lgu os mgenios con pretexto de no ser nec4sarios/' Madrid, 16. IV. 1639, 1 f. (mc 727). "
no ^IfiR t^^Ao^^^'^'^r i^^'
includes two copies of the order:
^nH '^^^^ Sol6rzano Pereira in 1654)a d no. 3 9B which appears to be the original; both are 2ts. m length. The order was also included in AGI, Charcas266 no. 20B, "Cedula del repartim. to
^ with a letter fromPresident Nestares Marin to ?he crown, 30. V. 1652? andother extracts supporting the distribution of mitayos onthe basis of stamping mechanisms (mazos ) , 4 fs. total- thismay be a draft of AGI, Charcas 26871^ 70C, "TestimO
' sobreel repartim^o General de Indies de las Minas," 4.II.1679,
7 fs., which includes an order to Corregidor de PotosiSarmiento de Mendoza of 8. XI. 1653 to implement the terms ofthe 7 XII. 1639 cidula; AGI, Charcas 266, no. 20B could alsobe a draft of that 1653 order (which will be discussed inChapter V)
.
57. In addition to the sources in note 56: Castillo(AGI, Charcas 270, no. 33C~see note 30, Chapter II), 15v,gives the 5,000 Indian figure; Valera (AGI, Charcas 268,
nos. 69A & 69B—see note 58, Chapter II), 10, relates the
7. XII. 1639 order and Lizarazu's three guidelines.
58. ANB, M 125, no. 3, "Provisi6n del virrey: La
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aijuuT: now Dad things are at Potosl.
Perez Manrique to the Marqugs de Mancera, Potosl, 6. X. 16422 fs The azoc^ueros ' 1642-1643 informaci6n (AGN S^la ix,'
testimony 'bi ^hr^ Chapter II) includes lengthy
'
^hf^ !^?^T,^ azo2ueros, from March and April of 1642that the President had personally underwritten some azoaue-
iIIv:r°m:L^hant:^'^ ^^^^^^ .oneylendlrt™
r™-; ^^^^ 1' the Deputies of the
e^X 1642? i^f'^''^''^^
t° Marqugs de Mancera, Potosl,
63. AGN, Sala IX, 6-2-5, no. 4, the Marques de Mancerato the Gremio de azogueros, Lima, 1. XII. 1642, 1 f. (draft).
64 ANB, M 125, no. 5, "Acta en testimonio, de un
cabildo celebrado por el gremio de los azogueros de PotosI
con presencia del general don Juan VSzquez de Acuna,
corregidor de dicha villa: En consideraci6n a la pobreza
actual de los metales, a los gastos excesivos de azogue,
mineros, capatazes, herramientas y otros inconvenientes
,
el gremio resuelve suspender las labores y hacer dejaci6nde los indios mitayos," Potosl, 26. X. 1642, 8 fs. (MC 746;MOM 601)
.
Gunnar Mendoza relates the events surrounding
the dejaci6n in a note in ArzSns, Historia
,
II, 90; he
refers to "Minas catllogo 418, 420-425" in that note—it
would seem that the numeration of the ANB/BNB catalogues
has changed since the Arz5ns Historia was published.
65. ANB, M 125, no. 6, "Carta del gremio de azogueros
de PotosI a esta Real Audiencia: Informa que los azogueros
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mitroor^el^L?"^"""J' . <1^3^<=i«n de los Indies deta p l mal repartimiento que de Sstos pretendia hac^srdon Pedro Manrique, hermano de don Dionlcio^ManriqGe,
rii:'wc%^l.."^S Real_Audiencia," PotosI, 2...AV,2.
66. ANB, M 125, no. 5 (see note 64).
67. Ibid.
rhJnlc c' ^x*^ ^' ^c^e^do de la audiencia decnarcas: Se vi6 una proposiciCn del doctor don DionisioP§rez Manrique, gobernador-presidente de esta audiencia
en orden a la dejaci6n que los azogueros han ofrecido hacerde los indios mitayos agraviSndose del castigo que dichogobernador habia impuesto en algunos de ese gremio por elmal uso de los indios llamados de faltriquera , " La Plata
2. XII. 1642, 4 fs. (MC 750; MOM 604).
69. ANB, M 125, no. 6 (see note 65).
70. Ibid.
71. ANB, ACh.LA 7, no. 42 (see note 68).
72. ANB, M 125, no. 7, "Carta de su presidente, don
Dionisio Manrique, a esta Real Audiencia, desde el camino
a PotosI: El tribunal no debe dejarse sorprender por los
diputados del gremio de azogueros de dicha villa que
vienen a representar supuestos excesos del mencionado don
Dionisio en el repartimiento de los indios de mita," El
Terrado, 3. XII. 1642, 2 fs. (MC 750a; MOM 606).
73. ANB, M 125, no. 8, "Carta de su presidente-
gobernador, don Dionisio Pgrez Manrique, asistente en
PotosI, a esta real Audiencia: Da noticias sobre el
estado en que se encuentra esa villa despues de los alter
cados que promovieron los azogueros en el asunto de los
~
indios de mita. Incluye un auto para que se los notifique
a los siete diputados del gremio de azogueros que vinieron
a esta ciudad de La Plata a presentar sus quejas a la
Audiencia, para que comparezcan en PotosI, como deudores
de la real hacienda por azogues, a seguir en sus labores
de minas para afianzar sus deudas," PotosI, 6. XII. 1642,
3 fs. (MC 751; MOM 607)
.
74. ANB, M 125, no. 9, "Carta de su presidente, don
Dionisio P§rez Manrique, estante en PotosI, a esta Real
Audiencia: Desmiente la especie de que el prop6sito de
los mineros y soldados el dia de su encuentro con los
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contra su heLano d:n'pldrola^??°L?"%o?osr°rxiri642
75. ANB, M 125, no. 10 (see note 74).
iTon^
Sala IX, 6-2-5, no. 2, is an undated petitional g the same lines as the 1642-1643 informaci6n ; it ?s2 fs. long and entitled "Petission del gremio de losazogueros de esta Villa, Para que su ex la probea lo quefuere servido en aquello que solo pende de^su Voluntadque en quanto a los demas, en que puede obrar Don Dionisio
ciydad^
haziendo Las diligencias con tSdo
p.ol^; i^^'- ^^^^ "Informacian" beforePresident Dionisio Perez Manrique, including testimony bythe religious orders of PotosI supporting the Gremio de
azogueros' request for assistance, PotosI, 25. VIII. 1643
14 fs. For P^rez Manrique 's correspondence, AGN, Sala IX,6-2-5, no. 10 (see note 74); and AGN, Sala IX, 6-2-5, no.4b, for what appears to be a letter from Perez Manrique tothe Marques de Mancera (so noted by the Viceroy's secretary
on the letter), Potosi, 8. IX. 1643, 4 fs. (unsigned).
78. AGN, Sala IX, 6-2-5, no. 45 (see note 77); AGI
,
Charcas 266, no. 14, "Consulta del consejo de 16 de Abrilde 650 sobre la pretension de los Acogueros de Potossi,"
Madrid, 16. IV. 1650, 9 fs.
79. Castillo (AGI, Charcas 270, no. 33C— see note 30,
Chapter II) ,15.
80. AGN, Sala IX, 6-2-5, no. 48, the Marques de Mancera
to the Gremio de azogueros, Lima, 1. XI. 1643, 2 fs. (draft;
in the Viceroy's hand?)
.
81. One such denunciation, undated however, is AGN,
Sala IX, 6-2-5, no. 44, Christ6val de Castaneda to the
Marques de Mancera, 1 f. His position is supported by
AGN, Sala IX, 6-2-5, no. 42, the Gremio de azogueros to the
Marqugs de Mancera, Potosi, 1. XII. 1643, 1 f. The Viceroy
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comments on the situation in AGN, Sala IX, 6-2-5, no 38
note o. l.XIX.l64%^!.o^nf^i-XX^:'%^^!^-L!l"!f^^e^:;oie
r.r.ll'^ • f
rrival of the Visitador was one of manv item^
o?!
a letter describing the gamut of difficultiesplaguing the azogueros . ux^r x
r^J^' ^^^^ ^-2-5. no. 47, the Deputies of the
?X ^64. T.h'^r^^"^" ^^^^^^^ ManceL, PotosII . 1 3 (t e day is not provided), 2 fs.
84. AGN, Sala IX, 6-2-5, no. 37 (see note 82).
ri. ll^ Corregidor Bias Roblesde Salzedo to the Marqugs de Mancera, PotosI, 31.1.1644
P^r^;'M''''''-
^^'2 '''' President Don Dloni^ioSrez Manrique to the Marqugs de Mancera, PotosI, 31 I1644, 2 fs.
86. AGN, Sala IX, 6-2-5, no. 16, the Marqugs de Mancera
(draftf^
Dionisio Pgrez Manrique, Lima, 1.1.1644, 4 fs.
87. AGN, Sala IX, 6-2-5, no. 38 (see note 81).
88. AGN, Sala IX, 6-2-5, no. 39, the Marques de Mancerato the Gremio de azogueros and Corregidor de PotosI, Lima,30. VI. 1646, 10 fs. The twenty pages include drafts of theViceroy's letters and a copy of the tentative repartimientode la mita
. Bollbar is mentioned in the letter to the
Gremio; he also figures in Mancera 's "Relaci6n" (see note
52) ,149.
89. Castillo (AGI
, Charcas 270, no. 33C~see note 30,Chapter II), 15v, mentions a letter of 30. VI. 1646 which
stated that the census had been ordered, including the
yanaconas and forasteros. The results are to be found in
AGN, Sala IX, 17-1-4. The letter noted by Castillo is,
most likely, AGN, Sala IX, 6-2-5, no. 39 (see note 88).
Valera (AGI, Charcas 268, nos. 69A & 69B~see note 58,
Chapter II)
, 11, says that Mancera ordered reports from
provincial corregidores on the number and condition of the
Indians in their jurisdictions. Zavala, Servicio personal
,
II, 109, says that Phelipe de Bollbar presented the
Marques de Mancera with a document entitled "Padrones de
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21-]!^ tu^\ ^ ^^N, Padrones, 1623-1646,
TY ]l ' K ^5^,i^2iao of padrones for 1623-1646 in Sala
In a fn^^""^^ NicolSs S5nchez-Albornoz no^es
Alto PerQ Si'Lif °? "Migraciones internas en el
^tlu f r. ^ ^^^"^^ acumulado en 1646" (provided bv theauthor)
.
Zavala provides the province-bylprovince
T^r^^r?' SSnchez-Albornoz analyzes\he da?a further
and 10 alt T""^ originarios; 15,446 forasterSs;*
52? 149 sltTtT.t";^
Mancera, in his "Relaci6n" (see n^te
ItL'^ \ ^ ^ ^ ^^^""^ ''^^^ enough Indians to support
savs ggat th^?^" '' '""^i^' ^^^^^ exception^andy th e figures show an insufficient Indian base for
^^^
/^P^^^i"'^^"^^ - The census was presented to the Viceroywith prefatory remarks that many corregidores had under-
represented the Indians within their jurisdictions and thatothers had not complied with their orders to send an
accounting (Zavala, II, 109); perhaps Mancera's decisionthat there were enough Indians was based on his beliefthat the official figures were a minimal estimate of thetrue Indian population in the provinces. SSnchez-Albornoz
'
forthcoming article will have more to say about the 1640s
census, and its ramifications. For the terms of the
repartimiento, AGN, Sala IX, 6-2-5, no. 39 (see note 88).
90. Mancera notes his order in his "Relaci6n" (see note
52), 159. Valera (AGI, Charcas 268, nos . 69A & 69B—see
note 58, Chapter II), 11, also says that the meeting was
ordered by the Viceroy. AGN, Sala IX, no. 39 (see note 88)includes the notes sent to the Corregidor and the Gremio,
as well as the tentative repartimiento
.
91. AGN, Sala IX, 6-2-5, no. 17 (see note 35). It
would seem, judging by the azogueros ' response, that they
were privy only to the totals involved in the tentative
repartimiento
.
92. AGN, Sala IX, 6-2-5, no. 18 (see note 35). For
the Viceroy's acknowledgement, AGN, Sala IX, 6-2-5, no.
19, the Marques de Mancera to Pedro de Vallesteros, Lima,
31. VIII. 1646 (draft), 1 f.
93. AGN, Sala IX, 6-2-5, no. 40, the Oficiales reales
to the MarquSs de Mancera, Potosl, 31. VII. 1646, 2 fs.
94. AGN, Sala IX, 6-2-5, no. 29, Corregidor Juan de
Velarde to the Marques de Mancera, Potosi, 31. VII. 1646,
2 fs.
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||£aHeros. reply, PoLsr3.xa646'ah;'or iiSL^'tholatter beginning where the former leaves off?' s i t . ,A draft of the Viceroys letter L'AGN? Sa"'ix! 6-2-5°'''-no. 13, Lima, 1. IX. 1646, 2 fs. o ^: b.
96
2 fs. Velarde says that he is including a oo^v of'hf^
'
£ n L-L'^e^i?^ r?
•i^^''^^ his instructions forthe Corregidor were despatched.
97. AGN, Sala IX, 6-2-5, no. 23, the Gremio deazogueros to the Marqugs de Mancera, Potosi, 1. IX. 1646,
98. AGN, Sala IX, 6-2-5, no. 22 (see note 95). Thelist of good, bad and mediocre pueblos is AGN, Sala IX
Z.'.^°' ^' "^^"^ '^^ Provincias Y Pueblos qe estan,obligados a emuiar, Yndios Para la mita del cerro dePotossi con distincion de quales Son buenos medianos Y
malos," 2 fs.
99. AGN, Sala IX, 6-2-5, no. 22 (see note 95).
100. AGN, Sala IX, 6-2-5, no. 20, the Oficiales realesto the Marques de Mancera, Potosl, 31. X. 1646, 3 fs.
101. AGN, Sala IX, 6-2-5, no. 21, Corregidor Juan deVelarde to the Marques de Mancera, PotosI, 31. X. 1646, 2 fs.
102. Baquijano y Carrillo, no. 212 (13 de enero de
1793), 39. The 43,000 pesos figure is included in the
Royal Officials' letter of 31. X. 1646 (AGN, Sala IX, 6-2-5,
no. 20—see note 100)
. Mancera discusses the overpayment
issue, and his actions on it, in his "Relacion" (see note
52), 148; he says the amount of the overpayment was really
5 pesos
, 6 tomines , per quintal . The Viceroy's letter,
which includes the 43,000 pesos figure (actually 43,900) is
AGN, Sala IX, 6-2-5, no. 26, the Marqugs de Mancera to the
Gremio de azogueros, Surco, 31. X. 1646, 3 fs. (draft).
103. AGN, Sala IX, 6-2-5, no. 33, the Marques de Mancera
to Corregidor Juan de Velarde, Lima, 30. XI. 1646, 2 fs., for
the Viceroy's unhappiness with Velarde.
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104. AGN, Sala IX, 6-2-5, no. 26 (see note 102)
no 24 ^hf
^zo2ueros' request, AGN, Sala IX, 6-2-5,
Poios^' I xi itTe'' f/^°^:;^-°^to the Marques Mance^a,
Sala ly k l'\ ' Viceroy's response is AGN,
rrp^J ' Marques de Mancera to theG emio de azogueros, Lima, 20. XI. 1646, If.
106. AGI, Charcas 267, no. 1, the Oficiales reales tothe crown, Potosi, 10. IV. 1647, 3 fs.; I assume a simll^?report was sent to the Viceroy.
i ar
^aa^h^ ^^^^^^^ ' ^ "RelaciSn" (see note 52), 140, 148-150
268 no; fi^A^f^Si"' °" 2lita. Valera'(AGI charcas', s. 69A & 69B—see note 58, Chapter II), 11 sav<.that Mancera believed it would b4 bet?er to h^ve an
^
incoming viceroy implement a repartimiento than an outgoingone. Bartolomg de Salazar, who would later serve asPresident of Charcas and Superintendent of the mita, wasAsesor under Mancera, and told the crown in 1662 that therepartimiento had been ready to be put "en limpio" when
"jA^i""^^? Salvatierra's imminent arrival reached Mancera(AGI, Charcas 267, no. 24, Bartolome de Salazar to the
crown, PotosI, 1. IV. 1662, 15 fs.).
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CHAPTER V
1648 TO 1666
In the wake of Mancera's decision not to issue a new
repartimiento de la mita, the Council of the Indies tried
again to break the impasse between the Gremio de azogueros
and the viceregal administration in Lima. Beginning in
the early 1650s, the Council issued a comprehensive
program, including both reforms and a new repartimiento
.
which it hoped would meet the legitimate needs of the
azogueros without condoning their involvement in abuses.
The fate of the Council's program in Peru is further
testimony to the frustrations of administering the mita
from afar. Because a series of viceroys in Lima found
the Council's program counter to their conception of what
should be done at PotosI, or feared the repercussions of
it, they postponed its implementation. Meanwhile, in
Potosi, corregidores de Potosi and presidents of Charcas,
moved by varying mixtures of personal and professional
jealousies, worked at cross-purposes.
While the government proved incapable of answering
the crisis over the mita, the caciques who bore the brunt of
the system's disintegration responded to the increasingly
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violent means used by the azogueros against them with
complaints to the government and flight from the provinces.
The Council of the Indies ' Program
The Council of the Indies, in its capacity as referee,
responded to Mancera's decision not to issue a new
repartimiento during the early 1650s. it developed a
two-part program which it hoped would appease the azogueros
,
protect the crown's economic interests, and ensure that
the Indians were not mistreated. The Council was trying
to find a middle road that would break the stalemate that
had resulted from the Marques' efforts.
The first step was taken on April 28, 1650, when the
crown despatched a cedula ordering a new repartimiento
,
to be based on a census and reducciones in the sixteen
obligated provinces. The Council considered the April 28
order to be a concession to the azogueros
, for it complied
with Sandoval y Guzman's second proposal.""" The directive
was complemented by a simultaneous edict suspending the
collection of mercury debts incurred from 1609 to 1631
while the matter of azoguero overpayment was debated by
2the Council. The second part of the program began with
a May 6, 1651 order banning "pocket Indians." The
concessions that were granted in 1650, the Council argued,
had removed any need on the part of the azogueros to engage
3m misuse of the mita.
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The council of the Indies had constructed its program
after carefully analyzing Sandoval y Guzman's four
proposals, other azoguero petitions and government
correspondence on the mita/ Those materials had emphasized
both the importance of the system for the production of
royal revenue and the extent of the abuses that permeated
the mita. The two-part program was a balanced effort to
minimize the abuses while maximizing silver production at
Potosi
.
The two orders also showed a renewed concern about the
justness of the mita. The question had been raised anew
by Juan de SolSrzano Pereira in his 1648 opus, Politica
Indiana. Sol6rzano had extensive experience in America,
including service at Huancavelica under the Viceroy Conde
de Chinch6n, and he had served on the Council of the Indies
from 1629 to 1644. His was one of the great legal minds of
the day, but Sol6rzano was unable to determine definitively
whether the mita was just. Instead, he fell back on the
traditional method of presenting affirmative and negative
arguments
:
Affirmative
The parity of mine work and agricultural work; if
the Indians could be rightfully assigned to the
fields then they could be assigned to the mines.
The need of the public good, which in Peru depended
upon gold and silver production. The Indians were
the best-suited for mine work (compared to the
Spanish, Blacks and mixed-bloods) .
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Princes could rightfully require that th^^ir-
to ^rkloi'^hr^'^'''' "^^^'^^^ ^'^^^—
Service in dangerous occupations was permissiblewhere death was not certain, as during tTmes of
theL^f^r^r^"" """^ " '^'^^ Americas, fromneir rirst discovery.
Negative
The incompatibility of Indian liberty and theirgood treatment with their service in the mines.Such work was normally left to criminals.
Indian service was not justifiable when the work
was strange to them, or when it was intolerable.
Indians were subjected to great dangers and
suffering in the mines.
There was no difference between the Indians'
service and that of slaves during Roman days.
Indeed, the condition of the Indians was worse,
for they had committed no offense for which to
atone
.
Personal service for encomenderos had been
banned because of abuses; so it should be for
the azogueros
.
The Indians were prohibited from pearl diving
because of the dangers involved. In addition,
the republic was not supported by mita labor,
but was being destroyed by it.
For all of the orders allowing such labor there
were many others that banned it.
The questions that Sol6rzano raised about the mita in 1648
had been asked at its inception, and they were debated by
the Velasco junta in 1603. During the intervening
I
half-century they had not received a great deal of
attention, until the azogueros
-vicerovs struggle over the
conceptual basis of the mita brought them to the fore once
again. The legal foundation for the system was well
established, as Sol6rzano's lists attest. The question of
its justification, however, was more difficult. Sol6rzano
leaned toward the negative, but he offered no clear
statement one way or the other. He was torn between the
crown's continuing need for silver and the abuses that
pervaded the mita. He suggested, simply, that the mines
be worked, wherever possible, by slaves, criminals and
volunteers. The Council of the Indies' dual-fold program
reflected that same dialectic.^
If he was unable to determine whether the mita was
just, Sol6rzano did create the device for measuring the
"justness" factor: as long as the benefits of mining
outweighed the evils wrought by the mita, the system would
be justifiable. The balance between evils and benefits,
however, was subject to differing interpretations based
on varying conceptions of the mita—one in Lima, one at
PotosI, and still another in Madrid. From 1648 to 1666,
the azogueros' de facto mita and the viceroys' "official"
mita were still battling for supremacy.
The Council ' s Program in Peru
The balanced program devised by the Council of the
indies would have to survive both the bureaucratic process
and the Potosl-Lima confrontation if it were going to be
effective. The program's first stop in Peru was at Lima,
where it was received by the Viceroy Conde de Salvatierra.
The Conde was aware of the problems that the Marques de
Mancera had faced with regard to the azogueros
, and so he
declined to carry out the April 28, 1650 cedula. He
offered two reasons for not implementing the Council's
order for a new repartimiento : first, he doubted that the
azogueros deserved assistance, for their abuse of the mita
was epidemic—of only 2,600 mitayos delivered each week,
over 1,600 were "pocket Indians"~and unstoppable; and
second, he doubted that reducciones, now prerequisite to
any new repartimiento
, could be completed successfully.
The experiences of his predecessors, Salvatierra noted,
had demonstrated the futility of such efforts.^ A third,
though unarticulated, cause for the Conde 's refusal was his
fear that Potosi silver production might collapse if any
significant novelties were attempted. As the chief royal
official in the realm, Salvatierra, not the Council, would
be held responsible for the cedula 's consequences. He was
aware that a viceroy's performance in office was measured,
to a very large extent, by the amount of royal revenue that
was produced during his tenure.
Potosi was still the source of a large part of the
silver Peru despatched to Spain each year, though it was no
longer the producer that it had once been. During 1651 the
Villa suffered through a four-month drought that lowered
silver output from the already deficient levels of the late
1640s. Salvatierra was afraid that PotosI was doomed,
and he resolved to allow it to die a slow death rather than
risk bringing on its complete demise during his
viceroyalty .
^
The Viceroy took limited actions, however, to keep
PotosI going for as long as he would be held accountable
for it. On October 29, 1652, he empowered the Corregidor
de PotosI, Francisco Sarmiento de Mendoza, to suspend and
replace any corregidor who failed to assist in the despatch
of mitayos to PotosI.^ The following August, he exhorted
the provincial corregidores to return the Indians who were
hiding in the valleys or elsewhere to their pueblos, and
to include them in the mita.^° These were the traditional,
time-worn, measures that his predecessors had used.
One of the effects of Salvatierra
• s decision not to
execute the 1650 cgdula was that local government officials
at PotosI took it upon themselves to solve the silver
industry's problems. Unfortunately, Corregidor Sarmiento
de Mendoza and President Francisco Nestares Marin of the
Audiencia de Charcas did not agree on a course of action.
Nestares did not play a supportive role where the azogueros
were concerned because he was also a visitador
, with orders
to collect outstanding mercury debts and to implement the
1651 royal order to ban "pocket Indians. "^l His duties
as Visitador placed him in marked opposition to the Gremio.
Sarmiento de Mendoza, on the other hand, championed the
azoc^ueros ' cause, in much the same way that President
Lizarazu had done.
The Council of the Indies was worried about the future
of Potosi silver production. When the Viceroy refused to
implement the 1650 cgdula, it decided to bypass Lima
entirely and assign the matter to Sarmiento de Mendoza. in
a cgdula of November 8, 1653, the crown ordered the
Corregidor to conduct the new repartimiento according to
Lizarazu 's three guidelines. Nestares Marin was instructed
to guard against abuses and the Viceroy was told only to
assist each official in his duties. -"-^ The Council was
aware that there would be some antipathy between Sarmiento
and Nestares. In traditional fashion, it relied upon
their antagonism to ensure that each would execute his
orders to the best of his abilities . "''^
Sarmiento approached his duties with a conception of
the mita much like Lizarazu' s. He believed that abuses
had been caused by rising prices for mercury and other
production costs. He opposed the closing of a mill because
its owner had engaged in misuse; he felt that it was better
to punish the azoguero in some other way and to keep the
mill in production. Sarmiento 's repartimiento plan
followed Lizarazu' s guidelines closely: a) no owner would
be allowed to have more than two mills; b) five mitayos
would be assigned for each stamping mechanism; and c) those
mills that were owned by widows or children would be rented
to worthy individuals for two years at a time.^"*
To increase the now-depleted pool of mitayos
, the
Corregidor suggested that a census be conducted by a group
of specially-empowered judges. Once all the Indians had
been counted, then everyone—originarios
, forasteros and
yanaconas—would serve in the mita. They would, however,
have the option of serving in person or remitting four and
one-half pesos per week in silver. The inclusion of the
previously-exempted Indians, and the legitimization of
service in silver, he said, would make a 4,000-Indian
J^ita ordinaria possible without overly burdening anyone.
The need for reducciones
,
moreover, would be eliminated.''"^
Sarmiento borrowed upon extant theory to design his
repartimiento
,
but he also included some original ideas
of his own. His most ambitious suggestion was that the
Corregidor de PotosI administer the mita without any
interference from the Viceroy or the Audiencia de Charcas.
Sarmiento claimed that the Conde de Salvatierra •
s
reluctance to implement the Council's program was caused
by his economic interests, which competed with PotosI for
Indian labor. The Audiencia was a long-standing enemy of
1
6
the mita. The Corregidor proposed another new idea to
the Gremio de azogueros: that provincial corregidores be
forced to pay the rezacfos de mita that were incurred
during their terms in office. He shelved the plan when the
^^""^^^^os doubted that the corregidores had the resources
required to pay the sums that were involved.
President Nestares Marin was unhappy with the crown's
decision to assign the repartimiento to Sarmiento de
Mendoza. He accused the Corregidor of wrecking the mita
during the preceding three years, through mismanagement
and his tolerance of abuses. Nestares asked the Council
to name Ger6nimo Luis de Cabrera in Sarmiento 's place.
The President's letter had little immediate impact,
however, since it was lost in a shipwreck with most of
the government's correspondence for 1654, and a copy had
to be sent to Spain in 1658. "''^
Nestares did not have to worry about Sarmiento 's plans
for a repartimiento
, for the Viceroy had already intervened
to prevent its completion. In May, 1654, Salvatierra
ordered the Corregidor to suspend all action on the 1653
cgdula until the arrival of his successor. The Viceroy's
suspension of the 1653 order, which had been meant to
circumvent his opposition to the Council's program, points
to the role of the bureaucratic hierarchy in frustrating
the Council's efforts to resolve the outstanding problems
with the Potosi mita ."*"^
Salvatierra not only bequeathed the political liability
of the proposed repartimiento to his successor, he also
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confused the issue of who was responsible for the two-part
program with a last-minute directive to Nestares Marin that
he take control of the mita.^O This brought vehement
complaints from Sarmiento to Lima and Madrid, and fueled
his 1655 broadside against the President-Visitador
. The
Corregidor accused Nestares of engaging in misuse of the
mita to pay the costs of his visita and to collect the
azogueros' mercury debts. Sarmiento charged that he had
held back travel allowances to pay Chucuito's back taxes,
rented mills and mitayos, and assigned the veedores and
the alcalde de minas four "pocket Indians" each in lieu
of wages; he had also blocked the Corregidor ' s attempts
to hold provincial corregidores accountable for mita
21deliveries. Whatever the degree of truth in Sarmiento 's
claims, the conflict between the two officials had clearly
gone beyond productive competition.
Caspar Conzalez Pav6n, a government official with many
years of experience at PotosI and in TucumSn, wrote to
Lima on May 26, 1655 that the personal and professional
squabbling between Sarmiento and Nestares had rendered them
ineffective as representatives of the crown. He asked the
Viceroy Conde de Alba (1655-1661) to send someone else to
supervise the mita—a superintendent that would be superior
22to both Sarmiento and Nestares Mar£n. The Corregidor
23
asked the new Viceroy to assume that role himself.
259
The Conde de Alba and Francisco de la Cruz
The arrival of the Conde de Alba in Peru did not speed
progress toward the new repartimiento
. Like Salvatierra,
the new Viceroy ordered Sarmiento to act swiftly against
uncooperative corregidores
. but he held off on resolution
of the proposed repartimiento until he could study what
Mancera had done during the 1640s.
The Corregidor wrote to Alba often during 1655 and
1656, with his suggestions on how best to realize the
aims of the 1653 cgdula .^^ In addition to repeating his
earlier sentiments about the repartimiento
, he noted the
difficulties that were presented by the Principe de
Esquilache's order, of 1617, that Indians who had been
absent from their pueblos for more than ten years could
not be returned home against their wishes. That directive
had fallen into disuse, but it had been revived by the
Conde de Salvatierra after the caciques of Pacajes
descended upon Altos de Arica to gather up the Indians
2 ftthat had left their province.
Sarmiento also expanded upon his earlier comments that
service in silver was a necessary part of the mita . He
again suggested that the remittance be reduced to four and
one-half pesos per week, with the azogueros contributing
the balance of the seven peso minga wage. The veedores
and the capitgn mayor de la mita , he added, should oversee
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the hiring of the mingas. and none of the money should go
to the azogueros themselves
.
Despite the Corregidor's insistence that the new
repartimiento was long overdue, the Conde de Alba made no
movement toward its execution. Sarmiento was not the only
one who was impatient. The Council of the Indies sent yet
another cgdula to the Viceroy on April 18, 1657, ordering
him to conduct the repartimiento and to abolish "pocket
Indians." The Council said that it had been moved to
repeat its earlier orders by reports from Nestares Marin
and the royal officials at Potosl that no action had been
taken on its previous directives
.
The Conde de Alba had been persuaded by Salvatierra
'
s
"dying patient" analogy, and he was disinclined to
introduce any novelties at Potosl. He responded to the
1657 order with a delaying tactic meant to force the
Council to assume responsibility for the implementation of
its program with a direct order. The Viceroy was uncertain,
he said, who was supposed to do the repartimiento
. The
1653 cedula had named Sarmiento de Mendoza, but an April 18,
1656 order said that Nestares Marin should be responsible.
Alba said that he thought it would be best to name someone
other than the Corregidor or the President to draft the
repartimiento
, which Sarmiento would then implement and
Nestares monitor.
While Alba waited for the Council to respond to his
query, he began preliminary preparations based on his
belief that a third party should conduct the repartimiento
.
He brought the Audiencia de Lima together in an Acuerdo
consultivo on August 26, 1658 to determine the best course
of action. After reviewing the arguments of Sarmiento de
Mendoza and Nestares Marin, and hearing the views of
Protector Diego de Le6n Pinelo and the Fiscal, the Acuerdo
voted to send an emissary to investigate the situation at
Potosi and then to conduct the repartimiento
. The Viceroy
chose Francisco de la Cruz, Bishop-elect of Santa Marta,
for that assignment.
The Conde provided Cruz with extraordinary powers as
Superintendent of the mita which ostensibly placed him
well above President Nestares Marin and the new Corregidor
de Potosi, Gomez Davila.^^ His apparent authority was
curtailed, however, by secret instructions. Publicly
Cruz was free to act as he deemed necessary; privately he
was ordered only to gather information. Any action was
to await viceregal consent, and no azoguero was to be
punished for misuse of the mita until the repartimiento
3 3was finished. The Viceroy wanted Cruz to be spared any
interference from local officials at Potosi, but he did
not want him to implement the anti-abuse section of the
Council's program until the azogueros ' reasons for engaging
in abuse were removed. Alba also wanted to delay action
until the Council's reply to his query was received.
Cruz set forth for Potosi immediately, and he arrived
in the villa on May 20, 1659. On the twenty-ninth he
called the azogueros and the local officials together to
explain his mission. His message was unmistakable: the
new repartimiento would have no place for service in
silver, and all of the abuses that had stemmed from it,
including the mistreatment of mitayos and their caciques
.
Sarmiento's arguments in favor of service in silver had
apparently not impressed the Conde de Alba.
The Superintendent then began to collect the
information that was required for the new repartimiento
.
The kinds of material he gathered also suggested that
Lizarazu's three guidelines had been replaced by the
viceregal position that mitayos should be distributed on
the basis of merit. Cruz ordered the silver merchants to
report on the number of silver bars produced by each
azoquero during the preceding ten years, and he told the
veedores to conduct a visita of the mills and the cerro.^^
The Bishop-elect then broke with his secret orders to
send three judges of his own to conduct a census in the
sixteen obligated and fourteen exempted provinces of Upper
Peru. This step was taken, he explained to the crown,
because he had encountered very few Indians in the mita
provinces while he was en route to Potosi. If the mita
were to be revived, then more provinces would have to be
added. His letter to Madrid was sent by way of Buenos
Aires, as a quick reply would be needed if his suggestions
were to be incorporated into the new repartimiento
.
Although Cruz had changed the criteria for both the
distribution of the mitayos and where they were to come
from, he had maintained a balance between assistance for
the azogueros and the elimination of misuse. The extension
of mita obligation to more provinces would benefit the
azogueros; the abolition of service in silver would benefit
the Indians and their caciques ; and both measures would
contribute to an increase in silver production
. Thus,
while the means had been changed, the object of the Council
of the Indies' program had been preserved.
Cruz would soon abandon his balanced approach, however.
A new element in the relationship between the benefits and
the evils resulting from the mita would cause him to launch
an attack on misuse while the new repartimiento was still
in the preparatory stage. Cruz was moved by the desolation
of the pueblos he had passed through on his way to Potosl,
but he was particularly horrified by what he had discovered
once he arrived. His initial enquiries revealed that the
sums collected by the azogueros for service in silver came
to 587,000 pesos per year, while the crown's quintos had
3 8fallen to 300,000. More importantly, he found that to
extract some 11,000 pesos per week from the capitanes
enteradores
, the azogueros were employing torture, including
the hanging of the caciques by their hair, beatings and
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whippings. TO save themselves from such treatment, the
caciques were selling their property, and their wives and
children into slavery cruz also learned of one cacique
who had hung himself upon hearing that he was to serve as
a capitan enterador, and of the practice of maiming male
children to keep them from serving the mita/^ He
determined that all but a dozen of the azogueros were
involved in these abuses—both fraud and the mistreatment
of the caciques/^ The torture of the caciques was a new
factor which joined the depopulation of the provinces and
the misuse of the mita by the azogueros on the negative
side of Sol6rzano Pereira's justness equation.
The crimes that were committed by the azogueros
, Cruz
reported, did not end with torture and fraud. They were
also involved in Indian slavery—selling Indians in Lipez
for 250 pesos each—and they were carrying on a thriving
contraband trade with the Hollanders via Buenos Aires. Not
only were the azogueros merciless sadists, he cried, they
were defrauding their King to aid his enemies l"*"^
Thus, in Sol6rzano Pereira's terms, Cruz had decided
that the evils that were wrought by the mita far outweighed
the benefits produced by the silver industry at Potosli
Indeed, he believed that the relationship was now so far
out of balance that he felt compelled to abandon the
Council's balanced approach and immediately relieve the
44Indians of the oppression they suffered under the system.
on June A, 1659, Cruz ordered all service in silver
halted. He instructed the capitanes enteradores that they
were to deliver mitayos in person only. The Superintendent
had to qualify that order, however, in the face of adamant
complaints by the azogueros that silver that had been sent
to hire mingas would now end up in the pockets of the
caciques. In a clarification issued on July 1, Cruz
ordered the capitanes to hire substitutes for those Indians
who had chosen not to serve in person, and had sent money
to Potosi for that purpose. The Conde de Alva was
persuaded by Cruz' arguments for the June 4 order, and he
issued his own directive that service in silver be stopped.
Thus, in November of 1659 the ban was again enforced; not
only were the capitanes not to deliver mitayos in silver,
they were not to be held responsible for any more Indians
than they received from their corregidores in their home
46provinces. Rezagos de mita were outlawed as well, in
accordance with two sixteenth century provisions by Canete
47
and Velasco. Thenceforward, the mitayos who arrived in
Potosi would be distributed to the azogueros on a pro-rated
48basis. In December, Cruz underscored the government's
insistence that corregidores , and not the caciques , were
to be held accountable for the failure to send Indians in
the mita. If the azoguero s had a complaint, he told them,
then the Corregidor de Potosi could, at their expense, send
a judge to investigate the regional corregidor who was at
fault
More orders were forthcoming in February of 1660. On
the third, Cruz prohibited the use of corporal punishment
against the caciques. On the eighteenth, he reinforced
the ban on mita service in silver, this time adding that
the cagitanes did not have to replace mitayos who were
injured while working or those who were driven away by the
azogueros
.
^'^
Although Cruz had abandoned his plans to conduct the
repartimiento, the Viceroy had not. Alba probably felt he
would have to compensate for the damage done to the
azogueros ' production capabilities by Cruz' anti-abuse
campaign. The Conde ordered the Superintendent to return
to Lima; Alba would then draft the repartimiento himself,
based on reports he would receive from parish priests in
all thirty of the provinces. Cruz did not approve of
the Viceroy's plan. He said that most of the priests were
idiots^ and that they were engaged in economic pursuits of
their own which would compromise the reliability of their
4. 53reports
.
The azogueros ' first response to Cruz' actions was
their request that he reconsider his orders. They warned
54him that his actions would have dire consequences. He
did qualify his June 4, 1659 order, as noted above, but
once the Viceroy had reinforced his stance on service in
silver, Cruz refused to listen to the azogueros ' protests.
They also complained to the Conde de Alba, through the
Corregidor, that the Superintendent was trampling on
G6me2 DSvila's jurisdiction and jeopardizing the villa 's
very existence with his ignorant demands. The Viceroy
stood behind Cruz, however, and answered the Corregidor's
complaint by naming the Superintendent Judge of Appeals
in all matters concerning the mita.^^
Rebuffed by the Viceroy and Cruz, the azogueros chose
the only course of action that was still open to them. On
the night of April 23, 1660, they slipped poison into his
chocolate; he went to bed in perfect health and died in
his sleep. President Nestares Marin died the same evening,
quite possibly murdered by the same means.
Cruz' anti-abuse campaign had threatened the azogueros
on both the conceptual and functional levels, because he
was in PotosI to enforce his directives. They had responded
by exercising their ultimate power advantage—violence. The
Superintendent's death only halted the government's attack
on misuse temporarily, however, for another official soon
replaced both Nestares and Cruz, and sought to implement
the Council of the Indies' program. Before we consider his
fate, a brief look at the de facto mita is in order.
The de facto Mita
Francisco de la Cruz painted a very grim portrait of
the mita in his correspondence with Alba and the crown.
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His description of the system was largely an extrapolation
from his limited personal experiences. His assertion that
the provinces were depopulated, for example, was based on
what he had seen while traveling from Lima to Potosi. He
attempted to prevent the torture of the caciques after he
had personally witnessed various instances. From these
particular observations he had concluded that: a) the
provinces were depopulated; b) the caciques bore an
impossible burden as capitanes enteradores ; c) the mita
had degenerated to the point where the crown lost more
from the system than it gained; and d) the azogueros did
not deserve royal assistance.
Despite the limited bases for Cruz' conclusions they
were essentially correct. The question of depopulation
in the provinces, and the mita 's relationship to that
phenomenon, were also discussed by the Alcalde de Lima,
Juan de Padilla, in his 1657 memorial on Indian labor in
57Peru. The Council of the Indies asked viceregal officials
in Lima and in Charcas to comment on Padilla 's memorial in
a series of orders of October 7, 1660. The respondents,
who included the Archbishop of Lima, Sarmiento de Mendoza
(now an oidor of the Audiencia de Lima) , Fiscal Nicolas de
Polanco and others, all agreed that the provinces were
depopulated. They believed that the Indian exodus to the
cities and outlying areas had been the principal cause,
and that Indian flight had resulted from the forced labor
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demands made by the correqldores
. caciques and priests in
the provinces, as well as the rigors of mita service and
the mistreatment of mitayos by the azogueros
. The sale of
lands under the Conde de Chinch6n, which had continued in
the viceroyalty of the Marqugs de Mancera, had caused
irreparable harm, they said, because the Indians had not
only been left without lands for their crops, their pueblos
were now inhabited by Spaniards and mixed-bloods. The
respondents also blamed legal loopholes—the exemption from
tribute that Toledo had afforded the forasteros and the
ten-year exemption from resettlement ordered by the
Principe de Esquilache; the protection provided to the
Indians by the chacareros ; and the harboring of fugitives
by local priests. The death of mitayos in the mines at
PotosI was not a major factor in the depopulation of the
obligated provinces; the mita was only one of many reasons
the Indians had migrated away from their pueblos.
The Conde de Alba was instructed by the October 7, 1660
orders to develop a program to counter the problems that
the respondents identified. But by the time the Viceroy
called the group together on May 20, 1661, he had already
learned that he would soon be replaced by the Conde de
59Santisteban (1661-1666) . He passed the responsibility
for compliance with the Council's directive on to the new
Viceroy, as well as the burden of the still undone
repartimiento de la mita.
The officials who replied to the Padilla memorial may
not have blamed the mita for depopulating the provinces,
but it is clear that the system had had an effect on the
pueblos that were obligated to it, and that the situation
in the provinces had also had an impact on the mita.
The caciques had started to deliver incomplete quotas of
mita^ during the 1600-1633 period, and they had faced
increasing difficulties thereafter. Even the repartimiento
drafted by Caravajal y Sandi in 1633 demanded only a few
Indians less than Francisco de Toledo had included in his
last distribution in 1578. Then, with the introduction
of rezagos de mita by the 1640s, the burden of delivering
mitayos—in person and in silver—was compounded by each
year's failures.
The caciques of Pacajes complained to the crown about
their plight in 1657. They charged that the azogueros
were using torture, humiliation and extortion to squeeze
silver from them. Under that kind of pressure, many of
their comrades had fled from their provinces or committed
suicide. They asked that the position of capitln general
for their province be abolished, as had been done for
Chucuito, and that capitanes be named for each of the
pueblos, so that the economic burden of mita service in
silver would be distributed among them.
The capitanes of all sixteen obligated provinces
combined forces on January 23, 1660 to ask the crown for
relief from the abuses that they suffered at the hands of
the azogueros
.
The caciques charged that the azogueros
were not content just to torture them, but also jailed
their wives and children, and mistreated them while they
were being held. Four years later the Protector general
sent the crown a pair of petitions that offered specific
examples of the mistreatment of the caciques ' families
by the azogueros: the cacique principal and gobernador
of Calcha, Domingo Yelma, claimed that he had been whipped,
and his wife and children jailed, because he was unable to
meet his mita quota in silver; and Ignacio Bias said that
he had sold everything he owned to raise 1,100 pesos of a
2,000 peso debt for rezagos de mita
, but that because he
could not deliver the remaining 900 pesos his wife and
children had been jailed for three years.
Other reports of the mistreatment of capitanes by
the azogueros reached the Condes de Salvatierra and Alva.^^
One cacique who was able to meet his obligations was
Gabriel FernSndez Guarache—the same cacique who had so
much trouble with the Corregidor de La Paz in 1633.
FernSndez Guarache was named to be capitgn general for
Pacajes ten times between 1628 and 1660, and often he was
chosen after another cacique had fled from the province.
He alone had the personal wealth and property necessary to
be capitSn--his wealth permitted him to meet the service in
silver obligation of the province and his property kept him
from fleeing with the others.
The sum of silver required from Pacajes was enormous.
The quota for two villages alone came to 16,408 pesos per
year, and the total for the province was just under 50,000
pesos. The province of Porco contributed between 65,000
and 70,000 pesos per year.^^ Francisco de la Cruz reported
that 50,000 pesos for a province was quite common, and
given the figures for Pacajes and Porco, his total of
600,000 pesos per year in mita service in silver is quite
6 7plausible.
Not all of the silver delivered in the mita came out
of the caciques ' pockets, however. Padilla said that
many of the miners in recently discovered zones were
willing to pay the Indians' service in silver obligation
in return for their services. FernSndez Guarache's
province had a similar means of raising the money: indios
maharaques
.
When the mitayos from Pacajes came together
at Topoco each year for despatch to Potosi, they were
offered for hire to anyone who needed Indian labor. The
caciques
,
or often the Indians themselves, would contract
out their services for a payment of 150 pesos and the
cancellation of their tribute requirements. The indios
maharaques also received two reales per day in wages, and
69the tenure of the contract was one year.
In 1662, the chaplain of Caquiavire estimated that
there were 500 indios maharaques working at Merenguela (a
mining center) alone. For most of them the decision to
work for someone in Pacajes, rather than go to PotosI in
the mita, was their choice of the lesser of two evils.
The 150 £esos covered their service in silver obligation
for twenty weeks (a mitayo was supposed to work a total
of four months) and they were spared the trip.^^ Similar
arrangements were probably common elsewhere as well. The
treatment of the caciques at Potosi would suggest, however,
that even these means, and the caciques ' personal
resources, were insufficient to meet the demands of the
azoqueros
.
The extent to which the mita was delivered in silver
is also suggested by a comparison of various officials'
and individuals' accounts from the period 1650-1655, as
shown on Table 2. it appears that total mita service
averaged about 2,000 Indians per week, with roughly half
of that amount being "Indians in silver." Moreover, the
total number of mitayos serving at PotosI seems to have
fallen gradually over the fifteen year period, with a
sharper fall in 1659 and 1660 caused by Cruz' actions with
regard to service in silver.
One cannot base too many conclusions on the data in
Table 2 because the true relationship between mita service
in silver and "pocket Indians" remains cloudy. Many
officials began to use the terms interchangeably. Cruz
and Gonzalez Pav6n both argued that very few mingas were
TABLE 2
ESTIMATED MITA SERVICE, 1651-1665'^-'-
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YEAR SOURCE
TOTAL MITAYOS MITAYOS
MITAYOS IN PERSON IN SILVER
1651
1651
Council of the Indies 2,800
Salvatierra
1651 Sarmiento de Mendoza 2,600
Sarmiento de Mendoza 2,778
Sarmiento (unofficial)
1654°
1654®
1655^
1658^
1659 Francisco de la Cruz
Salvatierra
Gonzalez Pav6n
2,000
1659-^
>
1660^
Bartolomg de Salazar 2,580
Salazar and the
Archbishop of Lima
1660 Acarete du Biscay
1660"'" Conde de Alva
2,447
2,300
1660"^ Bartolome de Salazar 1,603
1661n
1662°
1662^
1663^
Salazar and the
Archbishop of Lima
Bartolomg de Salazar 2,000
Bartolomi de Salazar
VSzquez de Velasco
1,300
1,500
1,294
400
1,252
2,306
1,600
558
1,100
2,000
1,600
882
957
1,449 (plus 286 for
the mills)
1664^ Vazquez de Velasco 1,670 (plus 310 for the mills)
166 4 the azogueros
1665^ Guerrero de Luna
1,800
2,000
hired with the money that was remitted for service in
silver, but later sources suggest just the opposite. "^^
More specific statements are impossible because the real
uses to which the silver was put was a secret that was
carefully guarded by the azoqueros
.
Another indication that the caciques were no longer
capable of meeting the azoqueros ' demands is the
appearance of Indian collectors (sacadores)
. The azoguero
hired these collectors to gather money from the caciques
,
and paid them a percentage of the silver that they were
able to produce. "^^ The methods the collectors used, and
their abuse of their contracts with the azogueros
, can
only be surmised. But it is clear that the caciques were
no longer a dependable vehicle for the delivery of mitayos
as far as the azoqueros were concerned. The Corregidor de
Potosi did his part to pressure the caciques by sending
judges against them, at their expense, to collect rezagos
74de mita
.
Life for the mitayos who served in person had changed
very little from what it had been at the beginning of the
century. They were still paid less, for example, if they
failed to meet a quota—now twelve bags of ore per day.^^
Padilla noted that the mitayos were also forced to work
both day and night, and that they were often used to drain
7 6water from flooded mines. Other than his memorial
,
however, the sources for this period are silent on the
subject of mitayos in person, for the most part.
Table 2 includes figures for the 1660s as well as for
the 1650s. It indicates that the decline in the total
number of mitayos at PotosI was not reversed after Cruz
'
death. This discussion of the de facto mita has suggested
that the abuses that he attacked outlived him also. Cruz'
successors had little more success than he when they were
confronted with the realities of the mita. Yet each new
superintendent believed that he would succeed where others
had failed; each learned from experience that the mita
was virtually uncontrollable.
Administration of the Mita after Cruz
Francisco de la Cruz' demise had a profound effect on
the mita. For one thing, his murder convinced the Conde
de Alba that all of his reports about the azogueros had
77been true. in a letter to the crown of July 3, 1660,
the Viceroy adopted Cruz' argument that the mita now
wrought more harm than good. He noted, for comparison,
that the mines at San Antonio Esquilache (in Chucuito) had
produced 400,000 pesos in guintos that year without any
mitayos ; Potosi had yielded some 100,000 pesos less, despite
the hellish mistreatment of the Indians and caciques there
7 8by the azogueros
.
The Viceroy acted quickly to preserve what Cruz had
accomplished, and to keep the azogueros from returning to
business as usual. He ordered Bartolomg de Salazar to
leave his post at Huancavelica and assume the offices of
President of Charcas and Superintendent of the mita."^^
Alba's antipathy toward the azogueros manifested itself
in Salazar 's commission. First, he explicity restricted
the census, upon which the new repartimiento would be
based, to the sixteen provinces that were already subject
to the mita. Second, he ordered Salazar to collect all
service in silver and hire the mingas with the money
himself. The Conde now placed the measures to relieve the
Indians' suffering far above providing assistance to the
azogueros
. His repartimiento
, he said, would affect
one-seventh of the originario population in the sixteen
provinces, no matter how small that number might be. He
had concluded that the azogueros deserved no more.
Bartolomg de Salazar drew different lessons from the
Cruz visita than Alba. His experience .at Huancavelica
had accustomed him to the realities of mining, and once
he arrived in Potosi—on November 7, 1660—he was able to
see the need for a new repartimiento . He agreed that
abuses would have to be curtailed, but he believed that
his efforts in that regard would have to wait until the
repartimiento had revitalized the mita. Cruz, he said,
had destroyed one house before building another; his
anti-abuse campaign had reduced the total delivery of
mitayos to 1,603, and so had worsened the production crisis
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rather than alleviating it. Salazar pointed to many ways
that he believed Cruz might have been more effective, if
less spectacular. He expected that he would be more
successful.
It is interesting that the azoqueros shared the new
Superintendent's assessment. They agreed that Cruz had
not been malicious; he had simply represented ignorance
run rampant. Salazar, they noted, seemed to be more
realistic, and they held great hopes that PotosI would
slowly recover under his guidance.
The Conde de Alba and President-Superintendent Salazar
were therefore at odds about what they expected to happen
at Potosl. The Viceroy was looking to punish the azoqueros
for their crimes, while the President was trying to
revitalize silver production in the villa
. The immediate
object of their disagreement was the pre-repartimiento
census; Cruz had already launched the attack on misuse of
the mita
.
The officials' argument over the census was an
obstacle in the path to the repartimiento itself. The Conde
wanted the census to be conducted by two judges, within the
sixteen obligated provinces. Salazar, holding to his
contention that the repartimiento should contribute to the
recovery of Potosi, counseled the Viceroy that more
provinces would be needed if the mita ordinaria were to
include a sufficient number of Indians. Nor did he approve
8 3of assigning the census to two judges. The President
based his opinion on the fate of the three judges that
Cruz had sent out for that purpose. They had been
overwhelmed by bribery, deception and their own
incompetence. The payment of the judges was another
problem, Salazar argued, for the total cost of the census
would come to 66,600 £esos, and neither the azogueros nor
the government could afford to pay that sum. He asked
Alba to reconsider his orders in conference with Sarmiento
de Mendoza and Alarc6n, both of whom were now stationed in
Lima, and he strongly suggested that the provincial
correqidores conduct the census in all thirty of the
84provinces
.
The struggle between Salazar and Alba was fought with
bureaucratic maneuvers. The President's letter to the
Viceroy was dated December 1, 1660. The Conde responded,
after an Acuerdo consultivo of February 3, 1661, that all
thirty provinces would now be included, but that the census
would be conducted by local priests. Salazar replied that
the new plan would be disastrous, because the priests could
not be trusted. Alba called another Acuerdo for April 29,
and then sent the President an ambiguous instruction that
could be interpreted to mean that Salazar could do as he
wished, or do nothing at all. He was therefore compelled
to ask for a clarification, which he did on June 1. By
that time he had learned that the Viceroy's successor,
the Conde de Santisteban, was on his way to Peru, so he
also wrote to Santisteban with his analysis on the matter
as it then stood. On July 1, Alba decided to allow the
President to do as he wished, and he sent Salazar the
requisite orders on July 3, 1661. The Conde de Alba
acceded to Salazar 's requests only after he had delayed the
execution of the census for almost a year, and only after
it was clear that the President's plan would be conducted
under his successor.
Salazar quickly prepared the orders for the provincial
corregidores to undertake the census, and despatched them
to all thirty provinces. No sooner had they been sent
than he received new instructions, from the Conde de
Santisteban, to suspend action on the July 3 directive.
The new Viceroy wanted the census to be conducted by two
oidores from the Audiencia de Charcas, during the course
of a visita general of the sixteen obligated provinces;
the fourteen others were not to be included.
The President suspended Santisteban • s order and wrote
to the Viceroy that there were a host of reasons why the
oidores were incapable of performing the duties that he
had assigned to them. He also expressed his displeasure
with the Conde 's decision to limit the census to only
sixteen provinces. Santisteban replied to Salazar 's
critique on September 30, 1661. He said that the matter
would be studied further, and that a decision would be
forthcoming. When Salazar pressed him for a decision in
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November he was scolded for his haste. The Viceroy told
him that a decision on the census had been postponed until
the arrival of Pedro Vazquez de Velasco, the next
President-Superintendent. When VSzquez arrived in PotosI,
Santisteban promised, then Salazar could return to Lima
and participate in the final deliberations on the census. ^"^
The Conde de Alba had successfully postponed action
on the new repartimiento until the arrival of the Conde
de Santisteban by frustrating Salazar 's efforts to conduct
a census. He had been convinced by Cruz' accounts, and
especially by his murder, that the azogueros did not
deserve the new repartimiento
. Santisteban was no more
enthusiastic about coming to the Gremio's aid than his
predecessor, and he was using another bureaucratic ploy
to delay his consideration of the census, and ultimately
the repartimiento
.
The Viceroy's decision to wait for VSzquez de Velasco
effectively postponed a resolution of the questions about
the census for two years. The President-elect was detained
in Quito, where he was President of the Audiencia, by
charges lodged against him by the Bishop. He would not
arrive in Potosi until August of 1663.^^
The delay also had a serious impact on Salazar 's
enthusiasm for the repartimiento . His change of heart
resulted from his realization that he could not comply
with his orders or improve the situation at Potosi. A
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drought had stopped the mills from December 18, 1660 to
February 6, 1661.^9 corregidor G6mez Davila steadfastly
refused to cooperate with him. His efforts to oversee
the hiring of mingas with the money collected for mita
service in silver, moreover, were disastrous-ruined by
confusion at Guayna and his inability to communicate
directly with the capitanes enteradores . ^
°
The President was dishearted, as well, by the
difficulties he faced in determining the true situation
at Potosl. Despite his presence in the villa
, he could
not discover how many Indians were actually working in
the cerro. Trying to count them, he said, was like
counting bees in a hive, and nobody would testify against
those azogueros who were involved in "pocket Indians"
and other forms of misuse. The veedores and the alcalde
de minas were afraid to act against wrongdoers because
they would be open to revenge. Everyone in Potosl knew
what happened to someone who pressed to hard against
abuses; the means that had been used to dispose of Cruz
and Nestares Marin were public knowledge
.
Meanwhile, in Lima, Fiscal NicolSs de Polanco raised
grave questions about the propriety of a census. He said
that the costs and risks of such a venture were very high
in comparison to the potential gains. Should the sixteen
provinces not hold enough Indians, then the mita would have
to be halved or obligation would have to be extended to
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more provinces. The addition of new areas would be
hampered, he warned, by the novelty of the action, the
exemption from resettlement after ten years and the
logistics of a thirty-province mita. A new repartimient_g
would also drag the Indians away from more profitable
mining centers in their own provinces and from agricultural
activities which were as important to the economic health
of Peru as PotosI silver production. Polanco supported
the execution of a repartimiento that was limited to the
sixteen traditional provinces, and he suggested that the
Conde de Santisteban find a means to implement the new
distribution of mitayos without conducting a census.
The Viceroy was impressed by Polanco 's discourse on
the difficulties involved with the census, and the Fiscal 's
arguments were now echoed by President Salazar.^^ The
Conde began to explore alternatives to a census-based
repartimiento de la mita
. Where Alva had decided to tailor
the mita to the originario population in the sixteen
provinces, Santisteban sought to adapt the de facto mita
to the needs of the crown. On August 20, 1663, he wrote to
the Council of the Indies with a rationalization of service
in silver—comparing it to the recruiting of soldiers in
Spain during wartime. He sent along three papers, without
identifying their authors, that weighed the pros and cons
of mita service in silver, and the possibility of a total
delivery of mitayos in money.
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Another who responded to Santisteban
• s questions
about service in silver was Pedro VSzquez de Velasco.
The President had finally escaped from the grasp of the
Bishop of Quito, and he was in Lima by November of 1662.^^
There he conferred with the Viceroy on the problems
surrounding the execution of a census, and thus the
96repartimiento. He had recently completed a census in
Quito, where he had included forasteros and yanaconas in
various mitas, and he felt that he would also be able to
overcome the difficulties that NicolSs de Polanco had
described. The Viceroy decided to let him try, and
VSzquez de Velasco left Callao for PotosI on February 11,
1663.^^
When the new Superintendent finally arrived in the
villa in August, he found the mining industry in a shambles.
The total number of mitayos
, he reported, was down to a
mere l,449~plus 286 for the mills—and only 500 Indians
were actually working in the cerro. VSzquez charged that
Salazar had understated the extent of Potosl's degeneration,
and that he had included fifteen months of silver production
98in the last carta cuenta. Salazar had apparently indulged
in a favorite pastime of Hapsburg administrators: the
protection of one's reputation by adjustment of official
production figures during his term of office.
Despite his initial outrage, VSzquez de Velasco was
determined to save Potosl. He looked to accomplish that
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feat with a fresh approach to government there. He
informed the azogueros that their past involvement with
misuse of the mita, and all past difficulties in general,
would be forgotten. Furthermore, he would not act against
those who were currently engaged in misuse until he had
completed the new repartimiento
. and he would then be
lenient toward the first offense. Thenceforward, however,
they were to keep careful records of the Indians that they
received, both in person and in silver, and the use to
which they were put.^^ VSzquez had seen a glimmer of hope
for the new repartimiento when the Corregidor de Chayanta
delivered 1,100 Indians, after conducting an extensive
reducci6n in his province. At the same time, he wrote
to the Viceroy to confess that Potosi's recovery would
take longer than he had originally predicted
.
During the latter half of 1663, Vazquez de Velasco
corresponded with Santisteban about how best to conduct
the census. The President suggested that priests be used
in all thirty provinces, under the general direction of
the Archbishops of Lima and Charcas . """^^ On January 31,
1644, he again urged that a prompt decision on the matter
be reached, for while he had been able to raise the number
of mitayos to 1,670 per week, his success at PotosI would
103ultimately depend upon the repartimiento . The azogueros
warned the Viceroy that Potosi would collapse within two
104years if the new repartimiento were not completed soon.
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The President sent a comprehensive repartimiento
plan to the Viceroy on February 2, 1664. He now wanted
to include only the Indians in the sixteen provinces,
and those in the fourteen others who had migrated out of
them. The provincial corregidores were to conduct the
census, and the new mita would not distinguish among the
forasteros, yanaconas and originarios
. The new plan was
predicated upon the Viceroy's ability to order its
execution on his own authority; VSzquez said that the
census could no longer wait for another crown directive
.
On March 3, he again warned that silver production at
PotosI would soon collapse if action were not taken
immediately. -"-^^
The azogueros reinforced Vazquez de Velasco's
exhortations with petitions that underscored Potosl's
economic and military importance to Peru. They were
sensitive to the villa 's diminishing role as a silver
producer, and so they promoted its importance as a
consumer of goods produced in Charcas and its strategic
location half-way between Lima and Buenos Aires. "^^"^
Bartolome de Salazar, who had earlier joined Nicolas
de Polanco in raising doubts about the feasibility of a
census, now pressed for an immediate enumeration and
repartimiento
. He said that the questions that had been
raised about the dependability of the corregidores mattered
108little when compared to the urgency of the situation.
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The Viceroy refused to proceed, however, for he said that
he had only been ordered to conduct a repartimiento
. and
did not have the authorization to undertake a census. He
wrote to the Council of the Indies to request permission to
follow VSzquez de Velasco's suggestions, and he added that
he would act anyway if he did not receive a prompt reply
While Santisteban waited for word from Madrid, VSzquez
de Velasco—like Bartolomg de Salazar before him—grew
disheartened and frustrated. He was painfully annoyed by
the new Corregidor, Guerrero de Luna. Despite Vazquez'
insistence that he put the crown's interests before his
own, Guerrero had set up gambling in his home for the
azogueros. The President was not upset that the azogueros
were gambling, but that they paid for their losses with
mercury and "pocket Indians." The Corregidor was therefore
encouraging the abuses that VSzquez was trying to end. The
President asked that his and the Corregidor 's positions be
merged, to eliminate such problems in the future, and that
the joint position be awarded to someone else."'""''^
Guerrero countered Vazquez' charges with manifestations
of his innocence and the claim that his efforts to augment
provincial compliance with mita obligations had been
compromised by the President's meddling. He claimed that
he could have doubled the effective mita ordinaria had he
been free to act on his own.
Meanwhile, Viceroy Santisteban was again looking for an
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to a census-based repartimiento
. m 1665 he
aez de Velasco a plan that called for 1,000 mitayo s
from the sixteen obligated provinces, and another
^
the fourteen theretofore exempted provinces who
^ the option of serving in person or remitting two
^ilf £esos per week for a year. Oriqinarios
.
iand forasteros were all included on an equal
l^ose who served in person would work more often
fceek in three, but the actual ratio of work to
reft open. All service in silver from the fourteen
Pwould be matched by the azogueros
, and mingas
w<ired for five pesos per week. All workers,
wlta^os or mingas
, would be distributed equally
arazogueros
. Should the new mita not revitalize
ti silver industry, then the guinto would be
Icrhe Viceroy suspended all discussion of the
ceil this new plan could be considered by Vazquez
an.
ssident did not hold out much hope for the plan.
Hereferred a program consisting of a census and a
£^ito
, but his ultimate conclusion was that the
IILLl be abolished altogether. He argued that the
po^ains from a new repartimiento—however it was
rsoere simply not worth the costs. Misuse of the
niiJe only way the azogueros could make a profit at
Po^said^ and it was therefore impossible to prevent.
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The evils wrought by the mita would not be solved by the
completion of the new plan, or the implementation of a
census-based repartimiento
. Only the abolition of the mita,
VSzquez counseled, could accomplish that goal. The crown
would lose little, he added, for the guintos it received
from PotosI were no longer significant . '"'•^
Fiscal Juan Baptista Moreto de Espinosa was another
who responded to Santisteban
' s 1665 plan. He found as many
problems with it as Vizquez de Velasco. By the time he had
devised a step-by-step plan for its implementation,
furthermore, it was so unwieldy that it presented even
greater difficulties than the census it was meant to
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replace
.
The Conde de Santisteban died on March 16, 1666, before
he could receive the opinions of Vazquez and Baptista. His
death effectively ended all discussion of the new plan.
The Audiencia de Lima, following established practice,
assumed direction of the realm until the arrival of his
successor, the Conde de Lemos (1667-1672) . ''"'^ It was the
Audiencia that received Vazquez' call for the abolition of
the mita. It also received an order from the Council of
the Indies and Queen Mariana—Phillip IV had died on
September 17, 1665
—
permitting the Viceroy to act in any
way he wished. "^"^^ The Audiencia could therefore have
legally pursued the matter of the repartimiento , but it was
no more inclined to assume the responsibility for it than
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Viceroys Salvatierra, Alba and Santisteban. The Audiencia
chose to leave the entire affair to the Conde de Lemos-^^'^
Summary
From 1648 to 1666, Hapsburg officials spent a great
deal of time and effort on the mita. They accomplished
very little because the Council of the Indies, the
viceroys and the local officials in PotosI were often
working at cross-purposes. The Council of the Indies tried
to implement a two part program involving both a new
repartimiento and the abolition of misuse. The program
contained assistance for the azogueros and the Indians, and
it required a balanced execution of its tenets for it to
succeed.
Viceroys Salvatierra, Alba and Santisteban—and the
Audiencia de Lima as interim head of government—did not
implement the Council's program for three reasons: first,
they doubted that the azogueros deserved further government
assistance, given the extent of their misuse of the mita ;
second, they doubted that the prerequisites for a new
repartimiento—first reducciones and then only a census
—
could be conducted successfully; and third, they would have
been held responsible for any negative consequences of
their execution of the Council's orders.
For fear of making things worse at PotosI, therefore,
each viceroy did his utmost to pass the responsibility for
compliance with the Council's directives on to his
successor. Meanwhile, he presented the appearance of
action by collecting information and making short-term
decisions of little consequence.
President Nestares Marin and Corregidor Sarmiento de
Mendoza pressured the Conde de Salvatierra to comply with
separate sections of the Council's program, and they were
later assigned the responsibility for implementing that
program when the Council of the Indies grew tired of the
Viceroy's obstinacy. Their effectiveness was diminished
by the division of responsibility for the program between
them, and their personal antipathy toward one another.
The two halves of the Council's program were then reunited,
by the Conde de Alva, and assigned to Superintendent
Francisco de la Cruz; but Alva refused to allow Cruz a
free hand, despite his apparent authority to do as he
deemed necessary.
Cruz was shocked by what he encountered in the mita
provinces and outraged by what he discovered at Potosi.
The provinces, he reported, were so thoroughly depopulated
that the caciques were unable to meet their mita quotas in
persons or in silver. The azogueros
,
supported by the
Corregidor de PotosI, demanded mita deliveries according
to the 1633 repartimiento
, and they used collectors,
torture, extortion and other abuses to squeeze as much
silver from the caciques as they could possibly produce.
The mistreatment of the cacicrues by the azogueros
. the
extent to which they were involved in misuse of the mita,
and their illegal trade with the crown's Dutch enemies
caused the Superintendent to abandon the Council's balanced
program and launch an attack on the de facto mita.
Cruz struck against the azogueros ' misuse of service
in silver and their mistreatment of the caciques by
demanding that they conform to the tenets of the Toledan
mita. He abolished service in silver and rezagos de mita,
and he ordered that the caciques were not to be held
responsible for their provinces' inability to meet
unrealistic mita quotas. The azogueros complained that
Cruz' direct enforcement of the viceregal position that
the Toledan mita was still viable was itself unrealistic,
and that he would destroy the PotosI silver industry if
he were allowed to continue. When their protests were
ignored, they killed Cruz and President Nestares Marin.
Cruz' reports to the Conde de Alba, and especially
his murder, further disuaded the Viceroy from assisting
the azogueros
. In Sol6rzano Pereira's terms, the
Superintendent and the Viceroy concluded that the mita
was no longer justifiable—that the abuses it generated
far outweighed the benefits of Potosi silver production.
Alba did not act to abolish the mita
, but he did prevent
Bartolome de Salazar from making any progress toward a new
repartimiento
.
The Conde de Santisteban looked for some means to
tailor the mita to current realities: the extension of
obligation to more provinces; the legitimization of
service in silver; the inclusion of forasteros and
yanaconas
; or a combination of all three. He hoped to
restructure the de facto mita so that it might continue
to meet the legitimate needs of the azogueros without
generating the abuses that Francisco de la Cruz had
documented. The implementation of alternatives to the
standard mita, however, presented as many problems as
the execution of the Council of the Indies' program.
Santisteban was also kept from developing an
alternative by an overzealous and overconfident President
Vazquez de Velasco. He had conducted a census and had
reformed mitas in Quito, and he believed that he would be
able to do the same in Charcas. VSzquez learned very
quickly, however, that the problems at Potosi were unlike
any he had encountered elsewhere. By 1666 the President
had resolved that the abuses that were plaguing the
Potosi mita could not be eliminated without abolishing
the system, and he began a concerted drive toward that
goal. He too had concluded that the mita now caused more
harm than good—that it was unjust.
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Notes for Chapter V
1. AGI, Charcas 266. no 1 Qr "r-^i/iiii, e
2^.?v??i5^? m: ^'-^ - ------ ?os^L^?-?^°
vil?nrPo.'%^5^^^^"'^^ azogueros de la
^iio^ h ^! ^^^1^^ el exceso que por
16^9 hast^?6??^f° ^^"^'-^^ ^--^^ibuy sta 1 31 o que se impuse a cuenta de ese exceso lo
(MC 806K
retrasados/' Aranjuez, IstwtiesJ
r',.,
^-
^^l' ^^^^^^s 266, no. 15, the President of CharcasFrancisco de Nestares Marin, to the crown, Potosi, 3o!v!
'
1652, 2 fs. This letter discusses the Council's order atlength, including the motivation for it. Nestares was
responsible for its execution in Potosi.
Tc
Charcas 266, no. 14, "Consulta del consejo de16 de Abril sobre la pretension de los Acogueros dePotossi," Madrid, 16. IV. 1650, 9 fs.
5. See note 27, Chapter I, for the first citation ofSolorzano Pereira's Polltica Indiana
. The summary includedhere is drawn primarily from Castaneda Delgado, 345-349
Arguments in the affirmative, in SolSrzano's discussion 'ofthe good and bad of the mita
, are found, in the Bibliotecade Autores Espanoles edition, on I, 261-271; arguments in
the negative are on pages 272-288. Sol6rzano's observa-
tions on the question are on I, 289-314.
6. Salvatierra's response is included in AGI, Charcas
266, no. 30D, "Copia de la carta que el Virrey Conde de
salbatierra escrivio a S Mg.^ en 2 de 7re de 1651
Respondiendo a la cedula de 28 de Abril de 650~en que se le
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su sucesor," 15. XI. 1667, Los virreye s (ed. by Hanke and
Rodriguez), Perta IV (no. 283), 205-209 (from Biblioteca
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altamagistratura Indiana ocasionaba esta tardanza sinotambign la de Espana, que finalmente, ante la variedad
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See, also, Valera (AGI
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"^^^""^
^^^^^ Audiencia's
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para suspender a los Corregidores el de Potossi," 29. X.
1652, 4 fs. Sarmiento de Mendoza's compliance with that
order is discussed in AGI, Charcas 266, no. 24A, an undated
and untitled addendum to no. 24, Corregidor Sarmiento de
Mendoza to the crown, PotosI, 30. IX. 1654, 5 fs . See, also,
AGI, Charcas 266, no. 28, "testimO de las diligS qe se an
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Potosi, 26. IV. 1655, 1 f.
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15. Ibid.
16. AGI, Charcas 266, no. 19, Corregidor Sarmiento de
Mendoza to the crown, PotosI, 31. VII. 1654, 3 fs. This
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.
19. AGI, Charcas 266, no. 20A, "Capi de carta q.e le
escrivo el virei pa qe no hiciese el repartimto asta qSllegase alba" (an escrivano 's report to Sarmiento de
Mendoza on the contents of two viceregal letters to him
of 31. V. 1654)
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observed in note 12, is AGI, Charcas 266, no. 20.
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gidor Sarmiento de Mendoza to the crown, Potosi, 31. V. 1655,
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2. Cartta que se remittio al Virrey conde de alva por El
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22. AGI, Charcas 267, no. 3A (see note 13); and AGI,Charcas 266, no. 59, second item, "Copia de carta escrita
al Conde de Alba de aleste Virrey del peru" (by CasparGonzSlez Pav6n)
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Potosi, 31. VII. 1655, If.
23. AGI, Charcas 266, no. 32K, "Tanto de la Carta que
el correg.r de Pottossi don franco sarmto de mendoca
escrivio al conde de alva Virrey del peru sobre que
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Su magci que asi lo mando a su antecesor El Conde de
salvattierra," PotosI, 31 .VIII . 1655 , 4 fs. The 1650 order
said that the Conde de Salvatierra could go to PotosI if
he believed it would help matters there.
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339, f. 120, "Carta del Senor Virrey escrita a los offis
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17A, "Tanto de la carta que escrivio el Virrey Conde de
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25. AGI, Charcas 266, no. 32E, "Tantto de la carta que
Don franco sarmiento de mendoza Corregidor de pottossi
escrivio al Virrey Conde alva Sobre que ponga remedio en
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31. XII. 1655, 1 f.; AGI, Charcas 266, no. 36C, Corregidor
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Chapter II)
.
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29. The Council of the Indies' deliberations, in
anticipation of the 16 57 cgdula
, noted that the Viceroy
was dragging his feet on the matter of the repartimiento
(AGI, Charcas 266, no. 35, 1 f.).
30. For Alba's response, see AGI, Charcas 266, no. 39,
the Conde de Alba to the crown, Lima, 22 .VIII . 1658 , 2 fs.
See, also, his "Relacion que el Conde de Alba hace del
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no. 9B, the Conde de Alba to the crown, Lima, 3. VII. 1660,
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Mita de Potossi y lo resuelto por el Conde de Santisteban
con consulta del Acuerdo de la Audiencia de Lima para la
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34. AGI, Charcas 266, no. 41, Superintendent Francisco
de la Cruz to the crown "Sobre lo obrado en El desagrabio
de los Inos de la mita de Potosi," Potosi, 3. VI. 1659, 6 fs.
35. Ibid.
36. AGI, Charcas 267, no. 8A, Superintendent Francisco
de la Cruz to the crown, Potosi, 11. VI. 1659, 4 fs. That
this action was against orders, AGI, Charcas 26 7, no. 31A
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ncJ^' 11,000 pesos per week figure, AGI, Charcas266, no. 49, Superintendent Francisco de la Cruz to the
crown, Potosi, 1. IV. 1660, 2 fs. For the use of torture,AGI, Charcas 266, no. 52, Superintendent Francisco de laCruz to the crown, Potosi, 15. IV. 1660, 1 f. (the same source
used by Crespo, "La 'Mita,'" 179-180).
40. AGI, Charcas 266, no. 49 (see note 39).
41. For hangings, AGI, Charcas 266, no. 43B, "Certifi
cacion de un Cazique qS se aorco" (Father Garcia de
Vargas to "V^a mma"), Toledo, 4. II. 1660, 2 fs. Cruz
'
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AGI, Charcas 266, no. 42, "Los caciques y principales delas Prov,as que mitan a Pottosi" to the crown, Potosi,
15. IV. 1660, 3 fs.
42. AGI, Charcas 266, no. 41 (see note 34).
43. For the sale of Indians, AGI, Charcas 266, no. 55,
Superintendent Francisco de la Cruz to the crown, Potosi,
14. IV. 1660, 1 f., describing "Excesos graves que se cometen
en la Provincia de lipez Comparando Y Vendiendo los Indios
publicamente y Remedio que pide." Sarmiento de Mendoza
noted this problem in AGI, Charcas 266, no. 28 (see note
9). For contraband, AGI, Charcas 266, no. 56, Superinten-
dent Francisco de la Cruz to the crown, Potosi, 14. IV. 1660,
1 f., describing "Extravios de quintos y Plata Por Buenos
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ayres. y como no a tenido reparo con los ordenes delGovyno y nececita de los de V.M. por la distancia qrandeque ay de lima al Puerto." President Nestares Marin wasordered by Alba to combat contraband on 4.I.!660rASB
Ar.tl 1
/^""^^ virrey al presidente Nestares Marin:nte la frecuencia de noticias sobre el contrabando dePlata por Buenos Aires, ad6ptense las providencias delcaso, Lima, 4.1.1660, 2 fs. (MC 874); the notices maynave come from Francisco de la Cruz.
44. For a Cruz retrospective, see AGI
, Charcas 266,
no. 46, Superintendent Francisco de la Cruz to the crown,Potosi, 17.11.1660, 3 fs.; "Da qta por menor de lo que
obro pra remedio de los excesos que se cometian en el
entero de los Inos de mita de Pottosi, y repartimto ge de
ellos se hace, y de las molestias y bexaciones qe los dhosIndies recivian de las Justicias y de los mineros, yremite Testimo de los autos que s^e gllo hico." AGICharcas 266, no. 49 (see note 39) is another look back byCruz. Valera (AGI, Charcas 268
, nos. 69A & 69B~see note
58, Chapter II), 13-14, is perceptive when he says that
Cruz began where he should have finished.
45. AGI, Charcas 267, no. 8C, "Testim.o del auto de
su senoria" (Francisco de la Cruz), Potosl, 1. VII. 1659,
2 fs.; the June 4 order is related in this clarification.
Zavala, Servicio personal
,
II, 139, says:
"El virrey Conde de Alba de Liste envi6 a
Potosi como juez de comisiSn a fray Francisco de
la Cruz, O.P., que en 1652 habia sido presentado
para el Obispado de Santa Marta. El comisionado
promulg6 auto para que el entero de la mita se
hiciese en persona. Los mineros se opusieron y
fray Francisco revoc6 el auto. Informo al virrey,
por carta escrita en Potosi el 2 de agosto de
1659, que los indios de faltriquera montaban al
afio 600,000 pesos y los quintos reales apenas
alcanzaban a 400,000. De la provincia de Porco se
enviaban 60,000 pesos al afio a Potosi. El virrey,
en 2 de marzo de 1660, inform6 al rey que habia
mandado empadronar y reducir los indios de las
provincias que mitaban a Potosi y los que estaban
en la comarca. Pretendla reforzar aquella mita."
(based on Rub^n Vargas Ugarte, Historia General del Pert!
(10 vols.; Lima, 1966-1971), III, 289-292).
46. AGI, Charcas 266, no. 53B, "Autto para que no
obliguen los curacas y capittanes a enterar mas yndios que
los que les hubieren entregado en sus provinzias" (by
Superintendent Francisco de la Cruz), Potosi, 3. XI. 1659,
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Francisco de'la Cruzr?'lo?o^i:Tx???65^'^'?r'^'^"'^^'
de tI*crn^^;o^!?K''''^^ Superintendent Francisco
"Li^^f^'f ^° Potosi, 14. IV. 1660, 2 fs •Representase a V.M. como se a Reformado el abuso de apremiar a los capitanes enteradores por lo qe no deSian "
267^
'nn ^?fr execucion.""^ See, ^IsS? A§I''charcas267, o 31A (see note 20), for Alba's basing of the orderon precedents set by Canete and Velasco.
48. AGI, Charcas 266, no. 51A, "Autto para que losYndios no paguen Ressagos" (by Superintendent Francisco de
51 ^n'i'-T°f ' 3. XI. 1659, 6 fs.; AGI, Charcas ^66 no51, Superintendent Francisco de la Cruz to the crown
r™; 1 '-rQue los Indies no'de™;garezagos. Y lo que en esto se a hecho~Con testimonio")
.
49. AGI, Charcas 266, no. 45D, "Testimonio del Autopara que los diputados pidan se despachen jueces" (bvSuperintendent Francisco de la Cruz), PotosI, 8. XII 1659
6 fs. Also, Cruz' exhortation of the Corregidor, AGI,
'
Charcas 266, no. 45E, "Testimonio del exssotatorio CoA laRepuesta del Corregidor," Potosl, 12 and 14.1.1660, 5 fstotal.
50. AGI, Charcas 266, no. 451, "Auto para que se oyga
a los Indies en justicia y no se execute desta forma en
ellos pena corporal" (by Superintendent Francisco de laCruz), Tarapaya, 3. II. 1660, 1 f.; AGI, Charcas 266, no.
52A, Auto. Paraque contra los caciques se proceda
conforme a de^ sin llegar a pena corporal" (by
Superintendent Francisco de la Cruz), Tarapaya, 3. II. 1660,
2 f s
.
51. AGI, Charcas 266, no. SOB, "Auto para que los indios
no enteren en platta sino en perssona y La dilixencia que
con ellos se hico" (Superintendent Francisco de la Cruz)
,
Potosi, 18.11.1660, 8 fs. Penalties are included in AGI,
Charcas 266, no. 50A, "Auto en que se rrefieren las penas
contra los que reciven en plata Los indios de mita con su
publicaci6n y dilixencias que se hicieron," Potosl, l.Ill.
1660, 6 fs.
52. AGI, Charcas 26 7, no. 9A, the Conde de Alba to the
crown, Lima, 2. III. 1660, 4 fs.; "Da qta de las dilig^s que
se han comenzado a hacer sobre el repartimto genl de los
In°s de Potosi, la forma conque se precede y la quexa de
los Interesados por haver quitado los In^s que llaman de
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census. DeUberaSons on thrif^°\^°-^^^^ priests do the
to include represei?ativL fk^^^^^"^^^"^° ^^^^ ^1^° going
Juan de Ybarra! azogueros and Inquisitor
Charc;s 266 ^nn ^^f^^hat priests were idiots, AGI,Ln a , o. 43, Superintendent Francisco de la Cru^to the crown. Poto«:;T ^A tt iccn o ^ "^^---^o^u x u z
tied from the mita provinces—AGI
. Charcac; r,^ ao
^4^1^J^^rfZ^^^r^^ cJiz'^o^^thl c^^;n?°Po
de'io*iaze; mita * { o??^^^^^^^^'^ ^ incombenient^s
de su naturaTeza.i adquieren Domicilio fuera
Po^?^ ^^5^.' Charcas 267, no. 8B, "Testimonio de la
Potosr^'l SiT^^fi^Q^
de azogueros" (to Francisco de la Cruz),i, 1. VII. 1659, 2 fs.; AGI, Charcas 266, no. 45C,
sa!arine°lo^ ^ ^^^in dellario de los jueces" (to and by Francisco de la Cruzrespectively), Potosi, 17. XII. 1659, 4 fs. total
AiK^^'r ^^^'-.^^^'"''^^ decree of the Conde deAlba, Lima 1. XII. 1659, 2 fs. His letter to Cruz is AG?,Charcas 267, no. 9D, "Copia de carta que escrivio El Condede Alva mi s^ Virrey del Peru al M.R.P. Mro. fray franco
7?..Q n''f''l
Obispo de santa marta en l.o de Diciembre deib^/ If. But Cruz' public orders were again curtailedby secret orders, AGI, Charcas 267, no. 9F, "SegundaYnstrucion secreta que el M R P M fr. fran.co de la Cruzde la orden de Predicadores ha de observar para el usso de
sus comissiones, y espezialmente la que se le remite en
este chasque, que sale de esta Ciudad oy dos de Diziembrede mil seiscientos y cinquenta y nueve," 2 fs. See, too,AGI, Charcas 267, no. 15A (see note 33). Cruz was to act
only with Alba's consent.
56. AGI, Charcas 267, no. 93 (see note 33); and AGI,
Charcas 26 7, no. 3, Caspar Gonzalez Pavon to the crown,
Potosi, 30. IV. and 10. V. 1660, 4 fs. Arzans, Historia
,
II,
128-133 discusses an earlier attempt, in 1651, to kill
Nestares Marin with poison; on II, 187-194 he notes the
deaths of the two officials. The author of the Dominican
contribution to the Conde de Lemos' proposal that the mita
be abolished (in 1670) said he was in Potosi at the time
Cruz was there. He noted that the azogueros first tried
to burn Cruz' house down, and later killed him. On the
Tuesday following the murder indios de faltriquera were
again demanded by the azogueros
, and caciques who refused
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to comply were jailed (AGI, Charcas 268, no. 15E sin
lu^ lu I" ^° crown, CSdiz, 2. IV. 1676, 9 fs savsthat the "voz pGblica" was that Cruz had be4n poisonedthe venom slipped into his chocolate. ,
57. Padilla's discourse is AGI, Charcas 266, no. 37A
^« ? i-?? apuntamientos que remite el Alcalde, Don Juan
'
Travatoi^e''^^"^ ^^f^^ ^ ^^1^° 657'sobre losy jos qe padecen los Inos = asi en lo eiEIritual comoen lo temporal," 20 fs. His letter is AGI , "^Charcas 266?
? ; 'i-'^^
Padilla to the crown, Lima, 20.VII.1657
Lz: ^^"-^ discourse is published in Ruben Vargas Ugarte,His^ori^ General de^ (10 vols., Lima, 1966-1971) lii,
nr. ^l^u
the Council's orders to Alba, AGI, Charcas 266,
? o 1^;/ °^''''^^° '^^^ ^ista de la carta de D Junde Padilla de 20 de julio de 657," Madrid, 3. IX. 1660, 1 fMore action was taken in the Council on 22. IX. 1660; AGICharcas 267, no. 6, "En El consejo a 22 de sep.re de 1660-Decreto del g.o sobre los despachos qe se an de dar cercadel repartimto General de los inOs de Mita su fha de 22de Septtre de 1660
,
If. The c§dula sent to the AudiiHciade Charcas is ANB, RC 438, "Copia de real cedula dirigida
a esta Audiencia de La Plata: Envigse relaci6n de los
abuses que en perjuicio de los indios de mita cometen los
corregidores y demSs encargados de ella, en perjuicio de
ese servicio," Madrid, 7. X. 1660, 3 fs. (MC 879; MOM 643).
The Archbishop's response is AGI, Charcas 267, no. 16 (see
note 91, Chapter II)
. Sarmiento de Mendoza wrote the
response for the Audiencia de Lima (AGI, Charcas 267, no.
19, Lima, 10.1.1662, 14 fs.) but the other oidores would
not sign it when it was finished; Sarmiento explained what
had happened in AGI, Charcas 26 7, no. 17, Oidor Sarmiento
de Mendoza to the crown, Lima, 31. XII. 1661, 1 f.
Bartolom^ de Salazar answered as President of Charcas in
AGI, Charcas 26 7, no. 25, Bartolom^ de Salazar to the
crown, 8. IV. 1662, 12 fs.; the Audiencia 's official answer
is AGI, Charcas 267, no. 28, Bartolomg de Salazar to the
crown, PotosI, 29. IV. 1662, 7 fs. Oidor de Lima SebastiSn
de Alarc6n wrote the crown about the mita in AGI, Charcas
267, no. 21, Lima, 20.11.1662, 3 fs. The Fiscal de Lima,
NicolSs Polanco de Santillana, wrote the crown on the
problems with a prerequisite census in AGI, Charcas 26 7,
no. 22, Lima, 20.11.1662, 9 fs. These last two letters may
well have been in response to the cedula
,
given the fact
that Alarc6n and Polanco refused to sign Sarmiento de
Mendoza 's missive. AGI, Charcas 267, no. 10, is a brief
note by Juan de Subica, Madrid, 22. IV. 1661, that he is
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59. See Alba's "Relaci6n" (see note 30), 118-119.
see^AGI ^cLTclTlti °' th^,^°£££2idores' abuse of Indians,
ToL^^^pa?^^^^^
agravios que reciven los In.os de sul'correa
n a^o^°^^^
comparar lo que no an menester y prenSeSdoies
v^rnn?^.'' ?^
^^^^^^ ""^^^^^^ retirarse a despoblado Se?ando
vran si no i^^^""^" I ^^""^^^ ^"^^^ destru
no 3?N "Jnt cT^rlT' "^"^ ' ^GI , Charcas 267,"
'
u^?^
Gov. res y caciq.s de aq.l Pueblo y del detolapampa" to the crown, Tomahave, 20. V. 1664, 2 fs
J^llt^^^^ que reciven de los Correg.res los
?:: comprar por fuerca y a precios muy suvidoslos generos que comercian y si ocurren a la Aud.a lesprenden y molestan y les venden las hazdas para conseguirsus grangerias como sucedio con D. P.o oe Cartaxna gravo
?r ^^'^ Correg.r En la feria de unas mulas; de queresulta q.e prosigan en nra sta fee retirandose a laydolatria y no hava quien sque metales y perdiendoselosquint. s y supp can se provea de Rem.o" For a comprehensivetreatment of the mita 's impact on a province, in concert
with internal factors, see Canedo-Arguelles • study ofPacajes. Her thesis is based on documents in the AGI,Escribania 868a. Hanke, in notes on pages 253-254 ofArzSns, Historia, II, says that Escribania 868 includes
a 911-folio complaint by Gabriel Fernandez Guarache from16 6 3.
61. Canedo-Arguelles, 71-74. An earlier request was
made m 1648, but the azogueros were able to block the move
to abolish the capit^n general position.
62. For the caciques ' 1660 petition, AGI, Charcas 266,
no. 42 (see note 41). For the 1664 petitions, Zavala,
Servicio personal
,
II, 146-146.
63. See their relaciones (described in notes 6 and 30,
respectively), pages 40 and 120, respectively.
64. Canedo-Arguelles, 57-59.
65. Ibid
. , 60-64.
66. AGI, Charcas 267, no. 43, President of Charcas
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Pedro VSzquez de Velasco to the Conde de Santisteban
zlTll' f the quote from
'
Zavala, Servicio personal
, II, 139, included in note 45.
67. AGI, Charcas 266, no. 53 (see note 53). For anexample of a cacique who was spared such problems, legallyIf not really, ANB, M 125, no. 17, "Don Felipe
Choquetijlla, indio principal del pueblo de Oropeza delos Quillacas, provincia de Paria, sobre que le guardenlos privilegios por los cuales esta reservado del oficiode capitSn enterador de la mita de Potosi y de otros
SnM^'^^i^f'" 29.x. 1652-31. XII. 1666, 26 fs. (MC 934;MOM 649a)
.
68. Padilla (AGI, Charcas 266, no. 37A—see note 57),7v (Vargas Ugarte transcription, page 401) .
69. Cafiedo-Arguelles, 93-96; Fernandez Guarache was
also engaged in wine and coca transport to raise money for
the delivery of the mita (page 67)
.
70. Ibid
. , 97.
71. Sources for Table 2; "Estimated Mita Service":
a. AGI, Charcas 266, no. 19C (see note 1)
.
b. AGI, Charcas 266, no. 30D (see note 6).
c. AGI, Charcas 266, no. 19D, "Resumen de la
Vissita de minas y ingenios hecha por d. fran.^°
Sarmiento Oydor de la Ciudad de los Reyes Y Correg
de Potosi," 4. VII. 1654, 2 fs.
d. AGI, Charcas 266, no. 19A, "Testimonio de los
Yndios que enteraban siendo Correg.i^ d. fran.co
O^^. „ .rr. .
, — — — , - - — -
sarmiento que eran 2660," 1651,
e . Ibid ,
f. Salvatierra, "Relaci6n" (see note 34, Chapter
II) , 40.
g. ANB, M 125, no. 14 (see note 72).
h. AGI, Charcas 266, no. 41 (see note 34).
i. AGI, Charcas 266, no. 60B (see note 81).
j. AGI, Charcas 267, nos. 16 and 25 (see note 91,
Chapter II; and 58, respectively).
k. Acarete du Biscay, "An Account of a Voyage up
the River de la Plata and thence over Land to Peru (c.
1660) ," Colonial Travelers in Latin America, ed. by
Irving A. Leonard (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1972)
,
137-138.
1. AGI, Charcas 267, no. 9B (see note 33).
m, AGI, Charcas 266, no. 60B (see note 81)
.
n. AGI, Charcas 267, nos. 16 and 25 (see note 91,
Chapter II; and 58, respectively)
.
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pi Ibid
^^^''''^^ 29 (see note 93).
?* S?^^^^^ 267, no. 37E (see note 100).
s. AGI, Charcas 267, no. 36 (see note 107).t. AGI, Charcas 267, no. 46 (see note 111).
72. For GonzSlez Pav6n, ANB, M 125, no. 14, "CoDia dP
escr!Mr'de^Po."\''"r"'"^° ^"^^^^cribiS, de P tosI a Espana, a don G6mez DSvila,corregidor provisto para dicha villa: Refi^rele orincin;,!mente al rggimen de la mita," Potosi, 25?! lels iS ?s^ "(MC^864;^MOM 639). For Cruz, AGI, cAarc^s " 266^ 'no! 46* (see
nn ^?nr ^ ^^^^ '^^'> ' ' Charcas 266,o. 20C (see note 12); and Salvatierra
' s "Relaci6n" (see
^^^P^^^ ^V)' 36-37. Sarmiento (AGI, Charcas 266,no. 24A—see note 9) and GonzSlez Pav6n (ANB, M 125, noi4--see note 72) both say that Tuesday was the day of
reckoning for "pocket Indians."
74. AGI, Charcas 266, no. 46 (see note 44).
Tv^-r^^A,-
Canedo-Arguelles, 47. For wages being withheld,AGI, Charcas 267, no. 43 (see note 66). For what happened
when a cave-in occurred, see ANB, M 125, no. 13 (see note
133, Chapter II)
.
76. Padilla (AGI, Charcas 266, no. 37A~see note 57),
8 (Vargas Ugarte transcription, 401)
.
77. AGI, Charcas 267, no. 9B (see note 33). For Alba'sindictment of G6inez D^vila, AGI, Charcas 267, no. 9G,
"Copia de Un Capitulo de carta de el Conde de Alva de
Aliste de 28 de Mayo de 1660 que es del N.o 17 tocante a
los procedimientos de Don Gomez Davila CorregO^ de Potosi,"
1 f •
78. AGI, Charcas 267, no. 9B (see note 33)
.
79. For Salazar's discussion of the letter sent to him
on 24. V. 1660, AGI, Charcas 267, no. 24, President Bartolome
de Salazar to the crown, PotosI, 1. IV. 1662, 15 fs. For his
comments on his commission and its contents, AGI, Charcas
266, no. 60A, "Copia de la Carta que el D.or Don Bartolome
de Salazar Oidor de la r1 Audiencia de Lima y Press. te de
la de los charcas escrivio al Conde de Alba Virrey del Peru
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en 1^ de Diciembre de 1660 aOs Potosl 1 xtt ifi^n n ^
see also, AGI, CharcaF^T
, no. ISA (s^e ;oJe*33
'
Angulo (AGI, Charcas 268, no. 36-see note si, Chapter II)2v-2, discusses Salazar's experiences.
^n ii
,
Charcas 267' nn^''?^.^^^' ^^^^ ^5)' AGI,L.narc 267, o. 28 (see note 58).
el D. r Don Bartolome de Salazar Oidor de la r1 AudienJiade Lima Press. te de la de los charcas escrivio al S cSndede Alva Virrey del Peru en 30 de Novy.re de 1660 a^s "
ITlfi' ll'^'^'^'lln ' ^^^^^^1 - - -ell,in AGI, Charcas 267, no. 12, President Bartolomg desalazar to the crown, PotosI, 1. VI. 1661, 4 fs.
82. AGI, Charcas 267, no. 41B, the Deputies of theGremio de azogueros to the crown, PotosI, 17. XII 1660
The Protector de los naturales agreed; AGI, Charcas266, no. 61, Christ6val Laredo Trevino to the crown,
Potosi, 14. XII. 1660, 2 fs. (that Salazar was better thanCruz had been)
.
83. Alba's plan was contained in Salazar 's commission,
which is described in AGI, Charcas 266, no. 60A (see note
79) and the same questions were put to the crown in AGI,
Charcas 266, no. 60, President Salazar to the crown,
Potosi, 13. XII. 1660, 3 fs.; a comprehensive report on his
activities in Potosl.
84. AGI, Charcas 266, no. 60A (see note 79).
85. This entire course of events is included in AGI,
Charcas 267, no. 24 (see note 79). Valera (AGI, Charcas
268, nos. 69A & 69B—see note 58, Chapter II), 17, is an
overview as well. Castillo (AGI, Charcas 270, no. 33C~
see note 30, Chapter II), 19v-20, says the O.K. for
twenty-nine provinces came on 3. II. 1661. In AGI, Charcas
267, no. 11, President Salazar to the crown, Potosi, 3. VI.
1661, 5 f s
. ,
the President says he received the go-ahead
on 3. III. 1661, but that it came with other orders to
suspend all action and that the 26. V. 1661 letter stuck
with the idea of using priests—though permitting him to
name some corregidores if he wished. For the Conde de
Alba's side of the story, see his retrospective, AGI,
Charcas 26 7, no. 18, the Conde de Alba to the crown, Lima,
2.1.1662, 3 fs.
86. AGI, Charcas 267, no. 24 (see note 79); AGI, .Charcas
267, no. 15A (see note 33); and Castillo (AGI, Charcas 270,
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no 33C—see note 30, Chapter II), 20-20v.
S^^ll'.r ^"^^lu^^^''''^^ President Bartolomg dealaza to the crown, Potosl, 9 V 16 6 3 P f= . c^T
relates the contents of the 1662 iorre^pondeAie as'ell
no "^24 (sernotr?9f °? AG^^lAarcaf ,. 24 se ote 79) he cleans his hands of the entire
i 'k^^ "^^tter would have been settledhad he been able to proceed with his plan. See? alsoAGI, Charcas 267, no. 15A (see note 33). '
32 ^p;«JS'' l^t S^^^^
°f the delay, AGI, Charcas 267, no.
2l'xi ?662 2 ff^V^'S^^^ t° the crown, ^Lim^,1. XI. 1 , 2 s. For his arrival in Potosl, AGI, Charcas267 no. 37D, President VSzquez de Velasco to the Conde deSantisteban, Potosl, 31.VIII .1663, 9 fs. (a copy).
89. AGI, Charcas 266, no. 63, Christ6val LaredoTrevino to the crown, Potosl, 31. V. 1661, 2 fs.; AGI,Charcas 267, no. 12, President Bartolomg de Salazar to thecrown, Potosl, 1. VI. 1661, 4 fs.
90. AGI, Charcas 267, no. 28 (see note 58).
91. Ibid.
92. AGI, Charcas 267, no. 22 (see note 58).
93. Salazar 's remarks are included in AGI, Charcas
267, no. 28 (see note 58). For Santisteban
• s comments on
the situation, AGI, Charcas 267, no. 23, the Conde de
Santisteban to the crown, Lima, 23. III. 1662, 2 fs. For
more from President Salazar, AGI, Charcas 267, no. 29,
President Bartolomg de Salazar to the crown, Potosl, 23. V.
1662, 3 fs.
94. AGI, Charcas 26 7, no. 35, the Conde de Santisteban
to the crown, Lima, 20. VII. 1663, 1 f. The three discourses
are included as AGI, Charcas 267, no. 35A, "Discursos que
han dado algunos celosos del servicio de su Mag.d sobre el
entero de la Mita de Potosl," 11 fs. As I pointed out in
note 23, Chapter I, the second of the three discourses is
that written by P. Rabelo (Biblioteca Nacional, Madrid,
Ms. 19699/30)
, and discussed by Zavala, Servicio personal
,
II, 41-43. The third discourse is also in Zavala, on page
110, and discussed in an examination of material from the
1640s; it too comes from the Biblioteca Nacional Madrid,
Ms. 19699—it is the second item in that document. I have
been unable to determine the author, but two possibilities
are Sarmiento de Mendoza and Gabriel Fernandez Guarache.
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j 7 ' ^°P^^ los Ynformes que en Virtnd r^<=
cnarcas 26 7, no. 20, the Conde de Santisteban to thi
tSr^; ^'^^ 10.1.1662, 1 f., and margin no?es on no 20Ahe respondents were: Oidores Sebastian de Alarc6nFrancisco Sarmiento de Mendoza, Bernardo de Yturric^rra
t^cald^ de'"nT'/^°"r Juan'de Re^ueria;
Ibarra ind tL^ Padilla; Inquisitor Albaro deY , a Protector general Diego de Le6n Pinelo—allresponding to a proposal offered by a "sugeto mui ce?osso "Another copy of the first discourse is AG?, Charcas 268
is*AGI cLr;J^?.« ''^'''fc^^ Ibarra's responseCharcas 268, no. 15B; both items were sent to thecrown in 1670 with the Conde de Lemos ' July 4 discoursearguing for the abolition of the mita (see note 76, Chapter
ill- ^^'^^ ^^th the three diiH^rses will be necessary
r n.t'^ ^^^^ ^° identify the authors of the first andthird. The question of a possible institutionalization ofmita service in silver is one that deserves more attentionm the future. See note 97, below, for more on this issue.
.95. AGI, Charcas 267, no. 32 (see note 88).
96. AGI, Charcas 267, nos. 37 J and 37K (37K is thelast page of the document)
, "Tanto de un parecer que dio
el D"^ Don Pedro Vazquez de Velasco Presidente de losCharcas al conde de santistevan Virrey del Peru estandodho Presste en Lima sobre la numeracion de los Yndios de
mita de Potosl," Lima, 31.1.1663, 3 fs.
97. For VSzquez de Velasco 's departure, AGI, Charcas
267, no. 34 (see note 87); Salazar's notation of the fact
that he was en route. For his comments while in Lima, AGI,
Charcas 267, no. 37B, "Copia de carta escrita al Virrey del
Peru por el Doctor Don Pedro Vazquez de Velasco Presidente
de los charcas sobre la numeracion de los Yndios=es Parecer
que dio en Lima=," si^ fecha, 4 fs. (see note 23, Chapter I
for the fact that this piece is published in Zavala,
Servicio personal
,
II, 43-44; it is a copy of Ms. 19699/30
third item, from the Biblioteca Nacional, Madrid; it is a
companion, therefore, of the second and third discourses in
AGI, Charcas 267, no. 35A (see note 94).
98. AGI, Charcas 267, no. 37D (see note 88)
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99. Ibid., and AGI, Charcas 267, no. 37F Presidpnf
J1.X.1663, 2 fs. (a copy). SSnchez-Albornoz
, 70 notescorrespondence between Vazquez de Velasco and Fi^caf
AGN "salfxi?fis"?^
the question of the cen^usNfroxna(jiN, baia XIII, 23.10.2) during 1663.
100. AGI, Charcas 267, no. 37E, President VSzguez develasco to the Conde de Santisteban, La Plata 3o!?x.IbbJ, 2 fs. (a copy)
.
101. AGI, Charcas 267, no. 37F (see note 99).
102. AGI, Charcas 267, no. 37H, President Vazquez de
yf^?^""? ^° Santisteban, La Plata, 30. XI.xb63
, 2 fs . (a copy)
.
103. AGI, Charcas 267, no. 371, President VSzquez deVelasco to the Conde de Santisteban, Potosl, 31.1.1664If. (a copy) . '
104. AGI, Charcas 267, no. 41A, "Copia de la Carta
que escribieron los Acogueros al Virrey" (Santisteban)
,
PotosI, 31.1.1664, 3 fs.; AGI, Charcas 267, no. 41C,
"Informe en que los Diputados del Gremio de los Acoguerosde Potossi representan al Ex, mo sehor conde de Santisteban
Virrey de estos Reynos quattro puntos que miran a la
conservacion y augmento de esta ymperial villa," Potosi,
25.11.1664, 4 fs.
105. AGI, Charcas 267, no. 37C, President Vazquez de
Velasco to the Conde de Santisteban, "sobre la forma que
da para hacer la numeracion de la mita del cerro y 'Rivera
de la Villa de Potosi," PotosI, 2. II. 1664, 5 fs. (a copy).
106. AGI, Charcas 267, no. 37L, President VSzquez de
Velasco to the Conde de Santisteban, Potosi, 3. III. 1664
,
2 fs. (a copy)
.
This letter was soon followed by AGI,
Charcas 267, no. 37M, a copy of a list of the provinces
responsible to the Potosi mita, the numbers of mitayos
required from each, and those that actually arrived,
Potosi, 31. III. 1664, 3 fs. AGI, Charcas 267, no. 37,
President VSzquez de Velasco to the crown, Potosi, 20. IV.
1664, 5 fs., is a comprehensive report based on many of
the letters cited in notes 88 to 105 (those with "AGI,
Charcas 26 7, 37" and a letter) , which were sent with it as
supporting documentation.
107. AGI, Charcas 267, no. 41C (see note 104); AGI,
Charcas 267, no. 41, the Deputies of the Gremio de azogueros
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2?7 nn ?r'/°^°^^' 21. XII. 1664 , 4 fs.; AGI, Charcas
llrLcol'a
general de PotosI Francisco deAr acol y Diaguez to the crown, PotosI, 18. IV. 1664, 3 fs.
SaiaLr to^;h^^^''''^^ ' Bartolomg deb aza the crown, Lima, 1. XI. 1664, 2 fs.
109. AGI, Charcas 267, no. 39, the Conde de Santistebanto the crown, Lima, 11. XI. 1664, 2 f s . In his discussionof the conde de Lemos
'
4. VII. 1670 proposal that ?hemi?a
personar"^?? 'itt
Chapter'llf, Zavala','sL^ol
,
ll, 149, says that Santisteban timidly proposedthe same to the crown in a letter of 16 .XI . 1664 (from AG^Lima 66
.
This would confirm that the Viceroy
• s requestfor a direct order was a delaying tactic.
110. AGI, Charcas 267, no. 40, President VSzquez deVelasco to the crown, PotosI, 11. XII. 1664, 4 fsT
111. AGI, Charcas 267, no. 45, Corregidor GabrielGuerrero de Luna to the crown, PotosI, 11. II. 1665 1 f •AGI, Charcas 267, no. 46, Corregidor Gabriel Guerrero deLuna to the crown, PotosI, 6. V. 1665, 3 fs.
112. The plan is included on the first 2 fs. of AGICharcas 267, no. 48A, "Papel que remitio el Virrey al
'
fiscal de lo Civil para que dijese lo que se le ofrecia "
with the reply dated Lima, 15 .VIII . 1665 . The total number
of fs. IS 21, with Fiscal Juan Baptista Moreto de Espinosa
responding on the remaining 19. AGI, Charcas 267, no. 50A,IS a hodge-podge of material by VSzquez de Velasco--most
of It directed to the Conde de Santisteban—which includeshis response to the plan in a copy of a letter of 3. IX.
1665, 5 fs.
113. AGI, Charcas 267, no. 43, President VSzquez de
Velasco to the Conde de Santisteban, PotosI, PotosI, 20.1.
1665, 17 fs.; "Respuesta qS da el Presidente al Conde de
Santesteban acerca de que deiga su parecer en Vnos puntos
y medios que se proponen acerca del cerro de potosi su
mita y evitas los dahos q^ se causan por los azogueros con
Cuia ocasion responiendo refiere lo que padecen los indios
y como por la mita de Potosi esta destruido este Reyno y
sino se avide al remedio luego luego no ay que hacer caso
del For more, AGI, Charcas 267, no. 42, President
VSzquez de Velasco to the crown, PotosI, 30.1.1665, 1 f.
114. AGI, Charcas 267, no. 48A (see note 112).
115. See note 6 for reference to the Audiencia de Lima's
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"RelaciSn" for the Conde de Lemos.
nu^'^^'
Council of the Indies' deliberations AGTCharcas 267, no. 49, "Cons.o a 12 de Novie 1665 Secre^^Acordado del Conss.o a la Mita de Potossi," 1 f.* Ill
Pres?dL?'v^ i'"" ^^nt ?o'
was senfto JS^v-^^
Velasco, 1 f. each. The cgdula thatnt the Viceroy is AGI
, Charcas 267, no. 56B
,Copia de Z.la de 12 de X.re de 1665 en que se respoAdioal Virrey del Peru lo que havia de executar cerca del
af^p^^o^te f }^ ""^^^ Potossi y avisandole se ordenaval Press. de los charcas asistiese en aq.Ha villa eltpo de su oblig. n," 12.XII.1665, 3 fs.; this order summari-zes a number of positions held by government officials inPeru. •
117. AGI, Charcas 267, no. 52, the Audiencia de Lima tothe crown, Lima, 21. X. 1666, 2 fs.; "Responde a la c.la deIZ de Diz^ de 665 tocantes al repartimiento Gen^ de la Villade Potosi Ydize Yra disponiendo lo combeniente mientrasllegara El Virey qe se esperava." See, also, the Audienciade Lima's "RelaciSn' (see note 6), 205-208. Zavala,Servicio personal
,
II, 148, treats the Audiencia 's handling
of the 12. XII. 1665 cgdula this way:
"Al recibir esta cgdula, la Audiencia (de los
Reyes) la comunicS a la de La Plata, para que
informase especialmente en los
_14 puntos pendientes
.
En carta de iQ de septiembre de este aho (de 1666)
,
recibida el dla 27, lleg6 la respuesta y tabla de
los indios que en el Qltimo repartimiento se
sefialaron y los que hoy se enteran. La Audiencia
de La Plata opinaba que se hiciera la numeraci6n de
los indios ajustandose la mita a la septima parte
de los que hubiere; que entonces se podria decir a
qug ingenios se darlan y el nilmero a repartir a
cada cual. La Audiencia de Lima estim6 que esto no
respondia a la pregunta sobre cual era el arreglo
posible sin hacer la numeraci6n .
"
This is based on the Audiencia de Lima's "Relaci6n" (see
note 6), chapter 38. It also mentions that Vazquez' reply
of 31.1.1666 was not an answer to the question posed,
whether the non-census-based repartimiento was a good idea.
CHAPTER VI
1667 TO 1680
The viceroyalty of the Conde de Lemos holds a special
place in the history of the PotosI mita, because he marked
the centenary of the system's foundation with a vigorous
viceregal attack on the mita 's very existence. Lemos'
attempt to abolish the mita had caused him to be regarded
as an anomaly; as the one Spanish viceroy who placed the
good of the Indians before silver production. The Conde
de Lemos was no anomaly, however, and his approach to the
PotosI mita was quite traditional. His decision that the
system should be abolished, his reasons for it, and the
fate of his proposal once it had been made clearly show
that Lemos' were the logical result of patterns that were
already present upon his arrival in Peru.
.
Perhaps as interesting as the question of abolition is
the fate of the mita's key element: the caciques . From
1667 to 16 80 they struggled to free themselves from the
pressures put upon them by the azogueros
,
corregidores de
Potosi, and a new tormentor—the CapitSn mayor de la mita.
The caciques also found new ways to disperse the obligation
of service in silver among the residents of their provinces.
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indeed, a wealth of documentation on the caciques for this
period adds greatly to our understanding of the de facto
mita, and their place in it.
The Conde de Lemos
The Viceroy Conde de Lemos took office on November 21,
1667. His official instructions included nothing unusual,
and there was little reason to believe that he would break
with the tradition of postponing action on the mita until
the arrival of his successor. This Viceroy would prove
different, however, for he would come to advocate openly
the abolition of the PotosI mita .
Lemos did not set out to extinguish the mita. Like
many of his predecessors he first sought to reform the
system. After four months as Viceroy the enormity of that
task was already apparent to him. The Audiencia de Lima's
relaci6n was highly pessimistic about the possibility of
a new repartimiento
, and the Viceroy's preliminary
enquiries found nothing to dispute its assessment . But
Lemos believed that he would succeed where other viceroys
had failed, much as Salazar and Vazquez de Velasco had
thought that they would be able to overcome the problems
that had stymied their predecessors.
The Conde wrote to the crown on March 4, 1668 to report
that the solution of the problems surrounding the mita
would require three steps:
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workings, and this can be completed by the President
Is th^^d'^r^K^^^ '''"^"^ The seconfS e istribution of the Indians to the minersaccording to the mines, mills and workings that thev
^
'r^''
^° without leaving Lima! The thirdis the determination of the Indians in the provincessubject to the PotosI mita. This can only £3°''^^'^^^
accomplished by the Archbishop of Charcas, becausethe miners, the Indians and the government all lackthe means to pay for a census. If Your Majesty
accepting this assessment of the situation, should
name to that post an individual of sufficient age
and intelligence, then I could adjust the mita to
everyone's satisfaction within six months. "2
The Viceroy's outline was drawn primarily from the
advice of Juan de Ibarra, Visitador to the Audiencia de
Lima. Ibarra warned Lemos that any attempt to return the
Indians to their pueblos would be disastrous, and he argued
that the inclusion of more provinces than the current
sixteen would simply add to the abuses caused by service
in silver. A census could be conducted in the sixteen
provinces, he said, if ecclesiastical channels were used;
and the government would save the 200,000 pesos in salaries
that an enumeration would otherwise cost. The number of
Indians included in the census would be sufficient, Ibarra
believed, if those who lived at PotosI were included.
One-seventh of the Indians would serve in the mita at any
one time, and the mitayos would be assigned to the
azogueros on a pro-rated basis. Should the number of
Indians found by the ecclesastical census not be sufficient,
then the Visitador felt that the yanaconas in La Paz and
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La Plata should be included as well."^
The Conde de Lemos presented Ibarra's plan to Madrid,
in its entirety, in a letter of January 26, 1669. He argued
that no alternative existed if a repartimiento were to be
4
realized. Because the means were novel and not provided
for by any previous royal order, Lemos said that he would
not proceed with the ecclesiastical census until the Queen
gave her consent.
While the Viceroy and Ibarra concerned themselves with
the prerequisite census, the need for a new repartimiento
was underscored by Luis Antonio de Oviedo, the new
Corregidor de Potosl. Oviedo had found 2,124-1/2 mitayos
,
of which 1,424 were serving in person and another 700-1/2
were delivered in silver. He counseled Lemos and the crown
that silver production would be greatly improved if the
number of Indians assigned to Potosl were increased. He
defended the mita against those who claimed that it had
depopulated the provinces, and he argued that service in
silver was a necessary part of the system—if only until
the new repartimiento was implemented.
If Oviedo and Lemos were in agreement that a new
repartimiento de la mita was needed, they disagreed on the
day-to-day administration of the mita. The Corregidor was
confronted with the practical limitations of government at
Potosl and he was mindful of the fate of Francisco de la
Cruz. The Viceroy's approach was based on legal
considerations and his experiences in the mining center at
Puno. Lemos had gone to Puno in 1668 after it was wracked
by Indian revolts, and he was dismayed by the treatment of
the Indians working there. ^ The Conde was motivated by
what he believed should be done at PotosI; the Corregidor
was limited by what he thought could be done. Thus, when
Lemos tried to institute three basic reforms of the mita
late in 1669, he and Oviedo came into sharp conflict over
the wisdom of their implementation.^
On November 4, 1669, Lemos decreed that the capitanes
enteradores were not to be held responsible for more
mitayos than those with which they had left their home
8provinces. On December 3, he ordered that day-and-night
work in the cerro be stopped and that quotas be eliminated;
and that the Corregidor not despatch judges against the
9caciques for rezaqos
. Each of the practices described by
these three orders was patently illegal but historically
common. Lemos told Oviedo that they could not be defended
on the pretext that they were required to boost silver
production. The conservation of the Indians, not Potosl
silver, was the most important factor for the realm's
. , 10
survival.
The Viceroy was further outraged by the fact that the
azogueros treated the mitayos as though they were their
personal property, and that they put their own interests
before the crown's. But he had not yet given up on the
320
mita. Lemos explained to Oviedo that the mita would be
just only as long as the mitayos ' work did not lead to
their destruction. The Viceroy's three reforms were
therefore meant to ensure, in Sol6rzano Pereira's terms,
that the good produced by the mita outweighed the evils
that were caused by it. Only then would its continuation
be justified.
The Conde de Lemos was mindful that his performance as
Viceroy would be judged, in part, by the level of silver
production during his viceroyalty. Because he was aware
that production at PotosI would probably decline with the
execution of his reform directives, he defended his actions
in a letter to the crown of December 16, 1669. Lemos told
the Queen that the Indians were more oppressed than any
people on the face of the earth; that it was not silver
that Peru shipped to Spain, but the sweat and the blood of
the Indians. Less government revenue justly earned, he
contended, would be better than more silver unjustly
gained.
The Conde had overcome one of the reasons that his
predecessors had not conducted a repartimiento . He
explained, however, in follow-up arguments of January, 1670,
that his reforms represented an alternative to the
census-based repartimiento
. Lemos said that he had
concluded that a government census would be impossible to
complete. He again suggested that Ibarra's plan for an
ecclesiastical census be adopted, and he asked the crown
to at least confirm his three reform directives with royal
cgdulas. He identified the caciques as the key to the
mita and blamed the undue pressures on them for the downfall
of the system. His three orders, the Viceroy argued, were
designed to lessen the burden on the caciques
, and to
relieve the mitayos as well."*"^
The reason that Lemos went to such pains to explain
his actions lay with secret instructions that had been
provided to him by the Conde de Penaranda, President of
the Council of the Indies, and Queen Mariana in 1667.
Penaranda had ordered the Viceroy to carry out the
decisions that had been reached in the Council with regard
to Potosi. Simply put, he was to abolish "pocket Indians,"
to include more provinces under mita obligation, and to
reverse the pattern of deficit spending that had been set
14by his predecessors. Queen Mariana had entrusted her
conscience to the Conde de Lemos. She had ordered him to
ensure the conservation of the Indians by freeing them from
the oppression they suffered at the hands of the colonists.
The Viceroy was therefore responsible for improving silver
production at Potosl, through extension of mita obligation
to more provinces and the elimination of misuse, while at
the same time ending the mistreatment of the mitayos .
By early 1670, Lemos had decided to put the alleviation
of Indian suffering, in accordance with his orders from the
Queen, before the execution of his orders from Penaranda.
Like Francisco de la Cruz, the Viceroy had decided that
the treatment of the Indians by the azogueros was more
important than Potosl silver.
Lemos- three orders were Cruz' directives reincarnate,
but the Viceroy was not in Potosi to answer for their
execution. Corregidor Oviedo was there, and fearing the
worst consequences, he refused to implement the Viceroy's
reforms. He told Lemos that the orders would bring silver
production to an instant halt, and he reminded the crown
that Cruz had been killed for trying to do the same. in
defense of his inaction, Oviedo argued that Potosl supported
the entire realm; if it were to survive, a census and a
repartimiento were needed. The Corregidor complained that
the Viceroy was too heavily influenced by legalisms, and
that he lacked the experience and understanding of mining
that was required to govern Potosl. He suspended the
Conde de Lemos' three orders, he said, because it was in
the crown's interest that he do so."""^ •
Oviedo had repeated every tenet of the potosino
position on the mita. The Viceroy was incensed by his
disobedience and ordered him either to execute the 166 9
directives or resign as Corregidor. He chided Oviedo for
supporting practices which were clearly illegal. The
n^ita contract, Lemos argued, provided only that an Indian
should work and that he receive a daily wage; if he did
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not work then he was not to be paid. Rezagos de mita and
"pocket Indians" were not part of the bargain. The
Viceroy ordered President VSzquez de Velasco to travel to
Potosl, and once there to implement the three reforms.
Should the Corregidor try to block their execution, Lemos
added, then VSzquez was to arrest, suspend and ship him
to Lima for trial. '^
The Conde de Lemos' direct orders to Oviedo and to
VSzquez de Velasco suggest an unwavering determination on
his part. But the Viceroy was clearly worried about the
repercussions of his actions. He wrote to the crown on
February 7, 1670 about the contents of an azoguero memorial
that claimed that Potosi would be destroyed by his
directives. He asked the crown to decide whether his
reforms complied with his secret instructions to guard
the Queen's conscience:
In the secret instructions, and in other despatches
that I have received from Her Majesty, I am told
to unburden the royal conscience by following my
own, and to aid this unfortunate people. In that
regard, I am proceeding to remedy the many offenses
that they suffer. If these reforms which I
propose are not appropriate, please tell me what I
must do, so that the tyranny suffered by these
Indians does not weigh upon my conscience. Otherwise
one must justly suppose that the rocks will soon
burst open, with the blood of the Indians flowing
from them. 19
Lemos was still groping for an answer in April of 1670.
He had returned to the possibility of conducting a census
via ecclesiastical channels. The nominee for the position
of Archbishop of Charcas had died, and Lemos suggested
that the crown appoint Juan de Ibarra in his stead. That
would place the Visitador at the head of the church
hierarchy, and thus in a position to oversee the census.
The priests would not be told why they were reporting on
their Indian charges, Lemos said, and he and Ibarra would
be the only ones who would know what they were up to. The
costs of a government census would be avoided, and the
entire process could be completed quickly. The Viceroy
asked that Ibarra also be named President of Charcas, and
that he be empowered to appoint Corregidores de PotosI for
as long as the regeneration of the PotosI mita required.
The only danger, the Conde added, was that the azogueros
might try to murder Ibarra, as they had Cruz.^°
The Viceroy was attempting to comply with all of his
secret orders—searching for some means to end the abuses
pervading the PotosI mita without ending silver production
there. His letter of April, 1670, threw the matter back
to the Queen and the Council of the Indies. He had, by
then, sent them a number of proposals—a series of
alternatives— from which he hoped they would choose an
appropriate course of action for him to follow.
Meanwhile, what little Lemos had accomplished on his
own was being frustrated by the Corregidor de Potosi. In
March, 1670, Oviedo finally published the orders that the
Indians were not to work day and night, and that judges
were not to be sent to collect rezagos from the caciques.
VSzquez de Velasco's insistence that Lemos' orders be
implemented had forced Oviedo's hand, but he was still not
beaten. The Corregidor ordered that all work in the cerro
be halted at sundown, and he informed the Viceroy that he
would send no more judges to the provinces at all, for the
correcjidores had no power to send the Indians in the mita.
He then complained to the crown that Lemos' directives
would bring on the demise of Potosl. His letter to Madrid
was complemented by similar warnings from the Gremio de
azogueros and the Cabildo de Potosl.^-'"
Lemos accused Oviedo of intentionally misrepresenting
his orders. He had ordered that no Indian should work both
day and night, not that all work should cease at sundown.
The Viceroy insisted that the Corregidor send judges
against those corregidores who failed to cooperate with
the delivery of mitayos
. After months of debate, Oviedo
and Lemos agreed that an Indian could work five hours
during the day and another five at night. By then the
Conde de Lemos had realized that any significant reforms
2 2were impossible as long as Oviedo was Corregidor.
Abolition?
The problems surrounding a census, the frustrations
that Lemos suffered in his efforts to reform the behavior
of the azogueros and Oviedo's refusal to cooperate with
him led the Viceroy to conclude that the abolition of the
mita was the only means of ending the abuses that pervaded
the system. He had followed the same route to that
conclusion as President VSzquez de Velasco had traversed
four years earlier: he had first tried to reform the
mita; then, realizing that he could not control the system,
he called for its abolition.
Lemos proposed the abolition of the mita in a letter
to the crown of July 4, 1670. His arguments in support
of the measure formed a twenty-one folio discourse,
including a history of the mita since its formation by
Francisco de Toledo. The paper focused on the problems
that had overwhelmed Toledo's original design. The Conde
said that the provinces were no longer able to support
"
the system, because they had been deserted by the Indians;
a process that had been accelerated by the Marqugs de
Mancera's sales of the Indians' lands during the 1640s.
The decline in the population of the provinces had led to
abuses such as constant service, "pocket Indians" and
rezaqos de mita. Lemos also provided graphic descriptions
of the caciques ' mistreatment of the mitayos
,
including
their transport to Potos£ in iron collars, dangling from
the tails of horses. All previous efforts to reform the
system had failed, he said, because viceregal orders were
ignored by the azogueros and undermined by the corregidores
23de Potosi.
The Viceroy did not question the legality of the mita
as it had been designed to perform; he said that it was
unjust in its current form. The system was also expendable,
he argued, because those azoqueros who had viable mining
operations at PotosI would survive the abolition of the
mita, and only those who depended on misuse would be hurt.
The royal guintos had fallen to fewer than 400,000 pesos
per year, he noted, and thus they no longer represented the
significant sum that they had once been. Lemos assured the
Queen, nevertheless, that her decision to abolish the mita
would be divinely rewarded with discoveries of greater
mineral wealth elsewhere in the Empire. Indeed, the
Indians who were freed from mita service at PotosI would
then be available to work at San Antonio de Esquilache,
Carangas, Cailloma, Puno and other mining centers that
were just coming into their prime. Production at those
centers would increase, and royal revenue would rise as
a result. PotosI 's silver industry, meanwhile, would
continue to function—albeit producing less silver than
it had with mitayos .
Lemos could only suggest that the crown should abolish
the mita because he did not have the authority to disband
25It himself. He probably would not have taken such an
important step on his own in any case, for he went to
great lengths to demonstrate that his proposal had
widespread support in Peru. The Viceroy included, with his
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letter and discourse of July 4, 1670, the minutes of a
junta that was held on the third, in which the abolition
of the mita had received the unanimous endorsement of
government officials and clergy alike.
The Conde also sent the crown the position papers that
he had asked the religious communities of Lima to prepare
in anticipation of the July 3 junta. An example is the
contribution of the Bishop-elect of Concepci6n. He claimed
that the Indians who were forced to serve in the mita were
stripped of their liberty, that their assignment to the
mines at PotosI was tantamount to their enslavement, and
that their treatment was abominable. Mita service in
silver, moreover, was equivalent to the payments that
slaves made to their masters in lieu of personal service.
In sum, the Bishop-elect argued that the Indians were
subjected to a bondage worse than the Hebrews had endured
in Egypt—the implication being that they would soon be
delivered from their unjust condition by God if not by the
27Queen.
Juan de Padilla wrote to the crown on July 7, 1670
with additional thoughts on the abolition of the mita.
He noted that the system's negative consequences were
spiritual as well as temporal: the Indians who served in
the mita were killed or oppressed, but those who escaped
via suicide or flight into "infidel" territory lost their
souls. Padilla said that the Bishop of Arequipa had
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certified that some 600,000 Indians had gone to live
outside the area of Spanish colonization, and he reminded
the Queen that the conquest of Peru had been justified by
the christianization of the Indians.
From PotosI on July 7 and August 9, 1670, President
VSzquez de Velasco added his name to the list of those who
were calling for abolition. He reiterated his arguments
of four years earlier, which Lemos had echoed in the July 4
discourse. He asked the crown to accept the advice of its
Viceroy and extinguish the mita. VSzquez also requested
that he be permitted to leave Potosi. His position in
favor of abolition was secret, and if it became public
knowledge he would never get out of the villa alive.
While the Conde de Lemos waited for the Queen's
response to his proposal, he vented his anger and his
frustration on Corregidor Oviedo. Following Ibarra's
counsel that Oviedo was responsible fox everything that
was wrong at Potosl, from low quintos to the failure to
implement his orders, the Viceroy replaced Oviedo with
Diego de Ulloa. The new Corregidor arrived in PotosI on
January 29, 1671. Lemos explained to the crown that the
change had been necessary to clear up the misconceptions
that Oviedo had fomented. Ulloa, he reported, had explained
the true nature of the three reform directives to the
azogueros
, and now everyone was content. The Viceroy had
also sent explanatory orders to the provincial corregidores
in the field.
Lemos- three reforms of 1669 received the Council of
the Indies' stamp of approval on December 31, 1671—two
years after they had been issued. The Viceroy would never
receive a reply to his call for the abolition of the mita,
however. The time lag that was caused by Trans-Atlantic
correspondence and bureaucratic delays had played
important roles in preventing the realization of a new
repartimiento de la mita since the 16 30s. Now they
contributed to saving the mita from abolition. Three
months after Lemos had sent his July 4 proposal, the
Council was only just responding to his early-1669 letters
on the problems that were preventing the execution of a
census. It would not debate the question of abolition
until May of 1673.
In October, 1670, the Council considered Juan de
Ibarra's plan for a secret census conducted by priests in
the sixteen mita provinces, and Oviedo's concurrent call
for a thirty-province enumeration done by the correqidores
and the priests. The Councilors favored the Ibarra plan,
but they left the ultimate decision to Lemos. He had the
matter at hand, they argued, and he could decide better
than they. Thus, a cedula of November 7, 1670 instructed
the Viceroy to do as he deemed fit, in conference with the
32Audiencia de Lima.
By the time that the Conde de Lemos answered the
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November 7 edict, it was September 18, 1671. He had sent
his discourse on abolition more than year earlier. The
Viceroy noted that the problems surrounding a census were
still how many provinces to include, whom to name to
conduct it, and how to pay them. He stood by his call
for the abolition of the mita, but should the Council
choose not to follow his suggestion, then Ibarra's plan
was his second choice. Lemos sent the matter back to
Madrid, and he was still waiting for a reply when he died
on December 6, 1672.
The Council of the Indies began its deliberations on
Lemos' proposal that the mita be abolished in April, 1673.
On the twelfth it decided to hold a consulta on the
question, and on the nineteenth it ordered Relator Andrgs
de Angulo to prepare a relaci6n of the Viceroy's discourse
and all previous correspondence on the mita. After it had
considered that material in May, the Council voted that
abolition was a matter that only the Queen herself could
decide. In other words, the Council did not want to take
the responsibility for ordering the abolition of the mita
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any more than the Conde de Lemos
.
The dilemma of the royal conscience versus the crown's
revenue had been passed from the Queen and Penaranda to
Lemos, then from the Viceroy to the Council, and finally,
from the Council to the Queen. The Councilors suggested
that a junta be formed, with members of the Council to be
joined by prominent theologians, so that all sides of the
question would be debated. It noted that the mita appeared
to have outlived its justification, and that it was now
more harmful than beneficial
. On October 9, 1673,
however, the Council abruptly halted the junta's enquiry.
It then ordered the Conde de Castellar to investigate the
situation in Peru in his capacity as Lemos' successor.
Castellar was provided with the Angulo relaci6n for his
information, and he was instructed to determine, once in
Peru, what course of action would be best, and then to
report back to the Council. "^^
The reason for the Council's decision was not included
in its order to Castellar. The suspension of the enquiry
may have come in response to the news of Lemos' death, but
it probably resulted from the Council's fear of the
possible ramifications of abolition of the mita, and its
inability to determine what was really happening in Peru,
and thus to judge the rationale for abolition. VSzquez de
Velasco and Lemos had both prefaced their calls for the
abolition of the mita with the impossibility of reform,
and the relatively low levels of crown revenue generated
by the once-rich mines at Potosl. The validity of their
arguments had been put in doubt by counter proposals and
their own government reports.
Nicolas Matias del Campo y de la Rynaga issued a
work in 1672 entitled Memorial apologetico , hist6rico.
juridico y politico . He said that he was responding to an
anti-mita memorial written by a friar. The structure of
Campo's Memorial and the issues it considered, however,
suggest that it was written to counter the Conde de Lemos
'
July 4, 1670 discourse. The unidentified friar may well
have been an invention to protect Campo from viceregal
retribution, for the work was published in Lima.^"^
Campo's Memorial was heavily indebted to Sandoval y
Guzman's Pretensiones of 1634, and it may best be
characterized as a revision of that earlier work. Campo
likened Peru to a sick patient, whom the doctors had
failed to cure because they had applied mere half-measures.
Some physicians (also unidentified) had recently decided,
he said, that the disease (the abuses caused by the mita)
was incurable and that the infected organ (the PotosI mita)
would have to be removed. From a list of fifteen offenses
that they blamed on the mita, they had come to these four
conclusions
:
I. That the distribution and assignment of
the Indians to work at PotosI was unjust, and
that it was counter to their natural liberty.
II. That the crown had aggrieved its royal
conscience with the assignment of the Indians to
the mines at PotosI.
III. That the mita, or repartimiento of the
Indians for the cerro of Potosi, and the offenses
of the azogueros
,
had destroyed and depopulated
the provinces.
IV. That it was convenient, and the crown in
defense of its conscience must, abolish and revoke
the repartimiento of the Indians to PotosI- and
tSat T^^""^"" ^^^^ proposal were rejected) .h It should assign them to other mining centers
Campo's arguments against each of these conclusions
sought to ally the interests of the crown with those of
the azogueros, against those of the advocates of the mita's
extermination. His first Article maintained that the crown
had an unquestionable right to order its vassals to work
for it, and it defended the justness of the mita . The
offenses that were currently plaguing the system, Campo
argued, were not the fault of the crown or inherent in the
mita; rather, they were the product of individual azogueros '
malice. To doubt that the crown had a right to order mita
service, or to question the justness of the system, he
said, was disloyal and an affront to the royal family. The
individual azogueros who were guilty of wrongdoing should
be punished, but abolition would unjustly penalize the
O Q
crown and the meritorious azogueros
.
Article II of the Memorial defended the mita against
the charge that it had depopulated the provinces. Campo
claimed that the priests, the corregidores and the caciques
who advanced that notion were trying to blame the system
for the damage that they had caused. He admitted that the
mistreatment of mitayos by the azogueros had contributed
to Indian migration, but as he had in Article I, Campo
argued that the system could be reformed; that the abuses
335
that contributed to Indian flight could be purged from
the mita without destroying it altogether
In Article III, Campo called for the continuation of
the mita in recognition of Potosl's record of service to
the crown, the azogueros ' current needs, and the
ill-effects that would come from shifting the Indians to
other mines. He reiterated, therefore, all the tenets
of the azogueros' long-standing position in defense of the
mita save one: that the system was part of their pact with
Viceroy Toledo. Perhaps Campo realized that the usefulness
of that argument had been eroded by time and by the extent
to which the azogueros misused mita service in silver. He
employed the remainder of their position to the fullest:
the transport of the Indians to other mining centers, he
said, would add to the problems that were caused by Indian
migration; and Potosl would collapse without mita labor.
When Potosi fell, he warned, then Peru would fall; and when
Peru fell, then Spain would fall; and when Spain fell, then
Catholicism would fall; and then the world would be left at
the mercy of the Protestants 1
Finally, in Article IV, Campo took on all fifteen of
the abuses that the mita ' s enemies had used to construct
their four conclusions. He made no effort to deny that
the azogueros had engaged in the mistreatment of the
Indians or in the misuse of the mita, but he argued once
more that any abuses could be eliminated without abolishing
the system. '^^
Thus, the most important message included in the Campo
Memorial was that reform was possible. The second most
important point that it had to make was that PotosI would
collapse without mita labor. Those arguments were
supported, quite naturally, by the azogueros in their own
complaints to the crown about Lemos' abolitionism."^^ But
the strongest evidence supporting Campo 's assertions came
from Lemos himself, and his replacement Corregidor, Diego
de Ulloa. Their efforts to demonstrate that they were
complying with their orders to end abuse and raise silver
production at Potosi were the cause of this ironic
circumstance. In 1669, for example, Oviedo reported to
Lemos that his diligence had raised the number of Indians
working at Potosi to 3,424—both mitayos and mingas
. Lemos
relayed the Corregidor 's report to the Council of the
Indies, with one "minor" alteration: he claimed that the
number of mitayos had reached 3,424—an apparent improvement
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of nearly 100 per cent.
After Lemos had replaced Oviedo with Ulloa, the new
Corregidor reported, in February of 1672, that he had
raised the production of royal quintos significantly, and
that he had abolished "pocket Indians." He attributed his
success to his implementation of Lemos' three reform
45directives of 1669. Pleased with Ulloa 's progress, the
Viceroy sent the good news on to the crown on April 26,
1672.
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The Conde de Lemos
•
reports of his actions countered
what he had argued in his July 4 proposal: a) that reform
of the mita was impossible and that abolition was necessary
to end abuses; and b) that production at PotosI could not
be improved and that the mining center was on its way out.
The crown clearly appreciated the news of higher quintos
,
for the Queen sent Oviedo orders on June 10, 1673 to
maintain the high level of silver production that Diego de
Ulloa had reported. Oviedo had been returned to office
by virtue of a royal cgdula, which he had been able to
obtain via personal connections in the Council of the
48Indies. The Queen's directive to the Corregidor was sent
just two days after the Council had presented her with the
case for the abolition of the mita. The two issues were
therefore considered by her concurrently
.
It is even more ironic that Oviedo would later refute
Lemos' claims. Upon his return to Potosi in April, 1673,
he charged that Ulloa had manipulated production data,
and that silver output had not been as high as he had
reported. Oviedo said that the apparent rise in quintos
had been derived by Ulloa 's use of 1670 as the base year
for his comparison. Production had been hindered that year
by a severe drought and an eleven-month production period.
Ore that had been stockpiled during 1670 was later milled
in 1671 and 1672, the two years for which Ulloa claimed
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credit. The carta cuenta for 1671 had included, moreover,
thirteen months' worth of silver production; and that for
1672 had contained fifteen months' worth. The total work
force had actually fallen, Oviedo added, to 2,664 Indians:
1,427 mitayos and 1,217 mingas .^^ The Condessa de Lemos
and Diego de Ulloa defended the integrity of the late
Viceroy's reports in May, 1673, but by the time their
arguments had arrived in Madrid, the issue of abolition
had already been placed in the hands of the Conde de
Castellar.^"'"
Despite his refutation of Lemos' claims, Oviedo may
have contributed to the Council of the Indies' decision
to postpone any action on the abolition of the mita. His
reports to the Conde de Lemos and to the Council about the
labor force at Potosi had indicated that the shortage of
Indians was not as bad as the system's detractors had
claimed, and that the mita was functioning better than
they had charged. His reports differed from those of his
predecessors because he included mingas as well as mitayos
,
and he divided the latter into those who served in person
and those who served in silver (see Table 3)
.
The figures presented on Table 3 come from one source,
and therefore only tentative conclusions should be drawn
from them. Oviedo ' s combination of the totals for mitayos
and mingas to determine the total work force is especially
questionable, for the money that was sent as mita service in
TABLE 3
MITA SERVICE ACCORDING TO
CORREGIDOR OVIEDO, 1668-1673^^
MITAYOS MITAYOS TOTAL
IN PERSON IN SILVER MITAYOS MINGAS
1,424
1,777-1/4
700-1/2
374-3/4
2, 124-1/2 899
2, 142 1, 282
2, 033 1, 595
1/ 830 1/ 061
1, 427 1, 217
1, 634 1, 404
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silver was used, at least in part, to hire mingas. A
combination of his totals for mingas and mitayos in person
would probably be a more accurate indication of the actual
work force, and this would come to a bit more than his
total for mitayos in 1668 and 1669. His figures for mingas
were larger than the numbers for mitayos in silver for
those two years, and this would suggest—to the historian
and perhaps to the Council of the Indies as well—that some
mining operations at PotosI were profitable enough to hire
minaas, and that the azogueros were not as heavily involved
in "pocket Indians" as their enemies charged.
These suggestions must remain very speculative until
more work can be completed with the quantitative source
materials. They are offered here because the Council's
decision to halt its consideration of the Conde de Lemos
•
proposal in 1673 may have been based, in part, on a similar
interpretation of Corregidor Oviedo's reports.
The Campo Memorial, the reports of reform and higher
silver production at PotosI and the azogueros ' arguments
combined to derail the abolition movement headed by the
Conde de Lemos. They did not end discussion of the matter
completely, but the element of doubt and confusion that
they created in Madrid caused sufficient hesitation on the
part of the Council of the Indies that it postponed a
decision on the question of abolition until the Conde de
Castellar could report from Peru.
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Viceroys Castellar (1624-1678)
Lin^n ^ Cisneros ( 1678 -1681 )
The Conde de Castellar assumed office on August 15,
1674. The Audiencia de Lima, which had ruled Peru since
Lemos' death sixteen months earlier, reported to the new
Viceroy that the mita was as it had been when his
predecessor arrived in 1667. Lemos' three reform orders
of 1669, it said, had been completely neutralized by
54Corregidor Oviedo.
Castellar complied with his orders from the Council of
the Indies and reported on the mita on February 2, 1675.
He said that he had hoped to act quickly and decisively,
but that he had been forced to suspend his efforts when he
was unable to find anyone who would advocate the abolition
of the mita. The officials who had served on the July 3,
1670 junta now claimed that they had been coerced by the
Conde de Lemos. Given the circumstances, the Viceroy had
decided that he had better not risk anything novel, and
that he should keep the PotosI silver industry going with
traditional, if imperfect, means—the mita .
The Viceroy was perplexed by the unanimity of opinion
in favor of the mita. The current regimen of government
officials at PotosI showed uniform support for the system.
Corregidor Oviedo recounted his earlier sentiments for the
crown on November 1, 1674.^^ The new President of Charcas,
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Bartolomg GonzSlez de Poveda, wrote to Madrid in February,
1677, that he had found the mita, and the silver industry
in general, to be in a terrible state, but that the
azogueros were doing their best to keep the center in
production. He claimed that they hired as many mingas as
there were mitayos
.
The Archbishop of Charcas, Melchor LifiSn y Cisneros,
sent the crown a proposal six days later that called for
the mita to be returned to the status quo ante. Lemos'
orders, he said, had cut silver production at PotosI in
half, but the Indians had not benefited at all—only the
caciques
.
The Archbishop suggested, moreover, that the
28,000 Indians who lived in the villa should be included
in the mita, perhaps to work at night while the other
mitayos were resting. They had no occupation at all at
present, he said, and spent most of their time committing
all manner of sins. If they did not like the work, then
they would return to their pueblos, and the provinces
5 8
would be repopulated.
It seemed to Castellar and to the Council that the
sentiment for the abolition of the mita had simply
evaporated. Responding to the Viceroy's report of
February, 1675, the crown issued two cgdulas
, on July 8 and
November 16, 16 76, ordering that the mita be maintained.
The first order empowered the Viceroy to extend mita
obligation to more provinces, after consultations with
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President GonzSlez de Poveda. The second order instructed
Castellar to abolish "pocket Indians," in league with the
new Corregidor de PotosI, Pedro Luis Enrlquez.^^ The
Council of the Indies had dusted off its dual-fold program
of the 1650s.
Castellar 's dislike for novelties extended beyond the
question of abolition, however, and like Alba, Salvatierra,
Santisteban and others, he approached the two-part program
with great caution. In response to a May 18, 1676 cgdula
,
which asked his opinion on a proposed pan-Peruvian census
and an alcalde mayor de minas ' report that the number of
mitayos had fallen to 1,300, Castellar confessed that he
did not like the idea of introducing anything new at
Potosi, no matter what might be happening there. On
February 22, 1678, he replied to the July 8 and November
16, 1676 orders. The Viceroy said that all of the
provinces were experiencing a shortage of Indian labor, and
that the Indians who were taken from the fourteen exempted
provinces to work at Potosi would be sorely missed by their
current employers. He suspended the implementation of the
two cgdulas until he could collect the opinions of Gonzalez
6
1
de Poveda, Oviedo and Enriquez about their contents.
Oviedo and Enriquez answered Castellar 's request for their
comments on May 1 and June 2, 1678, respectively. The
6 2President replied in an informe of April 28. But by the
time their letters were received in Lima the Conde had been
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replaced by LiMn y Cisneros, now Archbishop of Lima and
Viceroy of Peru.
The Archbishop brought a unique background to his
duties as Viceroy. For example, he was the first
seventeenth century viceroy of Peru to have personally
visited Potosi. His long experience in Charcas and his
pro-mita discourses while the Archbishop there, gave every
indication that he would be more decisive and more
realistic than his predecessors in tackling the problems
surrounding the system. On August 24, 1678, LinSn reported
to the crown that he would soon complete his study of the
various responses to the 1676 cgdulas, and that he would
then proceed as he deemed best. Attached to his letter
was a long note by the Fiscal supporting the mita and
arguing that it was both legal and just, as long as only
one-seventh of the Indians served at any one time. The
note referred directly to Nicolas Matlas del Campo's 1672
Memorial
.
Oviedo and Gonzalez de Poveda both argued for the
extension of mita obligation to more provinces. Enrlquez
had only recently assumed the office of Corregidor de
Potosi, and he deferred to their years of experience. Their
arguments were reiterated for the Archbishop-Viceroy by his
Asesor general, Francisco de Valera. He reduced the matter
to six points, most of which revolved around the now
familiar problems with the execution of a census: who to
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name to conduct it; and how to pay them. Following the
lead of Gonzalez de Poveda, Valera argued that the census
should be conducted in all thirty of the provinces by
their corregidores and local priests, to save the cost of
judges' salaries and to complete the process as quickly as
possible. He also noted that the ten year exemption from
resettlement would have to be eliminated, and he advocated
the abolition of mita service in silver. The number of
mitayos to be included in a new repartimiento would be
determined by the Corregidor de Potosi and the President of
Charcas in an in-depth visita of the mills and the cerro.
The required number of Indians would then be drawn from
one-seventh of the Indian population in the sixteen
traditionally obligated provinces and any of the fourteen
that were needed. In the event that more provinces were
needed, then the villa of Potosi and the provinces of
Yamparaez, Pilaya, Tomina and Chuquiauo would be the first
64to be included.
Given the Viceroy's philosophical inclination in favor
of the mita, the unanimity of support for the system in
Charcas, and the Council's orders of 1676, it appeared
that the long-promised repartimiento de la mita might
finally come to fruition; but it did not. The cause this
time was the Council of the Indies. In response to LinSn's
earlier comments on the mita, the Council sent him a series
of position papers on the system on September 13, 1678,
346
including the Conde de Lemos' discourse on abolition. The
Archbishop was instructed to study them all, and to obtain
the written opinions of the Audiencia de Charcas, GonzSlez
de Poveda, Oviedo and Enriquez.^^ The Council was having
second thoughts about its 1676 orders, and because the
1678 cgdula superseded those instructions, LiMn had to
suspend the implementation of a new repartimiento until
he could comply with the order.
The azoqueros and the government officials at PotosI
were anxious that LinSn proceed in accordance with the
1676 orders. President GonzSlez de Poveda complained to
the Council of the Indies on April 11, 1679 that nothing
had been done since he submitted his informe a year
6 7
earlier. The azogueros reported that the number of
mitayos working at Potosi had fallen to 1,600, and they
said that all the doubts about the feasibility of a
census were ludicrous. Francisco de Toledo, they noted,
had accomplished the original repartimientos de la mita
all by himself.
In August of 1679 the Archbishop-Viceroy and the Real
Acuerdo decided that Lemos* 1669 reform orders should be
observed until a new repartimiento was completed. LifiSn
also ruled that corregidores should send one-seventh of
the Indian population in their provinces, including the
forasteros and the yanaconas if the number of originarios
was not sufficient. The capitanes enteradores were not to
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deliver service in silver, he ordered, and they were not
to be held responsible for any more Indians than those
that they received from their corregidores
. LinSn did
not distribute these orders right away, however, but
submitted them to the Fiscal, the Protector de naturales,
and Gonzalez de Poveda for their comments. He then
suspended their execution when he learned, in April of
1680, that he would soon be replaced as Viceroy by the
Duque de la Palata (1681-1689) .^^
The instruments of bureaucratic delay are by now
painfully familiar. The Council of the Indies' wavering
between the abolition of the mita and the reformation of
the system was only the latest manifestation of the many
pitfalls of administering PotosI from afar.
On April 21, 1679, the crown sent forth a cedula
ordering Bishops and Archbishops to oversee reports on
their jurisdictions by priests in the field. The cgdula
was not connected in any way with secular government.
Was it the culmination of Juan de Ibarra and the Conde de
Lemos* suggestion that priests conduct a secret census of
the realm in preparation for a new repartimiento ? As the
Archbishop of Lima, even after Palata arrived in Peru,
LifiSn would participate in that process. The possibility
is certainly intriguing, but for lack of further evidence
70it must remain just that: a possibility.
Such was the state of Hapsburg administration of the
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mita when the Viceroy Duque de la Palata arrived in Peru
in 1681. While the various echelons of the government
had debated the merits of the mita, considered its possible
abolition and discussed the form of a new repartimiento
.
the caciques who made the system work had begun to fight
back against the mita.
The Caciques
In his letters to the crown of January, April and
July, 1670, the Conde de Lemos identified the caciques as
the key element in the mita , both in its design and its
deterioration. He noted that he had received many
complaints from them about how they were treated by the
azoqueros
,
and he described the violent methods that they
employed to deliver Indians to Potosi.^"'"
In earlier years, the caciques had responded to the
pressure upon them through flight, suicide and legal
complaints, the last with limited gain. From 1667 to 1680
they employed the legal machinery of Hapsburg government
with remarkable success. The caciques ' petitions and
court challenges not only had an impact on viceregal policy
toward the mita, they also affected the de facto system.
The materials that were included with their legal arguments
also provide further insights into the actual functioning
of the Potosi mita.
Gabriel Fernlndez Guarache ' s efforts to ease the burden
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of the mita on himself and other caciques in Pacajes
influenced the Conde de Lemos and contributed to the
Viceroy's decision to propose that the mita be abolished.
In the mid-1660s, Fernandez Guarache petitioned the
government in Lima to resolve five points. First, he
again requested that the position of capitgn general for
Pacajes be eliminated. Second, he asked that only
one-seventh of the current Indian population in the
sixteen obligated provinces be required to serve each
year. As the capitSn enterador for Pacajes he had been
unable to deliver more than 176 Indians in person, and
had been forced to pay for 1,000 fugitives in silver.
Third, Fernandez Guarache argued that the Indians should
receive two weeks of rest for every one that they worked,
and that they should not be forced to work both day and
night. He said that the mistreatment of mitayos at
Potosi had contributed to the labor shortage there. It
had disabled many workers, and the stories that returning
mitayos told to the uninitiated caused many of the latter
to flee from their pueblos. Fourth, the Indians who were
required to serve as meses were now assigned to the mines
and the mills, rather than to the support activities that
they had originally been used in. Fernandez Guarache said
that they should no longer be required to serve at all.
Finally, he asked that the fines that were levied against
the Indians for missing a day not exceed one day's wages.
I I
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A day's absence was currently met with a one peso fine,
and thus an Indian who was absent for two days received
nothing for the week at all. The mitayos were also fined,
he said, when they failed to meet illegal quotas, and
that too had to be stopped.
The practices that Fernandez Guarache described in
his petition were those that the Conde de Lemos tried to
prohibit with his 1669 reforms, and ultimately with his
call for the abolition of the mita in 1670. The cacique '
s
petition had been sent to the Council of the Indies by
the Audiencia de Lima, and it was discussed by the Council
on June 19, 1668. A royal order was then sent to the
Viceroy and to the President of Charcas to act against
the illegal practices that Fernandez Guarache had
described. That edict contributed to the Conde 's "decision
73to issue the 1669 reform directives.
The Viceroy borrowed the cacique ' s logic when he
prefaced the three reform orders. He said that the mita
had been a solution for the problems of Toledo's day,
but that it had given vent to new difficulties. The
azogueros had so modified the Toledan system that the de
facto mita no longer bore any resemblance to its original
design. The Indians had fled from the oppression they
suffered as mitayos , and they had left the caciques to bear
the full weight of the mita—at seven pesos per Indian per
week in silver. The Conde de Lemos' July 4 discourse also
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followed this line of thought.
Fernandez Guarache's arguments continued to influence
the government's approach to the mita even after Lemos
died. In August of 1680, for example, the Council of the
Indies considered his comments on the prospects for a
general census and for reducciones
. He maintained that
the execution of reducciones would be an exercise in
futility, because the provinces that were subjected to
mita service were already completely destroyed. He noted,
moreover, that the Indians did not have to be compelled to
work in profitable silver mines. The reason that they
were unwilling to serve at PotosI, Fernandez Guarache
argued, was that the center had ceased being profitable
long ago. He claimed that only eight of the sixty-eight
mills there were viable operations, and that most of the
azogueros merely collected mita service in silver. The
majority of the silver refined at Potosl, he added, came
7 5from surrounding mining zones.
Gabriel Fernandez Guarache's general portrayal of the
mita is substantiated by the events in Paucarcolla from
1669 to 1673. The Corregidor of the province, Josef
Ord6nez de Aguila, was a creature of the Conde de Lemos,
and as such he gave unusual attention to his mita duties.
Ordonez was obligated to despatch a contingent of mitayos
at the end of 1669 to serve at Potosi for two years—the
province's distance from the villa had led to biennial
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periods of service for the Indians of Paucarcolla. in
October, 0rd6ne2 ordered the caciques of the province to
prepare lists of those who would serve from 1669 to 1671,
and to make ready for their departure. The gobernadores
of Puno and Ycho responded that they could not deliver the
number of Indians that was required of them in person, and
that their personal resources were no longer adequate to
meet their obligations in silver. They asked that they be
allowed to resign their positions. The Corregidor
investigated the gobernadores ' claims, found them to be
true, and accepted their resignations."^^
Four years later, Ordonez began his preparations
earlier. In April, 1673, he reported to the Audiencia de
Charcas that he had jailed the cacique gobernador of
Macari for a number of offenses, including the failure to
carry out his mita responsibilities. Ger6nimo Cajiamarca,
the Corregidor charged, had run a series of illegal
enterprises and conducted unlawful collections of silver
from the residents of his pueblo, ostensibly to meet their
tribute and mita obligations; the gobernador had then kept
the money for himself. Ord6nez said that he had imprisoned
Cajiamarca, but that he had posted 200 pesos bail and then
77disappeared
.
The despatch of the mitayos took place from Puno in
November, 167 3. Ord6hez named a Spaniard to accompany the
troop to Potosi. The gobernador of the pueblo of
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Paucarcolla provided him with five Indians; a sixth was to
be picked up in Oruro en route to Potosl. The caciques of
Puno and Ycho could not deliver anyone in person, but they
entrusted him with 450 and 400 pesos
, respectively. They
said that they had collected the money through the rental
of land to forasteros and yanaconas
, and the sale of their
own property and livestock. The gobernador of San
Francisco de Tiquillaca provided two Indians in person and
300 pesos in lieu of the usual third from his pueblo. He
too had raised the money through collections among the
forasteros
.
The cacique of Capachica sent ten Indians in
78person.
From this limited base of evidence it is apparent that
the exempted Indians
—
forasteros and yanaconas—were not
entirely free of mita obligation. The rent that they paid
for their lands, and the collections that were demanded of
them, went toward satisfying the mita quota from their
pueblo of residence. They were, therefore, contributing
to mita service in silver.
The pressure on the caciques to deliver mitayos, in
person and in silver, is nowhere more evident than in
their legal battle with Joseph FernSndez Valencia, the
CapitSn mayor de la mita in Potosl. FernSndez employed
a combination of financial, corporal and psychological
pressures to force the caciques to deliver as many mitayos
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as they possibly could.
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In 1677, the caciques launched a legal assault on the
CapitSn mayor, en masse. They charged that when they
arrived in Potosi with their mitayos they had to pay him
an illegal delivery tax, and that they were then imprisoned
until other caciques bonded them. The caciques also
claimed that they were forced to bring Fernandez Valencia
presents, in kind, from their provinces; that they had to
lend him their mules whenever he wanted them; and that
they had to contribute building materials for his mining
operation, decorations for his parties and Indians to
work in his mine.^°
With the able assistance of the Protector de naturales
of Potosi, the caciques argued their case before Corregidor
Luis Antonio de Oviedo. Fernandez Valencia defended the
bonding of the caciques and his rigorious treatment of them
as being necessary to ensure that they would comply with
their obligations. He denied that he had required them
to contribute to his personal enterprises. Oviedo was
sympathetic toward the Capitan mayor's situation, and he
ordered only a minor penalty that would have returned him
O 1
to office after a short suspension.
The caciques and the Protector then launched a second
offensive, through appeals to the Audiencia de Charcas and
the Viceroy. They added new charges to those that they
had included in their first complaint: that Fernandez
forcibly sold wine and chicha to the Indians at Guayna each
Monday; that he forced the caciques to come to his home
and bid him good day; that he used physical and verbal
abuse against them that was not appropriate for nobles;
that he forced them to work silver ore by hand while he
held them in his jail; and that he prevented them from
hearing mass while they were imprisoned. In the end, the
evidence that the caciques accumulated against Fernandez
Valencia overwhelmed him and the Corregidor. The Capitin
mayor was heavily fined and permanently stripped of his
office. Gabriel Fernandez Guarache had influenced the
Viceroy of Peru and the Council of the Indies; the caciques
as a group took on and defeated the immediate object of
their difficulties at Potosl, the Capitan mayor de la
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mita
.
As the key pressure point in the mita, the caciques
also had their problems with the Indians. They were by
no means benevolent toward their charges, and they used
many of the same methods against the Indians that the
Corregidor de Potosl, the Capitan mayor de la mita, and
the azogueros used in dealing with them. The Indians'
response to oppression, as we have noted many times, was
largely passive: flight from their home provinces. By
16 80, however, some of them had also resorted to violence,
and another apparently sought his revenge through the legal
machinery of the Hapsburg administration.
In 1679, Bartolome Gonzalez, the capitan enterador for
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Toropalca, Yura, Potobamba and Chaqui-all in the province
of Porco-asked the Audiencia de Charcas to permit him to
carry a sword and a dagger while he was performing his
duties as capitSn. GonzSlez provided the court with
testimony of the problems that he had faced in 1668 with
four Indians who had refused to serve in the mita. They
had answered his efforts to include them in a contingent
of mitayos for Potosi by beating him up on one occasion
and pelting him with sticks and stones on another. It is
interesting that the number of witnesses that GonzSlez
brought forward to substantiate his case far outnumbered
his attackers; they did not explain why they had failed to
go to his rescue. The Audiencia nevertheless acceded to
his request and granted him a license to carry arms to
8 3protect himself.
The most compelling case involving the mita during
this period is that of Francisco Sonco Cari versus the
Corregidor de Asangaro, Francisco de Castro. Sonco Cari
appeared before the Audiencia de Charcas in 1673, claimed
that he was the cacique principal of Asillo, and charged
that Castro was engaged in a number of abuses, including
the misuse of mita labor. Sonco claimed that Castro had
forced him to buy wine, mules and clothing at inflated
prices; that he had forced other caciques to do the same;
and that he was using mitayos in his pack trains and his
other personal enterprises. Sonco brought a series of
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witnesses before the Audiencia to corroborate his charges.
The court was sufficiently impressed with the case against
Castro that it sent a judge to Asangaro to investigate.^^
The testimony that the judge gathered in the province
was completely at odds with that which supported Sonco
Carl's claims. Indeed, the caciques and the Indians of
the pueblos of Asangaro and Asillo said that Sonco was not
a cacique and that he never had been one. They claimed
that he was a common Indian who had been sent to PotosI in
the mita three or four years earlier. The other witnesses
who had been involved in the preliminary hearings were
unknown to the residents of the two pueblos. The judge
ruled, therefore, that the charges against Corregidor
Castro had been fabricated, and the Audiencia stood by his
, . . 85decision.
The Sonco Cari versus Castro case has two possible
explanations: a) that the charges were true but that the
Corregidor managed to cover up the affair with pressure
on the Indians and/or bribery of the judge; or b) that
the charges were brought by a vengeful mitayo . The second
is more probable, for while the charges may well have been
based on some degree of fact— such practices were common
—
the Corregidor 's ability to control the caciques and the
Indians would have had to have been extraordinary to keep
8 6them quiet. The documentation in the Audiencia 's files
held nothing to suggest that the judge had been corrupted
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by the Corregidor. if Sonco Cari was a disgruntled
mita^, then the judicial process had been manipulated,
if not entirely with success, by a conunon Indian against
a provincial corregidor
.
Summary
Since 1633, the limitations of Hapsburg administration
had prevented the completion of a new repartimiento de la
mita. The time delays that were caused by trans-oceanic
correspondence, the short viceregal terms in office, the
viceroys' reluctance to innovate, the problems confronting
a prerequisite census and the contradictory information
that the government officials at PotosI produced had
combined to postpone the execution of a repartimiento for
decades
.
While the government had wavered on how best to act,
the gap between the Toledan mita and the de facto system
had grown wider. Service in silver had become a major
part of mita deliveries, the mistreatment of the caciques
had grown more violent and the provinces had proven
increasingly unable to support the mita. Finally, in
the mid-1660s. President Vazquez de Velasco had concluded
that the abuses that pervaded the system could not be
prevented, and he had begun to call for the abolition of
the mita.
From 1667 to 1680, the same governmental limitations
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that had prevented the execution of a new repartimiento
combined to frustrate first the reform efforts of the
Conde de Lemos and then his call for the abolition of the
mita. Indeed, his support for the system's extermination
was a direct outgrowth of his frustrations vis-a-vis
reform, and his realization that he could not otherwise
alter the status quo at Potosi and alleviate the suffering
of the Indians who were serving in the mita.
Lemos' proposal for the abolition of the mita, like
Toledo's decision to establish the system a century
before, drew upon existing opinions and responded to the
condition of Peru as he found it. The Conde 's reform
package was drafted by Juan de Ibarra, and his July 4,
1670 discourse borrowed heavily from the arguments of
VSzquez de Velasco and Fernandez Guarache. A generation
of anti-mita sentiments came to a climax during his
viceroyalty. Lemos may have been unusually receptive
to those sentiments because of Queen Mariana's concern
for her conscience, but he was the vehicle of the abolition
movement, not the source of it.
Juan de Ibarra played an important role throughout the
period, from his proposal for the use of ecclesiastical
channels to conduct a census to his support for the three
reforms that Lemos ordered in 1669. He and the Viceroy
looked upon the mita as a legal and a moral problem, quite
apart from the realities of silver production. The reforms
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that they championed were those that Francisco de la Cruz
had died for ten years earlier. Corregidor Luis Antonio
de Oviedo was faced with the realities of the mita full
square, and he was mindful of what had happened the last
time that reforms were attempted at Potosi. He was
therefore reluctant to comply with the Viceroy's
directives. The struggle that ensued between Oviedo and
Lemos over the 1669 reforms was between what could and
what should be done; between potosino realities and limeno
plans; and between the de facto mita and the viceregal
position that the Toledan system was still viable.
The proposal to abolish the mita was an act of last
resort—a response to the impossibility of implementing
reforms at PotosI, and to the falling levels of silver
production there. Like his predecessors, the Conde de
Lemos was disinclined to take action of major proportions
without first, obtaining the consent of the crown and the
Council of the Indies. He proposed that the mita be
abolished; he did not disband it himself. The Council
sought to evade the responsibility for such a crucial
decision by leaving it to the Queen alone. Its reluctance
stemmed from Spain's need for revenue, which complicated
the question of the mita ' s justness.
The downfall of the abolition proposal lay with the
arguments upon which it was based: that reform of the
system was impossible and that Potosi was no longer an
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important producer of silver. Those points were countered
by NicolSs Matlas del Campo in his Memorial and by the
azogueros in their correspondence with Madrid. Lemos ' own
reports that guintos were higher and that abuses were
being eliminated by Diego de Ulloa confirmed what the
enemies of abolition argued: that reform was possible
and that production could be increased at Potosi. The
Viceroy's desire to prove that he was a good administrator
compromised his call for the alleviation of the Indians'
suffering via the abolition of the mita.
Once the abolition proposal had been put to one side,
the Council of the Indies issued a series of resolutions.
First, it repeated its earlier call for both a new
repartimiento and the abolition of "pocket Indians." Then,
after Archbishop-Viceroy Linan had begun to implement those
those orders, the Council asked him to reconsider his
earlier position in support of the mita, and the Conde de
Lemos' proposal for the abolition of the system. It is
also possible that the Council then undertook to complete
a census through ecclesiastical channels, as Juan de
Ibarra had suggested. The vacillation at the Council's
level clearly prohibited Lihan from pushing forward with
a new census and repartimiento
, when viceregal resistance
to that process had been eliminated for the first time
since the 1640s.
Almost lost in the question of the abolition of the
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mita is the role of the caciques
, both in the formation
of government policy and in the de facto system. Long
the key element in the mita-caught between the system as
it had been designed and as it actually worked—the
caciques now fought back against their deteriorating
condition with petitions to the government and with court
challenges. Gabriel Fernandez Guarache
• s arguments of the
mid-1660s played an important part in the development of
Lemos' reform directives, and in his subsequent call for
the abolition of the mita. The capitanes enteradores, as
a group, defeated the CapitSn mayor de la mita, Joseph
Fernandez Valencia.
Lest we come to pity them too much, because their
access to the legal machinery was greater than that of
common Indians, we must bear in mind that the caciques '
treatment of the Indians was a mirror reflection of their
treatment by the azogueros and the government officials at
Potosi. Rather than absorbing all of the increased
pressure on them, the caciques diffused that pressure
downward onto the Indians. They developed, for example,
a number of methods for collecting money from yanaconas
,
forasteros
, widows and others, through land rentals and
forced donations. Those Indians, who were legally exempted
from mita service, nevertheless contributed to the service
in silver deliveries from the pueblos where they lived.
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Notes for Chapter VI
1. For the Audiencia de Lima's "Relaci6n," and
chapter 38 in particular, see note 6, Chapter V. Forthe Conde de Lemos' response to the Audiencia 'sRelaci6n," see note 2, below.
2. El Conde de Lemos da cuenta a S.M. del estado enque hall6 el reino del Peru cuando entr6 a gobernarle yel remedio que ha comenzado a poner en las materias mSsprmcipales de su gobierno," 4. III. 1668, Los virreyes (edby Hanke and Rodriguez), Pert! IV (no. 283), 271-273 (from*the manuscripts in the Archive de la Casa de Alba, Madrid,Caja 263-9; and AGI
, Lima 67); the quote is on page 272.
Lemos' response to chapter 38 of the Audiencia 's "Relaci6n"Uee note 6, Chapter V) is AGI, Charcas 267, no. 54B,
"Copia del Cap.o 38 de las adbertencias que hico el Virrey
Conde de Lemos a la R.on del estado de las Prov.as del
Peru que le entrego la Au.a de lima del Tpo. que las avia
governado por falta de Virrey=," sin fecha, 2 fs. The
complete response is also included in Los virreyes
,
Peru
,
IV, 251-271; it is entitled "Advertencias que hace el
Conde de Lemos a la relacion del estado del reino que le
entreg6 la real Audiencia de Lima " (from AGI, Lima
466), and dated "c. 1668."
"3. In addition to AGI, Charcas 267, no. 54B (see note
2), see Zavala, Servicio personal
,
II, 148-149, for a
discussion of Ibarra's "Informe." For more on the problems
surrounding a census, AGI, Charcas 268, no. 8, the Conde
de Lemos to the crown, Lima, 13.1.1670, 3 fs.; "Refiere
las dificultades que se ofrecieron en tpo del conde de
Alva de Aliste cerca de la numeracion y repartimiento gen.-'-
de los yndios de mita de Potosi y la que de nuevo se
ofrece Ynsistiendo en lo mismo que Represento a VMg.'^ en
el numerS 38 de las advertencias que hico a la Relacion del
estado del Reino q.e le entrego la R^ Audiencia." See note
2 for Lemos' "Advertencias."
4. AGI, Charcas 267, no. 56, the Conde de Lemos to
the crown, Lima, 26.1.1669, 1 f.; "Da quenta de la forma
y modo, con que se puede ajustar la mita de Potosi,
remitiendose al Num.o 38 de las advertencias de la
Relaz,on del estado del Reino." See note 2 for Lemos'
"Advertencias."
5. AGI, Charcas 267, nos. 56C and 56D (56D is the
envelope)
,
Corregidor Luis Antonio de Oviedo to the crown.
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aauel^Cer;n-i'^'' ' "^^P^^^^nta que el descaecimto ^e
ricos ni In. OS ni de qe los Acogueros tengan mas de uningenio porqe de otro modo cesa?ian en la^lavo? de toSosni tampoco es la causa los In.os ^ue llam;,n • '
Zt/'^. P-^-" el'dinlro qie ?mportfnquedandose con el los enteradores. Y las JusticLs v Curas
s?rven%r^rS??/""" Travajando iL'q!"
descanc^n n ?
sin ningun Intermedio de tpo para suanso p.r g^e no abia reducido la mayor p. te de los aue
rep^???m tS ^'!'" " ^^^^'^^ ^ ^^^^^^^ que se hLfconvendra qe dejando reducidos los In.osYanaconas qe no mitan y son los de Potosi mas de 17 S)
IZ
^^""^
^f"^^^ apliguen a la Mita y-despuesse haga dho repartim^to entre todas las treynta Prov.ls
^^"^ puntos de tanta conss.on a
tf^v^tL ^iputados de los Acogueros a comunicarlos conel Virrey y le a escrito s.e ello para qe provea lo conv.tede quien lo espera por su buen zelo." AGI, Charcas 267,
^Uo''^ tJ^^ ^^""^^ orders which accompanied theB.X.1668 letter. Their cover reads: "Por estos autos
consta de los Indies de cedulaz y mingas que havia en losIngenios del Zerro, Los que alquilaban o, mingaban los
azogueros, y Como los metales salen y se sacan de muy baxaley que es todo lo que toca el Correxidor en su carta de
arriba.
"
6. For information on the altercations at Puno, AGI,Charcas 26 7, no. 55, President VSzquez de Velasco to the
crown, 29. XII. 1668, 2 f s
. ; AGI, Charcas 268, no. 4, theConde de Lemos to the crown, Lima, 6. XII. 166 9, 5 fs.,
"Da quenta de lo que, a, proveydo y resuelto en orden al
alivio de los Indies, y pondera la tirania y opresion conque usan dellos los Mineros de Potosi intentando por este
medio acavarlos de alquiler en conveniencia suya, y no dela R haz,da y i^s oras que, S, senalado para tratar de
su conservacion, y desagravio por ser materia en que se
deve poner la mayor atencion. In his letter, VSzquez de
Velasco suggests that Lemos come to Potosi and personally
conduct a visita ; that suggestion was not followed. For
more from the Viceroy, AGI, Charcas 268, no. 16, the
Conde de Lemos to the crown, Lima, 4. VII. 16 70, 3 fs.;
"Representa las extorssiones de los Yndios en las mitas
forcadas de minas especialm.te en la de Potossi y quan
aresgada esta La conciencia r1 si no se executa el nuebo
medio que propone y que lo a Comunicado con los prelados
y personas mas doctas de la Ciudad que son del mismo
sentir como consta de los recuados que acompanan esta."
7, Oviedo's opposition is noted in Zavala, Servicio
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^t\^r.i''^^\'^''^ ^ escripto Luis Ant.o de ob^ko cirrLor
^sL":^i:"-'T^"'^'---^ -----
.
L?m; ?2 I 1670 S""?- ^'•n''^
''^^^^ t° ^he crown,
^ t^n.:^' t ' ^ quenta de la resoluzion que,a tornado sobre que a los Indies que enteran la mita de
Corrla'cH ''T^ Capitanes Gene?ales no les obUgue elrreg or a, enterar por muertos y ausentes, y remitecopia del auto que sobre esto mando publicar, y de lacarta q.e escrivio al correg. or de Potosi"; this letterIS discussed by Ronald Escobedo Mansilla, El tributeindigena en el Peru ( siglos XVI-XVII) (PamiToHTlEdiciones Universidad de Navarra"rT979)
, 88-89 (from AGI,
l:^'^^J^--^PP^^^^tlY a copy). AGI, Charcas 268, no. 10,the Conde de Lemos to the crown, Lima, 3. II. 1670, 2 fs.,is a follow-up letter explaining that he had also orderedthat caciques were not to be punished under any circumstan-
ces, unless the azoqueros could prove that they had beenhurt by the caciques ' actions. See, also, Zavala,Servi^ personal, II, 149; Valera (AGI, Charcas 268, nos.
^t\< ^o?":.^^ ""^^^ Chapter II), 22; and EzquerraAbadia, 489-490, note 9bis. In AGI, Charcas 268, no. 4(see note 6)
,
Lemos says that he reached his decision in
conference with Ibarra; he repeats that fact in AGI,Charcas 268, no. 5 (see above)
.
9. AGI, Charcas 26 8, no. 6A, the Conde de Lemos to
Corregidor Luis Antonio de Oviedo, Lima, 3. XII. 1669, 2
fs.; and AGI, Charcas 268, no. 7A, the Conde de Lemos to
Corregidor Luis Antonio de Oviedo, 3. XII. 1669, If.,
respectively (both are copies). See, also, AGI, Charcas
26 8, no. 6, the Conde de Lemos to the crown, Lima, 12.1.
1670, 1 f., "Que combendra se sirva Vmg.^ de despachar
cedula para que los mineros de Potosi no puedan obligar a
los yndios a que trabajen continuamente de dia y de noche
y remite copia de la carta que en esta Racon escrivio el
correg. or de aquella Villa"; and AGI, Charcas 268, no. 7,
the Conde de Lemos to the crown, Lima, 12.1.1670, 1 f.,
"Que combendra despache Vmg.d cedula para que los corre
gidores de Potosi y Governadores de Guancavelica no
~
embien Jueces para enterar las mitas de anos atrasados
sino para el entero de cada mita pues tiene facultad para
ellos." Ezquerra Abadia, 489-490, note 9bis, says that
Lemos first ordered that Indians were not to work day and
night on 26 .VIII . 1668 . According to AGI, Charcas 268, no.
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10. AGI, Charcas 268, no. 6A (see note 9).
11. Ibid.; and AGI
, Charcas 268, no. 4 (see note 6).
of ll'xTT^h^?'^''''^^/tt' ^ (^^^ 6)- An order
J ; ^
banned the payment of tribute for dead orabsent Indians; AGI, Charcas 268, no. 9A, copy of an o?der
persona?°^?T ^?4^""°^' 20
XII. 1669, 1 f/ Zagala^ ServiciSEgi l, li, 148, says that the 20. XII. 1669 order decreedthat the entero de la mita was to be determined according
r° uf^
revisita, but my notes refer to taxes aloneCrespo, "La 'Mita,'" 181, notes all of this in passing!'
n-r^o"!"^:
/^"^ comments on the census, and that Oviedo had
Ar?
a government census in a letter of 4 . X. 1669,AGI, Charcas 268, no. 8 (see note 3). AGI
, Charcas 268
^^S^'i ' t' ^ ^^^^ "^^^^^ 8 and 9) all requested that
g^^^^f^ be sent to confirm his orders of November andDecember, 1669.
14 "Instrucciones secretas del Conde de Penaranda,Presidente del Consejo de Indias, al Conde de Lemos,"
sin fecha (c. 1667)
, Los virreyes (ed. by Hanke andRodriguez) PerQ IV (no. 283), 246 (from the manuscriptm the Archive de la Casa de Alba, Madrid, Lemos C. 263-1).
15. The Conde de Lemos refers to the Queen'sinstructions in his 4. VII. 1670 discourse on abolition ofthe mita (see note 76, Chapter II); and in AGI, Charcas
268, no. 11, the Conde de Lemos to the crown, Lima, 7. II.
1670, 2 fs., "Da quenta de vn memorial que presento el
Procurador del Gremio de Azogueros de Potosi diciendo seperdia aquella Villa si se ponia en execucion lo ordenado
en alivio de los Yn.os de mita, Y supp.ca a VMg.d se
sirva de embiar la resolucion de lo que en este punto
hubiere de executar, y que en el ynterian hara se cumpla
lo resuelto en los puntos que expresa."
16. AGI, Charcas 268, no. 21A (see note 7) includes a
letter from Oviedo to Lemos of 6.1.1670 which warns the
Viceroy that his orders will destroy Potosi; for Oviedo 's
correspondence with the crown, AGI, Charcas 267, nos. 58
and 58A (58A is the envelope) , Luis Antonio de Oviedo y
Herrera to the crown, Potosi, 12. III. 1670, 3 fs. Because
the Corregidor was aware that his opposition to Lemos
might get him into trouble with the Council of the Indies
he asked a friend—a secretary of the Council— to make
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certain that his arguments received their due- apt
^^S^^^f
267, no. 59, Corregidor Oviedo y Herr;raGabrxel de Quires, Potosi, 12 . Ill
. 1670 ,^ I TdeLrminedwhat position Quiros held by referring to Ernst SchSfeJn Conseco Real y Supremo de las indiL: Su histor^aorqanizaci6n y labor adminlitFiti^^j-h^i-. li terminaci6n
itMi§?fil^ .^^^tria (2 vols.; SevilllT- llcuela deEstudios Hispanoamericanos, 1935-1947) I 37n n,Ho^„included, with his letter Quiros, aA inallof ?he
?h??^L f«7^^ ^° "^"^^t" his Lse (A§I,C arcas 26 , no. 59A, If.). '
rnnHl*^/?^' Charcas 268, no. lOA, "Copia de Carta qe e1Co de de lemos Virrey del Peru escrivio a D Luis Anto deobiedo Corregr de Potossi," 33. II. 1670, 3 fs.
Pr-^lh.r.t%k ^^^^^^^ 268, no. lOB, the Conde de Lemos toesident VSzquez de Velasco, 3. II. 1670, 2 fs. (a copy)Both this order and AGI
, Charcas 268, no. lOA (see note
17)
,
were products of deliberations which included Ibarra
as a participant.
19. AGI, Charcas 268, no. 11 (see note 15).
20. AGI, Charcas 26 8, no. 14, the Conde de Lemos to the
crown, Lima, 7. IV. 1670, 4 fs.; "Refiere el Vnico medio qe
se ofrece para conseguir el apuntamto general de la mita dePotossi con ocassn de la muerte de D Berndo de Ycaguirre
obpo de Cuzco." President VSzquez de Velasco was to bekicked upstairs to the Council of the Indies; Lemos did not
worry about what would happen to the Corregidor.
21. Corregidor Oviedo's report that he had implemented
the orders was dated 10. III. 16 70 and included in AGI,
Charcas 268, no. 21A (see note 7). Zavala, Servicio
personal
, II, 149, says the orders were promulgated on
9. III. 1670. Supporting letters are: AGI, Charcas 268,
no. 13, the Gremio de azogueros to the crown, Potosi,
19. III. 1670, 3 fs.; and AGI, Charcas 268, no. 12, the
Villa de Potosi to the crown, Potosi, 15. III. 1670, 1 f.
22. AGI, Charcas 268, no. 21A (see note 7). The
Corregidor 's proposal came in a letter of 6. VI. 1670, and
the Viceroy's consent—reluctant consent—came on 8. VII.
1670. Lemos may well have surrendered the battle because
he had already proposed, in his 4. VII. 1670 discourse (AGI,
Charcas 268, no. 15—see note 76, Chapter II), that the
mita be abolished.
23. AGI, Charcas 268, no. 15 (see note 76, Chapter II)
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24. See the sources cited in note 23.
Charc^s Ten^'^'ln^ 9^
President Vazquez de Velasco in AGI,
crown, 9. VIII. 16 70, 2 fs.; "Pondera las qrandes Veiazesque padecen los Inos de la mita de Potoli y lo que conv ese quite sm envargo de haverse discurrido en el m.S'^Se*
ion,r?r Cellos (pues no tiene nunca efe^to?c mo lo propone el Virrey c&e de lemos y lo escrivio a suantecesor el c.de de santistevan en la carta de qe'remi?e
nn^o^;^ '^nt ^t""^^ ^f^^ °^ ' ^harcas 268, no. 15 (seeote 76, Chapter II) is an "Indice de los Recaudos q.e laaconpanan el Informe y relacion q.e hace el Exmo sr condede Lemos Virrey del Peru a su Mag.d en el r1 Conss.o delas Indias
; and the items listed are included as AGI,Charcas 26 8, nos . 15A to 15J:
ISA. "Papel del s^ Conde de santistevan escrito
and Visittor d. Alvaro de Ybarra y Su
respuesta sobre si se devia mandar q.e los15B. Indies de la mita de Potosi se enterasen en
platta y no en persona por escusar la
diminucion de las Prov.s y la vejacion y
molestia q® padecen en sus personas," 1 and
4 fs., respectively (see note 56, Chapter V).
15C. "Parecer de la Junta de desagravios en que
concurrio el s^ ArzobpO d. po de Villagomez
en conform. a de cedula de su Magd," i f.
15D. "Parecer del sehor obpo. electo de la concept,"
2 f s
.
15E. "Parecer de la religion de Domingo," 2
fs. (see note 56, Chapter V).
15F. "Parecer de la religion de sn fran<^°," 2 fs.
15G. "Parecer de la religion de sn Agustin," 2 fs.
.
15H. "Parecer de la religion de la mrd," 2 fs. •
151. "Parecer de la Religion de la comp^," 2 fs.
15J. "Parecer del cavildo eclesiastico de Lima,"
2 fs.
Pareceres jurldicos (ed. by Vargas Ugarte)
,
154, is a
transcription of the Jesuit contribution (no. 151) . For
more on the 3. VII. 1670 junta, Zavala, Servicio personal
,
II, 149-150. Angulo (AGI, Charcas 268, no. 36— see note
58, Chapter II), 7-8, discusses these supporting papers. .
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27. AGl, Charcas 268, no. 15D (see note 26)
28. AGI, Charcas 268, no. 18, Juan de Padilla to thecrown, Lima, 7.VII.1670, 1 f.; "Afiade algunas conss?es^
el vL?ev a7n r""^ conformarse con la proposs.n que haze
^Ll^ ?• ^'''^^ Mita de Potossi quandoconcurrio en la Junta qe cerca desto tuvo el Virrey"
•
Padilla was Alcalde del Crimen. Kubler, 347-350, saysthe yuncjas were habitable for the Indians because of theintroduction of European crops and livestock. Crespo,Reclutamiento," 4 74, discusses desertion of the sixteenobligated provinces by Indians fleeing from the mita andother obligations.
29. AGI, Charcas 268, no. 17, President VSzquez deVelasco to the crown, 7. VII. 1670, 2 fs.; "En que da q.tade lo obrado En el despacho de armda de este ano de 670.Y que se haga la numeracion de yndios para la mita De
—
*
Potosi." Actually, the 7. VII. 1670 letter proposes either
abolition or the completion of a new repartimiento based
on a census. In AGI, Charcas 268, no. 20 (see note 25),
written two days later, VSzquez de Velasco drops the
alternative and supports abolition fully. Ezquerra
Abadia, 489-490, note 9bis, says VSzquez de Velasco went
to Potosi on the orders of Lemos, and supported abolition
on the basis of what he witnesses there. In his 7. VII.
1670 letter, the President says that the azogueros were so
upset with the reform directives of the Conde de Lemos
that they threatened to stop payment for mercury and halt
production. His personal intervention, he claimed, had
kept the silver center from collapsing; he did not explain
how he had accomplished that feat.
30. AGI, Charcas 268, no. 21, the Conde de Lemos to the
crown, Los Reyes, 14 .VIII . 1670 , 2 fs.; "Remite a V Mg.<^
relaci6n de las cartas que a escripto el Correg.^ de Potosi
tocantes a la Mita y de las ordenes que se le an dado en
alivio de los Indies con el parecer y motives que an
ocasionado a hacerle comparecer en esta Ciudad." The
"relaciSn," as noted in note 7, is AGI, Charcas 268, no.
21A. Ibarra's suggestion that Lemos replace Oviedo is AGI,
Charcas 268, no. 21B, 1 f.; in the margin is a note that
reads: "Hagase como parece al s^ Visitador D Alvaro de
Ybarra para cuio efecto se despachen los ordenes necesa
rios. Lima 15 de Agosto de 16 70 " ; it carries the rubric
of the Conde de Lemos.
31. AGI, Charcas 268, no. 23, the Council of the
Indies to the Conde de Lemos, Madrid, 7. XI. 16 70, 2 fs.;
"Respuesta al Virrey del Peru lo tocante al repartimto
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2lB'and%Rr
""^^^ Potossi." AGI
,
Charcas 268, nos
. 25A
pertenecientes a la mita de el Potosi, para que saaue enresumen vna Relacion de todas las razones y parece?es qSse han dado para que se cese la mita de el Potosi
^
resoluciones qe ha avido sre ello, para que con dAarelacion se pase a hacer la Consta acordada en 12 de este
and 33^3 B ""^h'^^" ' ^^^^^^^ 268,"Hos! 33A3B (33 is the envelope), 3 fs., "Decreto de laConss.ta que se a de hazer tocante a la mita de PotossiEl mismo dia se puso otro pa qe p Andres de Ang.lo hagar.on de todos los pap.s pa formar esta consta que esta dentro. The relaci6n by Andrgs de Angulo is AGI, Charcas
zbH, no. 36 (see note 58, Chapter II).
32. AGI, Charcas 268, no. 23 (see note 31); and AGI,Charcas 268, nos. 25A, 25B and 25C (see note 31).
33. AGI, Charcas 268, no. 24, the Conde de Lemos tothe crown, Lima, 18. IX. 1671, 2 fs., "Responde a la cedulade V Mg.d de 7 de Novyre de 670 sobre lo tocante al
repartimto General de la mita de Potossi, haviendo lo
comunicado con el Acuerdo de la Aud.a" agi, Charcas 268,
no. 25, is a 1 f. list of papers sent with the 18. IX. 1671letter. AGI, Charcas 268, no. 26, is a draft of the
letter that the Council of the Indies sent to Queen
Mariana relating the contents of the 7. XI. 1670 cedula and
Lemos' response of 18 . IX . 1671~it is incompleted AGI,
Charcas 268, no. 35, is another draft of the Council's
letter; and the final draft is AGI, Charcas 268, no. 37,
the Council of the Indies to the Queen, Madrid, 8. VI. 1673,
21 fs., "Da q.ta a V Mg,d de lo qe ha escrito El Virrey
del Peru y pareceres qe a remitido de difertes minos y
comunidades de aquel ReyO, proponiendo se quiten las mitas
forcadas de Inos y en partr la de Potosi, reduziendolas a
q se travagen las minas con Voluntos para evitar los
agravios q^ se les hazen
El conss° es de parezer qe para poder tomar resson en mat^
tan grave, se sirva V Mgd de mandar formar Vna junta de
los Mnos del, y de los Theologos qe el Presste nombrare y
con lo qe se discurriere en Ella sobre este negO en ambas
facultades se conss^e a V Mg.d lo qe se offreziere."
Valera (AGI, Charcas 268, nos. 69A & 69B—see note 58,
Chapter II), 24, is mistaken in saying that Lemos died on
6. XII. 1671.
371
34. AGI, Charcas 268, nos 3^ '^^a /
31); and AGI, Charcas 268, n:;/26,'3t; and ' 37^ (i^nS?e^
35. AGI, Charcas 268, nos. 26, 35, and 37 (see note 33).
Tn^?^*.
^^^^^^s 268, no. 41, is the Council of the
JSndrl r"^"^"?? °' 9.x. 1673, 1 f.; "Escribase al sr vLreyConde de Castellar enviandole reion hecha por el Reior nAndres de Angulo de lo qe en diferentes tiempos se ha
'
escrito sre quitar la mita forzada de el Potosi, diciendoleque tmiendolo presente infe lo qe en esta mata se ?eoffreciere qe puede ser de el mayOr servO de S. Mgd y biende aquellos naturales Y por ahora se suspenda a la Constaqe estaba acordada cerca desto" (rubricado)
. AGI, Charcas
t lu^'^'f.' ^^.f?^ two drafts (no. 43 is the final)ot the Council's orders for Castellar, Madrid, 9. X. 1673If. each. The Council's end-of
-century summary (AGI,
'
Charcas 273, no. 21—see note 91, Chapter II) said the
order was dated 9. XII. 1673. It was once thought that theConde de Lemos had obtained a temporary suspension of thePotosi mita:
"Viceroy Luis de Velasco complained in 1597
that the greatest difficulty in the mines was the
lack of Indian laborers on account of the constant
opposition of ecclesiastics and lawyers. At one
time in the second half of the seventeenth century
Viceroy Conde de Lemos, a great friend of the Indians
who carried on the Las Casas tradition, actually was
able to obtain a temporary prohibition of the mita .
"
(Lewis Hanke, The Imperial City of Potosi, 25-26) ',Tut
the mita was not suspended.
37. See note 29, Chapter II, for the first citation of
Campo y de la Rynaga ' s Memorial. It was addressed to Dr.
Diego Hernandez de Cardona y C6rdova, Marques de SantillSn
(Schafer, I, 36 3, says the Marques de SantillSn was a
member of the Council of the Indies between 17. XI. 1671 and
1695)
,
and therefore sent directly to the Council of the
Indies for consideration. Zavala, Servicio personal
,
II,
150, notes the existence of Campo 's work, but did not use
it.
38. Campo y de la Rynaga, 4-5.
39. Ibid
. ,
9-52.
40. Ibid
. , 53-92. Actually, each Article is paginated
individually; the running pagination used in these notes
is that in pencil on the copy in Sucre.
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41. Ibid
.
, 93-160.
42. Ibid
., 161-221.
rr-J?;
Charcas 268, no. 19, the Deputies of theG emio de azogueros to the crown, PotosI, 8. VII?. 1670,
44 Oviedo's breakdown of the Potosi work force
IT'^-tl jSnL^^de^^^^^f '''' -s. 56C and 560^ s^I note
267 nS 5? thfrnT^I mis-representation is AGI,. Charcas^b/, o. 7, he Conde de Lemos to the crown, 18. III. 1669If.; a testimonio was included (AGI, Charcas 257, no. 57A,
to tha? in 1?^^^.''°'"?^''^^ ^^^^ °f Indians in 1669t m 1668. Zavala, Servicio personal. li, 149follows Guillermo Lohmann Villena's lead and states that
p?%n;^;S^5 T 3,424 (Guillermo Lohmann Villena,El Conde de Lemos
, virrey del PerQ (Madrid, 1946))Ezquerra Abadia, 489-490, H^e^bls, discusses the'role ofproduction in a government official's reputation.
45. AGI, Charcas 268, no. 28, Corregidor Diego deUlloa Pereyra to the crown, Potosi, 4. II. 1672, 2 fs. AGI,Charcas 268, no. 28A is his testimonio showing an increasem qumtos of 12,374 pesos from 1670 to 1671, 1 f. AGI,Charcas 26 8, no. 29, is a cover sheet for both pieces.
AGI, Charcas 268, nos. 31 and 32 (32 is the envelope),
Corregidor Diego de Ulloa Pereyra to the crown, Potosi,
20. V. 1673, 4 fs. repeated his earlier claims two yearslater. An interesting sideline to Ulloa 's activities in
Potosi is the effort of Escrivano Juan de Torres Domlnguez
to get paid for the extra duties he was assigned under the
new magistrate: BNB, CPLA 30, fs. 69V-72v, "Testimonio
de las diligencias seguidas ante el virrey de Lima y este
cabildo de Potosi por Juan de Torres Domlnguez, escribano
de gl, para que se le reconozcan, de penas de camara ygastos de justicia, 400 pesos por su asistencia de todos
los lunes en la manana al sitio de Guayna al entero de los
indios de mita," Potosi, 1677 (MC 1012; MOM 663); Torres'
efforts were apparently insufficient, for he was still
looking for recompense in 1686, ANB, M 146, "Diligencias
hechas ante la audiencia de Charcas por Juan de Torres
Domlnguez, escribano del cabildo de Potosi, para que
conforme a provisi6n vicerreal se le asigne un salario por
su asistencia de los lunes en el sitio de Huayna al entero
de la mita del Cerro," 1686, 28 fs. (the fifth through the
sixteenth repeat the information in BNB, CPLA 30, fs. 69v-
72v) (MC 1071a; MOM 679).
46. AGI, Charcas 26 8, no. 30, the Conde de Lemos to
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the crown
, Lima , 26 TV if^io i ^
del aumto'que hkn tellko II'PotlkL lTlt certificacion
aiio de 1671 mediante el c^pl?™?^' dalo'a ?o,'n fdel Govierno D Diecrn H*:^ mi^I • ° ^ ordenes
de aauella viii*. "^mu ^ "^uien nombro por Correg.or
no. sSf ? f ll i.^^! certification is AGI, Charcas 268,
2Bk (see iot;'45f. ^^^^^^^^1
to AGI
,
Charcas 268, no.
47. AGI, Charcas 268, no. 45A, a c^dula of 10 VI 167-^sent to Corregidor Luis Antonio dL Oviid^ Herrerl by the
dHe^or "dLdo!'' Of a favorable letter Lortll^oLT"ae Lem s
,
andole noticia
... del aumento que tuvieron
D^eaHfmi""' ^^^^1 offizTo
?en^a en ll'Tuyl ^Tl'.^''^'''^
^"^'^ ^^^^^
48. AGI, Charcas 268, no. 38, the Audiencia de Lima to
tuhn H°r'
17.VI.1673, 1 f.; "Remite la carta quebo del correg.or ^e Potossi D. Luis Antonio de Obiedo enque dio quenta del estado de aquellas minas, con testim.ode la Vissita g.l q.e hico del cerro e ingenios." Thecopy of the letter is AGI, Charcas 268, no. 38A, "Copiade Carta de D luis Ant.o de obiedo y Herrera Correg.or ^ePotosi," 26.V.1673, 3 fs.; the statistical results of hisvisita are AGI, Charcas 268, no. 38B, 22. IV. 1673, 2 fs.Oviedo s return to office is noted, as well, in theAudiencia de Lima's "Relaci6n de la audiencia de Lima a su
sucesor el Conde de Castellar," 1. VIII. 1674, Los virreyes(ed. by Hanke and Rodriguez)
, Peru V (no. 284y7~19-20 —(from Biblioteca Nacional, Madrid, Ms. 3122, fs. 62-86v)
.
See note 16 for Oviedo 's personal contacts in the Council
of the Indies, which probably helped him to regain hisposition as Corregidor de Potosi.
49. See note 33 for the Council's letter to the Queen,
AGI, Charcas 268, no. 35.
50. AGI, Charcas 268, nos . 38, 38A, and 38B (see note
48); and AGI, Charcas 268, no. 40, Corregidor Luis Antonio
de Oviedo y Herrera to the crown, Potosi, 6. IX. 16 73, 2
fs.; AGI, Charcas 268, no. 44, Corregidor Oviedo y Herrera
to the crown, Potosi, 22. XI. 1673, 2 fs., "Remite testimO
por donde consta el benefi.o que hallo en la visita Gen.l
que hico de Ingenios y labores, Y dice a sido tanto el
aumento en 7 meses al estado en que hallo el mineral que
havia vuelto a ygualar al que tenia quando el Conde de
lemos le despojo de aquel offiO." The testimonio mentioned
in AGI, Charcas 268, no. 44, is no. 44A (2 fs.).
51. AGI, Charcas 268, nos. 31 and 32 (see note 45). A
374
lengthier discussion of Ulio;?'.?
is AGI, Charcas 26 8? no. 32A a serilfif ^5 Corregidortenure in office anH 2°:^. ' . ^^^^^^ of orders from his
Condesa de Lemos to the crown, Lima 2 V 167^* i ?
luin^or-f16'?r^^^\^t^^^^^^^^^'^ ^-'^'^^^ thai'*
^'^^
irrespectively:" '""^ '"^^ - ^^^1'
CorregidorSvildo-: "^^'^ '^^^^^ According to
b' apt'
267, nos. 56C & 56D (see note 5).. AGI, Charcas 268, no. 58B, 2 fs
.
; atestimonio of Oviedo's activities as Corr4gidor thathe sent to the crown with AGI, charcas 268? no! 58Corregidor Obiedo to the crown, 25. III. 1678 2 fs
^nl' S!?^^^as 267, nos. 58 & 58A (see note 16).d. AGI, Charcas 268, no. 2lA (see note 7)
e. AGI, Charcas 268, no. 38A (see note 48).f. AGI, Charcas 268, no. 44 (see note 50).
_
53. For evidence that mingas were hired with servicein silver, AGI, Charcas 268, no. 50, Francisco AntonioManzolo to the Conde de Medellln, Madrid, 22. IV. 1676 2fs. Manzolo says that Oviedo had told him, while he'was
visiting PotosI, that the azogueros used the money they
received in the mita to hire substitutes, at least partOf the time. He said that the number of Indians workingin the mines and mills was larger than the number in the
repartimiento, and that some azogueros hired extra help ifthe ore they refined was of sufficient quality. The Condede Medellin was President of the Council of the Indiesfrom 1671 to 1679 (SchSfer, I, 352).
54. Audiencia de Lima, "Relaci6n" (1674) (see note
48), 19-20. Zavala, Servicio personal
,
II, 151, discusses
this section of the Audiencia 's account as well.
55. The crown's response to Castellar's report includes
his observations: AGI, Charcas 268, no. 51, "Copia dedespacho de 16 de Novre de 1676 al Virrey del Peru en
respta de lo que escrivio s.^ el estado en que se hallava
el cerro de Potosi y repartimto cen^ de los In.°s de mita
del," 1 f. See, also, the Council's end-of
-the-century
summary (AGI, Charcas 273, no. 21~see note 91, Chapter
II) . ' f
56. AGI, Charcas 268, no. 47, Corregidor Oviedo y
Herrera to the crown, Potosi, 1. XI. 1674, 2 fs. A financial
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lllrlTs^'letnt^tli:
^fT.'^ ""'^ ^"^^ letter ,AG1,
quenta de el estado en ae se h^Ut ' ' ^"
p^ooTJ f? ' s^s"^ to corroborate thePresident's statement about the azogueros
.
Platf 'tn^f^I
Charcas 268, no. 53, Melchor Arcobispo de Laa o the crown, 28. II. 1667, 3 fs. Part of LinSn'Sletter IS reproduced as AGI
, Charcas 26 8? no? 54 "Sooiade Capitulo de carta que el D.or d. Melcho? de Linan
MeleUifef28"d f^o^^— ^ escriv^fa^ T.r^CoTae de
de ?os ?nd?nl^ ^ Alferazgosa l I ies, y mita de Potosi," 3 fs.
n ^-i "^""^^ ^ order, AGI, Charcas 268, no. 55,President GonzSlez de Poveda to the crown, 30. i. 1678, 1 f
mtifL P ''^^^'^ "^^^<^^ aumentar'La
'
t
^^^ °tossi a mas pueblos." A copy of his reply to
de^Pov^df ^^^^"^^^ P^esiden? GonzSlezoveda to the crown. La Plata, 28. IV. 1678, 17 fs.,
1 ""m^.^*!
"^"^^ P""^^^ prebenir para La ampliazion
^rr
Potosi." For the November 16 directive, seeAGI, Charcas 268, no. 51 (see note 56). For Castellar'streatment of both, AGI, Charcas 26 8, no. 57, the Conde deCastellar to the crown, Lima, 22. II. 1678, 3 fs., "Responde
a tres Z-Las gobre la mita de Potosi dize lo que a obrado yestado de la materia y que en otra ocasion dara quenta delo que se ejecutare con conferencia del r1 Acuerdo " Thethird order was that of 12. IX. 1676—1 do not know what it
concerned—and all three directives came to him via Buenos
Aires. Valera (AGI, Charcas 268, nos . 69A & 69B~see note
58, Chapter II), 24-25, discusses the two cgdulas of 8. VII
and 16. XI. 16 76; as does Holmes, 53 and 55; and the Council
of the Indies' end-of-the-century summary (AGI, Charcas
273, no. 21—see note 91, Chapter II). Castillo (AGI,
Charcas 270, no. 33C— see note 30, Chapter II), 23-24v,
provides a transcription of the July 8 order.
60. AGI, Charcas 268, no. 56, the Conde de Castellar
to the crown, Lima, 1. II. 1678, 2 f s . The report cited was
that of Alcalde mayor ThomSs Martin de Ubidla, in a letter
to the crown of 1. XI. 1674; AGI, Charcas 268, no. 46, 2 fs.
61. AGI, Charcas 268, no. 57 (see note 59)
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tha^he ,He note.
to lie c^oln.'c^^^^^^^^^^^ -^^n
Po?oIL'"'
'^^^ ^^'^^
^ ^ lo'^icant^'a II TtTll
H.J^K I^^^""^ Charcas 268, nos. 69A & 69B) isdescribed m note 58, Chapter II. Corregidor Enrlquez-response is AGI, Charcas 268, no. 68A, "?nforme delCorregidor de Potosi, hecho al Virrey del Peru? sobre elrepartimiento de los Yndios a las labores de ninas" ^PedroLuis Enrlquez to the Viceroy, 2. VI. 1678), 12 fs? ForOviedo y Herrera's remarks, AGI, Charcas 268, no. 58 LuisAntonio de Oviedo to the crown, 25.III.1678, 2 He
?0A
receipt of the c^dulas in AGI, Charcas 268,no. 58A, Luis Antonio de Oviedo y Herrera to FranciscoFernSndez de Madrigal, Potosi, 25. III. 1678, If adissenting opinion was that of Contador Sebastian deCollado, AGI, Charcas 268, no. 59, 1.V.1678, 1 f.; heargued that crown revenue would suffer if the mita was
extended to more provinces, and suggested that^^aconas
and forasteros in the sixteen provinces—plus 20,000
Indians living in Potosl—be included instead, with
one-seventh of the total to serve in the mita each year.Collado s arguments are those which the CoHdi de Castellar
relayed to the crown on 22.11.1678 (see note 59) so I
would assume that the Viceroy was heavily influenced bythe Contador 's counsel.
65. AGI, Charcas 266, no. 14A, the crown to Archbishop-
Viceroy Linan y Cisneros, 13. IX. 1678, 2 fs., "Al Virreydel Peru remitiendole copia de los ynformes y pareceresque ultimam.te se an dado cerca de Potosi para que pida
los ynformes q.e se le ordena y con vista de todos informe
de suerte que se pueda tomar resolucion en esta materia."
The papers which were to be sent to LiMn are discussed by
the Council of the Indies' Fiscal in AGI, Charcas 26 8, no.
66, 1 f.
66. AGI, Charcas 270, no. 3, Archbishop-Viceroy Linan
to the crown, 7. VIII. 1681, 2 fs., "El Arzobispo Virrey del
Peru Responde a la R.l Cedula de 13 de sep.e de 678 sobre
los informes que se piden para resolver el punto de la
mita de Potosi y dice el estado en que tenia la materia en
virtud del que se le mando por la de 8 de jullio de 676 de
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q. dio quenta en carta de 21 de Abril de 6fin " t-~<says that he articulated thi~st;fn; it ^^""^"^letter of 21 iv 1680 ^n/i ?^ f^^^""^ °^ the mita in his
Valera paper The ^onn^fi f.;^ "^^^ accom^ed by the
the exteS!oA ofmi^a obUaation%^"^'^' hesitated on
opinions of those named in the 11 ty ^liZ 2
Rodrlgiez ;''pe;aT(n3^2W^ itt^^/ Hanke and
Nacional, Madm Ms 30fi?? f^"^^? (from Biblioteca
personal tt iiA iik ^^S^^ ' See, also, Zavala, Servicio
,
II, 174-175. See note 69, below, for m^^.
PovlL i-o^Jh ^^^^^^^ no. 67, President Gonzalez deveda to the crown, 11. IV. 1679, 2 fs.
4.^ It'
^^^^^^s 268, no. 68, the Gremio de azogueros
268 nn^''?n^ l^^'^r^'
1.V.1679, 2 fs.; and AGI, Cha^cas
21 XI ?fi7Q ; ^ ^''^'"^2
azogueros to the crown, Potosi,. . 1679, 2 fs. (mis-dated "28. XI. 1679" on the envelope);
69. AGI, Charcas 268, no. 69, the Archbishop-ViceroyLmSn y Cisneros to the crown, 22. IV. 1680, 3 fs "Daquenta del cuidado que a aplicado al remedio de la diminucion de Indies que padece la mita de Potosi de que remiti
restimonio y el papel que a despuesto el D.or francode Valera su Asesor Gen.l sobre se estienda a mas Proviasde las 16 senaladas." This is, most likely, the letter
or April, 1680 Linan refers to in AGI, Charcas 270, no 3(see note 66). The Council of the Indies' end-of-the-
century summary (AGI, Charcas 273, no. 21~see note 91,Chapter II) says the issue of extension went to the Fiscal
and Protector general, who opposed the idea. The Viceroy
and Acuerdo decided, at that point, the summary says, to
enforce Lemos
'
1669 reform directives, but suspended all
action when news of Palata's impending arrival reached
Lima. The crown was unhappy about the delay, according to
Its letter to the Duque de la Palata of 28. V. 1681; see
Castillo (AGI, Charcas 270, no. 33C~see note 30, Chapter
II)
,
25-32 for a transcription of that letter.
70. AGI, Charcas 270, no. 7A, "Copia de Cedula Gen.l
que se despacho^en 21 de Abril de 1679 a todos los
Arcobispos y obpos de las Indias para que ymbiasen relaci6n
de las ciu,des villas y Poblaciones que huviese en su
diocesis," 1 f. The order reads, in its entirety:
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"El Rey. Muy R. Inxpto P.e Arcobispo de la Iqlesia
las Provas^LT^eru'rcons'o S'^''
^^^'^
-
de ellas en ynterlm- nor Vo'l^'^''^^''^^'^^ ^ ^^P'^
in as nodc^y^^'^ Ss C?u?^e^°??iLfy^^^Poblaciones que huviere en el distrito de cada ^obispado, y la vecindad que tuviere cada una Li do
refac?ord"°"?.^" ^^^^^ Y enSaJguS e^Jesel ion de ello con toda distincion y claridad en lprimera ocasion que se ofrezca; fha en Buen Retire aVemte y uno de Abril de mil y seiscJentSs y se^enta
fran^co f ^^^=^°^ ^'^^ Rey nro! 'r^D
have s^en tS^n?^??
Madrigal Senalada del Consejo="
^^r-^L J.u^^ responses, by Bishops in America,
iT'ctrclTlin^ componen 38B666 almas";
crlJ^^t VT f ; ^^'^^^ ^^^^°P °f TucumSn to the
PnSJ^A
^-^^-l^S^, 3 fs., "Refiere las ciudades Villas yueblos que ay en aquel obispado, el estado que se halla
President^rnl^^Sr ^5
havitadores que puedan tomar armas."
^f^^if^?^
GonzSlez de Poveda says that he believes such aCharcas cannot be successfully completed inAGI, Charcas 270, no. 1, President GonzSlez de Poveda tothe crown. La Plata, 20. VI. 1681, 1 f.; but I have seennothing more for the ecclesiastical census in Peru.
o^q"^^*
Charcas 268, no. 5 (see note 8); AGI, Charcas268, no. 14 (see note 20); and AGI, Charcas 268, no. 15(see note 76, Chapter II). *
72. AGI, Charcas 267, no. 53, "Relacion de lo que
contiene el memorial Inclusso de D. Gabriel fernandez
Guarache y Copia de z.la q.e se m.de juntar con el," 2 fs.There is no date on the relaci6n, but on AGI, Charcas 267*
no. 53A, Fernandez Guarache 's petition, 4 fs., is the note
"En M° a 19 de Junio de 1668."
73. The route taken by the cacique ' s petition is
explained in AGI, Charcas 267, no. 53 (see note 72), save
for the date that it was sent back to Peru; that is taken
from the note on AGI, Charcas 267, no. 53A (see note 72).
74. AGI, Charcas 267, no. 59A (see note 16) includes a
letter "del Senor Virrey escrita sobre varias materias de
la mita, y particularmente en lo tocante al Cap.n Gen.^ de
Pacajes." No. 59A is merely an index, so I do not know
I
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-rtoj., L^narcas ^b/, no. 53A (see note 72) anri
Ser iir'ln ^nv^^' ' '''' (-e L?f76,^napter ll)
.
m a y event, it seems clear that the Condede Lemos was aware of the cacique 's petition.
^7.Jf; 268, no. 64, Juan Carlos Inga def "Serenissimo Senor," Lima, sin fecha, 3 fs •
29 VIiri68o'%hf ^thTlHdies oA'
Ti;y^Jo*i : 5^ envelope reads "Participando lo q.e hallegad a entender en contra de lo q.e el Governador ycasique Principal de Jesus de Macha jurisdicion deBerenquelilla ha escrito al consejo de Yndias, sobre elPadron gen.l de los naturales, y reduccion de ellos a susPueblos para la mita de Potosi, proponiendo grandes
seryicios con deshonor de los Pobres Indies sobre q.eincluye un Processo."
76. BNP, B575, "Paucarcolla
. Autos sobre el despachode la mita de Potosi e informaci6n de los caciques para
su grand disipaci6n. villa de la Concepcion, Octubre 24de 1669. 7 ff. utiles y 1 de carStula."
77. ANB, C 1899a, "Carta de don Antonio Ordonez del
Aguila, corregidor de esta provincia, a la audiencia deCharcas: Que tiene preso a don Ger6nimo Cajiamarca,
cacique governador del pueblo de Macari en esta provincia
por diversos excesos
. . . Entre los excesos la falta de
cumplimiento en el entero de la mita de dicho pueblo para
Potosi," Lampa, 8. IV. 1673, 2 fs. (MC 972; MOM 655).
78. BNP, B585, "Despacho de la mita de Potosi. Puno,
Noviembre de 16 73. 5 ff. Notaci6n de caratula al margen
de la primera hoja."
79. ANB, M 125, no. 21, "Los indios mitayos del cerro
de Potosi contra Joseph Fernandez de Valencia, capitan
mayor que fue de dicha mita, sobre los gravlsimos excesos
que cometi6 en el uso de su oficio," Potosi, 19.11.1677 to
29. VII. 1679, 302 fs. (MC 1028; MOM 670). An adequate
presentation of such a long and involved case as that
between the capitanes enteradores and Capitan mayor de la
mita is impossible in the space provided by the present
study. This legal battle will be the subject of a future
work, perhaps in conjunction with others involving caciques
and government officials.
80. John Rowe mentions the pattern of bringing presents
to the CapitSn mayor in his "The Incas under Spanish
Colonial Institutions," 174. He bases his comments on
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century'contex?!'Lfdol nS? L^rjrpJLLItr^'rf
'
c^^?e^^I/"^ "Manlfiesto.. and L ^a^^of^^^e^t'^or
81. ANB, M 125, no. 21 (see note 79).
82. Ibid
.
in^f^
ANB M 125, no. 20, "Don Bartolomg Gonzalez,dio, capitSn general enterador de la mita de los iueblosde Toropalca, Yura, Potobamba y Chaqui, provincia de Porco
de su oficio en consideraci6n a los excesos a que se
MoTtelr. 19.VII.1679, 13 fs^ (MC 1027;
84. ANB, M 125, no. 19, "Capltulos puestos por losmdios del pueblo de Asillo, provincia de AsSngaro,
contra el maestro de campo don Francisco de Castro
corregidor de ella, por el mal uso de su oficio, y enparticular por la distracciSn de indios de mita en provechosuyo, Aslngaro, 6. III. 1674, 60 fs. (MC 984; MOM 658).
85. Ibid.
86. For another example of the corregidor- Indian
struggle, see ANB, EC 1677, no. 19, "Residencia que por
comision del marques de Castellar, virrey del Peru, tom6don Francisco Bomonte y Robledo al maestro de campo don
Alonso de Ortega y Robles, caballero de Santiago,
corregidor que fue de la provincia de Sicasica, difunto,
y a sus tenientes y ministros, 1677, 287 fs. (MC 1012a;
MOM 664)
.
Two of the questions asked of the Indians
concerned the improper use of their labor and forced sales
of merchandise. Nicolas Sanchez-Albornoz says that
correqidores extracted service and money from the Indians
under the "care" (Sanchez-Albornoz, 97)
:
"Malversaci6n aparte, los entuertos mediante los
cuales los corregidores y sus tenientes se enrique
clan a expensas de los indios eran principalmente"
cuatro: repartimientos
,
trajines, confiscaci6n de
tierras y alquiler de peones. De ellos, el mas
comun era el primero. Los detalles, mencionados al
pasar, puesto que las preguntas no concernian este
punto, no modifican cuanto se ha dicho de este
abuso tantas veces."
CHAPTER VII
1680 TO 1700
A century of evolution in the de facto mita, and of
the Hapsburg administration's continual attempts to keep
pace with it, came to a head during the last two decades
of the seventeenth century. The long-awaited and
oft-postponed general census and repartimiento de la mita
were finally completed during the 1680s under the
direction of the Viceroy Duque de la Palata. Long-believed
to be the solution to Potosl's declining fortunes, and the
controversies swirling about the mita, the new
repartimiento only served .to enflame the passions of the
azogueros and the provincial interests alike.
The Viceroy Conde de la Monclova responded to the hue
and cry over Palata 's program in 1692, with a repartimiento
of his own. His distribution of mitayos won the approval
of the Council of the Indies, but it did not end the
controversy over the mita
. Indeed, despite an outward
appearance of government effectiveness during these
twenty years, the mita continued to elude the viceroys'
attempts to control it.
381
382
The Viceroy Duque de la Palata
When the Duque de la Palata was appointed Viceroy of
Peru in 1680, Charles II told him to concentrate his
efforts on the revitalization of the PotosI mita.l An
October 25, 1680 cedula outlined the procedure that the
Viceroy was to follow: after consultations with Linan
and GonzSlez de Poveda, Palata was to design and then
implement a comprehensive program for the restoration of
the faltering mita deliveries. ^ The crown was frustrated
by Castellar and LihSn's failure to carry out its earlier
directives. Palata was a trusted royal advisor who had
served on the junta that governed the Empire during the
King's minority, and Charles was confident that he would
comply with his instructions."^
Palata acknowledged the receipt of his orders and
supporting materials from Chiclana on December 15, 1680.^
Eleven months later, on November 7, 1681, he assumed
office in Lima. Compliance with his orders was to require
every one of his eight years as Viceroy. It had been
nearly fifty years since the last repartimiento
, and the
chasm between the Toledan and de facto mitas was immense.
Palata 's task was not to reform the mita
,
therefore, but to
re-establish it. In many respects he would have to serve
as another Francisco de Toledo.
The Duque spent the first year of his viceroyalty
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consulting with experienced officials and the Real Acuerdo
about the mita. Not only did he request information from
LiMn and GonzSlez de Poveda, but also from Corregidor
Enrlquez, Contador Sebastian de Collado and the Archbishop
of Charcas, Christ6val de Castilla y Zamora. These men
held varying opinions about the propriety of the mita and
the reforms that were required to reinvigorate it.^
LiMn's defense of the mita in 1677—that it kept
otherwise idle Indians busy-had been an important
counterbalance to the Conde de Lemos' call for the
abolition of the system. The Archbishop explained his
performance as Viceroy in his relacion, on December 8,
1681. Palata asked him for any additional comments in
June of 16 82, and although he was about to leave on a
^^^^^^ of his archbishopric, Lilian set down a few
impressions. He wrote that the question of the mita 's
justness was now moot, for the crown had repeatedly issued
orders for its implementation and continuation. The focus
of Palata 's attention, he said, should be on the restoration
of Potosi, and the key to that was a census. LinSn
suggested that Enriquez, Gonzalez de Poveda and the Bishop
of Arequipa, Antonio de Leon, be named to conduct an
enumeration in the sixteen traditionally obligated
provinces. Their salaries could be paid by fines on the
guilty correqidores and by collections among the azogueros .
Lilian disagreed with those who thought that the fourteen
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other provinces should be included in the census and the
mita. He shared their belief that the sixteen provinces
had been depopulated by Indian migration into the exempted
provinces, but he thought that the inclusion of the latter
would only drive the Indians further away, into unconquered
regions. The Archbishop argued that the inclusion of the
forasteros and the yanaconas who were residents of the
sixteen provinces would probably suffice, given the reduced
number of viable mills at Potosl, and he suggested that
stiff penalties be imposed to prevent future outward
migration. Only if the total population of the sixteen
provinces was insufficient, he added, would he condone the
inclusion of two or three more provinces under the mita.^
The Archbishop of Charcas agreed with LiMn that
Potosi needed to be preserved, for the crown had a
substantial investment in the large population, garrison,
mint and royal treasury there. Like his predecessor, he
said that it was not realistic to expect that silver
production would ever return to sixteenth century levels.
But Castilla y Zamora differed with Lihan on how best to
provide the 2,000 Indian laborers that he believed were
required. Rather than devise a means to include the
fugitives who were living in the fourteen provinces, he
said, those Indians who were found guilty of a civil
offense—and who were currently punished with the lash or
execution— should be sent to Potosi for four-, six- or
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ten-year terms. These sentences would not constitute the
enslavement of the Indians, but would be equivalent to the
assignment of Spanish criminals to the galleys. The
Indians and the azogueros alike would benefit, he argued,
for the azogueros would not have to pay their workers and
the Indians would be freed from mita service forever. The
government stood to benefit as well, the Archbishop noted,
because the problems that were caused by the Indians
traveling to and from PotosI would be eliminated, as would
be the criticism heaped upon Spain by other nations because
of the mita. The Indians might later be required to pay
two £esos per year apiece, however, should the abolition
of the mita cause a lowering of the royal quintos .^
If the Viceroy opted to maintain the mita, Castilla
y Zamora felt that the fourteen exempted provinces, the
Indians who lived at PotosI, the forasteros and the
yanaconas should all be included, to spread the obligation
as thinly as possible. The prerequisite census, he argued,
could be conducted by a committee within each of the
provinces, composed of the corregidor
, the local priests
and the caciques
.
Further support for the incorporation of the forasteros
in the mita on an equal footing with the originarios came
from Contador Sebastian de Collado. He noted that the
current system of secular and ecclesiastical revenue
collection pitted the priests against the government's
tribute collection efforts and the recruitment of ,nita^.
The priests in the provinces received one ^eso per year
for every forastero that they instructed, while their
income for the originarios was not prorated. They did
their best, therefore, to minimize the number of
oric^inarios in their midst, while welcoming forasteros with
open arms. The problem was particularly acute at PotosI,
he said, where 20,000 Indians basked in their exemption
from the mita. Collado suggested that the Indians be
deemed "natives" wherever they were found, and that
one-seventh of them be sent to PotosI to serve in the
mita
.
Corregidor Pedro Luis Enrlquez provided Palata with a
point-by-point defense of the mita against the claims that
were made by the Conde de Lemos in his July 4, 1670
discourse. Enriquez argued that Lemos had lacked the
necessary experience in mining affairs, and in the
administration of the Indians, to draw the correct
conclusions from the caciques ' complaints about their
treatment by the azoqueros
. Rigorous treatment of the
Indians was required, the Corregidor maintained, because
their nature was such that they obeyed only those whom
they feared. The complaints that were made by the caciques
,
furthermore, were not caused by their mistreatment at
PotosI, but by their desire to reserve the Indians for use
^1- • . 12m their own economic enterprises.
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Enrlquez also defended the mita against the charge
that it had depopulated the provinces subject to it. His
investigation of baptismal and death records, which he had
obtained from the priests in PotosI, had shown that men
died at the same rate as women-both at moderate levels-
and that the number of children born in the villa was well
over twice the number of adults who died. Because the
women did not work in the mita, the equal death rates
showed that the mitayos were not killed in the mines. The
high birth rate discredited the claim that procreation was
hurt by mita service. """^
The Corregidor said that the reports accusing the
azogueros of involvement with "pocket Indians" and other
abuses were untrue. His latest visita had determined that
there were 1,541 mitayos working in the mills and the
mines, while the minga work force totaled 1,713. The high
number of mingas
,
he concluded, proved that mita service in
silver was being converted into substitute laborers.
Enrlquez was indignant that officials in Lima could consider
their counterparts at Potosi to be so inept that they would
permit the kinds of horrible treatment that Lemos had
described. Finally, he reminded Palata that Toledo had
made a pact with the original azogueros
,
in which he had
promised that mitayos would be sent to Potosi in
perpetuity. The crown owed it to the azogueros
,
therefore,
to continue the mita . It was also in the royal interest to
do so, for Potosi supported most of the other economic
enterprises in Upper Peru, in one way or another. Thus,
the Corregidor had recounted the potosino position in
support of the mita, in its entirety.
President Gonzalez de Poveda had already responded to
the 1678 cedula when the 1680 order arrived, and he felt
no compulsion to cover old ground again. He and Palata
exchanged correspondence throughout 1682, however, on the
mechanics of a census and some possible changes in the
mita's design. Gonzalez de Poveda 's arguments in favor
of the use of the corregidores to conduct the census
sufficiently persuaded the Viceroy that the latter asked
him to draw up the guidelines for a corregidor
-conducted
enumeration
.
"'"^
Palata also asked the President to comment on the
idea that the mitayos be provided with a mill and a mine
of their own at Potosl. The Viceroy understood that the
voluntary labor force of the pre- and early-post-Toledo
periods had been drawn by the profitability of mining for
the Indians themselves. He was searching for a way to
restore the economic incentive for the Indians that had
evaporated by the end of the sixteenth century. Income
from the mitayos ' mine and mill would be used, according
to the plan, to pay their tribute, rezagos de mita, service
in silver, and any other debts that were incurred by the
16Indians or by their capitanes enteradores .
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on balance Gonzalez de Poveda was attracted to the
concept of a mita^. niining operation, but he was hesitant
because of the probable difficulties with its realization.
He noted that the Indians had always had the legal right to
discover and work their own mines, but that they had not by
choice. There would be problems, moreover, with obtaining
a mine in the first place, the day-to-day administration of
the mill (i.e., finding someone to serve as the azoguero )
and robberies of ore from the other mines and mills for the
initaxos' mill. The capitanes enteradores stood to benefit
the most from the proposal, he noted, and they would try to
assign their Indians to their mill and mine rather than to
those of the azogueros
. in deference to the Viceroy, the
President said that he would not object to suggesting the
idea to the capitanes
, to see whether they wanted to go
forward with it."""^
The mitayos ' mining operation was never founded, for
reasons that do not emerge from the documentation. Palata
and Gonzalez de Poveda ' s discussion of the possibility,
however, points to an important theme in the Viceroy's
approach: his attempt to return to the balance between
the mi tayos ' work and their profits that was characteristic
of the boom years of the 1570s. Indeed, as he proceeded
with his investigation, and later with the reforms that he
considered necessary, Palata showed more signs that he was
trying to recapture the elusive magic of the Toledan
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production formula. Por example, the Viceroy had hi,h
hopes for a new
.ethod of silver refining that was both
cheaper and quicker than the current process.
•
Like Toledo, Palata drew upon the advice of those who
were experienced in Indian administration and mining, of
all the written opinions, only that of Archbishop Castilla
y Zamora suggested that the mita should be abolished.
Everyone else agreed that it should continue, with the
ori^inarios and the forasteros to be included on an equal
basis. The only remaining areas of disagreement were the
number of provinces to be included and whom to name to
conduct the prerequisite census.
While Palata and the Real Acuerdo were considering the
logistics of a census and a new repartimiento
. the Viceroy
received another cedula from Charles II. The May 28, 1681
edict not only reinforced the October 25, 1680 directive,
it made the decisions that had originally been left to the
discretion of the Viceroy. The crown had been strongly
moved by a printed memorial from the Gremio de azogueros
warning that PotosI would soon collapse without the prompt
resolution of the long-outstanding issues of the census
repartimiento. The crown told Palata to follow
Gonzalez de Poveda • s 16 76 plan for a correqidor
-conducted
census in all thirty of the provinces, and to add any
provinces that were needed to gain an effective mita
ordinaria of 4,220 Indians. -"-^
The 1681 cedula resolved any doubts as to whether the
crown wanted the^ to continue, how .any provinces to
include in the census and whom should conduct it. it also
showed the crown's displeasure that the Indians were able
to avoid the^ and their tribute obligations by moving
from one province to another. This royal disapproval lent
support to the incorporation of the forasteros in the
coming re^artimiento
,
and it reinforced the determination
to conduct the census in all thirty of the provinces. The
Real Acuerdo voted, accordingly, to conduct the census on
June 21, 1682. it then turned its attention to problems
that could be anticipated with the inclusion of the
forasteros
,
and to finding the means to prevent Indian
migration from undercutting the mita in the future.
The Viceroy reported to the crown about his plans for
the census and the new repartimiento on December 15, 1682.
He told the Council of the Indies that the fourteen
theretofore exempted, as well as the sixteen obligated,
provinces would indeed be included in the census. Then,
if the number of Indians in the latter was insufficient to
support the mita, he could add new areas without having to
conduct a second population tally. The count in the
fourteen provinces would also permit, he said, the final
resolution of the question whether the Indians had
actually migrated from the sixteen provinces to the
21fourteen or not.
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Palata was concerned, however, about the use of the
-rre^idores to conduct the census. Gonzllez de Poveda
and the 1681 c|dula had both said that the use of the
£0££e2idores would allow the enumeration to be completed
quickly and at a minimal cost, but they were interested
parties who might try to conceal the number of Indians
in their provinces, and thus they were untrustworthy. The
question was one of prime importance, Palata argued, for
should the census not be well done, the impact on the royal
treasury could be disastrous
.
Sometime after his December 15, 1682 letter, if not
before, the Viceroy decided that there really was no
alternative but to use the corregidores if the census and
the repartimiento were to be completed before he left
office. In anticipation of the problems inherent in a
corregidor-conducted census, Palata issued orders on
April 7, 1683, for the Bishops and Prelates to instruct
their priests to report on the Indians who were under their
care. He explained to the churchmen that he needed to have
a clear understanding of Peruvian demographics if he were
to adjust the Indians' tribute and mita obligations so
that they would be exacted more fairly. To ensure that
their accounts would be factual, Palata cautioned, the
priests were not to be told why they were reporting on
their Indian charges.
An ecclesiastical census had been proposed by Juan de
Ibarra and the Conde de Le.os, and one was undertaken by
the Archbishop-Viceroy. Another had been halted in Charcas
after Gonzalez de Poveda said that it would probably not be
successful. 24 The Duque de la Palata now resurrected the
idea to serve as a check on the reports that he would soon
receive from the corregidores
.
Later, when the correaidor-conducted census was about
to begin, Palata published a circular for the priests. He
told them not to impede the government census for two
reasons: a) so that those who were present in the pueblos
would not have to carry the entire weight of obligations
that were meant for many more; and b) so that those who
were hidden or absent might pay "to Caesar that which is
Caesar's." The Viceroy ordered the priests to provide
the correqidores with any baptismal, confession or
marriage records that might help them to comply with their
instructions. 2^
Palata 's reservations about the correqidores led him
to build other safeguards into the general census as well.
He announced that grave penalties would be applied to
those who failed to carry out their orders or impeded the
census by hiding Indians: Indian officials would not only
lose their posts, they would become mitayos; Spaniards
would forfeit their offices, encomiendas and any other
privileges. Those who aided the census, by uncovering
Indians who were not included on the correqidores ' lists,
would be rewarded: Indians would be freed fro. all tribute
and^ Obligations, and na.ed to cacicaz^, Spaniards
would receive the services of one-seventh of the Indians.
Printed instructions were sent to the corregidores in
July Of 1683, and the census was scheduled to begin on
October 1, in all of the provinces at once. Originally it
was to be completed in one year, later changed to two, after
which the results were to be sent to Lima, changes in mita
quotas or tribute levels were not to be initiated locally,
but were to await new orders from the Viceroy. All
eighty-three of the provinces in Peru were now included in
the census, for Palata had decided that an accurate
demographic profile of the realm would make all of the
government's programs more effective.
The instructions that were sent to the corregidores
were detailed and explicit. They were to draw up a series
of lists based on sex, age, status and other factors. A
sample entry was provided for their use as a model. The
uniformity of response was necessary, the Viceroy said, so
that the various individual reports that were submitted by
the corregidores might be compiled into a larger volume by
officials in Lima. The forasteros were permitted six
months to decide whether they were going to return home or
stay where they were resident. Those who did return to
their pueblos were to receive lands if their own had been
sold during their absence.
Palata reported these developments to the Council of
the indies on August 21, 1683. He was confident that the
general census would provide a good base upon which to
determine the new renartinuer^ and the Indians ' tribute
Obligations. The Council's Fiscal endorsed the Viceroy's
plan with one qualification: that fiscales should be sent
to monitor the activities of the corre^idores
, as had been
done in New Spain. He concurred with LiMn's contention
that the justness of the mita was no longer in question,
because Linan, GonzSlez de Poveda and Enrlquez had all
argued that the temporal benefits of the mita for the
Indians outweighed the corporal rigors that were
characteristic of the system.
On June 10, 1685, Palata wrote to Madrid with the
news that the census was nearly completed; only a few
valley regions and the area around Quito remained. He said
that he had named two contadores
, Joseph de Villegas and
Pedro Antonio de Castillo, to compile the data that was
being sent to Lima by the provincial corregidores
. There
had been a few problems, as some of the corregidores had
not followed their instructions, but the Viceroy was
certain that any and all difficulties would be overcome
and that the census would be finished soon.^-*-
Villegas reported to the crown that he had been
assigned the responsibility for the thirty-three provinces
of Upper Peru, which included the sixteen that were
subject to the nuta and seventeen others that were not
The initial results, he said, suggested that there had been
an overall increase in the nuxnber of Indians since Toledo's
day. Disease had been less prevalent in Upper Peru than
elsewhere in the real., and Villegas believed that this had
been the reason for the increase. Some confusion had
resulted from the fact that many of the provinces had not
been inspected since the 1573 census, and one hundred years
had changed the demographic landscape considerably. Some
pueblos had been founded, while others had disappeared.
But the greatest problems had been caused by the
corregidores who refused to follow their orders and prepare
the lists that Palata had required. The adjustment of their
tallies was delaying the completion of the total census.
The Contador noted that an accurate profile of the
Indian population was needed to protect the Indians from
the caciques
,
and to protect the caciques from the Spanish;
and that the success of the repartimiento hinged on the
successful execution of the census. Accuracy was also
important because such an enumeration would probably not
be conducted again for some time to come.^^
Ironically, the same day that Palata wrote to the
crown—June 10, 1685—Charles II signed a cedula that
withheld royal approval from the Viceroy's actions. The
Council of the Indies had consented to the execution of
the census, but it said that it had reservations about the
means that he was employing. since the use of the
Sorre^i^ had been provided for by the 1681 cedula,
this was not the true reason for the Council's reticence
Nine Viceroys had feared the effects of such a census, it
noted, because if few Indians were found, then both the
mita and tribute levels would have to be constricted.
Thus, it was its fear of the potential financial
ramifications of the census that caused the Council to
advise the crown to wait until the results of the
enumeration were known before deciding whether to give its
assent. Two Councilors-the Conde de Castellar and Joseph
de Veytia-strongly disagreed. They argued that the
council should aid the census with a statement of support,
not cripple it by withholding its af firmation
. But as
had been the case when Toledo decided to establish the
mita over a century earlier, the crown reserved judgement
until it knew the outcome of Palata's program; it would
support success, but not failure.
When the Viceroy received the crown's decision, in
February of 1686, he was livid. He replied that his
predecessors had not conducted the census because of their
personal limitations, not any intrinsic difficulties with
its execution. A government official was supposed to
conquer tough problems, he argued; that was his job.
Great things, Palata concluded, were never won without
overcoming great problems.
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The crown's refusal to lend its support to the census
did not stop it fro. being completed. indeed, by the ti.e
that Palata responded to the 1685 cedula, the enumeration
was nearly finished. On April 6, 1686, the Viceroy wrote
to Madrid that he lacked only three reports. So.e problems
had been caused by the Indians' mobility, he noted, but
everything for the provinces that were under the treasury
in Lima was completed and new tribute levels would soon go
into effect. The results for Upper Peru, however, were
being delayed by its distance from Lima, the resultant
lag in correspondence and a lack of uniformity in the
corregidores ' reports.
Palata, like Toledo, was sufficiently confident of
himself that he pushed forward despite the crown's doubts.
He confessed, however, that he was uncertain that the
government would be able to prevent Indian migration in
the future. He had stripped the cover of "forastero" from
the runaways, and he had doubled tribute levels and mita
obligations for anyone who was absent from his native
pueblo, but he feared that even these measures would not
be sufficient to immobilize the Indians.
As promised, the Viceroy soon began to issue reforms
which were based on the census. On October 16, 1687,
he published an "Aranzel de jornales" that delineated the
daily wages that the Indians were to receive in various
enterprises and locations. The new tribute levels for
for the provinces that were under the Li.a treasury went
into effect on Christmas Day, 1687^° The census was not
completed in Upper Peru until 1688, but it was sufficiently
Close to its conclusion by March to permit Palata to begin
work on the new repartimiento de la mita. He had planned
to have the two contadores draw up a tentative distribution
of the mita^, but they were exhausted by their three-year
struggle with the census and had fallen ill. The Viceroy
was personally distracted by the aftermath of the October
20, 1687 earthquake, which had left the provinces of
Guanta and Angaraes in a shambles. Palata therefore
instructed Fiscal Juan GonzSlez de Santiago, of the
Audiencia de Lima, to compose the tentative repartimiento
.
based on the results of the census and any information
that was available in Lima about the mills and the
azogueros at Potosl.^-'-
The Viceroy then sent the tentative repartimiento to
La Plata and he assigned Archbishop (and ex-President)
Gonzalez de Poveda, Corregidor Enriguez and the new
President of Charcas, Diego Christoval Me s la, the task
of tailoring it to local realities. The committee of
three was encouraged, moreover, to make some major
adjustments of the Fiscal 's plan.^^
Palata was particularly bothered by GonzSlez de
Santiago's reference to a capitulation by Toledo to the
Indians when he first established the mita . The Viceroy
felt that the mita was part of the Indians' natural
obligation to work for their sovereian not ^r..r .o^ eitixg , any agreement
between them and Toledo. Neither did he believe that the
one-seventh fraction constituted a strict quota, nor that
two rest periods were absolutely required. He suggested
that the existence of many resident mingas at Potosl made
it unnecessary for the mitayos to work on their weeks off,
One week's rest would be enough, he argued, if they
actually rested. This would also ease the burden of the
mita on the provinces, for one-third of the mita gruesa
could remain at home rather than travel to PotosI—the
aspect of the system that Palata felt was the most
oppressive. Finally, the Fiscal had not included any
more provinces than the original sixteen, and this the
Viceroy considered to be an unwarranted reward for the
disobedient fugitives
.
The committee's report to Palata on the repartimiento
was despatched from La Plata on October 19, 1688. After
numerous meetings and two consultations with the Viceroy,
it had composed a repartimiento which reflected Palata 's
desires closely. Five provinces—La Recaja, Yamparaes,
Tomina, Pilaya y Paspaya-and Misque--were added, as was
the parroquia of San Pedro in La Paz, and sixteen curatos
and eighteen pueblos within the original sixteen provinces
that had won exemption from the mita earlier in the
century. From a population base of 56,046 tribute-paying
Indians, 2,829 were included in each of three nOtas
ordinarias, including the one that would remain at home
while the other two served alternate weeks at Potosl.
Fifty mitayos were assigned to each of fifty-seven
mills-an increase of three mills over Gonzalez de
Santiago's distribution-and sixteen others were left
without mita labor. The committee had considered the
possibility Of assigning a mix of thirty-four mitayos
and sixteen minaas to all of the mills, but it decided
against the idea because such a system would have been
unmanageable and the azogueros ' profit margin would have
been hurt. The mitayos were assigned by the committee
in complete ayllus or pueblos wherever possible, in
accordance with a provision of the crown's 1681 cedula.
The committee felt it was necessary, however, to assign
to each azoguero a combination of originarios and
forasteros, because the latter would have to learn their
jobs from the former.
The Viceroy accepted the committee's recommendations
and on December 2, 1688, he issued an order for the
incorporation of the newly-affected provinces and pueblos
The terms of the new repartimiento were sent to Potosi on
January 29, 1689, and to the provinces on February 2. In
addition to the provisions that were included in the
committee's plan, Palata provided a one-year exemption
from tribute for the mitayos following their year of
service and he reinforced his predecessors' prohibitions
Of mita service in silver. Finally, he placed the nuta
under the exclusive administration of the Corregidor de
PotosI, Pedro Luis Enriquez/^
With the orders for the new repartimiento despatched,
the Viceroy reported to the crown on February 19, 1689
that the entire program had been concluded. The census
and the repartimiento that had so baffled each of his
predecessors, since the Conde de Chinchon, were finished.
Not only was the census completed, Palata noted, but the
cost had been kept to a mere 20,000 pesos ; 200,000 had
been the estimate. He was pleased to report, moreover,
that the number of tribute-paying Indians was greater
than it had been a century before. Migration had caused
the apparent depopulation of the sixteen provinces-, he
argued, for half of the Indians in Upper Peru had turned
out to be forasteros. The Viceroy also said that he had
ordered the compilation of a single tome on the census and
the repartimiento, to serve as a guide the next time the
program had to be executed.
Palata was correct when he boasted that he had
succeeded where others had failed. His willingness to
press forward despite the crown's refusal to support his
actions and his determination to finish the process before
his successor arrived were unusual. But there were other
reasons for his success. First, he had been provided with
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direct, unequivocable orders to put the census and the
new renartimiento before all other matters. The 1681
cidula had removed any doubt about the crown's support
for the mita and it had answered the outstanding questions
about the general census. The Council of the Indies'
doubts were expressed only after the process was nearly
done. second, the Duque had profited by the advice of
Gonzalez de Poveda and LiMn, both of whom had extensive
experience in Charcas and with the mita. Third, no one
in Potosi was opposed to his program. Fourth, and perhaps
more important than these other factors, Palata was Viceroy
of Peru for eight years. Six of those years were required
to complete the census in Upper Peru, after a year of
preliminary investigation. Palata 's viceroyalty was
longer than the usual six years because his successor had
died en route to Peru, and the search for a willing
replacement had taken time. By the time that the Council
decided to transfer the Conde de la Monclova from his
post as Viceroy of New Spain, therefore, the Duque de la
Palata had been afforded a bonus year or two, and had had
the time to complete the repartimiento
, rather than leave
it to the whim of his successor.'*^
Developments in the de facto Mita
During the seven years that were required to design
and execute the general census, the traditional battles
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among the caciaues, the correHidores
, the azo^ueros,
the priests and the Indians had continued. Those
confrontations had underscored the need for a clear
determination of the extant population in the provinces
and the completion of a new repartimiento de la mita.
The caciques of Pacajes had objected to their role
in the mita for what seemed to be an eternity. On
August e, 1681, they wrote to the crown to complain that
the azogueros were still demanding that they deliver
mita^ under the terms of the 1633 repartimiento
. despite
the fact that the tribute-paying population of their
province had fallen from 10,675 to 1,510 Indians. The
number of mitayos that was required from Pacajes, they
argued, should be lowered accordingly, when this petition,
and others like it, reached the Council of the Indies,
they were put to one side. The Fiscal promised that the
general census, then being undertaken, would solve all
such problems. The Council may not have supported Palata's
program, but it did expect his census to settle complaints
such as that of the caciques of Pacajes.
As we have seen, other caciques also had a difficult
time delivering the quotas of mitayos that were demanded
of them. Some of them went to extraordinary lengths over
a single Indian. From 1682 to 1683, for example, the
capitan enterador for Caquiavire (Pacajes)
, Francisco
Quispi, tried unsuccessfully to extract Pasqual Guanca from
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the San Francisco convent at Potosl. The Franciscans'
president and £rpcurador foiled Quispi's efforts with a
series of legal ploys based on the pretense that because
Guanca was married to the daughter of a yanacona
, and
Toledo had ordered that husbands were to live with their
wives' a^^, then he too should be considered a yanacona
.
Pasqual Guanca was released from the CapitSn mayor de la
mita's jail when his father-in-law pledged that he would
produce him when a judgement was reached in the case.
Corregidor Enrlquez then ruled that Guanca should serve in
the mita while the Audiencia de Charcas determined whether
he was a yanacona, but by that time he was nowhere to be
found. Quispi had to hire a minga for every week that
Guanca was missing, and he appealed to the Audiencia to
force the father-in-law to pay the cost of the substitute.
The dispute went on for over a year, and although the
final decision is not included in the documentation, the
frustrations that Quispi suffered are testimony to the
difficulties that the capitanes enteradores faced when
they competed with other interests for Indians to deliver
49m the mita.
If the capitanes had a difficult time delivering the
originarios to Potosi, they were not shy about including
the forasteros when they could. In 1680, the Corregidor
de Porco ordered the caciques of Puna to leave Pedro
Mamani alone. Mamani complained that he had been forced to
serve in the mita despite his being a forastero. The
Corregidor's ruling did not end the matter, however, for
Pedro Mamani had to petition the Audiencia de Charcas in
1684 to obtain a reinforcement of the earlier decision.
The ca£itanes enteradores had their problems with
other caciques as well. The capitln for Puna, Juan
Bautista Catari, complained to the Audiencia de Charcas
that gobernador Pedro Anava was diverting some mitayos
for his own use, and that he was committing other abuses
as well. Bautista Catari was not alone. m 1690, on
orders from the Viceroy Conde de la Monclova (1689-1705),
Corregidor Enrlquez questioned the capitanes about the
problems that they faced in the delivery of the mitayos
.
To a man they charged that other caciques prevented them
from bringing as many mitayos—in person and in silver-as
they could otherwise have delivered. The caciques used
some of the reserved Indians in their own enterprises, but
they rented the majority to estancieros and chacareros in
exchange for the Indians' mita service in silver and
their tribute. The institution of indios maharaques
(described in Chapter V) was not peculiar to Pacajes,
therefore, but common in the sixteen obligated provinces.
The lands that were left vacant by the Indians, the
capitanes said, were rented to forasteros or sold to
Spaniards. The sums of money that were raised by these
means, they claimed, were well in excess of those that were
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needed to meet their obligations, but the caciaues kept
much of the money for themselves
.
The testimony of the capitanes in 1690 lends credence
to the suggestion offered in Chapter V: that the cacigues
were able to pass some of the financial burden of mita
service in silver down onto the Indians who were living in
their pueblos. indeed, the capitanes also claimed that
the caciques used collectors to gather service in silver
and tribute contributions from the Indians who were absent
from their villages.
The Effects of the New Repartimiento
The completion of the census and the new repartimiento
were significant accomplishments, and clearly they were
needed. But the Duque de la Palata's claim to ultimate
victory was premature. He had designed a new mita that
would ostensibly return equity to service at Potosi and
provide most of the azogueros there with an adequate,
inexpensive, work force. Yet as Palata prepared for his
return to Spain, he began to learn a central lesson of
the Hapsburg administration of Peru: that which was
planned in Lima was rarely what happened in Charcas.
The implementation of the new tribute levels and the
reformed mita began in Upper Peru during 1689. The
Indians were supposed to be sent to Potosi under the new
repartimiento in June, and the new system was to be
408
operational by .uly 1.54
^^^^^^
^^^^
practices that were novel, and he had included some regions
under the rnita for the first time. The detailed orders
that he sent to the corre^idores about the new tribute and
mita requirements, like those for the census a few years
earlier, stressed the themes of fairness and equality.
From afar-from Lima-the process and the reforms seemed
fair, and quite logical. m practice, however, the
cacigues and the Indians learned of the changes in their
obligations in bits and pieces, and only months before
those alterations were scheduled to go into effect. The
tribute and mita quotas increased dramatically with the
inclusion of the forasteros, and neither the Indians nor
their caciques could see any benefits for them in the
new regime. No sooner had Corregidor Enrlquez sent out
the new mita orders than the complaints about the
repartimiento, the tribute levels and ultimately the census
began to pour down off the altiplano and into Lima.^^
The caciques, the corregidores and the priests argued,
in unison, that the reforms that Palata was attempting to
introduce were both unrealistic and impractical. The
caciques were particularly upset with the incorporation of
the forasteros, and they balked at the reduction of the
mita to two shifts. The corregidores and the priests
claimed that the Indians were emigrating, en masse, out of
their provinces in terror.
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one source of the problems was that the census was
Six years oia by the time that the reforms that were based
upon it were introduced. Many of the forasteros who had
been included in the enumeration had moved away and some
Indians now discovered that they had been included on lists
in four or five different locations, other Indians had
died in the epidemics of the mid-1680s. The once-thriving
mining center at Porco was now abandoned. But the caciques
were nevertheless held responsible by their corregidores
and the correqidores by Corregidor Enrlquez, for deliveries
of mita^os and tribute that were based on the out-dated
census
.
Greater difficulties stemmed from the inability of
the caciques to control the forasteros
. even when they were
still living where they had been documented. The
forasteros had no property to tie them down and no
tradition of loyalty to anyone, and the first attempts by
the caciques to subjugate them resulted in their prompt
departure. Some forasteros who were living in the cities
moved into the countryside; some in the country went into
the cities; and some from each migrated into unconquered
territory. if the caciques tried to follow the forasteros
or if they tried to collect from the Indians who were
absent from their pueblos, they then had to compete with
the estancieros and chacareros for whom the Indians worked
or other caciques who also laid claim to them. Thus, they
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soon proved to be hopelessly incapable of meeting their
new Obligations, an. their correaidores tossed the. in
jail to protect themselves from retribution. Prom their
cells, the caciaues pleaded with the Viceroy to allow them
to resign. ^"^
The imposition of mita obligation on the previously
exempted frontier provinces created other problems
. The
Spanish residents of those areas complained that their
safety was threatened, for the Indians who lived in their
settlements served as a buffer between them and the enemy
Indians. Each of the frontier provinces had been spared
from mita service by Toledo for that reason, and their
Spanish inhabitants pleaded with Palata to respect that
58precedent.
In April of 1689, the Duque de la Palata tried to stem
the tide of confusion and opposition that his reforms had
caused with printed "Advertencias . " He explained that no
Indian was required to pay more tribute or serve in the
mita more often than he had under Toledo's ordinances.
The tribute and mita quotas for the pueblos had not
increased per capita, he argued, for now the forasteros
the originarios would share the responsibilities of
the villages in which they lived. The one week of rest
in the mita was for the Indians' benefit as well, he said,
because twenty Indians could now meet a pueblo's required
ten per week; and ten others could therefore stay home
With their families and work their lands. The Viceroy
also defended the incorporation of the forasteros in the
mita-again from a sense of fairness-but he cut their
tribute payments in half, and he allowed a 40 per cent
reduction in the number of mita^ that was required from
a pueblo based on their number.
The "Advertencias" did very little good. They were
legal arguments to support earlier legalisms, and they
simply confused matters further. The modifications of
the tribute and mita obligations of the forasteros were
not enough to quiet the voices of opposition
. The
overwhelming reality that the "Advertencias" were unable
to counter was that Palata's design and the de facto mita
could not be reconciled. The Viceroy had banned service
in silver and he had included the forasteros
-albeit now
at a reduced percentage. The caciques had to deliver
their full contingents of mitayos in persons, including
the forasteros over whom they exercised little or no
control. The various means that they had developed over
the previous ninety years to meet their obligations in
silver were now obsolete. The caciques were the key to
the mita in both its forms, but Palata's reforms had made
it impossible for them to perform that role. With most
of the caciques in jail or in hiding, the corregidores
tried to take up the slack by using their Spanish or
mestizo subordinates to deliver the mita
, but they proved
Dust as unable as the caci^ to deliver the required
number of Indians to Potosl.
Other historians have argued that Palata's hard work
was undermined by the weaknesses in the Hapsburg
government or by his replacement by the Conde de la
Monclova only a few months after his reforms were
introduced. Palata had only been successful, however, to
the point where theory had ended and implementation had
begun. Then his claim to parity with Francisco de Toledo
had faded. Toledo's mita, it should be remembered,
"worked" only because three other production elements kept
it from having to serve as a forced labor system. For
Palata there was no technological breakthrough, and there
were no piles of desmontes, and thus there was no 1680s
boom to attract the Indians to Potosl. other things had
changed since the 1570s as well. Palata, unlike Toledo,
had to contend with the increased abilities of the priests,
the corregidores
,
the caciques and especially the Indians
to protect their interests. Potosi, meanwhile, was no
longer the economic monolith that it had once been.^^
The Council of the Indies had reserved judgement on
the census and the repartimiento until the results and the
effects of the Viceroy's program were known. By 1689, that
decision was beginning to look very propitious. When the
Duque de la Palata boarded ship at Callao, he left Peru
with the intention of personally defending his actions
the council against the complaints that had been leveled
against the™. He carried with hi. a copy of the volume
that he had ordered to be compiled on the census and the
iSEartiHiento, a copy of his relaci6n and other pertinent
materials." But while he was en route to Spain-in
Portobelo, Panama-the Duque died." His side of the story
would have to be told, thereafter, by those docuxnents
alone
,
The council of the Indies did not have the opportunity
to review Palata's materials until 1692. The ship that was
carrying his possessions arrived in Cadiz late in 1690, but
the late Viceroy's belongings were not brought ashore,
despite the continual efforts of his secretary to obtain
his papers. Early in 1692, however, the Council was able
to obtain copies of the volume on the census and the
repartimiento and Palata's relacion from Contador Pedro
Antonio de Castillo. Thus, by the time that the Council
began its deliberations on the 1683 enumeration and the
1689 repartimiento. the Conde de la Monclova had been the
Viceroy of Peru for two years. Indeed, he had already
reversed most of the reforms that his predecessor had
tried to institute, and he had drastically reduced the
number of Indians in the mita ordinaria at Potosi. Palata
had been able to finish his repartimiento because of the
delay in the arrival of a successor; the two years that
the Council had to wait to see his records had provided
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Monclova with ample time to disassemble it.
The Viceroy Conde de la Monclova
The conde de la Monclova sent his first report from
Peru on March 15, 1690. m addition to the problems that
the realm was having with pirates, a mercury shortage and
the aftermath of the 1689 earthquake, the new Viceroy noted
the general commotion that had been caused by the 1683
census and the reforms of the Duque de la Palata. He did
not elaborate, but he did show a marked aversion to the
PotosI mita. Monclova questioned the need for draft labor
in mining operations, for he had just come from New Spain
where no such system existed. He argued, furthermore, that
any man-whether an Indian or not-was destroyed more by
one month of forced labor than by a year of voluntary,
paid, work.^^
When the news that a new Viceroy had arrived in Lima
reached Upper Peru, the already hefty volume of complaints
about Palata 's program from the provinces increased.
Added to the themes that were characteristic of the
earlier letters was a particular emphasis on the Indians'
flight into the yungas
. The priests were quick to point
out that the loss of the Indians to "infidel" territory
not only hurt the Peruvian economy, it also damaged the
crown's claim that it was christianizing the Indians. The
correqidores and their lieutenants reported that they had
been forced to resort to search-and-capture raids to round
up the nuta^, often returning after dar. to apparently
deserted villages to pick up the handful of Indians who had
hidden during the day. The corre^idores also said that it
was impossible for the. to provide the forasteros who were
returning to their pueblos with lands, as Palata had
promised; the Spanish titleholders refused to vacate their
properties unless they were paid for them.^'^
Interspersed among the common themes of the complaints
from the priests, the caciques and the corregidores were
some particularly poignant portrayals of the horrors of
the mita. One priest recounted, after a round-up of his
Indians for the mita, that one of the men that he had been
instructing came before him and other priests in chains
and screamed, "Look Fathers at the beneficent God that you
have brought to our land!"^^
The complaints from the provinces found a receptive
ear in the Viceroy Conde de la Monclova, but the provincial
groups were not the only ones that were unhappy with
Palata 's reforms. The Gremio de azogueros—the group that
ostensibly stood to benefit the most from the new
repartimiento—was also upset. The azogueros objected to
the fact that sixteen mills had been denied mitayos
, to
the assignment of the Indians in complete ayllus and to
the 2,829-Indian mita ordinaria
. Like the other interests,
the azogueros looked to Monclova to rectify what they
new
considered to be an unfair reformation of the ^ita."
Did the a^oaueros have a reason to complain? Palata
said that the effective mita ordinaria had fallen to
1,608 Indians before his changes were introduced.^" An
increase to 2,329 would seem, therefore, to be a
significant improvement, but only from a distance. The
azoqueros had argued for vears that- uy =u j.ur y at the number of mltayos
at PotosI was low to prove the need for a census and a
repartimiento
,
all the time understating the number of
nitaios that they received in silver. Corregidor Enrlguez
reported that 1,541 mitayos and 1,713 mingas were working
in the mines and the mills in 1682, or a total work force
of 3,253 Indians. Assuming that the mingas were hired
with the money that the caciques delivered for service in
silver, then the 2,829 mitayos that Palata had provided
for in his repartimiento represented a drop of 400 Indians,
not an increase. The inclusion of the forasteros, whose
inexperience and absenteeism were quickly apparent,
combined with the lowered official mita ordinaria to drive
the effective number of mitayos still lower. Furthermore,
the ban on service in silver cut off an important source
of capital and it prevented the azogueros from hiring
skilled mingas with the mita in silver contributions. The
azogueros were also left without any leverage to use
against the capitanes enteradores
.
With the complaints about Palata 's census and his
reforms coming in from all quarters, Monclova called a
junta to consider these issues for December 16
,
1690."
The a^oaueros agreed to send Corregidor Enrlquez
, at a
cost Of 35,000 eesos, to represent their interests.'^ He
was joined by Oidor XimSne. Lobaton, Oidor GonzSlez de
Santiago, Fiscal-Oidor Matlas Lagflnez
, Fiscal-Protector
MarquSz
,
Luis Antonio de Oviedo and Contador Joseph de
Urquiano." The junta met thirty-three times from
December 18, 1690 to May 12, 1691.'6 ^ ^^^^ ^^^^
prepared and later read to a larger group of officials,
including other oidores, the alcaldes del crimen and other
contadores
,
on the last day of May. Monclova then asked
Lagfinez and Protector Pedro de Flgueroa DSvila (who had
replaced MarquSz) to draft proposals to deal with the
problems that had been caused by Palata's program, which
had been outlined in the relaoiSn. Figueroa's offering
was read to the assembly in the three meetings that
followed July 20. Lagfinez began to read his statement
on August 3, but because it was 668 folios long, the
Viceroy grew impatient and on August 7, ordered him to be
brief. When Lagfinez refused, Monclova directed the
monstrous missive to the relatores for editing.^'
Lagfinez did summarize his thoughts, however, in a
letter to the crown. He said that he had read all of the
complaints about Palata's census and the subsequent reforms,
and that he had considered the arrival of Monclova to be an
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opportunity to correct the situation. LagQne. accused the
-oaueros of pure deceit in their correspondence with
Madrid, and of subjecting the unfortunate Indians to an
oppression worse than slavery, indeed, he said that if
the aitayos were slaves, then the azogueros would treat
them better, for they would then have an economic stake
in their survival.
The Viceroy was impressed with Lagunez' arguments,
if not With the length of his discourse, and he herded the
assembly toward the adoption of these twelve proposals:
^*
based ""on
°f the Duque de la Palata,
2 Thf^ i-hS t ^r^J^^ reformed.
on thP L?r^ ^^^^1 another decisione matter was reached, on the 33,423
originarios in the sixteen provinces that werehistorically obligated to the mita.
3. That the same not be true for the~31 031forasteros that were listed as residents oftne sixteen provinces.
^*
o$^c ^.^""^ additional provinces, the parroquiaf San Pedro, the sixteen pueblos and the
q ^t^^^^^""
curatos be freed from mita obligation.That a new census be conducted of the forasterosto determine the amount of tribute that they
would pay, and that until that time they wouldpay the same amount as yanaconas
, not to exceed
seven pesos per year.
6. That the mita continue to be determined on thebasis of one-seventh of the population that
was subject to it.
7. That two weeks of rest be reinstituted in theplace of the one week introduced by the Duauede la Palata. '
8. That in the place of fifty Indians for each mill,
the sum of forty be provided, and therefore that
thirty-four or thirty-five mills receive mitayos.
That the decision as to which would receive them
and which would not be based on information
provided by experienced but disinterested persons.
9. That the figures included for the originarios in
the Palata census remain the basis of government
at the established rate allowances
These twelve points were sent to the Contador de
retasas on April 24, 1692, and they were despatched in
printed form to the provinces three days later. The new
repartimiento was drafted by the Contador as well, and it
was issued as a general order on May 8, 1692. Following
the instructions of the Viceroy and the guidelines that
were provided by the twelve points, mita obligation fell
only on the 31,707 priginarios who were resident in the
sixteen provinces. The resultant 1,367-Indian mita
ordinaria was divided among the owners of thirty-four mills
according to information that was provided by Enrlquez,
Oviedo and Ximenez Lobaton. Twenty-three mills were left
without any mitayos at all. The remaining seven mitayos
per week were assigned to the maintenance of the lagunas
.
Monclova also ordered that travel allowances were to be
paid to the mitayos at the rate of two reales for every
four leagues traveled, and he lowered the mingas ' wage to
the same thirty reales that the mitayos were to receive. ^"^
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The azo2ueros had protested when Palata assigned them
2,829 mita^ per week. They now found themselves with
less than half that number, and with twenty-three of their
mills denied any access to mitayos. This was hardly what
they had in mind when they contributed 35,000 pesos to
send Corregidor Enrlquez to Lima. He took the precaution
Of breaking the bad news to them in a letter from Lima of
April 28, 1692. One can only imagine what might have
happened to him had he been in Potosi at the time. The
Corregidor explained that the Viceroy and the junta had
agreed with Lagunez on four basic points: a) that the
present generation of azogueros could not claim credit for
the quintos that had been produced in the past; b) that the
pretension that the azogueros worked only to serve the
crown was absurd, because everyone worked for himself
first; c) that the mitayos
, and their low wages, had been
a gift to them from the crown, not their right; and d) that
the azogueros were not as indispensable as they believed.
Enriquez said that Lagunez thought that other mining
centers were more important than Potosi, and that he had
noted that they had no mitas. The Corregidor conceded that
the azogueros would be hurt, especially by the increase in
the mitayos ' wage, but he insisted that lie had been unable
to prevent the reforms.^^
Bartolome de Arzans would later write that the
azogueros had misplaced their faith in putting it in
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Enrlquez, but he did credit- t-K^ na dit the Corregidor with preventing
the complete abolition of the ^. .^cording to ArzHns,
Monclova and Lag.nez were determined to extinguish the
system, and they had already agreed upon its abolition when
Enriquez convinced the. that the impact of such an act on
the royal treasury would be too great.
The azo^ueros apparently learned of the assembly's
decisions even before they received the Corregidor' s letter,
for on April 1, 1692, they proposed to the crown that
Archbishop Gonzalez de Poveda be named to replace Monclova
as Viceroy. 34 On August 19, 1692, they complained to the
latter that the thirty-real wage for the mitayos would
ruin them financially . ^5 The azogueros told Charles II
that they would not be the only ones who would be hurt by
the Viceroy's actions; his royal income would suffer as
well, and the originarios would now have to bear the full
weight of the mita while the disloyal forasteros would be
unjustly freed from that obligation. Palata's six years
of diligent effort had been undermined, they argued, by
the ignorance of the government officials in Lima.^^
Monclova sent Enrlquez back into the PotosI lions' den
on June 10, 1692, with orders to enforce the assembly's
resolutions. Arriving on October 26, the Corregidor also
carried a secret commission that provided him with alter
ego status to the Viceroy, and therefore with the power
to adjust the repartimiento in any fashion that he deemed
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was necessary. Enrl,uez published the ter.s of the April
27 edict, and he asW that the cafiitanes enteradores and
the Gre.io de azogueros respond to its twelve points. He
also ordered the veedores and the CapitSn
.ayor de la „ita
to report on the owners of the thirty-four
.ills that had
been assigned jota^ those of the twenty-three that
had not.^^
Enrlquez found the capitanes and the azogueros locked
in a struggle over which repartimiento they had to comply
with. The azogueros insisted that Palata's quotas of
-ita^os be delivered, and when the capitanes failed to meet
those levels, the azogueros demanded rezagos
. The
^^P^^^"^^ considered the Monclova repartimiento to be in
effect, and they accused the azogueros of not paying the
mita^^ the increased wages to which they were entitled.
The veedores and the CapitSn mayor reported that the
twenty-three mills that had been stripped of mitayos were
owned by widows, absentees and others, and that they had
a long history of abuses. The twenty-seven azogueros who
owned the thirty-four mills, on the other hand, had viable
refining operations and mines. Thus, the decisions that
Enrlquez and the others had made in Lima, regarding which
mills should receive the mitayos
, were confirmed by the
veedores and CapitSn mayor's report.
The Viceroy responded to the azogueros ' August 19
rial on October 22, 1692, by ordering that the twelvememo
points were to be obeyed without a.en..ent. The Corre.i.or
gathered the azo^ueros together on Nove:„ber 24, and he read
them the Viceroys letter. They responded that it was
Simply impossible to pay the increased wage to the mita^
They would wait for a reply to the Archbishop's October 18
petition to Monclova on their behalf, they said, before
commenting further.
When Gonzalez de Poveda died two days later, the
-oaueros understood that their chances for redemption had
perished with him. They went to Enrlquez and proposed a
compromise: a twenty-four-real per week wage for the
nitaYos.52 corregidor had already conferred with his
advisors and concluded that thirty reales was unrealistic,
so he accepted the azogueros' offer. Enrlquez explained
to Monclova that It would be unwise to force them to break
the law by insisting that they comply with an impossible
directive
.
The azogueros wrote to the crown on December 9, 1692
to report that they were still under siege by the ignorant
government officials in Lima.^^ The royal treasury
officials of Potosl found themselves in the peculiar
position of supporting the azogueros in their complaint
about the twenty-three mills that had been deprived of
mitayos. The Viceroy had told them, the officials said,
in a letter of May 29, 1692, that the collection of debts
from the owners of the twenty-three mills would have to
-it untiX t.e Shoe, of his
.efo^s had
.een a.sor.e.
the ajoaueros. The officials complained, nevertheless,
that any stoppage of silver production in the twenty-three
^iXls would permanently prevent them from collecting those
debts. ^
The azo2ueros got some relief in June of 1693, with
the arrival of a new Corregidor de Potosl, the Conde de
Velayos. He had been kept waiting in Lima for three years
by Monclova, so that Enrlquez might complete the process
Of introducing his reforms for the mita and the collection
of tribute. The Viceroy's gambit had been important, for
no sooner had Velayos arrived in Potosi than he began to
parrot the azogueros ' arguments. He reported to the crown
that the azogueros treated the Indians very well, and that
they paid the mitayos their wages promptly and without
incident. The mita should be returned to the status quo
ante, the Corregidor argued, because the number of Indians
that Monclova had assigned was woefully inadequate. The
^aci^Hes, the corregidores and the priests, he contended,
had unduly influenced the Viceroy. The two-week rest
period, for example, was not necessary; the mitayos
currently worked during their off weeks as mingas
, and
quite voluntarily. The mills that Monclova had denied
Indians, moreover, would cost the crown some 300,000
£esos in lost quintos every year that they were out of
production.
The Conde de la Monclova's attack on the azo^ueros
and on the de facto was not over. m an interi.
report to the crown of August 15, 1692, the Viceroy had
not only defended the twelve points of the April 27 order
he had proposed that the rait, be abolished altogether.
Monclova argued that Lagunez had proven beyond any doubt
that Potosi was no longer important enough to warrant the
continuation of such an oppressive institution as the
mita. The Viceroy left the final decision to the Council
of the indies and the King, but he strongly suggested that
all Of the problems that were caused by the mita could best
be solved by its extermination. included with his proposal
was an account of his correspondence with Archbishop LihSn
during the early part of 1692, which Monclova claimed
showed a change of opinion on the Archbishop's part against
the mita. This was particularly important because Linan's
arguments while Archbishop of Charcas had helped to defuse
the abolition movement led by the Conde de Lemos fifteen
years earlier. The Viceroy repeated his call for the
elimination of the mita when he sent the crown an account
of Enrlquez' activities at Potosi on October 21, 1693.^^
The various post-Palata representations about the mita,
from all sides of the issue, began to arrive in Madrid
during 1693. In March, the Council's Fiscal responded to
Monclova's March 15, 1690 comments on the commotion that
had been generated by Palata's reforms. He suggested that
the council adopt a wait-and-see attitude until further
reports were received. The Fiscal was decidedly opposed
to the mita, however, for he amplified the Viceroy's
co:nment that there were no mining repartinuen^ in New
Spain, and he dwelt at length on the unsavory means by
which the Indians were dragged to PotosI and kept there.
on April 2, 1694, the Council of the Indies ordered
that all of the materials in its archives on the mita,
from LinSn's viceroyalty forward, be brought together.
Soon thereafter, on July 13, Charles II responded to the
azo^ueros' latest petition by ordering the Council to
resolve the conflict between them and the Conde de la
Monclova once and for all time.-'-^"'-
The decision that the Council faced was not whether it
should confirm Palata's repartimiento or that of Monclova.
Rather, once it had received the latter's August 15, 1692
report, it had to find a compromise between Palata's
reformed mita and Monclova 's proposal that the system be
abolished. Given Charles' preoccupation with his quintos
,
which was more than evident in his July 13, 1694 edict,
the Council decided to confirm the twelve points in
Monclova 's April 27, 1692 directive. The mita would
continue, and thus the royal quintos
, but at a lower level
than Palata had provided for and hopefully free of the
problems that his program had created . "''^^
The Council of the Indies passed final judgement on the
2
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the matter in January of 1697. The Viceroy's twelve
points were transformed by the Councilors into nine of
their own:
That the mitayos and the mingas were to r^r^Ur.the same wage, without ex^i^fen. ^ ^ "^^
Th^^ ^H^""^ ^° service in silverat the substitutes were to be n;,iH thf
wage as the mitayos . ^^"^ ^^"^^
That the travel allowances were to be paid
?ra^^led1er°d^y^?^-^^^^ ^^^^ four^Llgues
^'
ITil toHh^Jr''^^ ^^^^^^ allowance was to be
Po^osl? ^
^^""^ ^^^^^ departure for
^* Wo ^^;^"^^tayos were to be paid directly,
7 ^hft ^h^ ^
Corregidor de PotSsi and a notary.
ll^l
treasury officials at Potosi
8 ^h^^ I?,
"^^intam lists of the mitayos
.
». T at the Indians were not to work beyond thehours or period of their obligation /underany pretense. ^ ' unu
^'
^^f^"" ^^^^ °f obligation had beencompleted, the mitayos were to return home. 103
A significant addition to this list was the Council's
proposal that the office of Corregidor de PotosI no longer
be sold. Enrlquez' performance had made it clear, it said,
that the post was too important to be trusted to the
highest bidder. Those who had been nominated to fill the
office in the future, the Council argued, should be
reimbursed for the donations that they had made to win
nomination; and in the future, the corregidores de Potosi
should be named solely on the basis of ability . "'^'^
The crown sent the Council's rulings to Peru in a
series of cgdulas of February 18, 1697. The response to
the nine points in Peru was generally pdsitive, with the
exception of the firc;+- mv,^ tv j.rn t rst. The Audiencia de Charcas, the
royal treasury officials and others noted that the^
would not work for the lower wages that the mita^
received, and they argued that skilled laborers should be
paid more than unskilled workers.
Previous royal and viceregal decrees had been ignored
in Charcas, and it would be a mistake to assume that the
1697 cidulas resolved all of the outstanding issues
concerning the mita. indeed, the Audiencia de Charcas
said that the lowering of the mingas ' wages really would
mean very little, because the Indians were all paid
according to quotas, not by the day. The azogueros were
more unhappy than ever, for the two repartimientos of
the preceding decade had disrupted the de facto mita to
such an extent that confusion was the order of the day
in the provinces . -"-^^
One problem that the Palata repartimiento had created
was the involvement of non-caciques in the delivery of the
niita^. In 1693, for example, the caciques of Aymaya
(Chayanta) complained to the Audiencia de Charcas that
Monclova and Enrlquez had required them to deliver more
Indians to Potosi than they were accustomed to sending.
Their corregidor had answered their protests to him by
sending two judges to their village to round up the Indians
for the mita
.
They and their men waited for Easter Sunday
to strike. Once everyone was at mass, they blocked all the
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means of escape fro. the church and began arresting the
Indians. Many were chased up, down and around the altar
itself. With the judges using the gated baptismal area as
a Dail for those that they had already captured. The
caciques were outraged by the judges' behavior, and they
said that it would be a very long ti.e before the Indians
returned to Aymaya, let alone went to mass.
Another problem was the question of immunity from the
inita for the forasteros. They had been involved in the
system extralegally even before Palata incorporated them
in his repartimiento, either in person or via contributions
Of money for service in silver. The exemption from mita
obligation that Monclova had ordered for the forasteros on
April 21, 1692, and which the Council had confirmed in the
1697 cedulas, took some time to take effect. in 1698, four
forasteros who were residents of Paria-Alonso Chui,
Pascual Parejava, Felipe Canasa and Alonso Choque-were
taken to Potosi as mitayos by capitan enterador Martin
Challapa. They were set free only after a protracted legal
battle in the Audiencia de Charcas."^^^
On the whole, however, the reforms that the Conde de
la Monclova introduced in 1692 created an official mita
that was a miniature of the system that Toledo had founded
120 years earlier. With only thirty-four of the mills
receiving the 1,367 mitayos each week, the ratio that
Toledo had used was paralleled (he had assigned 4,000
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Indians to 100 ™iU3,
. More importantly,
„onclova allowed
the de facto^ to function once again. He permitted
service in silver, he exempted the forasteros and he
reduced the caciques, quotas of ^itaios to levels that were
possible to
.eet. The Viceroy did not destroy Palata-s
^SE^££iaiento; it was in the process of self-destructing
When he arrived in Peru. Monclova tailored a new official
Mta to fit the realities of late-seventeenth century Upper
Peru, in so doing, he guaranteed that the system would
survive into the eighteenth century.
Summary
The reign of Charles II has been characterized by some
as the epitomy of Hapsburg decadence. The Council of the
Indies is supposed to have been ineffective, the colonial
bureaucracy is said to have been inept and corruption is
alleged to have pervaded all the levels of the government.
From the limited perspective that is provided by the
administration's approach to the PotosI mita, however, the
opposite seems to have been true. The Duque de la Palata
completed an eighty-three province census, and he drew up
a new repartimiento—a goal which had eluded nine of his
predecessors. The Conde de la Monclova chaired a lengthy
investigation of the problems that had been caused by
Palata 's program, and he designed a repartimiento of his
own. The Council of the Indies studied both repartimientos
own.
and it then produced a compromise solution of its
The Hapsburg government of Peru functioned; it may not
have solved all of the mita's problems, but it did a
rather remarkable job.
The Duque de la Palata completed the general census
through Sheer persistence. His reEartimiento
, however,
included too many novelties and it was implemented much
too quickly. The changes that he Introduced were
complicated and largely misunderstood by the caciques
and the Indians that they affected, and the speed with
which the alterations were enforced created a crucible
effect. The Indians- flight and the caciques - inability
to deliver the mitayos in persons were accentuated. The
abolition of service in silver and the inclusion of the
"^'^^ " impossible for the caciques to meet
their obligations at all.
Palata had been motivated by a sense of justice—of
parity of the forasteros with the originarios
-and direct
royal orders to increase the number of mitayos that was
serving at Potosi. His repartimiento incorporated those
elements into its design. But because it was based on
the premise that the Toledan mita could be re-established,
the Palata repartimiento ignored the fact that the caciques
made the system work. They delivered the Indians and the
silver that met the obligations of their provinces. The
inclusion of the forasteros and the ban on service in
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Silver
,,.3 „aae the^ „ore fair,
... the, aXso
made it fail.
The Conde de la Monclova arrived in Peru after a
successful tenure as viceroy of New Spain. The lack of
iSEartimlento labor for the Mines of that real™ led hi.
to question the need for the PotosI ^ita. His initial
doubts about the system were reinforced by the avalanche
Of complaints about Palata's reforms that was waiting for
him upon his arrival. Those complaints were transformed
by an equally unsympathetic Fiscal LagOnez into a 668-fclio
Indictment of the mita, and they eventuated in the
Viceroys twelve points of April 27, 1692. The official
mita was reduced to a mere third of what it had been under
Toledo, the forastercs were freed from mita obligation and
service in silver was permitted. The caciques were again
able to play their traditional role, and the mita lived on.
The twelve points were not the Conde s final statement
on the mita, however. They were soon followed by his
proposal that the system be abolished. Charles II assigned
the Council of the Indies the responsibility for
reconciling the azoqueros complaints about Monclova 's
actions and the viceroy's call for the abolition of the
mita. Because the King was concerned that his quintos
from PotosI should continue, the Council chose to adopt
the twelve points as a compromise between potosino
interests and viceregal policy.
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su filigressia V la Indios de
Abril lis!?" 4 L ?hr^n^'^" ^ Prelados en 7 de
the ViH5?5;-s sfc^etarv pll.'fj'^"^^ Vernal,the priest| why th^er^^'^^ere^^^^d^tin-r^he"^^^:!^^
porqe'^se !el SiSre?"p''r" ' Curaf^ot?bo
'
en las Irov^n^tff
el Padron, porqe en publioandolo
,ueL\^ in°L^L%"lar e",^^^SeTsl\^^ d^^^^e^SJ^-y^assi conviene ae ^^04-=, r-^v^-, i seguir, y
nar;. <.T \, ^
Carta la tenga VS. reserbada
curL ""^^^ reciviendo los Padrones de los
rna^o?' no.
remita para qe aqui me sirban de Libromay r p r donde pueda reconocer las diliqencias an^hacen los Corregidores I quienes se ha de cSme^er
S'coste^?^ irr^ la r5 HL'iend:Pnfnf^^ ' ^'^^''^ ^""^^^ grabar con ellos S losPueblos de cuyo alivio, y remedio se trata "Ezquerra Abadia, 491-492, briefly notes this process.
24. AGI, Charcas 270, no. 1 (see note 70, Chapter VI).
25. AGI Charcas 270, no. 15, second item (see note23—especially the quote there)
.
26. AGN, Sala IX, 14-8-10, f. 244, "A los cvras de las
l^Pa^at^'f ^^K^-^Z'"
^i--' 20.VII.1683 (by the Duque dea Palata), 1 f. see AGI, Charcas 270, no. 15, secondItem (see note 23) for the same sentiments. aIso o?value: AGI, Charcas 270, no. 16 (see note 2); and AGI,
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Charcas 270, no Ifl
council Of the indies on tS'?».^°' ^^^"^ °^ the3 fs. °" hat letter, Madrid, 18. V. 1685,
27. AGI, Charcas 270 nn nqve han de gvardar los Corr=;J ' ^^em, "Instrvcciongeneral que se ha de hazer S ^of? T """"^cion
"
jurisdicion," by the Suque dl la pf • ™° su
.n^?K ASN, Sa!a IX 14-f Lrma, 24.VII.1683,a other instruction hi r^ ' '1^-10- fs. 242-243.
general census a^d those toat'^^i? ^^^^^ «'^°"t tAe
P?l^i^t"9.^"<^i^"-' SmI? 24!vir?683^"^??^^^ completionPalata's
"RelaciSn" (see noie 1), vi,' 2t7!l28f
28. AGI, Charcas 270 nn i =; f ^ .and AGN, Sala IX, 14-8-10, 242^2!? r'*^" '"^^ ^8)
,
the change to two years-^hilh took i^? '^^ ^8) . For
3b 36, describes Palata's deei=!-ir.n= „ ^^^8-229. Holmes,
repartimiento The Vicerov^s ^ ^^"^"^ ^"<3 the
2i.VIII.1683"(AGI Cha?r^« °f
discusses this pJicess lee ; 2' ^1^°Indies' end-of-the-cln^urv ' Council of the
21-see note 91, Chapter Ilf^nS^J?"^' ^73, no.32 (see note 19) . ^ *' ^""^ Charcas 270, no.
29. AGI, Charcas 270, no. 15, first item (see note 27).
27o!°no.*?^'(L'e"Sote'2'6°,'."°ndlG^^'^."°*^ '
'
Charcas
(see note 19) . ^""^ ' Charcas 270, no. 32
to the croi^A,'Lima?'lo"Sf Tsk'^i ^^^^ ^^^^t-Da quenta a d del e^J^H^ ' ^•V El Virrey del Peru,
general de los'indios fremiti numerazion
xitt:\T,.rrH -^^^^-,^L^?frdu^daTq;i ^^l"
repa^^idrpa'?: L"\°ltfss^!"
numeraziones que si le h^^^
32. AGI, Charcas 270, no 20A "Potm- => i -,
?ror.e-:z%°n --.^^ J-L-r -"re\-L^^ra
Indios," Lima 12 VI leT^ 1^
numeracion g.l de los
10.VI.1685r lo ?; v^? (?--the copy is dated, by Bernal,
results of ^ho. Villegas said that one of the other
more priefts L^n^r appeared that there wereu s in some places than were necessary. Perevra
de^ogkffc"! gene^ri!"
""'^"^""^
^ "transfojmaciln^^'^^'
33. AGI, charcas 270, no. 20A <see note 32)
end-of-the-Sentury^sSllSa^r"?.^'^ °^ ^'^^ ^"-^i" in its
note 91, Chapter L) SLt^^'' ''''""^ ^73, no. 21-see270 no. 21, the Dug^e de la Pa1^^^?""^ " Charcll16.11.1686, 2 fs • "PI ,,7 lata to the crown, Lima
se le^ofre^e Jon ;.islt lllVest^l ^^P-sen?; l^^^e<^el ano pasado ,ue trata^L'^f^Le^a^i^; fr.^.'^
^-^^
19/the Council orthe'lndr^^?^^' 270 no1685, 2 fs.; "A 25 de Mavn Madrid "'25 VPone en las R.s ^Los d^^v ^L^T/t'^^^' • •*de la Palata, en que da auenta ^1 1 ""^^ adjunta del Duqueen orden al mejor cobro de ?a nifn S ^^^^ disponiendoel Cons.o dice lo que se L ofreof ^^^^^sxgn and "Co.o parlce a? conL' •o^:^.itfa'^^br^c!'^ ^
36. AGI, charcas 270, no. 21 (see note 34).
to th^ croln.'iZi:%'l^\Tse
'I'
J""^ ^^^^ Palata
Da guenta a v.M. d^l b^en estado f^"'
'^^ ""^^^^^ Peru.
Numeracion g.l y acomn^S= en que se halla la
Retasa de lis que se han dr/''^"^^^^^ Provision delas de la Provide v^^cas hechas ya
ofreze en esta matLia " Thf^n ' ^/i"^ ^° le270, no. 22A, "Nueva P^ovic^nn S^^n"""^^^ Charcasde pagar los lndiorderRepa??i^Ln^^%"^ '^^^^^^^Prova de Vilcas guaman que estuM ff° '^^ ^^^"^ ^^^^^^ laJuan Palomino como subzesor^o t fncomendados en Don
en la r1 hazienda por f!l?I t ilt"! ^^1°^^^° Y oy lo estanfs. For another defense o? " sin fecha, 25
270, no. 26, the Duque le la Pallta'to11. X. 1687, 1 f . "Fi ^TiTt
-La F ia the crown, Lima,
estado en que s4 hflla^^^ del Peru. Represents a V.M: el
de los indios de ^as Prn...- ^^^^^S"^^ Numeraci6n g 1
primer aviso remii^r/un manf^ ^T""^ ^ eldeste negocio.-'^Th'ougrnot'^erLc?
'?a?ata'"" ' T^^^has gone better than he had expected. ^^"^^^
38. AGI, Charcas 270, no. 22 (see note 37).
indio^ assrvo'luntarios
'ITnllZs''^^^^^^ ^^'^^ ^las Haziendas de E™?ni'oo ^ ' • ^^'^uilas , y agregados I
4 ae la Palata ... en virtud de Cedula de su Magestad
and reproduced as an a^pilfS^ W^'r/^'the John Carter Brown EibraJ^ Prnl^ ^^""^"^ ^°Pi^ inNO. 22). It is not Sated save fo? ihr^^^' ^^^^ Lfor handwritten dates are bllLf ^ .P^"" (spaces leftSala IX, 14-8-10, fs ?8-44 ?hi; ^^^^^^^ ^^PY is AGN,16.x. 1687. ^ ^^^t ^°Py is dated Los Reyes,
40. Zavala, Servicio personal, ii, 180-183.
ex.mo^-s.o?^Ou^:i:--J 2^A. ^Copia de Carta ,.e el
Arzobispo de los ch;,rn;,= * ^scrivio al s.or
Presste^de aquella rJ a^!^,^^^^ juntandose con el
confiriesen la reoartic^ni^^^?' ^ ^^^^^^'^^ de Potosi
a aquellos AzogSI?:rc'Sn?SrL' ereS'dr! '^^^^^^de cada uno." Lima, 18 III Tfifta l^s haziendas
no. 29, President ihrisJav^l Me^fa fo-;H''^'' ''^^^^^^ ^70,21.1.1689, 1 f "Tnfn^^= crown. La Plata,
desp.o de Arm da ^f^ando en Potosi en el
VirLy Duc^rde l^'pa^L^fpra'^ t^^^alT'l'''r'^^.sese en su Comp.a a aq.lla ciu d a? 1 i S^""^^
enrriquez correg.or de aa Ua v7i ?^ °- ^'^ ^^i^
punta^ a PntnlT r .^^^^ ymportava poner estefjunt x otosi p^^ el dpc;r';:^or^im to , - ,
de Inos". ACT rLr-^=o ??A ®^ ^ halla pr faita
'
'
Charcas 270, no. 31, the Duque de la Palat^to the crown, Lima, 18 it ifiSQ i ^ u i ri- i'aia a
d^ la Sudafde'lfpf? Ministros de L j^Ata
obrado^n if M ^^^^ ^f"" ^econocimiento de todo loado e la Numeracion g.i de los Indies para la
6 fs ^^Pa?a?a no.'^ "^t^l
Potosi," La Plata, 19 .X.1688,
Ll^' /^i^t tes that the census took longer than had
^aSia 4Sf d?.'''' "Advertencias" (see note^9) . EzquerraAi^adl , 92, iscusses the impact of the earthquake.
"o 1^' <^u-^^^^
relates the work of the committee in hisRelaci6n (see note 1), VI, 230; and in AGI, Charcas 270,
5?*J^ 0?^/""°^^ AGI, Charcas 270, nos.L u ^^^^ ""^^^ • ^^^^^ ^^ote the crown soonafter his arrival that he believed the general census wouldsolve Potosi 's problems, and that he felt fifty mitayos
43. AGI, Charcas 270, no 27a ^o««^/ "u. ^ /A (see note 41).
44. AGI, Charcas 270, no 3?a
^?22Heros said fifty-seven = ^f^^ "^^^^ • The
Gremio de azogueros to the c^own* III <^ Deputies of thefs. Palata said 2 821 Tn^^f ' Potosi, 21.vili.i692 10
^^in-ri. in AG?,'6ha'rcaf27r nr%2'"fCrespo, "La 'Mita,'" 182 uses ^h^^ ^ ^^^^ 19);"^
"Relaci6n" (see note 1) Pa^f^! figure, m hisfigure (VI, 230)? NOTE. ihe%;^^^^ ^'^^^ ^^^i^^sHanke and Rodriguez is incor?^^f^?S''^S^^°^ provided bymark thousands has bein ren^^^o^* ^^^^^^ ^^ed to2,829 Indians in the Sta nr^? ""^^^ ^ "°" thus the20,829. The Viceroy ^e^^l~¥ T "^^'^^P^^sented asthe areas added by Palata in ap? ""^JJ^^^^^ later notedeclaration by the Conde de m' 273, no. 4A, a
1692, 2 fs. ^he Council ol the ?ndiel?' 5"^^^'summary (AGI, Charcas 273 no 2^^! ^nd-of-the-centuryprovides the total of 56 04e ;.J ~u^ Chapter A)figure. Ezquerra Abadla 49? f break-down of thatincluded in the mita ordlnar?; fnf ^^^^2,829 Indians wereregions on 495-49Tr Se mtta-nr^? the newly added
one-third of one-seventh ^,T^^^^^^ ""^^ a strict
Toledo's re^LIS^s"see n:te'45 f^ti"percentages)
. The thr<=o 1 7 . , 45 or the varying
ento, over those !den?ilied bv gSL^I^^ £epJti|i-included a second nwn^J k . ? Gonzalez de Santlii^^^
(AGI, Chapels 270 nS 32I
d^GuzmSn Maldon^do
figure in a battle ^^ly. It"^^^ ""^^^ ' ^o^ld later
usi Of those'll^f MllT'to'' fAntonio de Guzmgn Maldonado Lhrf'i ' capitSn don
mita de su ingenio de r^n^l los cuarenta indios de
que le ha qu??a3o el conSne'vel'.v"
"'^^^^
villa," Potosi, l.IV-?9 V 16 9 9 ir?^' ^T^^^^gi^^^ de dichax iv iy. . 99, 91 fs. (MC 1148; MOM 694)
?n^?oo se extiende la obligaci6n de darmdios mitayos para las minas e ingenios de Potos? T^r..pueblos que hasta ahora estaban exL?os y L sefi^L el
orden general que en ec;<= ^4-
servicio," Lira!, 2.Klt%ls fMl\lT°L'''' ^^tepercentages of Indians reoui^=S I ' • Theof residence: q red depended upon their place
17 per cent (service once every six years)
-al,
Po?:s??"cL\''i" ^--ty leagLs^'f
Porco P^if? S^P^"^^®^' Chayanta,
16 per cent- 1^1 ' " ^"'^ Carangas
^l!rI^—a- :Sd^ia^ p-t-f--
and^PaSi; ^^^-^
15 per cent (service once every seven years) -
ij „^ Asillo and Lampa14 per cent (-rvice once Ivery seven years) -
The Re;,! 7\ . Canas y Canches
'
Of 4Tro^Tx''"%TletT ^|E2£ti2iento its sta^p of
Indies' end-of-thel^entu^v^,™ "5,*° "'^^ Council of the
21-see note 91, Chapter II ' ^''^ "3, no.
Albornoz?°76-?7?'^diLuss;s"?his', " ^^nchez-
Council's end-of-t^r^ff? " letter. See, also, the
ll;rih%"°^"^°' -^pte"'i^r/"^es^o,'^^j; '^^^^'i^^
"BTHlg^Le^^?fl33^^??!^^1e^?hlf^°2,^^^-" ----
n^T^ro^i-rrin^^the^ ^^^^i^^^^^^correct, but one must^; <n 5 ^""^ Basadre ari
from th^ sixteen oblLaK^ """^^ migration
offset by an increase^?^ ^^"''^^ l"^"^ possibly,
Peru. sLcSez-Mbornor ^^^f"^""? provinces of Uppe^
Toledo's 1573 census"a°nd the'l'ssr^ntf-for t^n^'^
fOf ^^^s/^tz^: ri^ ti\^\arl""r
noli Ty'.'c^lTtl^^l ^•^^ --in\^bo\\'ir! ee
Toledo-; 1573 IL^ks are nl^^K K?^^ however, that
1683 figures a^e!
Probably inaccurate, just as the
success of"thl^Dugue"ria'p;!^ta"°'?L^I;^ comparative
that the entire process would'be'^;ompJltIrby°Le"'^trml''his successor arrived in AGI Charr;^^ 7in 741 ^ TPr^v. ^-u^ u • ^-^'^ cn cas no. 27 (see notei)
.
For the chain of events which resulted in thenomination of the Conde de la Monclova as Viceroy of Perusee Hanke and Rodriguez, Los virreyes
, Peru VII (nof 286^'
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48. AGI, Charcas 270, no 2 i-h^the crown, 6.VIII.I68I, 2 fs'- '^nl^t.—i^ °^ Pacajes toque reciven del gremio de los ' acoat^f ^^'^ vejacionesquales ynstan en que el entero So^? Potosi, losultimo repartimto^ue hico ll a^n ^^^^ el
y sandi empadronando en aauel tS. '''' Carvajal,tributaries, siendo as? auf^n ? Yndios ^
'
hallaron 1B510 y aSnque an sonit/^"^^^ 680 se
revisita no lo an consLn?^^ ^^'^^ concedade q.e remiten ?esam?o"?^the ??80 ^^P^^^^^
"Mfo de campo Juan B^la^ques de OviH^I^ conducted by
origiAartfdel puebl^de'r i-^-
sobre que don pL^nciLo^oSi^^inS^ de Pacajes,dicho pueblo, no e^v-i-r-^, ! n ^7' ^^terador de la mita de
San Francisco at lotosl^ <iondr^^?"f^ convento depara mandarlo a las llborf^^^ ^^""r*^ sirviendo,
23. VI. 1683, 32 fs (MC iSfo. MOM^???' "^f ^^"^ ^""^ P°tosI,92-95, conuients on the pro?4ct?on SSnchez-Albornoz,Indians by hacendado, afforded to runaway
cacigHes;^sernotfgl
: be^o^^^f^I^J!"*^
they reached with
en ll-puTlo de'puna"°;ro;i:c?fS T'"'' -sldente
similar import, see ANB, EC 1689, no. 31, "Capltulos
Fernandez, gobernador del pueblo de Laja, corregimiento de
census, arrendamientos de tierras, servlcio personal v
Iflos m!tfvordI?''" H? "'^'"^ ^ •• Au^ento
K
"^itay s del pueblo de Laja por esfuerzo delgobernador FernSndez, f. 163, 229v. Privilegios de hijos
ll8r?fi?r%^?V^'r^^^ ^ 423, 424, 446,"'1685-1689, 346 fs. (MC 1093a; MOM 682). In this instance.
l'nliat"h'rh!fL\^'?orcIblv\'»t'^°"f^ ^ disgruntled
was then denied the '^MT^^.t lt,lil,^lT^°
'
Of th^
=SSi'abour^-^s"'a^rr"^^ '''^ co.,,.,ntstranscription of the oulstto.,-^ T ""^ P"^ovides a full
on pages 113-149 (froS Sala xt??^"??',^ ^" ^PP^ndixServicio personal II 190-1 Q? 23-10-2). Zavala,
t55tK5Hy^f-thS^Aaoi;;,n»= ^ describes the
took plaL in'potlff^l|Si£ff2£S|. The questioning
was produced on 24
.
Ill
.
iSS^hfEscJivfno 'jSn de^fff^
53. Ibid
.
ooInp^;ints^lbout"^^f "^"^ ^'"^^ ^" •=°<3i" of
ne^^S^l^'^i ?r:f?a\'=Bo"?h^;r:^en?!t^?^r' ^"^^
in^?L^^lSN'^<se°fLL^ff^^;; "?9-169^?^:;i'^are housed
Sala IX, 10-3-7 6^9 f='
'^'^^^^^'^
•
The first is AGN,
La Paz, Tomina P??avf A,-;""^ '"^^ provinces of
it perSned L ^«'"°^^d because
e-k- ^^^^^^^^^
? H af ™ --"-en?aI1e^^=,^^?r:4 in
Priests 'about Vh^ ""f^ transcribing complaints by rural
=e^ t: h'r„ir--/--ir^
.
-
he^^^^^ ir-^^^r^-^B-
r?a"^o-io^-L?-c^^caV3,^?? iS.%^-^cij° e^
"^""^ ^'"^ If Monclova Virreydestos Reynos sobre la numeracion Gen.l del afto de 683 y
foTttt. T"''" 19. III. 1691, 2 fs. A cover letter
« M 1 S?^' ^^""^ ^° is AGI, Charcas 271, no.8, Manuel Obispo de Cuzco to the crown, Cuzco, 3. X. 1692?
Ll\ Bishop says that the corregidores
^-J !
^^"sus; that many Indians had been counted many
.i^^V^^?^ T"" ^^"^ "^^^^ obligations failed to take intoaccount the demographic changes of six years; and that theIndians were fleeing to live with the infidels. The
response to Palata's reforms requires much more attentionthan that which I can give it here; I have copious notes onthe two AGN tomes, and suspect that others will be found
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for the second volume 'c?
-Fr^i-;^^
once Dr. Villanuev^s Ltlrltl fnt ""^"^'^ "4 77" forward,the AGN documentation 1 hone >^e"nited withstudy Of the provinci^i^e^^L-
^olhe^^ia^^^^^elor^^r
54)!'•pa:a^r::?L''?rcorLS^ ^^^'-^"O" (^eenote
"Relacien" (see note 1) 5?^^^^ ^ activities in his
Albornoz, 77, comments on ' SSnchez-in colonial PeruTlnera^L L^^'^^^^""" ^° noveltiesthat such balanceI?"|"omon-like
"so^itionf ^^^^
^LSIIS.^^^^enemies of the mita rhJ^r^ . caciques as the
re-%^I-^a-te^Sr™^^^^ -^^n;. .1-see
56. "Representaciones y gueias lfiftq-i^;Qn«i /54)
. The problem with i-h^ 3 i'
J-&89 1690 (see note
Abadia, 492-495 Dobyns 509-IlO^^^ ^^^^^ Ezquerra
54)^^*Hoi'm^?''^?r^^''f°''^^ ^ quejas, 1689-1690" (see note
donr in ' ^"^^ had certainly opened theo to their incorporation with its 1681 cidula?
^^^58. "Representaciones y quejas, 1689-1690" (see note
the various sources for the
21 Viri?89'';" °- 24!lV Ld
bu^ Jo'rPdn;. ^h""^ ^^'^•^^^''^^^^ Palata's reforms,
the fora^t^rn.^^
originarios
'
tribute by one-third andsteros ' by one-half, according to the Council of
no 21 til
^"?-°f-the-century summary (AGI, Charcas 2?3,. —see note 91, Chapter II).
60. Palata observed that his "Advertencias" had beenineffective m his "Relaci6n" (see note 1), VI, 238 Hissuccessor, the Conde de la Monclova, echoed that fac^t when
of-v^'^M^''^^'^ ""^""^ °^
Palata
-s reforms: BNB, MSS 4, fs. 279-287, Provisi6n del virrey (Monclova): Senalase nuevo ordenpara el regimen de la mita de Potosl, abandonando el que
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27T/?2i^^^^" que sobrevinferon en T ' nume^osos.IV.1692 (MC lUO; MOM 685K ^Plicaci6n," Lima,
caused by^Hapsburg'goee^'il^e^t'^^ -rehave been more successfurh?^ structures; that he would
rather than Charles IIp^ ^^^^^^ ^"^er Charles inthat Paiata's chances'for s^'e^: ^f^^' ^^2-495, says''by his replacement so soon a?ter hT ^^^^^^^^^ loweredduced. ^ "^^^^ ^^ is reforms were intro-
62 AGI, Charcas 270, no.
Antonio
secretary to the
' Couniirorj^rTn^'"''''Duque de la Palata's secretary! ^^^""^^
San'Mhian'^o^'-Seftor Sec^eta^io" ' °.^ciix to "Sen <=^f^nr'^i-::,-^A ^» ^^^^ii^.o aela cap na ,e GaIeonls!"=^^?^^J?l. °fi^f'^ "^^
libro y pap.s que se le oe^if
entrego y endandole el
se le ordeno";^AGI Charcff ^7} '^'^'"""^ ^1 Cons.o como
;senor Secretario, •'• Sdi::%o"xii??69 '°
la Palata d?1o irava nar. f^r P^Pa^<J"^ ^1 S.r ouque de
3A, Contadir PedJo 'Antonio d^' r "1, no.
CSdiz, 25.1.1692 I f A?T rK is '^°=^Ph Bernal,
Antonio de Ca^tjj^rto^oi^^o^'dfvln^t^ ??ii^?69r^rf •
servTn"^' ."^ ''^ hand, and that h?s iopy was
Chlrcal 2n^ nf "'^^ original. See /also? AGI,i-narc s 71, o. 9A, Joseph Bernal to Antonio Ortiz de
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Otalora, Madrid, 27 x IfiQ^ i ^
65. AGI, Charcas 270 nn 7-:> ^to the crown, Lima, 15
. lii ?690 l fi^ ^"""^^ Monclovade la Monclova da quenta i'xm^' ? Virrey Conde
a hallado el GovL?no d^ es^Ss ReiLf^° General^en quePeru." The letter is transcrfhf^ ! ^ Provincias del§eruano. Documentos para sS hiSfn^'''^ included in Virreinato
1^ virrei^eJT-C^Hd^df^ goleccion de^iHii"Paz-SoldSn Sind~G^i^7rrTJ^ Manuel M^ri^iF^
Lima: Publicaciones de? fnllf^^l Castillo (3 vols!
^
1954-1955), I, i?-23. i^''^^ Hist6rico del PerG,
17-18. Th4 letter ?; ^ Pertinent material is on paaes
fef^Ae-century sLtarv (AGI °rH^'' °' thiTHdlis •note 91, Chapter L) For th^ r.^^??^ ^l-seeto the repor?, AGI, charcas 270 no'^'i^? Fiscal 's response1693, 4 fs. ^n , . 33A, Madrid, 27.m.
in ^ts end-of-Se-c:nturrsS^'"'^.^^ ^--il
21-see note 9f cSfpter^ir^^^L^^f ' ^^^^^^^ 273, no.
the complaints from the D^ovi'noo=
azocjueros observed that
sympathetic ear In AG^? ?ha^cas 27r'nn''?^r^ "Joseph Bernal c;;=.ir! ^"^^^^^^ ^^1/ o. 7B see note 44).
orders from Pa?ajf un??/?K^ correc^idores had suspended
arrive in Peru UGI chL^^^ 5??^^ Monclova couldir-eru (AG , C arcas 271, no. 9—see note 64)
"Reor^sen^^Aio^^^ ^"^^ °f two volumes of the
I . ^
quejas, 1689-1690"-see note 54) 562-565V, Manuel de Ribero Leal to the Conde de la MonclovaSipe-sipe, 11. XI. 1690. n i ,
bni-^^Ao/^'^"'^^' 5^' ^^^^ t^^t azoqueros were jubilantut they were not. See AGI, Charcas 271, no. 7B (see nSte
offif^^l''''^ °r ^^^"^P'^ ^^^^^ unhapplness. The threecials who drew up the repartimiento (Enrfmi^. Mesl!and Gonzalez de Poveda) said^he azogueros we?e u^set w?th
no! 32A--^Iee'n:L'4?)?^'^ th^^fiFF^AGI , ChLcas^N'S,
70. AGI, Charcas 270, no. 32 (see note 19).
449
/I. Ezquerra AbadT;:^ aqothree (Enrlquez, Mesla and rA ^^^^ committee ofthe 2,829 IndiaAs in the mi?a ord!n/" noted thatincrease of 1,401-1/2 overrf.^^^^^^^ represented an1.427-1/2. The Dugue de L Palatf'^^f ^^^^^^^Y of onlycomparison in his "Relacifin" included that
noted in note 45 ? "°te 1), vi, 230- t
and Rodriguez copy is in^erro °' ^^^^^^^ in the Hanke
72. AGI, Charcas 270, no. 5 (see note 9).
73. BNB, MSS 4, fs 27q-9Q-7 /AGI, Charcas 273, ko 3 IL cIJT^ ^0) . See, also,crown, Lima, 31 .kll .iel[ ^^Tl fs "e? ^°"^lova to theMonclova Da quenta a V.M del 2;;.^^ ^^rrey Conde de lade Potosi, effectos que caus6 t.^ ^""^ Mitaindios que mando hacer su Antecesorv^^?'^".^^^"^'tiene vno y otro neaocin «n^K? ^ ^ ^"^ estado que oy
Relatores que asistin a ia S^^? °
vn papel firmado de los
sobre ambas materias nor dondf ^""^ mandado formarindividualmente!" reconocen mas
74. BNB, MSS 4, fs 27q-9P7 f
says that the idea wf^^hl ^^^^ ""^^^ ^0^' Monclova
irL^ZLl'li
^6^o!^l^°L.^?f - -'^ao
cha^geTSl'^^all^inl
--"^
llfaueros. request that ,°oLtet 3fPov:da's;c°:;ed°to'the
fofthe slke°of"=Lrit^^"'ha:r t"^^ Canilla's
,
'b^tor Cla y I have s ayed with his sir name.
end-of thi^' 273, no. 21 (the Council of the Indies'- e-century summary-see note 91 Chapter II)!
76. BNB, MSS 4, fs
. 279-287 (see note 60).
AGI^'6harcir2?2 ^f.
^'i^^^roa's offerings are included in
^narcas 272, as the first item: "Quaderno 2Reducese 5 los escritos de Alegaciones que die?on el Fiscalde la Audiencia de Lima, y el Protector General de losNaturales de el Reyno de el Peru en defensa de los Yndios
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^^"^f^i:'t/J^!r'''\r one ofitem, "Al Rey Nfo SefioJ En of' ""^^^^as 271, lastEl Virrey de el ?eru ^oide Se L m "^^^'^^^ Yndias.
entero de la Mita dl^Potosi v^^i''^ ^ executado sobre elProvincias afectas I e?^a v^^T^^f^^^ tributes en lastres quadernos
- quaderno'lo cnlt^
^^^^^^ dividido en
de los Autos de la Nu^eracion Gen l^""^ Memorial ajustadode el Virrey Duque dHa PaJata v'!"^?^ executo de ordenhechas sobre los Despachos in^^^ ^epresentacionesCoordinado En 1;, t,,«? ®^ su virtud.
third vo?Smfis'inSuderL'Ll^^^ ^^"^ reconocerlos" ; the
"Quaderno 3q Comp^ehende ' 273, last item,
en la Junta para qufiSs MlnLfrnf ' "^'^^^^ P^°P^-o
compusieron L diLssen su parecer ^ ^^0^"'dieron. Y lo aue con 5 ff* -^^^ se le
Lima, y resolvio ervirJe^ .n^^^^°\^^^° Arzobispo de
1692 y RepartimLnto de Mita qSr^'dL^" -de lo resuelto Al fin t ? se dispuso en conformidad
Despacho cftadi, y vn refL^n
quaderno estS impreso el
los Curas de Yndios ?o df^ ^""^ P^^^ que
sus Dotrinal. Y ?a clrt IT ^ ^ todos los de
Testimonio haziendo succinta
Y dize su parecer en a?m^no= ""^^f^ion de lo que contiene.
determinado?" iLh o? ?hS han
those indices are transcrL^d""^^ n°i^r i^^^^ed, and
Archivo General de indf^^^^ k— ^ ^ fuentes en el
^^i^.^SfraffoT^
^tlrcll f,f\--\^f^^T; t:BNB, MSS 4, fs. 279:287 (see'no?! 6 : aSd AG^'cha?cas''^
15 vx??:i^,^^L'?s'^
^E\'^i"°^^V°^V°
Remite a VM^ te'^tf^oniofd^tolo^s^L^fpa1eL%^°a"Ss\°do%
:fhLiLo™^ l^l^^^^ .^e
^i-s-n ^-^S-pa^h- - - In ™fque se execut6 el ano de 1683 haziendo re^acion succinS'dPtodo lo que contienen, y dlHi su parecer sob^ealgSnospuntos que no se han determinado . " Lagunez' pace? ?s alsodiscussed by the Council of the Indies? end-of-?he-cen?irvsupry (AGI Charcas 273, no. 21-see note 91 . 'chapter
"T ;
The condensed version is AGI, Charcas 273, no. 2,Lie. D. Joseph de ... de Garrica
... y Lie. D. Ber do'Romero" to the Conde de la Monclova, Lima, 26.XIl!^691
78. AGI, Charcas 273, no. 5, Oidor Mathlas LagQnez tocrown, Lima, 15. IX. 1692, 10 f s
.
; "El Lizenciado Don
^las Lagunes Oidor de la Real Audiencia de Lima da quenta
the^^;unSro%^?L\^L\^e^t\^-i/- 4, fs. 279-2S7; and inCharcas 273, no. 21-serno?e 9? ^^^"r''^^^^ ^^^^Y (AG^?Quaderno 30" (see note 77°. ^^^P^er II). See/also/
Monclova. bnb, mss 4? fs 279 de laPointed £rovisi6n of 27.iv 1692 th^^? 1?°^^ theEzquerra AbidIi7~495-496 Th! ; ^^^^^^ is noted bydescribed in Aci, Charcfi 271 ^^^^^^^^^ involved are
^
the Archbishop of Lima^s discuss?in of 'Charcas 271, no. 6, Melcho^ °^ ^he process, agi,Lima, 1. IX. 1692, 20 fs "Lff'^^T ^^"^^ the crown,dado en q.to al aiust^'^^ Re iere el expediente que se a
que le dio pte e?'virrev ^J^^^^^^^ion gen.l de In.os de
"Quaderno 3q" (see nlll^^V ^""^ ^'^^"^ "^^^i^"'* ^nd
37-53\*
"Lp^^Ken'^o^ fSifli^dj: T'mmas e ingenios de PoCsI hechn ^ "'^^^ P^^^Monclova, virrey del Pe?f" Lima ^t^^."^^?/^^ 1^MOM 686). For the general' o^:^ ' • 'J^' ^^^^ (MC 1111;8.V.1692, AGN, Sala^ix ?4-f?lF^ ^^^^^^a, dat^dAlbornoz, 79-83, refer^ to the irM^A 50-145v. SSnchez-
ordinances that azogueros w^r^ to fn??^^''^
''^^
fs 53-64, "Provliliirfil virrey? Se deta^f' fordenanzas con arrealo a ill Z^i* allan las
deciding wh?ch mUls ™uld hf^ ^^^isjed responsibility for
their pirforraance to d«f» ''^
assigned mltayos
-based on
AGI, Charcas no ?n Vo ^^"^ "^"^^ in-^luded inde azogueros, lL? is Jsgf'z ?S ^""^3":? '° ^'^^the Indies' end-o? thl f ' ^""^ Council of
no. 2?--sle nSte qI rhrr"''?Tf™'^^ ^^arcas 273,
personal TT iQc , a, P*," • Zavala, Servicio
bS^fthe''"'"- that-the".??a™:fcS2
Ca-^te%^^.fH-t-gf.-n^ir^.\"o^%^^Lie"-
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provinces were o.U^atea un.er Monclova.s r,,arti^.
82. AGI, Charcas 271, no 7n^'-L . /D (see note 81).
83. ArzSns, Historia, ii, 363.
to the crowA,^Potos£/riv''l6 9 2^S"i^ republica de Potosi"en el Gov.o superior deaaueno: ^up.ca se pongade Poveda, Arcobpo de cha?cas L^^^^" ^ ^^^'"'^ ^^^^-^de los minerales, por ?a practic^ w ""^^^^^ descaecim.tose hallava." Also, agI
€^0^^971 ^"'^^''^^^^^^^of the Gremio de a^ogue^os S ' ^' Deputies1692, 6 fs.; "Refie^In ^os dano^ 20. IX.con la entrada de los ln?os^de ceduL'I/^" experimentandodestinadas a las minas rl^i n ^^"^^-^^ las Prov.as
Charcas 271, n^? 7B tsee notn4) ^
azogueros ' unhappiness wi^h r • u expresses the
Monclova, Potosi it viA^tly^ '^^ la
complaint in AGI Charcas '273 'no fi' .k'^^X ^"^"^"^ ^^eirGremio de azoaueros to ?L ' ^'^^ Deputies of the
(sent after ?heir pleas to 9-XIia693, 3 fs.
The conde de la Mo^cfo^a describeftheir'net"^" •Charcas 273, no in i-ul ^^^^ pes their petition in AGI,
Lima, 21.x. 169 3: Tfi IrS?^^. la_Monclova to the crown.
Da quenta a V M ^1 i" Virrey Conde de la Monclova
y r^pa^rtLionl; tl MltTlT'^'nts'l IT'' '""T ^'''^^^
^-a-^ii-—
^^^^^
With a ™iaf^inra\so\r€K^
allowances, the shift back to two weeks rest tnri Ihlexclusion of forasteros (that they considered Responsiblefor leaving the twenty-three mills without mitayoTbor)
86. AGI, Charcas 271, no. 7B (see note 44).
rr. T'^ Charcas 273, no. 4 (see note 77). For the
the date o?
' % -tline of Enriquez' activities? and
note ssf Pni?
^^^^^^1' AGI, Charcas 273, no. 10 see85). E rlquez wrote the crown that everyone in PotosT
cL\cas 27r'no""'ir%'H^ indirectly-in th^ mita? Tg^Charca 1, no. 11, the Corregidor Conde de CaKTTTas to
the crown, PotosI, 10 xil ifiQ^ ^ ^discussed his report to viceroi m ^• ^^^^ ^^^^^^ ^Isocopy of it)
; AGlf Charcas 27r^nn ^^S''^ ^^^^ included aCanillas to the Conde dP m' ?' Conde de5.fs. Enrlquez.'cS^ifLo^ irAcrchr'^^'^.^' ' ' ^^^2 ,Lima, 7. VI. 1692, 2 fs. (a Sodv)^/ k''''^^ ^A,discusses the comolai n^-<=% * ^^"chez-Albornoz , 79-83
to PotosI; al do^s councxfof tf"? returned''century sununary (agi Charr^i o?? Indies' end-of-the-Chapter li)
; aL ^Arz^ns'^^JJIo^ Tl\ llZTel
'
88. AGI, Charcas 271 no nn /^/i, . IIB (see note 87).
did^mive'^to'collec^^he^deb?; of * EnrlquezANB, M 116, no. 5, "iestimnn?^ 5 ?^ twenty-three mills:
obraron en Potos£ en c^p??^l°
las diligencias que se
conde de la Monclova, ^^re^de Li^^
la coinisi6n que el
Canillas, corregidor de PotL? ^^T' "^^"^^que expidi6 el licenciLo don m l< dictamen
Real Audiencia de Lima en
Matias Lagunez, fiscal de la
oficiales reales de df^h! ^f.^^^^^lta hecha por los
cantidades que en raz6n de^'nL?
'^''^^ cobranza de las
las veintit?gs cabezas d^ in ^ azogues estSn debiendode mita en e? a??i^o reparJE?n ^^^^^^on sin indios
virrey," PotosI 5 tv-r f/ ^^oi ^1 "^encionado
This dicumen? viJv uJfnl h' ^''^ ^1^^' ^88).
description of thl relat^onsh^rK^'r P^^^^^es a complete
and azggueros : a profile o? t^^
^^t^e^n silver merchants
271 nA if IL r ' -J ^^^^ """^^ ' ^GI, Charcas^'±, o. 12, the Corregidor Conde de Canill^Q -^i.^PotosI, 10.XII.1692, 6 fs., provides the Correaidor's °™'account. Enrique^ sent along to the crown evidence ?hatthe a^oaueros were happy with the compromlsrahey deniedthat they were pleased) as AGI, Charcas 271, no. La
Ha!L?^rr°"r Acogueros de vde de pitosi cerca de
ex mo" r^connf^ 5^ Partimiento de Yndios Por El
r^^ 1 ^' f ^ Monclova Virrey Governador Y Capp.an
^/i, no. 12B, 5 fs. (the summary is dated 11. XII. 1692, and
reads
tesSonifae°Lirf=°L"l?:u"i'%^ Declaraciones del
mas Breve ynteligenc^a dl lsJas ^
^"^^
Cavezaf^» ^^^^^a^iones Consta aver treoe
Azogueros que unaH? n^l "fgestad, Y otras de
travajan Por cuyt rrLon f gi^eSus Yndlos a o^^^=" tenido arrendados
consta assi mesmrdr^?rarct°r"'^'""" ""^"^
a cinco Azogueros aue javezas quitadas
an quedado Lda vn^con vna duplicadas Y
Seflos tHntTMLli""° "r""^ ^"^enio cuyos
?nI.o° r a%€ ^ ei-n-^f^f--
?ro^i oV"'"-—^ lun^o-ll^o-de la
doy fee oons^ravlr^Ma^da'do^s: eKc"L'°cla' IT
PqSle--J||n.e-e ^Se^r -
L% vpeTtiel c^-lffde-Y^-i-l
-^T"quedado sin repartimiento
. en el qie tiene
iTMon""^
excelencia el Senor Virr^y Co^de de
Y assrirc;.?°?-'^' rrazones de sLorreferks
^or-nL^ Canillas det neros corregidor y Justicia mayor de esta
Poto^r''^"'^'^'-^^^^"^^ ^ ^^^^ declaraciones en
TnolLi: Hos'lnol^r^^^ ' seiscien?os
More supporting evidence follows as AGI, Charcas 271, no.
92. AGI, Charcas 273, no. 10 (see note 85).
94. AGI, Charcas 273, no. 6 (see note 85).
vr.J^< .^^h ^h^^^^s 271, no. 10, the Oficiales reales dePotosI to the crown, PotosI, 10. XII. 1692, 2 fs.; "Dan g.ta
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haverse suspendido
el Duque de la Pal,
la Moncloba a 34 i]
hallavan con i^Tos de'mlla^^Z^Z''\''"'' ~ ^ntesle an hecho p.ra cobras lo4 representaciones que
embian testiS.o de lo ll^'ln lTol^ resultas, Tque estan entendiendo con 0^^^^^ ordeno executar en en
conseguir." Monclov^TLt^e? to^^^^^"^^ P^^^^AGI, Charcas 271, no. lOA !? ^^^^^ ^^^h inOficiales reales de PotosT frnS ° t° theLima, 29. V. 1692, If The r^?? Monclova,forward, as sho^n by ANB m* Jie^^'ni^^^f ^^^^^ 9°in 1693. ^ ^ ^-^^ no. 5 (see note 89)
, but
Ynforma el estado de la MLf S^ f ^" ^^^'^ oficio. ,For more, AGI, Charcas 273 no I tt'^r V-^"Antonio Ortiz de Otalora, Potok 5 x Velayos toCharcas 273, no. 9 "Mpm a i ' -X.1693, 1 f.,. agI,
endo La Press.a de'chlfS'v ^^^^^^ estan slrvl
las que estan danL f,^: ^ Corregimiento de Potosi, y a "
2 fs? (thi lirff?«o'p:gerinvo?ee°t\f?'^?^'" ^
Velayo-s arrival in Potosi vi JmI^^TT^^ ?^
?aXls\c\^: cL^a^r2?r^ ^?ix??6B6rVso^^,
the crown, pitos^S
.Xl":i??3
, '.f^ ^-fier^de la Mita, y lo dem;:i<^ rmo i ^ Refie e el estado
promptly (see H^lFfl fo°r ANB Tl2*?,Pn^^ °'
97. AGI, Charcas 273, no. 4 Tsep nn-»-o 77^ r.
98. AGI, Charcas 273, no. 10 (see note 85).
99 AGI, Charcas 270, no. 33A (see note 65) for th^Fiscal s comments in Madrid. The material arri;inqi^Spam included AGI, Charcas 273, no. 14, "Los cIcJaues v
has "1694-r ""'^f '?a5^^ fecha (e^vllo^e), 2 fs.; "Sup. c n confirii-lFTiiolucion cuecerca del serv.o personal de los In.os de la mi?a de aqSel
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causa pu.ca
^ que an\^^r.^^^ t' J"^^"^ nat.s y la
by the council of the iLlll fol\h^^ ^^^^ receivedCharcas 273, no. 15, the Grimif ^^^^ °f AGI,Potosi, sin fecha, io fs "Renr^^ azogueros to the crown
planta y repartim to aue !
no ynnobe, ni altere la
enlorespectibo a'la Mita l^?o no^"^ ^^^^^ ^^l^tacon mas conocim.to y pJena aberC^°''^ ^ ^^^^^^^
a podido tener el Conde de ?a Mnn^?oi°'' '^^ motibos quedispuesto por su anteclso'r^ ll T.llTnL fo^Lfc^^^^e^S
de'?694
'''Busquense\^^^; Tos ' 1 ''I "^^^'^ ^ ^ de Ab.lVir?i7-y del Duque de la PaJL?^"^;, ^ ^"^^^^^^ del-Arzobpo.de Charcas D. Bart ml con^ \ f^^^^^^' Y del Pres.te
Potosi D P.o Luis henrr?a s /?eT^^^^ correx.r de
Mittas de Potosi Tiu.t^ f: reintegrac.n de la
Indies c,%'Telok loT.r.ToTe LTur^"el Virrev Dua e rie i= d = iT I ^ ®" ™°' ^ °tro ejecuto
(-bricado,
. Th'islrthI- entire docS^ieL:''"^
^"
d^ugueros to the crown
, sin fprh;:! 9 -Fo "o^^t •
conde de la Monclova virfif Hff;.^ f^b^raza^'L'^^^^^Lf
y forma de Mita para las labores de la ribera de aauel
TeT. Pai^tf :o?°^e^^^^° ^^^^^ ^
" hLo'^efDuque
vL d !n 1 ' -^J ^^^^ suspenson es interesadoVMg a e los qumtos, Suppa a VMg.d se sirva de mandar queen el interim que se Justifica su racon y la del Conde se
M dispuesto por El Duque de la Palata"? andb) AGI, Charcas 273, no. 17B, the Deputies of the iremiode azogueros to the crown, sin fecha, 2 fs. See, also'AGI, Charcas 273, no. 15 (see note 99)
.
i^rr^^nu
the minutes of the Council's deliberations,AGI, Charcas 273, no. 19B, 18.1.1697, 2 fs.:
5
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continue la mlta qe el mdi. e
travajo y los de ida y Vuelta sefn • f ^^^^Voluntarios y tamn en el ?ravaio v ^^^^^^ ^ los Indiesla vltima Providencia dada or^ capitulos detar reduciendo y arJeg^ando'^cad^'''''^''^ ^^^^uSer de mas alivio y convenLn^fS T^^^ P^edaque qdo esten enfeLos Ie ^es asista v%^"^'°^cuydado, Se guarden los q^i^f ^ y Cure con todoMinas los delinquentes al ?^ i^''^^ apliquen a lasde los de esta caUdad minor.r^^''"^^^" ^^^e numOSenalen Indios Mitayos T^nl ^ seVso, y qe no Se repl^ta mas tuvieren Minas enProvincias (Iv:) ^ ^i^z y Seis
o?de^\r^e^,^^ ^^^^ las mismas
a ellas los capitulos ?
Guancavelica
, y se adapten
Conde de la Monc^nh° Providencias dadas por elloba
Baraez
. f,^ """I?*^""^ "^t^ Sin diferencia de los
cota Solamte ^ la" leaual oe hf"! Travajo poniendo
se arreglen los f.^To tt ^a^p1Idosf-^'^ '
Bustamte
Solorzano
espana 3 B - qumtales de Azogues
Lo mismo
Camargo
v°i^\'^''^^^ "^^^^ ^^g^ el salario del
respecto de cinco RS Leguas se excuse la miL de if
f^^r^'i^ ^^^^^^ (2:) y las demas qe esLn
de la juntf ^ modif'i^cio^ls
Sierra | Se quite la mita, y si la huviere de haver————
—
sea en los Indios qe estan en Potosi, y lassiete leguas en contorno ^
No se quite y se igualen los salaries Se
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as
extenssion de deniegue ^^^"^ '''''^^ ^^^^^ Y la
ConssO 18 de en^o 1^:0-711 .
The search fHr I cLprMfie if^lsfl/^^^" document.,Charcas 273, no. 21 (the Cnni^<?. '^^^^'^ibed in AGI,Chapter 11); and Holmes 56-5? ? sunmary-see note 91,given his anti-mita observations in AGI "rf"33A (see note 65T7"the Pi q^^t" ' Charcas 270, no.
abolition: AGI
, charcas 2?f strongly in favor ofthe envelope),
"Respy^rdel s ''^""^Pap.s tocantes a los r&J^r-t^l'tnl^^^ "^^^ta de los
numoracion Gen.l qui dt^tllo^'tt '^'"^ ^i^^' Yquales algunos an estado en nJ i""? ^^^^^ 1°^del Ror clballos? y asfser/hf^'' ^^1^^^' ^ otrosde entregar. y si su IM^f^ere s.f-f^'^^^ a q.n ^e annuebo," Madrid, 18.iv 1696 f ^i'^^ encomenderlos dede Tobar, and his option Is a cind?^ f^^^^^ ^^teo
abolitionist sentiments of fhf ^^^^^^^^tion of the« T:ime t e previous thirty years.
103. AGI, Charcas 273. no 1 Qr »-d^.p
en los doce puntos," sin fecha, 2 fsf^ ^
prevensiones
"reser^ Is
- si han de correr las retasasSi i©s se han de guitar de las 16Provmcias las qe estan distantes.Se conserven por ahora en la mismaconformd qe lo dispuso MonclobaSi han de correr en los forasteros,
do ? S excluyda con el punto 2q.4Q - sobre las Seis Provincias nuevamte
atfectas excluydo
52 - como se han de Volber a numerar losi^dios, como lo dice Moncloba.
7o
~
c? f^^''^^^^ 1^ Septima como viene./2 - Si los Yndios han de tener dos SemsSe confirma.
(iv:) sa
- Si han de Ser 50, o, 49 Ind^ pra
cada cabeza de Yngenios Sean 40 y Sipor accte de Cesar Mina el nrnnero delos 4 0 Se repartan con igualdad enlas demas.
9S Si convendrian las revissitas Corra
y q se haga de executar Sea con
acuerdo del Govno Superior y ha dedar qta dellas qe despachaze.
10 Augmto de Salaries con el Voto
11 faltriquera y con las prevenciones de
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Guancavelica
12 Leguage a 4 leguas Por dia
y mitad de Jornal.
Se conste'^e ellovno^Se'-pI^osffunae '^ = 'Provission de SMcd no ^ '^^
las futuras volvienSo iL canftl'^ ^ ''"^ S"^^" '^"'^^^
ejempXo correspte "i Se?vo pSrae tfi' °' "t'^"futura " ^TK-!^ • ^^^^^ ^ orqfci se les concedio la
The Council nf l^t r'-^-^^l ^^^^^^ document.)xn c o the Indies' summary (agi, Charcas 07^ „^21—see note 91, Chapter II) li^-t-l it^^ ^n 273, no.
resultant nine points are TLt,^^^ decisions; and the
sources Included^ii'^^^e'lOS; illlt^/'
'
see note 91, Chapter II) . '
^narcas 273, no. 21—
Charc^s 27l' nn^""??? ^"^^ ^^^^ 103); AGI,t-narca 3, o. 23A, the crown to the Vicerov and th^Audiencia de Lima, Madrid, 18. II. 1697? 14ls^ "Srdenan
d^'p".^°.^^^ executar en el repartim!to de ?a Mlta
tcT r^^^' ^ 3^?
q.ta de lo que en ello obraren".
ps^; ^^^f^^^ 2^^' 24, "Informe de el Correg?do? ; off sRS de Potosi sobre los 9 puntos en alibio de los Indies
Z tli^" t comprehende la Cedula de 18 de ?eb o
2I "lAfor^^T'i'-I'^-i'''' ' Charcas 27^, no!
^n'.i?K^ Charcas sobre Los nuebe puntosen alibio de los Indies mitayos de Potosi que Comprehende
1698, 10 fs.; AGI, Charcas 273, no. 26, "Informe de elArcobispo de la Plata sobre los 9 puntis en alTbio de los
Z f'l?.o^ rct.'^t comprehende La cedula de 18de ebo de 1697 " Tomina de la frontera, 3. VII. 1698, 3 fs.;AGI, Charcas 273 no. 29, the Oficiales reales de Potosi tothe crown, Potosi, 14. IV. 1699, 1 f., "Avisan del R,vo de lacedula que se embio tocante a la forma en que se havia dehacer el repartim,to de la Mita de Potosi y paga de losJornales y dice obserbaran lo mandado segun las ordenes ylas que les diese el Virrey y que hasta la fecha no lo haviadetermmado y que luego que llegase darian el devido
cumplim,to. BNB, MSS 4, fs . 156-157, "Cedula real al
corregidor de Potosi: Lo que se ha de observar para elbienestar de los indios y la marcha regular de las labores
y el beneficio de minas e ingenios en la aplicaci6n del
nuevo orden adoptado para el regimen de la mita de esta
villa," Madrid, 18.11.1697 (MC 1138; MOM 691); BNB, MSS 4,f. 155, "Cgdula real a los oficiales reales de Potosi: Que
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orden adoptado para el rgaim^n ""^^"^^^^ ^^^tro del nuev
cover letter from the crown +-A 4-^ ^ ^ °^ 18.11.1697
I believe, AGI, Charcas 27^, no! !7?Tl.f ^---^ov. is
Con
.
occasion de este Aviso remito S v F
excuse el .nandaLe DS ge a v I "s^^s^c^:!^ I"^- "° .a 18 de febrero de 1697" "^^^^"^ "
ta or Monclova.
M 126, no
Los
a de
de
nuevo
^^m;^^^ ^r,^""7
"^"^-^ vxirey conae de la Monclova,"
tfiqf r^H
24. III-?. 1693, 6 fs. (MC 1113; MOM
a wix ieal.^ °' Audiencia's ruling is obscured by
108. ANB, M 126, no. 12, "Alonso Chui, Pascual Pareiava
lult^^ S^""?'^ ^ ""^^^^^ originarios de^ '
'
Martin ChJf^''^' provincia de Asangaro , sobre que don
de ^J^n^^il?^^' ^^P^^^^ enterador de la mita del pueblo
mL^o ' provmcia de Paria, los a traido indebida
Ti^/^^'Y''.^'' "^^^^ consideraci6n a
"
^M.^ fi^f forasteros," Paria, 10-12 .XII . 1698 , 6 fs.(MC 1146; MOM 693).
109. For the investigation undertaken by Phillip v inthe late 1720s and early 1730s, see Ezquerra Abadla's
article. Two works he employs are: a) "Juicio, que sobre
ei aumento, conservaci6n o extinci6n del servicio personalde la Mita q. embian las Provincias de Cochabamba, Chaianta,
AjIu;,''S?Schar^icas?cr'Tin^ Azangaro,
Chucuito y Omasuyo/nara 1^ ^ ; ^^^5^^, Pacajes,
y sus Viveras, hac^ e^ Lizdo nn"" t^^ ""j^^^^^ ^^to^IGarcia, Fiscal de la Rl AnS.'. : ^2^^?^ Casimiro G6mez
Plata, 30. VII 1730 r^iA Audiencia de las Charcas," La
Biblioteca Nacional \S '"Soblr/T'^' ^'225,
y exclusi6n de Sangleyes de Phn? ^ P°tosIYgnacio Antonio del CastilTn n ^^^""5^ * ^ 'de La Plata, ProviicJ^de lo^ c^f^caf d^ -^-ncia
105 o. t.e sa.e^L^-scr!p??
-g^i.^^elor^^ a\^s^M io^,
CHAPTER VIII
CONCLUSIONS
Alberto Crespo was riah^ m,,y g t. lUs suggestions about the
nature of the mita at Poto^T in t-hiz i^otosl the seventeenth century,
which he advanced in his 195Slybb article, were correct. The
syste™ was not responsible for the demographic decline in
Upper Peru, and the Indians were indeed able to escape
their mlta obligations by fleeing fro. PotosI and from
their home pueblos. Thus, this dissertation is less a
revision or refutation of previous knowledge about the
Eita than it Is the confirmation and expansion of another
historian's thesis.
The implications of this study of the PotosI mita
go beyond our understanding of the system itself, however.
The mita is more than a topic; it is also a tool which can
be used to observe the patterns of Hapsburg government,
and to examine the character of seventeenth century Peru
in general. Certainly mucJi more can be said about PotosI
in the light of this dissertation. m fact, most of the
questions that were raised by D. A. Brading and Harry E.
Cross in 1972 can now be answered.
Let us look first at the three most over-worked queries
actuau,
..u the x„..ans. aia the^ contribute to
the depopulation of the provinces that were subject to
^t? and c) did the systen. cause Indian flight and social
disruption in those provinces-? tv,^inces The answer to all three
were true that is really important. There is little doubt
that some of the Indians who served in the mita at PotosI
died in the mines. Mining is a dangerous occupation, and
miners are killed in the course of their labors. But the
death Of mitaios in the mines at PotosI was not a
Significant demographic phenomenon-because the Indians
did not permit it to be. They could escape from the mlta
too easily for it to have been a direct cause of the
depopulation of the obligated provinces
. The number of
Indians that actually worked in the cerro during the
seventeenth century, moreover, rarely exceeded 2,000. The
mitaxos were only a small fraction of the Indian population
of PotosI, let alone Upper Peru.
The Indians migrated away from their home provinces to
free themselves from mlta service, tribute obligations and
the oppression that they suffered under their corregidores
,
'^^''^'^"^^
^"<3 priests. Many of the Indians moved to areas
that were completely outside the zone of Spanish
colonization. Their abandonment of their pueblos was their
most effective means of opposing their condition. Because
the Indians did not fight back with ar.ed resistance
their opposition to the Spanish invaders was ,uiet and
unspectacular. But we should not consider the. conquered
or portray the. as passive victims. Their flight did
cause the depopulation of the sixteen obligated provinces,
but it was the imposed lifestyle that they abandoned, and
the imposed social order that they disrupted.
The questions of the mit^os. working conditions and
the alta-s responsibility for the demographic decline in
the provinces were not the objects of the seventeenth
century struggle over the system. They were, however,
the rhetorical tools that the provincial interests used
m their battle with the azogueros of PotosI for access
to Indian labor. Those interests accused the azogueros
of abusing the mita^os, and the mita of depopulating the
provinces, with the hope of lowering the quotas that were
required from their regions, or winning the system's
abolition. The a zogueros accused them-the corregidores
caciques
,
priests, chacareros and others-of strangling
the mita and thus of undercutting the production of royal
c[uintos. The battle was not over loyalty to the crown or
the depopulation of the provinces; it was over who would
receive the services of the Indians.
Once the real cause of the seventeenth century debate
has been identified, then the de facto mita can be
examined objectively, and two more of Brading and Cross'
questions
.e answered: a, „H. ai. the PotosI ™,.a
persist until 18i2, while renarti^ i,,,,
~
niines of New ^n^-in /^a PFtidrea during the seventeenth
century, and aia a class of volunteer laborers not
"Place the
^^^^ ^^^^ ^^^^^
GarricK Wilson Holies, P The reason why the aita
continued throughout the seventeenth century was that it
was both a necessary capital subsidy, in service in
Silver, and a ™eans of forcing the Indians to work in
the cerro against their win. ^ 33„ice in silver
provided the azo^ueros with an ability to withstand water
and mercury shortages, deteriorating ore quality and the
crown's refusal to grant the. any new concessions. Mita
service in person was needed because, by the time that
forced labor was required at PotosI in the 1580s, the
mines were deep and the working conditions were appalling.
Thus, the ralta was not replaced by minaa labor because
part of it was service in silver, and the other part
involved work that volunteers refused to do.
Silver production was the sole reason for PotosI 's
existence. The mita was therefore responsible for
supporting the viUa-its convents, its mint, its garrison
and its large population-long after raining and silver
refining there would otherwise have been unprofitable.
The need for forced labor and a capital subsidy both
stemmed, ultimately, from the high cost of living at
Potosl. The Villa.
s geographic isolation and altitude
-ant that provisions were very expensive, and that
volunteer workers required unusually high wages.
Production costs were therefore higher at PotosI than they
were elsewhere. Once fining was no longer profitable
Without the ^ita, PotosI was too important as an economic
and strategic center to permit the abolition of the system
upon which it was so dependent.
The 2ita did not, contrary to what Brading and Cross
suggested, allow silver production at PotosI to soar. The
boom Of the 1570S was caused by a unique co^J^ination of
desmontes, a new amalgamation technology, a large capital
investment on the part of the potosinos and Indian labor,
once the desmontes were exhausted, the boom ended and the
rtiita had to serve as a forced labor system for the first
time. AS it had been designed by Toledo it was unable to
perform its intended function. The de facto mita did,
however, keep the PotosI silver industry in business long
after it would otherwise have collapsed.
A word of caution: PotosI does not represent the
Peruvian norm. It was unique-geographically, geologically
and in many other ways. Comparisons between New Spain and
Peru should not be made on the basis of PotosI. Rather,
those scholars who are looking for centers to compare with
Guanajuato, Zacatecas or San Luis PotosI should turn their
attention to Oruro, Puno, San Antonio de Esquilache, Castro
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Virreyna, Porco and other Peruvian
.inlng areas.
This dissertation also holds so^e Implications for the
theoretical model presented by John Leddy Phelan in his
I960 article,
"Authority and Flexibility in the Spanish
Imperial Bureaucracy." while a thorough discussion of the
relationship between the model and the specific case of
the Hapsburg administration of the mita wo„i^i-iie uld require more
than the few pages allotted here, l would like to offer
some tentative observations, with the promise that they
will be developed more fully elsewhere.
central to the Phelan model is the contention that the
crown employed contradictory and mutually exclusive orders
to maintain its authority over the colonial bureaucracy in
America. The example he used in the "Authority and
Flexibility" article was that of the Indian labor question
in Mexico at the end of the sixteenth century. Phelan
argued that the crown's incompatible orders for the
protection of the Indians and for the promotion of mineral
production were two such mutually exclusive orders. The
official who received them, he said, was therefore compelled
to determine what the true intentions of his sovereign were,
and to enforce the orders to the extent that he believed
they were applicable.
The local government official was therefore afforded
a degree of flexibility by the crown to shape government
policy to local circumstances, but he remained subject to
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«vie„-by vlsltadores, other government officials whose
.ur.sdiotions overlapped with his and ultimately by the
-Si^encia conducted at the end of his tenure-fro. above
Because he was unable to comply with all of his orders
Phelan noted, he regained vulnerable to dismissal or some
other form of reprimand,
' and thus he remained attentive
to the wishes of the crown.
The crown's cSdulas were, in Hegelian terms, the
thesis, and the official's response to them was the
antithesis; the government policy that resulted from their
exchange was, therefore, the synthesis. Phelan said that
the continual thesis-antithesis interchange did more than
maintain the crown's authority, that it also created a
bureaucracy that was very conservative and very unreceptive
to new ideas or reforms.
certainly the 130 years of Hapsburg administration of
the mita described in this dissertation have provided many
examples of the bureaucratic processes that are outlined
in the Phelan model. But there are also two or three areas
where I believe the model might be modified. Again, my
suggestions are speculative and tentative.
The incompatibility of the crown's orders had another
purpose, which is not necessarily inconsistent with the
one identified by Phelan. The simultaneous orders for the
protection of the Indians and for the expansion of mineral
production were also used, in the case of Peru, to advance
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the „ow„.s position vis-a-vis local interest groups. Xnh.s later work. The Kinados of Quito in the Seventeenth
^Sntus^ (1967)
,
Phelan argued that the bureai;^;:;;^
the local elite in i^erica-that there was no equivalent
to the medieval nobility that the crown had to contend
With for supremacy, save for the bureaucrats themselves
in the jurisdiction of the Audiencia de Charcas, that was
"°t so. The encomenderos (whom he dismisses in the case
Of Quito) and the
_azogueros_ were very much like the
independent-minded nobility of medieval Europe, especially
with regard to protecting their privileges.
The crown had created these American "nobles" in the
course of its efforts to expand its Empire and to
increase the economic benefits that it received from the
colonization of America, in order to colonize the Indies,
for example, the Catholic Kings had to rely upon a "conquer
now, pay later" formula, whereby prominent conguistadores
received encomiendas in exchange for their service to the
crown. The struggle between the crown and the encomenderos
that followed, during the sixteenth century, was not a
struggle for justice, but the crown's effort to regain the
ground that it had conceded to the encomenderos
—to
'
reassert the authority that it had lost with the granting
of the earlier concessions.
In the case of PotosI and the mita
, the crown had
temporarily lost sight of its priorities. In a moment of
enthusiasm over the in<-T-o = o^^T:n creased production of silver at
Potosi during the 1570s, the crown dropped its long-held
opposition to forced Indian labor in the ™ines and
consented to the establishment of the mita. As a result
it conceded privileges to another group of colonists: the
^Hoaueros. They received mitayos i^^unity from
imprisomnent for debts and other rights from Viceroy
Francisco de Toledo in exchange for their capital
investment in new amalgamation processing mills. As with
the encomenderos, the government had to grant the
Moaueros concessions to win their cooperation. Unlike
the encomienda, however, the mita was part of a
partnership between the crown and the azogueros for the
future. They would share the benefits of mita labor in
the form of Potosi silver. The crown controlled mercury
and the administration of th(= mi4-aC11.J.UI1 ui Tine t
. The azogueros owned
the mills and the mines.
Once the crown had confirmed Toledo's agreement with
the azogueros
.
in 1589, it began to learn that the mita
was not working as Toledo had said that it would. As the
silver boom at Potosi faded, the azogueros began to turn
the system to their advantage, by renting or selling the
Indians that were assigned to them, and later by
encouraging the appearance of the mita service in silver.
The struggle that developed between the crown and the
azogueros during the seventeenth century was a dispute
between partners over one's abuse of th. .o t e agreement between
them.
The crown struck back against both the enco^enderos
and the azoaueros with its 1601 cSdula b.nnl^^^l^^
personal service for the former and abolishing the ^ita.
The cMula was adamant and couched in absolute ter„s to
permit the Viceroy, Luis de Velasco, to employ it as
leverage over the coloniQ^c t*.sts. It may have been meant to
push him toward action, but it was primarily designed for
employment against the local "nobility." The terms of
the order clearly show that the crown's motivation was to
limit individuals' access to Indian labor while preserving
those forms of forced labor from which it benefited; and
the inclusion of a chapter empowering the Viceroy to alter
the edict as he deemed necessary demonstrates that it was
not meant to move him alone.
The crown held the ultimate trump card with regard to
the mita: its possible abolition. But because the crown
was interested in silver production at Potosi, and the
continued existence of the villa for fiscal and military
purposes, that weapon was essentially useless. The
abolition of the mita would have to be an act of last
recourse; when the benefits of the mita were no longer
worth the costs. The azogueros
, in turn, held the cerro
and the mills hostage, and they could use violence to
prevent any serious attempt to reform the de facto mita.
it was the a^oaueros who were reaUy In control at
PotosI
.
The crown had to rely upon its viceroys in Ll„a to
fight its battles for it, because its geographical and
temporal isolation in Spain prevented it fro. having any
direct role in the administration of the aita. The
viceroys were scarcely „ore effective than the crown
however, in controlling the behavior of the azogueros
They were hampered, in part, by the failure of the crown
to concede them sufficient authority. As Phelan noted,
there actually were two centers of authority, one in Lima
and one in Madrid. The orders that were issued by these
two centers were often contradictory and often served to
neutralize one another.
The viceroys' effectiveness was also hurt by their
'
own reliance upon "government by proxy" mechanisms, and
the division Of responsibility for the mita among various
government officials in Charcas. That division was
designed to prevent their subversion by the azogueros
, and
to ensure a steady flow of information to Lima and Madrid.
The battles that were waged between the Audiencia de
Charcas and viceregal officials in Lima, between the
Audiencia and the corregidores de PotosI, between the
presidents of Charcas and the corregidores de PotosI, and
between everyone and any visitador who arrived in Charcas
prevented those officials from performing the duties that
were assigned to them.
Perhaps the ™ost important reason why the government
could not respond to the development of the de facto ™ita
the refusal of the two centers of authority to assume
responsibility for important decisions, indeed, if there
is a central reason why the Hapsburg government was not as
effective as it might have been-within the limits of its
power-it is that nobody would assume responsibility. The
Viceroys, for example, employed a myriad of bureaucratic
delaying tactics when they feared that their execution of
the council of the Indies
• two-part program would cause
Silver production at Potosl to fall, and they would be
blamed. Then, when the Conde de Lemos proposed that the
Hita be abolished, the Council tried to pass the
responsibility for the decision to the Queen, and later
returned it to the viceregal office with the Conde de
Castellar.
To sum, the Phelan model seems to need expansion to
include the American "nobility" among those that strong,
and often incompatible, orders were meant to control. It
also needs to take into account, therefore, the relative
power lessness of the crown vis-a-vis its own colonists.
Finally, the miniature versions of the system described
by the model, which were used by the viceroys to direct
their subordinates, require closer inspection as well.
One more observation: the degree of control that was
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exercised over the Indians by the azoaueros, the
^oWores and the caciques has been overestimated, xhe
P-itio„ o. the ,,0^
^^^^^
-Oh the same as that between the crown and themselves
The a^oaueros. use of the caciques was also a parallel to
the crown.s use of its bureaucrats to keep some se^lance
Of control over the colonists. The azoaueros appear to
have been more successful in their employment of the
S£iaH£s, because their means of coercion were more
effective: at first financial penalties and later
physical torture.
The azoaueros. need to resort to the physical abuse of
the caci^ demonstrates, however, the effectiveness of
the Indians in evading their mita responsibilities. The
-2£ueros exercised a degree of control over the Indians
via the caci^Q^; the crown exercised a degree of control
over the azoaueros via its bureaucrats; and the viceroys
and the crown exercised a degree of control over the
bureaucracy with their orders. When the Indians migrated
away from their provinces, however, the azogueros and the
government were forced to adapt to their action. it was
the Indians, therefore, who were ultimately in control.
It is time for a few questions of my own, most of
which I would have liked to have answered in this study
but could not. First, I wonder what Indian labor was
like at other mining centers in Peru. What were the
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wor.i„, conaitions U.eP How ™uch „e.e the Xn.ians pa.a.
D.d they exercise any direct control over productionP
second, I am curious who the original a.ogueros were
and how their ranks changed over time. How often did thi
™llls Change hands, why were the Basgues such a prominent
group by the 1620s?
Third, What was the economic role of PotosI in the
seventeenth century? was it the force that had helped to
create support industries and economic enterprises in the
sixteenth century, and then was supported by them during
the 1600s, Via service In silver? Was PotosI a drain on
the capital that was produced elsewhere in the realm in
the seventeenth century?
Fourth, why did the cacicues continue to meet the
demands of the azogueros? Were they all
, like PernSndez
Guarache, too heavily involved in personal enterprises of
their own to leave their provinces and escape from service
as capitanes enteradores ?
Fifth, why did the chacareros and the estancieros not
figure more prominently in the documentation on the
Potosi mita? The complaints about the 1689 repartimiento
and reforms were written by the caciques
, corregidores and
priests. Did the hacendados leave the complaining to
them?
The answers to these questions, and many of the
details about the seventeenth century mita, are to be
found in the local archives of Bolivia, Argentina and
Peru (I know that the documentation exists for Oruro and
Cochaba„*a) and In the wealth of material tucked away In
the Archive de Indias.
Answers will also come from careful work with the
vast amount of quantitative material that is available on
the Potosi mlta. The analysis of visitas, testimonies,
rgfiartimientos and similar materials should^l^^I^to
determine, for example, the profit ratios of the azocueros
.
and it should allow more definitive statements about the
uses to which the mitai^os-in silver and in person-were
put.
It is my sincere hope that this dissertation has
provided the framework, the frame of reference, that will
permit more specific work to be done. There will, no
doubt, be many instances where I have erred. But even in
the role of a stalking horse, I expect that this study
will be useful to others.
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APPENDIX I
GLOSSARY
^ meeting of the Audiencia for thepurpose of counseling the viceroy
on a question of major Import; also
called an Acuerdo consultivo.
alcabalas sales taxes.
alcalde mayor
de minas
.... magistrate charged with mining
matters.
altiplano
..... high plain; the large flat plainbetween the ridges of the Andes.
^^^^^ Indian who worked in the mines,
carrying ore out of them.
Audiencia High Court of Appeals within a
geographic area, composed of a
president and oidores (judges)
.
That in Lima was chaired by the
viceroy
.
aviadores moneylenders.
^y^^^ clan group of Indians, based on a
common ancestor (often legendary)
,
with economic, social and political
functions
.
azogueros owners of amalgamation mills (from
azogue—mercury), and mines.
barreteros .... workers who stripped ore from the
walls of the mines with iron bars;
usually well-paid mingas .
Cabildo town council.
cacicazgo a position as an Indian noble (cacique )
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''^''^'i'^^ Indian nobleman; natural lord.
''^^''^^ the right of mitayos to work in the
ui??? Saturday evening
profit ^
"^o^ning, for their own
capitan de la
""""^^ also ca^itSn enterador: an Indian,
usually a cacique
, responsible fordelivering a contingent of mitayos toPotosl. A capitan general de la mita
was responsible for those f?3m~in
entire province. Toledo provided forfour "capitanes de la mita" to oversee
work at Potosl.
CapitSn mayor
de la mita
. . .
official, apparently subordinate to
the Corregidor de PotosI, responsible
for overseeing the delivery and
assignment of mitayos to azogueros
.
carta cuenta
. . . documented and armed shipment of
silver from Potosi.
cedula royal edict.
mountain; hill—especially the mountain
of Potosi.
chScara farm; agricultural enterprise (modern
chacra)
.
chacarero owner of a chacara.
^h^^h^ alcoholic drink made from fermented
corn
.
^h^^o freeze-dried potatoes.
a plant, the source of cocaine, from
which leaves are taken, dried and
chewed as a stimulant.
conquistadores
. . conquerors.
Consulado a self-governing guild, which is
empowered to settle disputes within
its own membership.
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consulta
corregidor
consultation; debate.
fortafrnf^''^^^' responsible
DSsticS^'^tc ^^-^-^t-tion Of
comptroller.
dejacion abandonment; surrendering.
^"'"""""^
Ill f-^ not refined, because ofts low quality, and placed in slag
neaps
.
^
"^^^^""^ one-tenth; a royal share of mineralproduction equal to 10 per cent.
encomenderos
. . . recipients of encomienda grants.
encomienda
.... grant, temporary, of the right to
collect royal tribute from vassals
withm a distinct geographic region.
The encomendero was responsible for
protecting the Indians under hisjurisdiction, as well as providing
for their religious instruction.
delivery; compliance. Really no good
translation. The entero de la mita
referred to the degree to which"!
province complied with its mita
obligation; and to the total delivery
of mitayos
. Enterar was the verb.
The entero en persona was the number
of Indians delivered in persons; and
the entero en plata was that which
arrived in Potosl in the form of silver
escrivano notary.
estancia ranch; livestock operation.
estanciero .... owners of an estancia
.
extractos extracts.
fiscal official of the Audiencia or the
Council of the Indies responsible for
guarding the crown's interests,
especially vis-a-vis royal revenue.
I
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forasteros
.... "foreigners"; outsiders; the Indianswho were absent from their original
villages, and often resident in others
^^^^^so disaster.
^^^^"^
l^l^^^^^^ P°tosI where the Indianstraded in unmarked and raw silver.
gobernador
.... governor of a village, usually a
cacique
.
^fjits of currency, small fractions ofthe circulating, un-assayed peso; theterm was used at Potosi to idiHtifythe mitayos ' contribution of one-half£eso per week each to pay the veedores
and alcalde mayor de minas.
Gremio de
azogueros
.... mine/mill owners guild at Potosi.
"^^^y^^ small wind-using oven employed to
refine the highest-quality silver ore
at Potosi; the dominant technology
before amalgamation was introduced.
hacendado owners of a landed estate.
hanasaya one of two parts of a village, each
called a parcialidad and composed of
members of one or more ayllus
. The
other parcialidad was hurinsaya
.
hatunruna rural Indian who paid his tribute in
labor
.
indios de
faltriquera
. . . "pocket Indians"; those mitayos that
were delivered in silver, ostensibly
to hire substitute laborers, and used
instead to cover production costs and
the azogueros ' personal expenses.
informaciones
. . . bodies of testimony on a specific set
of questions; usually used to document
a legal case presented in a petition,
report, etc.
informe an individual's report on an issue.
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jornal
. .
.
,
daily wage.
laguna
^ reservoir; lake.
lamas
. . ±.u^
processlnf °' amalgamation
InTslltaV. <=°™P°-"e of mercury
"""P""^ °f documentation in an archive,
leguas
. . ^
,
'
' ' lul allowances paid according tothe number of leagues (literally
1|2H||) traveled per day to and from
limefio
. r^^^-j-^j jpertaining to Lima; resident of Lima.
mayordomo
. . . ovf»r<;*^«r-
.
•
. .
e see ; foreman.
mazo
. . e.^--,^ Jstamping mechanism in a refining mill.
"'^"'^''^^^ personal account, report; espeically
of one's tenure in office. Also, anaccount of historical nature.
mercaderes
de Plata .... silver merchants.
"^^^^yos who were required to work ontheir weeks of "rest" in the repair
of the reservoirs and in other public
works; later sent into the mines andto the mills.
""^^^^^^ half-breed: half-Indian; half-Spaniard.
"'Stales raw ore.
^^"^"ja free, volunteer, Indian laborer.
^^^^ turn, time of service, or system ofdraft labor in turns.
mita gruesa .... total number of Indians required to
come to PotosI each year to serve in
the mita
.
mita ordinaria
. .
weekly number of mitayos ; one-third
of the mita gruesa (by design^
.
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mitayo
. . tt,^,- ^
^ Indian serving in the mita.
"^ontdn pilg^
""""^^^^ half-breed: half
-Spaniard; half-Black.
nervio principal
.
principal nerve;
.est important organ.
factory; textile shop.
one-eighth; royal share of mineralproduction at 12-1/2 per cent.
judge on an Audiencia; "hearer."
originario
.... mdian living in his original
village.
P^'^^^^ census; population tally.
parcialidad
.... half of a village; see hanansaya
.
parroquia parish; neighborhood; each provinceinvolved in the Potosi mita had its
own parroquia in the viTTaT
coins; units of currency.
suits; litigation; complaints.
"pocket Indian"
. . see indio de faltriquera
.
Indian overseer; taskmaster.
potosino pertaining to Potosi; resident of
Potosi
.
procurador .... attorney; legal representative.
protector protector; official assigned the duty
of advocating the Indians' position.
quebrado broken.
quintal unit of weight used for mercury and
ore
.
quinto one-fifth; royal share (quinto real )
of production at 20 per cent of
mineral output.
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rancheria small settlement; also a synonym forRarrocTuIa in the potosino context!
reales
roq-
units ofiixuis r currenrv #=rrnai 4-^ . ,
r,f ^„ ^
^-Litincy equal to one-eiqhthof an assayed peso. ^
Recopilaci6n de
las leyes
.
.
reducci6n
relaci6n
relator
repartimiento
•
. .
recompilation of laws.
.
. .
small pueblo to which Indians havebeen brought for resettlement; also
and ^f???^^ ""^^^^ ^^^^ ^^^^ gatheredsettled. A reductor was the onewho conducted the process. A reduccion2|n|ial was a comprehensive resettlemiHtetfort in a large geographical area.
.
.
report; summary; overview.
.
.
official responsible for writing brief
summaries of material on a given
subject ( relaciones )
.
. .
assignment of Indians to work in an
enterprise; the group of Indians so
assigned. A repartimiento de la mita
was the distribution of Indians"toindividual miners, soldados and
azoqueros
.
rescates the bying and selling of raw silver
in the ghatu plaza at Potosl.
revisita re-inspection; re-count of the
population in an area.
rezagos debts owed for failure to pay tribute
in earlier years; rezagos de mita were
the debts owed by caciques because they
had not met their quotas of mitayos in
previous years.
sacadores
soldados
Indian collectors used by the azoqueros
to qather money for service in silver
from the caciques
.
Spaniards who had served in a military
campaign, but who had not been rewarded
with an encomienda grant.
502
tacana
tarea
. .
testimonio
tindaruna
tomines
veedores
vicuna
•
. . .
extremely rich ore.
.... quota; daily task.
.... notarized copies of documents usedto buttress a legal case, petition,government report, etc.
.... Indian who was compelled to report to
a central location for hiring.
.... units of currency; parts of the commonpeso
.
.... officials charged with monitoring
work inside the cerro at Potosl.
.... animal, camelid, native to Peru and
Bolivia. The Vicunas were an alliance
of non-Basque Spaniards and Creoles
involved in the "civil war" at Potoslduring the 1620s.
.... usually a village, but used in
connection with Potosi because it was
known as the Villa Imperial after
purchasing that title from the crown
in the sixteenth century.
visita inspection.
visitador an outside official sent to inspect
a particular area, group, official or
institution.
yanacona Indian who was spared mita obligation
by Toledo, but who had to pay tribute
each year. Yanaconas were originally
tradesmen who were displaced by the
conquest, but the term was later used
for Indians who were assigned to
agricultural enterprises by Toledo,
their descendents, and other Indians
who adopted the name to escape mita
service and other obligations.
villa
yungas lowlands, on the eastern slope of the
Andes
.
zambaigo half-breed: half-Indian, half-Black.
APPENDIX II
VICEROYS OF PERU, 1544-1705
Blasco Nunez Vela assumed office on Mav 17 i^aa ^died on January 1, 1546. ^ ' ^ ^^
Antonio de Mendoza assumed office on November 121551 and died on July 21, 1552.
^^"^emo iz,
"""offLfon'june%f"f???' ^""^"^^ ^--^e, assumedOffice June 29, 1556 and died on September 14,
Diego L6pez de ZQniga y Velasco, Conde de Nieva
?Ibr^LVl'9'^1564/^^^^^^^ '''' ^^^^ -
'^l?69'\^Sd1e??^rorMaTi;i5^r '
Martin Enrlquez de Almansa assumed office on May 4liJbi and left it on March 12, 1583.
Fernando de Torres y Portugal, Conde de Villar,
assumed office on November 21, 1585 and left it
on January 6, 1590.
Garcia Hurtado de Mendoza, Marques de Cafiete,
assumed office on January 6, 1590 and left it onApril 4, 1596.
Luis de Velasco assumed office on June 23, 1596
and left it on December 8, 1604.
Caspar de Zuniga y Acevedo, Conde de Monterrey,
assumed office on December 8, 1604 and died on
February 10, 1606.
The Audiencia de Lima served as interim head of
government from February 10, 16 06 to December
21, 1607.
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It on December 18, 1615.
December 31, 1621. -^"j-j ana lert it
Diego Fernandez de CSrdoba, Marques de GuRri;.inS.^assumed office on July 25, lllTlnTllTt lt tn
'
January 14, 1629. ^ °^
Luis Geronimo Fernandez de Cabrera y Bobadillaconde de Chinch6n, assumed office on January'l41629 and left it on December 18, 1639.
Pedro de Toledo y Leiva, Marques de Mancera
assumed office on December 18, 1639 and left iton September 20, 1648.
Garcia Sarmiento de Sotomayor, Conde de Salvatierra,assumed office on September 20, 1648 and left iton February 24, 1655.
Luis Enrlquez de Guzman, Conde de Alba de Aliste
assumed office on February 24, 1655 and left it
on July 30, 1661.
Diego de Benavides y de la Cueva, Conde de
Santisteban, assumed office on July 30, 1661
and died on March 17, 1666.
The Audiencia de Lima served as interim head ofgovernment from March 17, 1666 to November 21,166 7,
Pedro Fernandez de Castro, Conde de Lemos, assumed
office on November 21, 1667 and died on December
6, 1672.
The Audiencia de Lima served as interim head of
government from December 6, 1672 to August 15.
1674. ^
Baltasar de la Cueva Enriquez
, Conde de Castellar,
assumed office on August 15, 1674 and left it
on July 7, 1678.
21. Melchor de LiMn y Cisneros assumed office on Julv1, 1678 and left it on November 7, 168l! ^
22. Melchor de Navarra y RocafuU, Duque de la Palataassumed office on November 1, 16 and left ?t'on August 15, 1689.
23. Melchor Portocarrero Lasso de la Vega, Conde dela Monclova, assumed office on August 1? 1689and died on September 24, 1705.
Source: Lewis Hanke and Celso Rodriguez, eds
.
, Los
virreyes_ espanoles en America durante el
—
gobierno de la Casa de Austr£a7"^ibnot^cade Autores Espanoles, nos. 273-277, 280-286
' Ediciones Atlas, 1978-19 80) •
APPENDIX III
MAPS
NOTE:
iier. iires de Divers Autheurs et de diverse^c; R^^i^-t-.-^r,^Par N Sanson d Abbeville Geogr ord?? du Roy A ParJsChez Pierre Mariette Rue S lacque a l'Esper;nce Aveca*Privilege du Roy pour vingt Ans 1656 " ri ? r^^ \ •
survey Library NoT 10601, 'fror^he L^p^Division ofSe'""'Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.Each of the maps in the series of five is an
dSt^efTSes?" P^-vlous one (marked in
Upper PeJu " 5^
boundaries on Map 3, "Provinces, of
tentative
Crespo, and should be considered
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MAP 2
PRINCIPAL CITIES OF
HAPSBURG PERU
Lima (Los Reyes)
• Huancavelica
Chincha
Cuzco
(Map 3)
La PazArequipa
Cochabamba
• Oruro
La'^Plata (
PotosI •
Porco •
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D
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• CUZCO
Acos
Yanaoca
Tinta
Sicuani
Nufioa
• Pichiqua '• Asillo
Omachiri • • Ayaviri
' Yauri jPucara •\ • Azangaro
/ Huancane •
Nicasio • \ * Taraco / ^°coinoco
• Moho
Capachica
Cavanilla •
Cavana
• Chuma
• Ainbana
•^Juliaca ^—• Carabuco
Puno • S ^sSorata'
-Acora •( Ancoraimesy \
MAP 4
CITIES AND PUEBLOS OF
NORTHWESTERN UPPER PERU
\ Copacabana^» Achacache
Julii-^ • • \ \« Huarina
Pomata-^ / i ^
Yunguyo - /P^carani
• Zepitan_LA PAZ
Guaqui *
Jesus de Machaca •
/
Caquiavire
Santiago de Machaca •
Cohoni •
• Viacha
I
Ayo-Ayo •
\
Caquingora
\
Callapa
Ullomo •
Huayllamarca
Carahuaca
Turco •
Choquecota
Colquemarca
Sabaya •
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Sapahaqui
» Luribay
Sica-Sica
Capinata
Quillacollo i
COCHABAMBA
• Sacaba
' Paria
ORURO
• Sipesipe
Tapacari • P^^ata
Capinota • • Tarata
• Arque
Tolgdo
\
•
• Corque
Andamarca
• Acasio
Sacaca
Pocona
Poopo
Chayanta
• Totora
• Mizque
• Tin-Tin
San Pedro • Aiquile
Moscari
Callapata
^"^Macha
Mo jocoya
LA PLATA/ •
/ • / •
— Yotala •
Tinquipaya
Presto
Tarabuco
Tomina <
Corona ^O^JSI
Tolapampa
Tomave
• Yura
Porco
MAP 5
CITIES AND PUEBLOS OF
SOUTHEASTERN UPPER PERU
» Calcha
Toropalca
• Cotagaita
Santa
Elena
Pilaya
Tari ja

